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chapter 1
Introduction –Marx’s Critique of Fetishism as
Method
Cryptocategories of Marxism: Exchange value is the most well-
known.To cryptologically uncover the hidden categorical determin-
ations of existence is not to reveal ametaphysical essence, but rather
the ‘surface’ of things, their appearance itself.
hans-jürgen krahl (1971)1
…
… in the capitalist process, every element, even the simplest, the
commodity for example, is already an inversion …
karl marx (1861–3 Economic Manuscripts)2
∵
This book wants to put the critique of the ‘fetishism of the bourgeois rela-
tions of production’ back into the Critique of Political Economy.3 Its aim is to
demonstrate that the disavowal of the critique of fetishism strips the Marxian
project of its critical core, its raison d’être. Disavowing, disregarding, or even
rejectingMarx’s critique of fetishism, as wewill show, resorts to the framework
of classical and neoclassical bourgeois ‘economics’ which no longer offers an
incentive to change or question the capitalist mode of production as a histor-
ically specific society. This book, however, precisely sees itself as a theoretical
contribution to the overcoming of the capitalist predicament, and therefore
as an intervention against the obliviousness to the problem of fetishism. To
pursue this task, we will highlight the pivotal role of Marx’s critique of the
fetish-characteristic forms of value, or the value forms, as the key method for
1 Krahl 1971, p. 84. Footnote. Many thanks to Jacob Blumenfeld for the translation.
2 Marx 1989b, p. 507.
3 We use capital letters to characterise Marx’s project, beginning with the Grundrisse in 1857.
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his analysis and critique of the capitalist mode of production and its bour-
geois interpreters as a scientific object.4 This impetus stands in opposition
to the desideratum of the ‘methodological purity’ of the economic categor-
ies, in which the critique of fetishism as the central incentive becomes sub-
altern, if not disregarded. This latter interpretation is presented in Japanese
Marxian economist Uno Kōzō’s (1897–77) theory of ‘pure capitalism’ ( junsui
shihonshugi), which the present work will examine critically. The neglect of
the fetish complex, we argue, leads to a truncated and functionalist under-
standing of capitalist economy, and, even more fatally, helps to prolong and
sustain a system of blind domination of social structures over humans, in
which old fetishes persist as new ones, making an emancipatory develop-
ment impossible. Most of all, however, the categorial reconstruction of the
capitalist modus operandi that was not only Marx’s, but also Uno’s intention,
becomes inadequatewhen the fetishistic forms that value assumes, both obfus-
cating its content and structuring ‘the self-presentation of value’,5 are left unad-
dressed: for leaving them unaddressed leaves these fetishised forms of value
intact as objects of cognition. It therefore reproduces the inverted forms in
which value, i.e. abstract human labour, appears at the surface of capitalist
self-representation – paradigmatically in the exchange-fetish and the view of
capital as ‘fruit-bearing’ in the categories of money, profit, price, interest, rent,
etc. – instead of deconstructing these self-representations, and with them, the
modes of their self-legitimisation. This book will show how and why Uno’s
contribution presents a methodologically and theoretically deficient attempt
at the analysis of capitalist relations of production. This deficiency is simul-
taneously explored in Uno’s misrecognition of the significance of the fetish-
character of value on the one hand, andUno’s failure to adequately address the
intrinsically contradictory character of capital in terms of value and use value,
represented in its inherently contradictory modes of (re)production, valorisa-
tion, and accumulation – culminating in crisis–on the other.Wewill argue that
Uno Kōzō’s understanding of value, notwithstanding his own endorsement of
central Marxian categories and ideas, fails to take the nexus between value
and fetish into account. Uno’s theory hence remains at a level which we call
an understanding of ‘value without fetish’, an idiosyncratic economic theory
4 To our knowledge, the only other two approaches identifying Marx’s critique of fetishism as
his method are Tsuru Shigeto 1994 and Helmut Brentel 1989. Tsuru, however, limits the cri-
tique of fetishism to the critique of ‘commodities’, ‘money’, and ‘capital’. We instead see the
problem of fetishism as pertaining to all concepts of bourgeois political economy.
5 Papadakis 2017, p. 52.
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that by using Marx’s terminology seems to speak from the level of the Marxian
problematic – but remains devoid of its critical core. Subtracting ‘Critique of’
from the ‘Critique of Political Economy’, however, only leaves us with ‘political
economy’ bare and simple. In this book, wewill show thatUno’s theory, indeed,
presents uswith a particular version of ‘political economy’ as a discipline of sci-
ence – but no longer with an incentive to understand, criticise, and eventually
overcome the fetishised modes of capital that continue to exert their oppress-
ive force over humans and nature. This diagnosis results from the conceptual
analysis of Uno’s coreworks from 1937 to 1969,which forms themainpart of this
book. To give the reader a – very preliminary – idea of what we mean by Uno’s
deficient attempt at the reconstruction of Marx’s analysis, we shall digress to
what we identify asMarx’s own approach regarding themethod and the object
of cognition – the capitalist mode of production and its constituents. For it
is precisely Uno’s failure to adequately identify the scope and level of Marx’s
own approach to capital as a problem – in other words, the inadequate grasp of
Marx’s own Problembewusstsein – which motivates our critique of Uno Kōzō’s
theory of ‘pure capitalism’ and its method.
To put the critique of fetishism ‘back into’ the Critique of Political Economy
indicates that Marx himself had already considered the critique of the fetish-
characteristic forms that value takes – both in its appearance in economic
reality as well as in the thinking of its economic ‘interpreters’ (Dolmetscher) –
as central to his mature oeuvre.6 In that sense, ‘back into’ suggests a temporal
aspect. We hence consider the critique of fetishism as the theoretical con-
sequence of the analysis of the value form in Chapter 1 of Capital Volume i,
as the Leitmotiv of Marx’s whole project.7 The formulation ‘back into’, however,
also has a systematic aspect: it indicates that the critique of fetishism had been
disavowed or missed out on in significant parts of international Marx-oriented
scholarly publications of the last decades.While in ‘analytical Marxism’,8 some
proponents of the ‘Value Controversy’ of the late 1970s–early 1980s (Steedman,
6 It is at the end of the 1864/5 Economic Manuscripts, better known as Volume iii of Capital,
that Marx returns to the problematic of the commodity, with which his analysis in Volume i
of Capital began, to identify the problemof fetishism as the over-arching predicament: ‘What
is also implied in the commodity … is the reification of the social determinations of produc-
tion and the subjectification [Versubjektivierung] of the material bases of production which
characterize the entire capitalist mode of production’. Marx 1981, p. 1020.
7 On the history of the emergence of fetishism as a theoretical problem in Marx, see Oittinen
2017.
8 See Cohen 1978, Wright 1978, Roemer 1981, Elster 1985 and 1986. See also the publications of
the ‘Sydney-Konstanz Project’ in the 1980s (Eldred 1984).
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Sweezy, De Vroey),9 AlthusserianMarxism,10 culturally-themed11 or new forms
of deconstructivist12 Marxism, political Marxism,13 not to mention the main
proponents of the Second and Third International,14 this is more evident, non-
Western Marxism has not been sufficiently examined in this regard. Yet, even
in themore strictly value-theoretical discourse in the Anglophoneworld, value
has not been sufficiently understood as a problem of fetishism,15 and fetishism
as a problemof value, its formandmagnitude.16We therefore contend that even
in the ‘West’ today, research into the interrelation of the value-form and its
fetish-character has been dissatisfactory. By drawing on the works of Uno Kōzō
and his influential school, this book’s purpose is to fill out that lacuna, a lacuna
that falls beyond the trivial ‘East’ and ‘West’ binary. In our critical analysis, Uno
Kōzō’s work is taken seriously as a contribution to Marxist political economy.
We reject its objectification as a proponent of ‘Japanese’ thought. As such –
and as we believe, in accordance with Uno’s own claim to the significance of
his work – our critique of Uno’s work and the revelation of its limits delivers a
rich matrix with which to grasp the actual problematic of Marx’s intervention,
unfettered by the boundaries of cultural and/or culturalistic considerations.
With these preliminary and general reflections on the critical nature of this
book in mind, we can also elucidate what we consider its positive contribu-
tion, namely a new inquiry into Marx’s method. This method stands and falls
with the overall impetus of Marx’s project of the Critique of Political Economy
9 See Steedman et al. (eds.) 1981.
10 For an overview of the disavowal of the complex of fetishism in the ‘Althusser School’, see
Dimoulis and Milios 1999, especially pp. 26–31.
11 Bourdieu 1979, Hall 1980, Hall 1997, Hall 2017, Jameson 1991, Eagleton 1976, Eagleton 2000,
Harootunian 2000.
12 E.g. Szepanski 2014a, 2014b, 2018. Szepanski’s intervention aims at introducing Deleuzian
theorems such as the ‘Rhizoma’ into ‘Marxist financial theory’. See also the online journal
‘non’, as well as the (in 2019) planned book series and journal. https://non.copyriot.com/.
13 Most notably Brenner 2002, Brenner 2006, Brenner 2009 andWood 2002,Wood 2003 and
Wood 2012.
14 ‘… the question of commodity fetishismwas almost completely ignored in the theoretical
work of the Second International, and even Kautsky himself was content with only a hint
at the problematic …The same can be said of the theoreticians of the Third International:
neither Lenin nor Gramsci ever paid much, if any, attention to the concept of fetishism’.
Oittinen 2017, p. 19.
15 Elson 1979.
16 Geras 1971, Steedman 1981, de Vroey 1981. Lucio Colletti, on the other hand, correctly
remarked ‘that Marx’s theory of value is identical to his theory of fetishism, and that is
precisely the virtue of this element (in which the crucial importance of the relation with
Hegel is intuitively evident) that Marx’s theory differs in principle from the whole of clas-
sical political economy’. Colletti 1972, p. 77.
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as the critique of theorists such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Samuel Bailey,
Jean-Baptiste Say, ThomasMalthus, Robert Torrens, Jean-Pierre Proudhon, and
others, and their various ‘bourgeois fetishisms’. In the following, we shall con-
sider in rough strokes17 what we mean by this.
What do we mean by fetish, fetish-character and fetishism?18 As will be
shown throughout this book, rather than the ‘standard’ interpretations,wehold
that the critique of the ‘fetish-character’ is not limited to the commodity.19
Neither do we think that the critique of fetishism can be adequately explained
by an inversion of the ‘social’ and the ‘natural’ properties of things (i.e. the
commodity). Instead – as will become clearer to the reader in the successive
chapters – we argue that the fetish-character that value assumes in its ‘palp-
able’, apparent forms pertains to all concepts of classical and vulgar political
economy: money, capital, wages, the forms of price (cost price, production
price,market price), profits (entrepreneurial and commercial), interest, ground
rent, and so on. The fetish-character of the value forms thus constitutes the
17 Our outline here remains rough and general for systematic reasons, reasonswhich directly
inform the form of our inquiry, which will become clearer in the following.
18 JohnClegghasprovidedauseful taxonomywhich this book roughly adheres to: ‘Thediffer-
ence between these twodefinitions [of fetishismboth as something that ‘attaches itself ’ to
the commodity and amistaken view of the social character of commodity production] has
led to confusion as to what the terms ‘fetishism’ and ‘fetish-character’ specifically mean
for Marx … At least part of the confusion can be put down to a lack of attention to Marx’s
own terminology. In the English-speaking world this may be due to poor translations. I
have already indicated in the terms I use above how the confusion may be overcome: by
distinguishing between the ‘fetish-character’ of commodities and the ‘fetishism’ of those
who mistake this as natural’. Clegg 2005, p. 3. The fetish-character thus pertains to the
value forms, while fetishism characterises bourgeois political economy’s view of capital-
ist relations of production, as e.g. in ‘the fetishism of the political economists’. Marx 1976,
p. 983. See also O’Kane 2013, p. 34, and Schulz 2011.
19 The section on ‘The Fetish-Character of the Commodity and its Secret’ in Volume i of
Capital has evolved as the locus classicus of almost all ‘commodity form’-interpretations
of the fetish problematic in Marx, which we see as a fatal truncation (see e.g. Benjamin
1999 [1927–40], Rubin 1973 [1928], Lukács 1971 [1923], Sohn-Rethel 1970, Geras 1971, Balibar
1993). The reader may thus be surprised that, in our view, the famous chapter on ‘Com-
modity Fetishism’ in Volume i of Capital does not constitute the locus classicus of Marx’s
‘theory of fetishism’. Aswill be explained later, the theory of fetishism is rather to be found
in the ‘three peculiarities of the equivalent formof value’, as developed byMarx in the sec-
tion ‘The Equivalent Form’ in the first chapter of Capital Volume i (in the first edition of
Capital of 1867 still referred to as the ‘four particularities’). We will show that the ‘three
particularities’ present the single pertinent heuristic-methodological insight to the ‘why’
of the phenomenon of the fetish-character of the value forms. It is precisely this insight
that is discarded from Uno’s theoretisation of a ‘pure capitalist society’ – with grave con-
sequences.
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very categories of classical political economy. This central diagnosis – cent-
ral for Marx’s evaluation of the classics, predominantly the theory of value
which forms the interest of this book – allows Marx to level the general, yet
far-reaching critique of a blind spot of classical political economy that essen-
tially informs Marx’s critique of fetishism: namely the blind spot of the spe-
cifically social form that labour assumes as value in capitalist societies. Because
classical and vulgar political economists disregard the social form of labour, a
concept resulting fromMarx’s crucial conceptual distinction between abstract
and concrete labour, and value and use value (to which we will return time and
again throughout this book), their understanding of the capitalist metabolism
is exhausted in the notion of simple and equal exchange. In short, the fetish-
character of the value forms, as we will explain soon, is characterised by an
increasing obfuscation of the social form of production as substance of value in
favour of the forms that value assumes in the process of exchange or circula-
tion. For Marx, labour and labour alone – in its specific social form as abstract
labour, expended as living labour in the process of production – is the source
and substance of value. In the categories of political economy, this source and
substance of value however becomes increasingly obscure, so that at one point
its relation to labour ‘is no longer recognisable’.20 Marx also calls this process
a ‘mystification’: while at the beginning of the categorial critique (in the Con-
tributions to the Critique of Political Economy as well as Volume i of Capital),
in the value-form of the commodity, ‘this mystification is as yet very simple …
[this] semblance of simplicity disappears in higher productive relations’.21 In
interest-bearing capital, discussed at the level of how the capital relation finally
appears to its agents (in Volume iii of Capital), this ‘fetish character of capital
and the representation of this capital fetish is … complete’.22 It thus, finally,
presents the ‘capital mystification in its most flagrant form’23 – i.e. an under-
standing of capital without the social form of labour, a form in which ‘it no
longer bears anymarks of its origin’.24Aswewill see,Uno’s theory of ‘pure capit-
alism’ is not free from these suppositions, but rather contributes to them.What
is hence increasingly obscured in the inverted forms in which value appears –
from the commodity to interest-bearing capital – is their common constitutive
ground, the Begründungszusammenhang, which alone provides the nexus by
which to adequately grasp its social character: the social form of labour in the
20 Marx 1981, p. 517.
21 Marx 1904 [1859], p. 81.
22 Marx 1981, p. 516.
23 Marx 1981, p. 516.
24 Marx 1981, p. 516.
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capitalist mode of production – abstract labour. Equally obscured is the pro-
duction of surplus value or exploitation. For Marx, this dynamic of increasing
obfuscation of the ground and nexus of the capitalist socialmetabolism, which
the categories of political economy only reflect as abbreviated and superficial
forms of mere semblance, thus becomes themethodological template by which
to address the categories of political economy and its two main fetishisms of
exchange and the notion of capital as ‘autonomous’, independent and unre-
lated to labour:
For vulgar economists, which seek to present capital as an independent
source of wealth, of value creation, this form [interest-bearing capital]
is of course a godsend, a form in which the source of profit is no longer
recognizable and in which the result of the capitalist production pro-
cess – separate from the process itself – obtains an autonomous exist-
ence.25
For Marx, elucidating the difference between social form as substance26 and
the inverted forms in which it appears, or content and its forms – forms that
obscure their origin in abstract-human labour and exploitation – is the single
methodological process or strategy for his Critique. As the golden thread of
Marx’s investigation, it begins from analysis of the value form in Section 3 of
Chapter 1 of CapitalVolume i and culminates in the analysis of interest-bearing
capital and the ‘demystification’ of the ‘Trinity Formula’ in Chapter 48 of the
1864–5 Economic Manuscripts (Volume iii of Capital).27 The significance of
this methodological process consists in the derivation of the origin of mystific-
ation, in categories such as ‘production price’ and ‘profit’, concepts to which
we will return in detail. Marx’s Critique is therefore decisively non-static, as it
‘shakes up’ the rigid appearances (of e.g. the value forms of price and profit) to
not only reconstruct the hidden content of the fetishisedmodes of appearance
in unpaid and alien human labour, but also to reconstruct how the categorial
convolutions of political economy come to inform the fetishisms and ‘mystific-
ations’ resulting from its obfuscation by necessity.We call this procedure, with
Helmut Brentel, form analysis:
25 Marx 1981, p. 517.
26 We will return to the concept of ‘social form as substance’ in Chapter 1.1.
27 Needless to say, Marx has not written Capital in the succession in which the volumes
appear (for an overview on the formative history of Capital, see Heinrich 2011). However,
its thematic is reflected in the consistency in which Marx follows the theme of fetishism
and fetishisation.
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Form analysis as the economic theory and critique of the object (öko-
nomische Gegenstandstheorie und Gegenstandskritik) contains a theory of
appearance. It acts on specific assumptions about the ‘mode of appear-
ance’ of economic facts, which hold both for its agents, as well as for
economic theories and the framework of their critical presentation. In
other words, it is based on a specific objective (inhaltliche) andmethodo-
logical assumptionabout the relationbetween theobject or the economic
fact, and its appearance or systematic semblance, which is structured by
itself in its mode of analysis.28
Following from this, the intent of form analysis is to ‘dismantle the pseudo-
subjectivities, withwhich economic relations appear as simple, transhistorical,
and autonomous, [to dismantle] the wrong notions, which the daily agents
form about their own social relations according to the measure of these con-
ceptualisations, and to disperse these reifications of social relations in the
economic categories, in order to reinstantiate the actual subjects of history,
humans in their relations of their labour and production, in their theoretical
and practical right’.29 This claim can be said to concretiseMarx’s critique of the
value-forms, as precisely the locus of the fetishisms of ‘simplicity’, ‘transhistor-
icity’, and ‘autonomy’ of the economic categories, as well as its aim to abolish
the sphere of semblance as a whole.
Yet, how did Marx’s incentive for the reconstruction of the obfuscated or
mystified ‘ground’ of the forms of appearance of value evolve? How did his Cri-
tique become essentially informed by the claim that it grasps the social form
of capitalist (re-)production in its true nature based on abstract human labour,
i.e. the ‘actual subject’ of history? Marx did not simply claim the social form
of labour as an ‘alternative’ (‘one among many’) explanation(s) for the basis of
capitalist reproduction. His claimwentmuch further: by pointing to the logical
fallacies, inconsistencies, tautologies, and contradictions of conventional polit-
ical economy,Marx could indeed demonstrate why explanations excluding the
common nexus of abstract labour must fail. And it was precisely this logical
impetus guiding his observations which led Marx – with Hegel, as we will
explain soon – to assume a specific form-content (Formgehalt) as the explan-
atory heuristic leading him to the ‘decryption’ of the fetishised categories of
political economy. Yet, what could this heuristic tool be?
28 Brentel 1989, p. 283. Original emphasis.
29 Brentel 1989, pp. 284–5. Original emphasis.
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Our fundamental claim is that ‘the condition of possibility’ for the heur-
istic of Marx’s Critique was the formulation of the labour theory of value at
the beginning of Capital.30 The labour theory of value, i.e. the definition of
the substance of value as abstract human labour and its magnitude in socially
necessary labour time,31 thus could be said to present the ‘decodingmachine’ to
the fetishisms of conventional economic science. Not only does this theory, as
Duncan Foley claims, parallel ‘the philosophical and theoretical innovations of
Galileo andNewton in the physical sciences as the founding idea of a science’,32
but in its function it perhaps even parallels Alan Turing’s ‘Bombe’ decrypting
machine, which was used to help decipher German Enigma-machine encryp-
ted secret messages during the Second World War.33 Marx’s labour theory of
value thus can be said to function as the ‘decryption device’ of the fetishisms of
classical and vulgar political economy.34 This elevation of the labour theory of
value to the status of Marx’s central heuristic insight may however come as a
30 The labour theory of value hence addresses both the quality and the quantity of value
as (abstract) labour: ‘A use-value, or useful article … has only value because abstract
human labour is objectified [vergegenständlicht] or materialized in it. How, then, is the
magnitude of this value to be measured? By means of the quantity of the value-forming
substance, the labour contained in the article. This quantity is measured by its duration,
and the labour-time itself ismeasured on the particular scale of hours, days, etc… Socially
necessary labour time is the labour-time required to produce any use-value under the con-
ditions of production normal for a given society and with the average degree of skill and
intensity of labour prevalent in that society’. Marx 1976, p. 129.
31 The objection that Marx did not use the term ‘labour theory of value’ in Capital, implying
that Marx did not hold such a theory (see Reuten 1993) is problematic in its nominalist
implications, for it confuses word and concept. A word is written, spoken, or enunciated
in some way, designating a fixed sequence of letters and syllables. A concept is the ‘idea’,
the ‘theme’ or ‘topic’ (roughly, for the present purpose). For example, one can talk about
Leonardo da Vinci’s ‘Mona Lisa’ at length without once saying the word ‘Mona Lisa’. This
person may for specific reasons refer to it as ‘La Gioconda’ or ‘Leonardo’s most famous
painting’. But he or she has still talked about theMona Lisa as a concept. In the same vein,
just because Marx did not use the words ‘labour theory of value’, does not mean he did
not have (and indeed apply!) the concept. In fact, the labour theory of value is the key to
understanding the critique of political economy, without which we would have a hard
time making sense of Marx’s critique of Smith, Ricardo, Malthus, Say, Bailey and others.
For the formation of Marx’s labour theory of value from the critique of the classics, see
Lange 2019b. See also Chapter 1.2.
32 Foley 1997, p. 1.
33 For further reading, see Davies 1999.
34 The critical function of this metaphor probably only differs from the ‘Turing-Bombe’ in
that Smith, Ricardo, Bailey, Say, Malthus, Rodbertus, Proudhon, and others, were alto-
gether uninhibited with the content of their ‘messages’. Not only were they not intent on
‘hiding’ their categories, but, to the contrary, they were to serve as scientific heuristics for
the science of political economy.
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surprise for readers who are familiar with the fierce criticisms and objections it
has received throughout its history. It seems that, beginning with neoclassical
economist Eugen Böhm-Bawerk’s criticism in 1896,35 disavowingMarx’s labour
theory of value has never really gone out of fashion. Except that today, even
Marxian theorists have become increasingly inclined to lessen the importance
or even reject or ‘refuse’ the labour theory of value.36 At times, it is counter-
factually presented as though this ‘refusal’ even were Marx’s own, which would
mean that Marx rejected his own theoretical basis (which to our knowledge,
he never did).37 Needless to say, attempts at disqualifying Marx’s value the-
ory vary not only in the different ‘areas’ of Marxist theory but also in their
emphasis on what function the labour theory of value designates: as a meth-
odological tool, it is argued, it is introduced ‘prematurely’,38 as a definition
of value, others say (predominantly proponents of Analytical Marxism and
theorists of finance/financialisation), it may even be neglected, since it does
not even deliver a coherent theory of price.39 Others, like the German ‘Neue
Marx-Lektüre’-scholars Michael Heinrich and Hans-Georg Backhaus, are less
doubtful about its usefulness (which they emphasise), but altogether ambigu-
ous about its locus of constitution, whether in the production process, or in
commodity exchange.40 What we can however discern unequivocally in most
35 See Böhm-Bawerk 1949.
36 Diane Elson’s characterisation of Marx’s value theory as a ‘value theory of labour’ (Elson
1979) confuses the explanandumwith the explanans:Marxdidnot aim to show that labour
appears as value (this would, indeed, be banal), but that the appearances of value – the
value forms – are to be traced back to their commondenominator, abstract human labour.
Simultaneously, Elson misrecognises Marx’s fetishism-critical method.
37 Paradigmatically here David Harvey’s ‘Marx’s Refusal of the Labour Theory of Value’,
available at http://davidharvey.org/2018/03/marxs‑refusal‑of‑the‑labour‑theory‑of‑value
‑by‑david‑harvey/.
38 This is predominantly argued within the Uno School: ‘The premature introduction of the
labour theory of value confuses the meaning both of the Doctrine of Production and of
the Doctrine of Circulation. Here Marx unwittingly violates his own structure’. Albritton
1986, p. 48. One of the tasks of this book is to show how fundamentally mistaken this view
is. See alsoThomas Sekine’s comment inUno 1980, p. xxiv: ‘… the premature and unneces-
sary reference to the labour theory of value in the early part of Capital frequently beclouds
the discussion of commodity circulation, etc.’.
39 See, e.g., the post-Uno School of value theory which we discuss in Chapter 5.1., and other
Uno-School theorists working on finance (e.g. Itoh 1976, Lapavitsas 2005, 2013, 2017). See
also Steedman 1978, Cohen 1979, Eldred 1985, Bryan/Rafferty 2013. See Lebowitz 2005 for a
response to the rejection of Marx’s value theory in Analytical Marxism, and Best 2017 for
a response to its rejection in ‘financialisation’ theory.
40 ‘Commodities possess this “shared feature” or “tertium” [value] only when they appear
in common, i.e., when they are related to one another in exchange’. Heinrich 1999, p. 215.
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attempts todelegitimiseMarx’s formulationof the labour theoryof value is that
it is viewedas a theoretical ‘residue’ of,mostly, Ricardianprovenance.The claim
of Marx’s labour theory of value as a ‘residue’ of the discourse of the classics is
to be found in almost all newer discussions of Marx’s value theory.41 Marx’s
‘break’ with the classics was therefore either unsuccessful or incomplete. This
opinion is also shared by Uno.42 Uno’s diagnosis therefore primarily motivates
us to demonstrate that nowhere wasMarx’s break with the classics, and predom-
inantly AdamSmith andDavid Ricardo, clearer andmore succinct than in regard
to their respective theories of value. Uno’s critique of Marx’s value theory and
its systematic locus in Capital forms a focal point of interest, and we will recur
to it throughout this book. In our introductory Chapter 1, we consider it there-
fore useful to explain the centrality of the role of the labour theory of value in
Marx’s oeuvre, especially with regard to its function as the method of critique.
This will be further elucidated by answering to the standard reproach that the
labour theory of value was allegedly presented ‘prematurely’ in the exposition
of Marx’s Capital. Against that, we emphasise the necessity of the ‘presuppos-
ition of the totality’ in Marx’s method. This is useful insofar as it allows us to
preliminarily contrast these two results with Uno’s theory of pure capitalism
and approach to political economy to tease out the limits to Uno’s Problembe-
wusstsein of the Marxian Critique of Political Economy (Chapter 1.1). Because
one significant objection to the labour theory of value consists in its delegitim-
isation as a ‘residueof the classics’, an objectionUno shares,we find it necessary
to elaborate on Marx’s labour theory of value as resulting, not from an appro-
priation of an alleged Ricardian ‘embodied’ labour theory of value (which, as
we will see, Ricardo did not hold), but precisely from the critique of Smith’s
and Ricardo’s respective theories of value in ‘The Aporias of Political Economy’
(Chapter 1.2). Finally, we will recur to the Hegelian notion of ‘form-content’
and the critical function of the analysis of the value form in Section 3 of Cap-
ital, Chapter 1, and its results. As mentioned before, we hold that it essentially
informs the overarching structure of Marx’s critique of fetishism.Wewill apply
it to some recent critiques of Marx’s project, which have gainedmomentum in
Marx research over the last decades, namely the ‘New’ or ‘Systematic’ Dialectic
‘Valuemay only be visible (sic) in exchange, but it is certainly not “created” there’. Heinrich
1999, p. 243. For a critical evaluation of Backhaus (Backhaus 2011), see Chapter 5.1.
41 See e.g. Itoh 1976, p. 312; Reuten 1993, p. 89; Arthur 2006, p. 10; Harvey 2018, p. 1. Interest-
ingly (or rather tellingly), these authors do not provide any original source for their claims.
42 ‘… by immediately presenting the labour theory of value, the historical viewpoint form-
ally established for the first time by Marx regresses to the “failures” of classical political
economy and cannot escape its dangers’. Uno 1974 [1962], p. 158.
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approach (Chris Arthur, Geert Reuten) (Chapter 1.3). Because with regard to
their criticism of the labour theory of value, Uno can be regarded as their pre-
decessor, this section serves as a critical template or prism through which the
book’s impetus can be viewed – namely to reinstateMarx’s Critique of Political
Economy as the most adequate heuristic known to science for understanding,
evaluating and overcoming today’s capitalist predicament.
1.1 The Critique of Fetishism and Uno’s Theory of ‘Pure Capitalism’
But the investigation of cognition cannot take place in any other
way than cognitively; in the case of this so-called tool, the ‘invest-
igation’ of it means nothing but the cognition of it. But to want to
have cognition beforewe have any is as absurd as the wise resolve of
Scholasticus to learn to swim before he ventured into the water.
hegel, Encyclopedia (1830)43
∵
Because already in the value-form of money, we can no longer see or detect
what it has ‘got to do’ with human labour – and money, for Marx, is the ‘direct
incarnation of all human labour’44 – Marx’s Critique of Political Economy can
be said to present the forensic investigation into the increasing mystification
(from the commodity to interest-bearing capital) of the fetishistic categories
of conventional political economy and its critique. As mentioned earlier, this
mystification or fetishisation is mediated by the process of exchange, in which
value receives the ‘palpable’, yet inverted form of appearance – precisely as
money. Because value never appears as such – it is not an empirical category –
it must cling to these apparent, empirical forms, generated by circulation and
exchange.45 This movement however, mediated by the process of exchange, as
Marx says, ‘vanishes in its own result, leaving no trace behind’.46 Marx’s assign-
ment is therefore in the reconstruction of the process, a forensic or probably
43 Hegel 1991 [1830], p. 34.
44 Marx 1976, p. 187.
45 We will return to this important relation between the empirical and the non-empirical in
our discussion of the ‘transformation problem’ in Chapter 4.
46 Marx 1976, p. 187.
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even archaeological attempt to reveal how certain categorial misconstellations
in the scientific view of the capitalist metabolism are conducive to burying the
originof value, andhence the social dimensionof the capitalist (re-)production
process. Uno however precisely misses Marx specific interest in the categorial
reconstruction: the problem of the constitution of these categories themselves.
According to our understanding,47 Marx’s theory of value is therefore primar-
ily a theory of the form-content (Formgehalt) and of the necessary constitution
of the fetishistic forms of value (the commodity, money, capital, wages, price,
profit, interest, rent, etc.), which form the categories of the bourgeois horizon.
It is this crucial – perhaps even the sine qua non – dimension of Marx’s project
as a whole whichwe find truncated, if not altogethermissing, fromUno’s inter-
vention. This criticism directed against Uno Kōzō’s understanding of value and
its fetish character in ‘societies, inwhich the capitalistmode of production pre-
vails’,48 however fundamental itmay appear, is notmeant to slight Uno’smerits
as an important pioneer of a non-dogmatic (that is, anti-Stalinist) Marx inter-
pretation. It therefore differentiates between Uno as probably the foremost
Marxian economist in Japan after World War ii, and his often idiosyncratic
approach to interpreting the texts in question. In the following, we shall there-
fore look more closely at important stations in Uno’s life and the formation of
his theory.
1.1.1 Uno’s Approach to Political Economy
Without a doubt, Uno Kōzō (1897–1977) remains one of the most influen-
tial Marxian economists today. In Japan, his legacy in left-wing or Marxist
economic interventions, especially in theories of value, finance, globalisation
and crisis,49 cannot be overestimated. Outside of Japan, his following – often
47 Seminal research literature has been published on Marx’s fetishism-critical method in
the last 30 years, mostly in German. Authors like Helmut Brentel, Anton Fischer, Dieter
Wolf, Nadja Rakowitz, Frank Engster, Ingo Elbe, Christian Iber, Ingo Stützle, and others,
have published path-breaking works in the fetish-critical branch of value form theory.We
largely base the argument presented here on this line of research, with special consider-
ation of Helmut Brentel. The translation of especially Helmut Brentel’s seminal work in
English remains an extraordinary desideratum. Historical Materialism’s translation pro-
jects provide an excellent opportunity to become acquaintedwith theseworks and should
be supported.
48 Marx 1976, p. 125.
49 For Uno’s lasting influence in the recent literature, see e.g. the works of Obata Michiaki
(e.g. Obata 2009, 2013), Yamaguchi Shigekatsu (Yamaguchi 1996, 2000, 2010), the volume
Global Capitalism and Stage Theory, edited by Kawamura Tetsuji et al., a part of a 10-
volume series on the Transformation of Modern Capitalism and Political Economy (Kawa-
mura et al. 2016). Scholars associated in the Japan Society for Political Economy (jspe,
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through the popularising efforts of Uno’s students Thomas T. Sekine and Itō
Makoto since the 1970s – includes suchprominentMarxist academics asRobert
Albritton or the theorist of money and finance, Costas Lapavitsas. Karatani
Kōjin, arguably the internationally best-known Japanese intellectual and cul-
tural historian, has studied with Uno at Tokyo University in the 1960s. While a
student, he became radicalised by Uno’s ideas, joining the ‘Bund’, or the Com-
munist League (Kyōsanshugisha Dōmei).50 Uno was born in the mid-Meiji era
(1868–1912) in Kurashiki, a provincial town in the prefecture of Okayama in the
south of Japan, famous for its modern spinning mill,51 developed industry and
its past as aprincipal reloading site formerchant goods in theEdoperiod (1603–
1867).52 Coming from a family of merchants himself, Uno enrolled at Tokyo
Imperial University in 1918 to study economics. He graduated in 1921, support-
ing himself and his newlywed Maria by a post at the Ōhara Institute for Social
Science, affiliated with Hōsei University in Tokyo. At this time in Japan, there
was little interest in Marx and the Critique of Political Economy at Japanese
economics departments. Instead, the influence of the Japanese Verein für Sozi-
alpolitik (Shakai seisaku gakkai), an anti-Marxist, liberal economic association
influenced by the German Bismarckian economists Gustav Schmoller (1838–
1917) and Lujo Brentano (1844–1931), could be felt throughout the field.53 Uno,
however, early onbecame interested inMarx and ‘scientific socialism’.His earn-
estness in pursuing his studies of Marx led him to board a ship to Berlin, Ger-
many, in 1921wherehe spent twoyears ‘reading, reading, reading:Capital, Lenin
on imperialism, and against Karl Kautsky, the socialist and communist daily
Keizai riron gakkai), a Marxist association devoted to issues of critical political economy,
alsomake use of Uno’s work and intervention. Kawamura Tetsuji is the current chairman.
The Uno School in the narrower sense is linked in the think tank ‘UnoTheory’ (unotheory​
.org) which proclaims to contribute to ‘Rejuvenating Marxian Economics through Uno
Theory’. Their semi-annual newsletter, published in Japanese and partly in English, con-
tains recent research in Uno theory. In the international context, Palgrave Macmillan is
at the forefront for publications on the Uno or, rather the ‘Uno-Sekine’ tradition which
has evolved from Thomas Sekine’s interpretation of Uno’s theory in the English-speaking
world, for which mainly Robert Albritton is representative (see Albritton 1986, 1991; Sek-
ine 1997, Albritton and Sekine 1995, Albritton and Simoulidis 2003, Albritton et al. 2001,
RichardWestra and Alan Zuege 2003).
50 For Karatani’s account of Uno’s influence at the University of Tokyo, see Barshay 2004,
p. 124.
51 The Kurashiki Bōsekisho or ‘Kurashiki Spinning Mill’ was founded by entrepreneur Ōhara
Kōshirō (1833–1910) in 1888 and was regarded as Japan’s most modern spinning factory.
52 ‘Kurashiki-shi’ literally means ‘City of Storehouses’.
53 For an overview of the earliest reception of Marx’s works in Japan, see Lange 2014.
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press’.54 Uno had readMarx’s works in the German original;55 complete Japan-
ese translations have not been published before 1924.56While in Germany, Uno
is reported to have been ‘listening and observing, attending party rallies, shar-
ing life and information and acquaintanceswith other Japanese in residence’,57
sucking in the spirit of the times. In the wake of the Russian Revolution in
the early 1920s, the world suddenly became a place where the shifting of para-
meters seemed possible. In 1924, on his return to Japan, Uno took the position
of associate professor at Tōhoku Imperial University in Sendai in the north of
Japan, to teach ‘economic policy’. Here, the shadow of the imposition to focus
on classical and neoclassical economics loomed over his own interest inMarx’s
theory. It wasn’t until after the SecondWorldWar that Uno’s interest in the ‘sci-
entific method’ of Marxism began to find expression in his own publications.
That was not only due to the political atmosphere of ultranationalist Japan in
the 1930s. Uno was deeply involved in the so-called ‘Debate on Japanese Capit-
alism’ (Nihon shihonshugi ronsō) that significantly shaped Marxist intellectual
life in Japan between 1933 and 1937.58 In the years following the founding of
the Japanese Communist Party (jcp) (Nihon kyōsantō) in 1922, the debate on
Japanese capitalism emerged as an inner-party debate about how to correctly
54 Barshay 2004, p. 98.
55 Uno seems to have worked with both the original texts and Japanese translations in his
later writings. In the Preface to his main work, the Principles of Political Economy (1950/2,
1964), we hear: ‘Quotes from Capital in the Institute-edition [the Institute of Marxism-
Leninism of the Central Committee in Moscow, i.e. the first edition of the Marx-Engels-
Gesamtausgabe or mega, published until 1938] are identified as ‘I’, quotes from the Japan-
ese translation [the Iwanami Bunkō translation] are identified as “Iwa” ’. Uno 1964, p. 10.
Whether by ‘Iwanami Bunkō translation’ Uno refers to the translation by friend and com-
rade Sakisaka Itsurō (1950) or the earlier translation by Hasebe Fumio (1929), is unknown.
56 Marx’s and Engels’s works have been translated into Japanese from the early 1900s on.
A translation of Marx’s and Engels’s Communist Manifesto appeared in 1904 in the first
anniversary edition of the Heimin Shinbun (‘The Commoner’s News’), a weekly journal
founded by the early Meiji socialist Kōtoku Shūsui, who also translated it. Kōtoku later
moved away from socialism to become an anarchist. In 1911, he and eleven other revolu-
tionaries were found guilty of trying to assassinate the Emperor and subsequently exe-
cuted.The following ‘winter years’ of JapaneseMarxism that eventually not only paralysed
the socialistmovement, but also theoretical endeavours inMarx exegesis, were succeeded
by a new interest inMarxianworks triggered by the Russian Revolution. The first Japanese
translation of the first volume of DasKapital (Shihon ron) by TakabatakeMotoyuki (1886–
1928) was published in June 1920 by Kaizōsha, followed by Volumes ii and iii in 1924. A
short summary of all three volumes of Capital was, however, presented to the public in
the Ōsaka edition of the Heimin Shinbun by Yamakawa as early as 1907.
57 Barshay 2004, p. 98.
58 Arguably the best study on the debate, both on its extent and intent, remains Germaine
Hoston 1986.
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evaluate the Meiji restoration:59 either as a bourgeois revolution that, with the
growing expansion of capitalist heavy industry and the expected roll back of
the traditional agrarian sector, would automatically lead to the elimination
of all feudal remnants – presenting a so-called ‘theory of a one-step revolu-
tion’ (ichidankai kakumei ron) – or as an incomplete, if not failed attempt to
establish a bourgeois-capitalist state which instead called for a so-called two
stage revolution, the nidankai kakumei. According to this latter interpretation,
first, a bourgeois-democratic statemodelled afterWesternEuropeandeveloped
capitalist states would have to be established, and second, its overcoming by
the proletarian, the final revolution, would have to be aimed at. The Kōza-
ha (Lectures-group),60 who supported the latter view, remained loyal to the
jcp and the Comintern theses on Japanese capitalism which saw Japan as an
economically underdeveloped country, whereas the Rōnō-ha (Labor-farmer-
group) even seceded from the jcp in 1927 to form a powerful and influen-
tial ‘non-Communist party Marxist group’.61 It launched its attacks against the
party line in its journal Rōnō (Labourers and Farmers) that had been founded
immediately after the split with the jcp in December 1927 and gave the group
its name. The Kōza-ha as well as the Rōnō-ha were exposed to severe perse-
cution by the military state between 1928 and 1937. In the so-called ‘Popular
Front Incident’ ( Jinmin sensen jiken) of 1937 and 1938, more than 400 mem-
bers of the Rōnō-ha, mostly university professors, were arrested – among them
Sakisaka Itsurō, a close associate of Uno Kōzō and translator of Capital, and
Uno himself, although he was, if close to, not a direct member of the Rōnō-ha.
While formerly ‘purged’ or arrested Marxist theorists were only able to return
to their academic positions during the US occupation, Uno, briefly arrested in
1938, had been able to work for a private research position at Tōhoku Imperial
University since 1941, keeping him financially afloat. During his ‘Sendai years’,
Uno published his first monograph, the major part of his work on The Types
59 The abolishment of theTokugawa clan’s feudal state and the reinstallation of the Emperor
system between 1867 and 1869 is generally referred to as theMeiji restoration (Meiji ishin).
60 The publication that gave the Kōza-ha its name was the 7-volume Lectures on the History
of the Development of Japanese Capitalism (Nihon shihonshugi hattatsu shi kōza), which
was modelled after a Marxist-Leninist interpretation of Japanese history in accordance
with the Comintern theses from 1927 and, partly, 1932. It was published by the prestigious
Iwanami shoten publishing house 1932–3. For a detailed discussion of the appropriation
of the Comintern theses into the jcp’s view of Japanese history and its divergences, see
Furihata 1987.
61 See Hoston 1986, p. 38. For an overview of the Kōza-ha-Rōnō-ha-debate, see Hoston 1986,
pp. 35–75, Sugihara 1987, pp. 27ff., Itoh 1980, pp. 22ff., Gayle 2003, pp. 24ff., Hoff 2009,
pp. 48–52.
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of Economic Policies (Keizai seisakuron) in 1936 (the final version appeared in
1954). But it wasn’t until 1947, when he had been appointed professor for eco-
nomics at the prestigious Tokyo Imperial University where he taught until his
retirement in 1958, that he became a prolific writer. Mainly in this decade, his
interest in the method and object of political economy as a rigorous ‘science’
was reflected inhis publications, such as the seminalTheory of Value (Kachiron)
(1947). Uno’s writings in this time also reflected a deliberate detachment from
jcp’s re-established appropriation of the ‘ideological’ interpretation delivered
by the Comintern.62 His stance against the ‘nomenklatura’ not only gave a par-
ticular significance toUno’smerits as anoutspokenanti-Stalinist,63 but secured
him a large following since the 1960s known as the (original) Uno School of
political economy in Japan. According to Uno’s associate Furihata Setsuo, it
formed ‘one of the three dominant streams of postwar Japanese social sci-
ence, alongside the political science of Maruyama Masao and Ōtsuka Hisao’s
economic history’.64 Many well-known Marxist economists (Ōuchi Tsutomu,
Ōuchi Hideaki, Iwata Hiroshi, Furihata Setsuo, ItōMakoto (Makoto Itoh), Baba
Hiroji, Sekine Tomohiko, among others) belonged to the Uno School, although,
with the exception of Itoh and Sekine, the scope of their theoretical efforts
remained largely confined to Japan. In the 1980showever, followingUno’s death
in 1977 and the seemingly unstoppable rise of neoliberal agendas, even crit-
ical engagement with Marx’s mature oeuvre had become increasingly difficult
in the context of academic economic debate. The Uno School, i.e. the school
of thinkers still directly associated with Uno in Japan, became largely obsol-
ete in the 1980s. After his retirement from Tokyo University, Uno continued to
teach at Hōsei University until 1968. While Uno had published over 10 mono-
62 For a historical contextualisation of Uno’s theoretical engagement in post-War Japan, see
Barshay 2004, pp. 92–4, 97–100, 120–6. See also Hoff 2016, pp. 97–115.
63 In an intervieworiginally published in 1958, Uno officially attacked Stalin’s viewof the ‘law
of value’ as transhistorical, simultaneously rebuking Engels’ doctrine of simple commod-
ity production: ‘… the law of value is the fundamental economic law of capitalist society –
in this pointmyunderstandingdiffers fromStalin…To say that the lawof valueof the com-
modity entirely demonstrates this lawfulness (hōsokusei) as a necessity does not mean
that products are merely exchanged as commodities, and it does not mean that they are
merely produced as commodities. But it means that commodities are produced by com-
modities, and that they exist within capitalist commodity economy …’ Uno 1974 [1958]a,
p. 119. For Uno, Stalin’s treatment of ‘the law of value’ as transhistorical ‘obscures the rela-
tion between the economic principles that are contained within and undergird the laws
of commodity economy on the one hand, and their historical form on the other, render-
ing vague the historical significance of abolishing the commodity form’. Ibid., quoted in
Barshay 2004, p. 122.
64 Furihata (ed.) 1989, pp. 152–3. Quoted in Barshay 2004, p. 120.
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graphs during his lifetime – mostly interpretations and contributions address-
ing topics in Marx’s Capital and other economy-critical writings (today collec-
ted in the 1973/74 Iwanami shoten edition of his Collected Works (Uno Kōzō
Chosakushū) – his most important work remains the Principles of Political Eco-
nomy (KeizaiGenron),whichpresentedUnoas a radical re-interpreter of Marx’s
Capital and established his international significance. The book first appeared
in two volumes in 1950 and 1952 and an abridged version (supervised by Uno
himself) in 1964.65 On the other hand, however, Uno became known as a ‘stage
theorist’ of capitalist economic development – and it was arguably the lat-
ter that sustained his reputation. The theory of different stages of capitalist
historical-economic development, however, was contained in the larger struc-
ture of what Uno termed the ‘Three Level-Method’ (sandankairon) of political
economy as a science: according to Uno, the method of the ‘science’ of polit-
ical economy should comply to a threefold structure, to become known as
the ‘three level-method’ or, more literally, the ‘three stages theory’ that guar-
anteed the coherence of the method and the object of investigation, namely
the capitalist ‘commodity economy’. It was conceived of as early as in the first
edition of Principles of Political Economy (hereafter: Principles) in 1951.66 In the
abridged version of 1964, this method was referred to as resulting from the
necessity to integrate a theory of imperialism as a mediating link between the
‘pure theory’ of capitalism (genriron) and the stages-theory of capitalist devel-
opment (dankairon).67 The ‘pure theory’ is characterised as ‘presuppos[ing]
the abstract context of a purely capitalist society made up of the three major
classes of capitalists, workers, and landowners in order to account for the laws
peculiar to capitalism and the dynamics of their (?) operation’.68 In contra-
distinction to the ‘pure’ analysis of the principles (genriron), then, a second
level of abstraction or ‘stage theory’ (dankairon) serves to present the con-
crete historical periods of capitalist development in their temporal sequence:
mercantilism, liberalism, and imperialism, and their corresponding forms of
65 A discussion of the Principles forms the largest part of our analysis.
66 ‘The field of research of political economy becomes separated into, first, the purely theor-
etical system, second, the world-historical developmental stages of capitalism, third, the
three stages of capitalism in each single country, or the concrete analysis of world capital-
ism. Furthermore, as against the economic analysis of capitalist societies, I want to show
the economic history of pre-capitalist societies, or the individually appropriate method
for the study of socialism’. Uno 1973 [1951], p. 18.
67 ‘If Capital is left as it stands, and if the doctrine of imperialism is consideredmerely as an
appendage, the relation between the pure theory of capitalism and the stages-theory of
capitalist development cannot be fully understood’. Uno 1980, p. Xxvi.
68 Uno 1980, p. Xxii; Uno 1964, p. 12.
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capital: merchant capital, industrial capital, and finance capital, respectively.
On the third and last level of the method of political economy, an ‘analysis of
the actual phenomena’ (genjō bunseki) serves to evaluate the concrete polit-
ical situation, not only of today, but of the past periods. The third level which
Uno also calls the ‘ultimate aim of the research of political economy’ also pre-
pares the stage of direct ‘socialist practical action’, which is neither given in the
principles nor the historical stages.69 Probably less investigated than his stages
theory or ‘three-levelmethod’, however, is Uno’s direct engagementwithMarx’s
theory in Capital. While in Chapter 2 we will exclusively discuss the problem-
atic of Uno’s sandankairon, we consider it an as yet unfulfilled desideratum
to investigate Uno’s engagement with Capital and other of Marx’s economy-
critical writings more closely. Our investigation is thus primarily directed at
Uno’s theory of ‘pure capitalism’ or the ‘theory of principles’ (genriron). At this
point, it will suffice to briefly characterise the theory of ‘pure capitalism’.
In his Principles, the only monograph translated into English for 36 years
since its publication in 1980,70Unopresented a ‘theory of principles’ (genriron),
heavily intervening in, restructuring and limiting the architecture of Marx’s
Capital, withwhichUno throughout his life remained in a theoretical dialogue.
To name but two examples: first, crucially for Uno, the ‘theory of principles’
is free from references to real historical development, empirical or statistical
evaluations, and therefore, in contrast to Marx’s Capital, which heavily draws
on and theorises these data, limits the scope of presentation to a ‘pure theory’,
or, as it were, a theory of ‘pure capitalist society’ ( junsui shihonshugi shakai). It
therefore represents the direct application of the level of ‘pure theory’ or ‘prin-
ciples’. Second, and more significantly for the present study, while Marx starts
the first volume of his main work with the analysis of the ‘Production Pro-
cess of Capital’, Uno regards the ‘Doctrine of Circulation’ (ryūtsūron), i.e. the
economic circulation ‘forms’ of the commodity, money and capital, as unre-
lated to the process of production, and as primary to the study of a ‘commodity
economy’.71 For Uno, Marx’s labour theory of value is prematurely introduced
69 Uno 1974 [1962], p. 55 and pp. 60–1.
70 In 2016, the English translation of Uno’s Types of Economic Policies under Capitalism
(Keizai Seisakuron 1936/1971) was published, by the same translator and long-time Unoist,
Thomas T. Sekine. See Uno 2016 [1971].
71 The term ‘commodity economy’ is favoured by Uno throughout his work overMarx’s term
‘capitalist relations of production’, which already shows where Uno’s interest differs from
Marx: while, for Marx, capital is mainly characterised by the specificity of its contradict-
ory social relation to (wage) labour, for Uno, the specificity lies in capital as a principally
commodity producing society. We will return to this issue in Chapter 2.
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for the theory of money and capital. Its systematic locus should instead be in
the analysis of the process of production.72 Furthermore, in his reconstructive
reading, stretching from his works on value (Kachiron, 1947) to the Principles,
Uno strongly criticises Marx’s ‘derivation’ of money from the analysis of the
commodity and the labour theory of value, arguing instead thatmoney already
represents the guarantee of the commodities’ commensurability.73 These pre-
liminary remarks should only help to ‘filter’ where we believe Uno’s interven-
tion significantly departs from Marx’s, while the actual analysis of Uno’s own
reconstruction, especially his reconstruction of the scope and intent of Capital
in the Principles and other writings, is performed in detail in the forthcom-
ing chapters. However, one further significant theoretical structure informing
Uno’s categorial reconstruction as against Marx’s should not go unmentioned
at this point. We shall briefly turn to it in the following.
Aswewill see andprominently discuss, Uno’s approach to political economy
is fundamentally based on the structural and systematic heuristic prevalence
of use value over value. This sets him squarely apart from Marx’s heuristic of
the centrality of value and the fetishistic forms it assumes. The conceptual cir-
cumference of use value in Uno serves to strategically account for capitalism’s
alleged ‘self-regulatory’74 production in a ‘commodity economy’where produc-
tion meets ‘society’s needs’, and which stresses the role of commodity owners
for exchange and equilibrium production conceived as the ‘law of value’ (kachi
hōsoku). For Uno, the capital relation itself becomes secondary to social pro-
duction. In fact, the ‘law of value’, for Uno, is a ‘corrective process’ through
which economic laws are ‘enforced’, and in which ‘social imbalances tend to be
removed, as individual producers pursue their profits’.75 This evaluation sets
Uno’s ‘law of value’ radically apart from the labour theory of value, in both
its methodological significance as well as in scope and meaning. In Uno’s the-
ory of pure capitalism, use value and the ‘social satisfaction of needs’ become
the angle from which capitalist production is viewed, with the ‘law of value’
72 ‘Marx begins the first chapter of Capital, vol. 1, by pointing out the importance of the
commodity-form that products assume. But after stating that use-value and value are
the two elements of the commodity, he immediately attributes the substance of value to
labour that is required to produce the commodity. But the production process of a com-
modity is not yet analysed at this stage … This means that commodity production or the
production process of capital can be introduced only after the conceptual development
of the form of the commodity into that of capital’. Uno 1980, pp. xxvii–xxviii.
73 We discuss this, along with Itoh Makoto’s and Costas Lapavitsas’s theories of money, in
Lange 2017.
74 Uno 2016 [1971], p. 17.
75 Uno 2016 [1971], p. 17.
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as the framework of an ‘equilibrium’ view of social production. This stands in
clear opposition toMarx’s ownheuristic of (surplus) value as the centre around
which production is organised. Because for Marx, the production of monetary
surplus value is at stake in capitalist production – the ‘general form of wealth
as wealth’ – the aim of producing capital is ‘never use value’.76 Accordingly,
we believe that Uno’s basic approach to political economy as an equilibrium
form of production aimed at use value is fatal, for it systematically obscures
the kernel of capitalist production based on the exploitation-nexus: ‘… instead
of the scale of production being determined by existing needs, the quantity of
products made is determined by the constantly increasing scale of production
dictated by themode of production itself. Its aim is that the individual product
should contain as much unpaid labour as possible, and this is achieved only by
producing for the sake of production’.77Wewill see that what we argue to be ‘use
value fetishism’ indeed forms a vital structural problem in both Uno and Uno-
affiliated research.78 For someonewho has dedicated fifty years of his life to the
study and especially the method of Capital,79 culminating his efforts in a com-
plete reconstruction of the architecture, scope and – as I will argue – object
of Marx’s magnum opus, this is quite an astonishing result. We will see that
Uno’s radical departure fromMarx’s original problematic, the Critique of Polit-
ical Economyand the critiqueof fetishism, alsonecessitates adifferent framing
of the object of critique: the capitalist mode of production no longer desig-
nates a problem, but a fact. Uno’s approach to the object of political economy
therefore incorporates both amethodological and factual ‘unhinging’ of Marx’s
entire project as a critique. As we will see, this ‘unhinging’ is not limited to the
heuristic prevalence of use value over value. It is also expressed in the reference
to the framework of methodological individualism in the personal ‘wants’ of
commodity owners implied in his reinterpretation of the analysis of the value
form (Chapter 3.2.), an understanding of ‘social reproduction’ detached from
the exploitation of alien and unpaid labour (Chapter 4.1.), the dismissal of a
concept of crisis in favour of a concept of business cycles consolidating that
equilibrium (Chapter 4.2.), and other significant divergences from Marx’s pro-
ject. These crucial departures fromMarx’s critical impetus, however, altogether
hinge on Uno’s reformulation, and – as we contend – mutilation of Marx’s
76 Marx 1973, p. 600.
77 Marx 1976, pp. 1037–8. Original emphases.
78 The term ‘use value fetishism’ was coined by Kornelia Hafner, in Hafner 1993. See our dis-
cussion in relation to Uno in Chapter 5.3.
79 Fifty Years of Capital (Shihonron gojūnen) is the title of Uno’s 2-volume monograph from
1970 and 1973.
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labour theory of value into an equilibrium, use value-oriented and overtly har-
monious ‘lawof value’. Asmentioned earlier,Marx’s theory of value is not only a
heuristic schema for grasping the social mode of capitalist production as a sci-
entific object. It much rather presents the method of critique by which we can
adequately confront the object of our scientific interest, namely the capital-
relation, i.e. the relation between capital and the social form of labour, as the
structuring principle of this thing we call ‘capitalism’.
1.1.2 Marx’s Labour Theory of Value asMethod (The Turing-Bombe of
Political Economy)
Itmay be useful at this point to say a littlemore about the specific critical claim
of Marx’s value theory. We hold that it serves as the methodological tool that
links Marx’s Critique with its object – the categories of bourgeois and vulgar
political economy – and, by doing so, points to the blind spots of conventional
economic thought that necessitates its various fetishisms. This claim, needless
to say, not only setsMarx’s theory of value radically apart from the value theory
of the classics, but likewise becomes the ground for their critique.Wewill show
in thenext section thatAdamSmith andDavidRicardo, despite thewidespread
view to the contrary, did not hold a consistent, social labour theory of value at
all – and that, in fact, only Marx’s value theory is able to form both the ground
to a consistent critique of the categories of conventional political economy and
account for the analysis of their implementation in the reality of the capitalist
production process. We therefore follow Brentel’s contention that
[it is]Marx’s central insight that the labour theory of value as a historical-
economic logic of ground and measure (historisch-ökonomische Begrün-
dungs- und Maßlogik) of capitalist-industrial society – ‘labour’ precisely
both as immanent measure, as well as ground of value – can only be per-
formed as a form-and fetish-theory of economic-social objectivity.80
Already forMarx,who, aswill be explained soon, confronted the problemof pre-
supposition in the exposition of the labour theory of value in the first chapter of
Capital, the labour theory of value presents the ‘secret’ to the fetish-character
of the commodity. In the history of its reception however, despite the section
title in which the theory of commodity fetishism is presented – ‘The Fetishism
of the Commodity and its Secret’ – the ‘secret’ to the fetish-character has been
almost entirely, and comfortably, ignored. Except that Marx made it very clear
80 Brentel 1989, p. 19. Emphasis added.
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that this ‘secret’, i.e. that labour-time is the real measure of exchange relations,
can only be ignored at the cost of – one’s head:
… in the midst of the accidental and ever-fluctuating exchange relations
between products, the labour time socially necessary to produce them
asserts itself as a regulative law of nature. In the same way, the Law of
Gravity asserts itself when a person’s house collapses on top of him. The
determination of the magnitude of value by labour-time is therefore a
secret hidden under the apparent movements in the relative values of
commodities.81
From this alone it becomes evident that Marx’s decision to present his theory
of value right at the beginning of Capitalwas neither amethodological stopgap
nor an unproven presupposition, but the objective and methodological vant-
age point that structures his analysis not only in its essence, but in its form.
Previously, we indicated that the labour theory of value is not only ‘statically’
applied to certain categorial misconstructions in conventional political eco-
nomy. It much rather accompanies these misconstructions to account for the
dynamic by which the source of value in labour is categorially lost. The fetish-
istic character of categories such as interest and rent therefore does not only
stem from a ‘real abstraction’ as constitutive of the mode of cognition within
the horizon of capitalist exchange relations.82 That is, even in cases when the
source of value does not seem to emerge from exchange alone (‘profit upon
alienation’), namely in the production process itself, it may seem to the cap-
italist as though the source of value stemmed from his own investment, from
his own advanced capital, e.g. machines or technology. For Marx, this type of
fetishism is the belief of capital as ‘fruit-bearing’, to which he returns time and
again throughout his economic writings (for example, he dedicates a whole
chapter to ‘Interest-bearing Capital as a Fetish-form of Capital’ in the 1861–63
Economic Manuscripts).83 To illustrate the complex of the fetish and to give an
81 Marx 1976, p. 168. Emphasis added. There is a commonmisunderstanding for the ‘regulat-
ive law of nature’ to indicate a kind of ‘second nature’ as has been theorised by Adorno
and Lukács to describe a type of ‘supra-individual domination’. See O’Kane 2013, p. 64.
Marx clearly means that in reality, the exchange relations are determined by the labour
socially necessary to produce them. This has nothing to dowith the individuals’ conscious
or unconscious relation to exchange.
82 On the concept of real abstraction in Alfred Sohn-Rethel, see Lange 2021 (forthcoming).
83 ‘Interest-bearing capital is the perfect fetish. It is capital in its finished form – as such rep-
resenting the unity of the production process and the circulation process – and therefore
yields a definite profit in a definite period of time. In the form of interest-bearing capital
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example for the origins of obfuscation, let us briefly review howMarx develops
the categories of interest and rent from the standpoint of the ‘functioning cap-
italist’ (the industral capitalist receiving interest-bearing capital) in the 1861–63
Economic Manuscripts:
Thus two forms of surplus-value – interest and rent, the results of cap-
italist production – enter into it as prerequisites, as advances which the
capitalist himself makes; for him, therefore, they do not represent any
surplus-value, i.e., any surplus over and above the advances made. As far
as these forms of surplus-value are concerned, it appears to the individual
capitalist that the production of surplus-value is a part of the production
costsof capitalist production, and that the appropriationof other people’s
labour and of the surplus over and above the value of the commodities
consumed in the process (whether these enter into the constant or into
the variable capital) is a dominating condition of this mode of produc-
tion … In critical moments, profit too confronts the capitalist in fact as a
condition of production, since he curtails or stops productionwhenprofit
disappears or is reduced to a marked degree as a result of a fall in prices.
Hence the nonsensical pronouncements of those who consider the dif-
ferent forms of surplus value to be merely forms of distribution; they are
just as much forms of production.84
The crucial point here being that in the consciousness and standpoint of the
capitalist, ‘everything happens above board, and at the same time, it does not’
(Adorno).85 To the functioning capitalist, surplus value in the form of interest
appears as a cost of production, since he has borrowed themoney or the ‘value
advanced’ with which production began. At the same time however, the func-
tioning capitalist is unaware of how this surplus pays not only interest and
rent, but even his own profit. He is unable to see how interest and rent become
the conditions of wage labour, which again yields the surplus from which his
profit, interest and rent is formed. The only thing that interests the capitalist
are his costs of production and his profit. What happens in between, the ori-
gin of both his costs and his profit, is anathematic. Interest-bearing capital, for
Marx, conceived of ‘without the mediation of either production process or cir-
culation process’ is the ‘consummate automatic fetish, the self-valorising value,
only this function remains, without the mediation of either production process or circu-
lation process’. Marx 1989b, p. 451.
84 Marx 1989b, pp. 477–8.
85 Backhaus 2011, p. 506. Own translation.
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the money-making money, and in this form it no longer bears any trace of its
origin’.86 But it is precisely this phenomenal state that crucially informs bour-
geois political economy’s scientific evaluation – and here is also the source of
the ‘sticking fast’ to the apparent forms that gives rise to the fetishism of e.g.
profit, interest and rent and capital, and not labour, as ‘fruit-bearing’. For Marx,
therefore, ‘[the] categories of bourgeois economics consist precisely in forms of
this kind’.87 The above passage however also serves as a striking example that
for Marx, fetishism is not a problem of a subjectively ‘wrong’ or ‘illusionary’
perception of reality. What Marx also calls ‘objective forms of thought’,88 and
what Hegel has termed ‘objective thought’ (objektiver Gedanke)89 are ‘socially
valid’,90 and hence objective phenomena. For both Marx and Hegel, ‘objective
forms of thought’ are the result of a process in which subjective conscious-
ness becomes sublated, which – to speak with Marx – gain an objectivity that
becomes independent of ‘the will, foreknowledge and actions’91 of individuals.
As Ingo Elbe contends, ‘[objective] forms of thought forMarx are neither value
normoney as economic forms, but the reproduction-in-thought of these forms
in their “ready-made” form of appearance, in which they no longer exhibit the
social mediation of their own genesis’.92 Yet, the category of abstract labour
that constitutes the ‘buried essence’ of capitalist self-representation cannot be
empirically verified/ falsified – its self-representation can only ever appear in
fetishistic form, as money, profit, interest, etc., fostering its various fetishisms.
It has no other mode of existence. It is therefore only by the methodological
‘Turing-Bombe’ of political economy, the labour theory of value as the logic
of the substance, the measure, and the form of the capitalist metabolism, that
a common grounding nexus of the disparate forms that value assumes in its
actual existence, asmoney, price, profit, interest, rent, etc. can bemeaningfully
‘decoded’ and thus generated. To explain whywe believe this faculty allows the
labour theory of value to link Marx’s critical method with its object, we shall
briefly refer to the problematic of essence and appearance and the notion of
form, and especially the form of labour.
86 Marx 1989b, p. 451. Original emphasis.
87 Marx 1976, p. 169.
88 Marx 1976, p. 169.
89 ‘The expressionobjective thoughts signifies the truthwhichought tobe the absolute object,
not just the goal of philosophy’. Hegel 1991 [1830], p. 63. For Hegel, in contrast to Marx,
objective thought denotes the thought-determinations (Denkbestimmungen) of an object,
is necessarily true.
90 Marx 1976, p. 169.
91 Marx 1976, p. 167.
92 Elbe 2008a, p. 3.
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As mentioned earlier, the question of essence (or substance) and appear-
ance (or form) is a recurring theme in Marx’s Critique, and serves as a fruitful
heuristic in light of the role of the labour theory of value for the critique of fet-
ishism, i.e. the critique of the fetish-character value assumes as form. Again,
it is important to be aware of this notion of form as fetish, for it marks the
discursive sphere in which Marx’s Critique is embedded. In this sense, in his
important work onMarx’s critique of fetishism, Stephan Grigat points out that
the ‘secret’ of the fetish consists not so much in the quantitative expression
of value in labour time as the measurement of the magnitude of value (its
‘substance’), as ‘orthodox Marxism’ would have us believe, but rather in the
qualitative form of capitalist labour itself.93 Indeed, Heinrich has emphasised
with regard to the transformation problem that the central problem of Marx’s
value theory, namely how it ‘is possible in the first place to relate products of
labour to one another as commodities’,94 has been neglected in theories of
value, which recur to the labour theory of value as a quantitative model for
determining price, instead of emphasising the qualitative form of the specific
kind of labour which is productive of value (abstract labour). While we agree
with these authors that the labour theory of value is not exhausted in determ-
ining the magnitude of value, we think that the relevance of Marx’s value the-
ory consists first and foremost in delivering the critique of the forms that value
assumes in bourgeois productive relations.With ‘higher productive relations’,95
(abstract) labour becomes increasingly obscure, as the fetishistic formsof value
proceed to abstract from the process of production. What therefore remains
hidden is the form of labour under capitalist production – and this second
meaning of ‘form’ plays yet another significant role for Marx’s Critique, fam-
ously in his direct reckoning with Smith and Ricardo’s negligence of the ‘form
of value which in fact turns value into exchange-value’,96 i.e. the social form
of exchange-value positing labour (tauschwertsetzende Arbeit). With regard to
these two equally important and yet distinct specific usages of form in Marx’s
Critique, Helmut Brentel has developed the heuristic of Social Form i and
Social Form ii:
It is … crucial to comprehend that Marx views both value and value-
form as specifically social forms (soziale Formen) of social labour (gesell-
schaftlicher Arbeit). Abstract-general labour as the substance of value
93 Grigat 2007, p. 73.
94 Heinrich 1999, p. 277.
95 Marx 1904 [1859], p. 31.
96 Marx 1976, p. 174, footnote 34.
introduction – marx’s critique of fetishism as method 29
already presents a specifically social form (Form i), which assumes its
formof appearance and existence in the categories of bourgeois economy
(Form ii).97
In otherwords, these two concepts of formwhich equally informMarx’s critical
method are related: in ‘Form i’, the social form of labour that is exchange-value
positing or abstract labour, presents the hidden matrix, or the ‘Turing-Bombe’
to ‘Form ii’, which designates the autonomisation from the ‘conscious stand-
point’ of the economic agents, paradigmatically as the autonomisation from
use-value in the value-form of money. The form of social labour in capitalism
(Form i), for Marx, is therefore to be found in the concept of abstract labour
at the beginning of his exposition, which ‘passes through’ (tōsu) – to use an
emblematic expression by Uno – the forms of appearance which the value
forms (Form ii) assume. Needless to say, the labour theory of value, which
defines abstract labour as this ‘commonality’, as substance, can only reach its
full exposition, and with it, its full ‘confirmability’ at the end of the exposition,
when all the categories of political economy ‘will have been’ analysed. It there-
fore anticipates a methodological ‘future tense’ that we have elsewhere named
‘the pudding’ whose proof is in ‘eating it’, i.e. in applying themodel of labour as
social form as the interpretative framework.98 Yet, this is precisely the analyt-
ical and anti-dogmatic strength of Marx’s labour theory of value. For the crucial
insight into the presupposition of the labour theory of value lies in themethod
of its proof, i.e. in the very process of the critical analysis of the categories and
contentions of political economy: in ‘eating the pudding’. Hence the ‘proof’ of
the ‘pudding’ – the labour theory of value – is in ‘eating it’, i.e. reviewing the
contentions, convulsions and conventions of the theoretical interpreters of the
bourgeois relations of production, the political economists, at every level of
the unfolding of their categories. The fact that it cannot be proven without the
process of its own implementation that must pass through the totality of cap-
italist social relations and their conventional interpretation is however what
endows its with its anti-positivistic and anti-dogmatic character.We can there-
fore conclude that for Marx’s labour theory of value as the critical method of
the ‘de-fetishisation’ or ‘de-mystification’ of the categories of classical polit-
ical economy, the standpoint of totality is already presupposed, and by being
presupposed, in every categorial instance shown to be both semantically and
pragmatically in effect: in that sense, for example, the concept of money in the
97 Brentel 1989, p. 14.
98 See Lange 2019b.
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very first chapter of Capital already presupposes the concept of wage labour
and capital.99 This view stands in stark contrast with Uno’s understanding of
the labour theory of value as an ‘unnecessary’ presupposition which cannot
be ‘proven’ at the locus of its presentation, in the first chapter of Capital.100
Because Marx’s presentation of the labour theory of value in the first chapter
of Capital, as will be prominently discussed, arguably presents the strongest
bone of contention for Uno, we shall give a brief account to a theme directly
related to the question of method and object: the question ‘with what must
science begin?’ – the question of presupposition.
1.1.3 Introduction to the Problem of Presupposition
For Uno, the definition of the substance of value as ‘abstract labour’, and its
quantity in ‘socially necessary labour time’ in the average, is introduced ‘pre-
maturely’ into the architecture of Capital. Marx should have instead deferred
it to the analysis of ‘The Labour Process and the Valorization Process’ proper
in Chapter 7.101 At the beginning, Uno contends, Marx should have focused on
the ‘form’ of value in exchange alone. In his own Principles, Uno hence presents
what he considers a significant corrective toMarx, by deferring the labour the-
ory of value to the ‘Doctrine of Production’, which is however preceded by the
‘Doctrine of Circulation’ (a detailed analysis of Uno’s restructuring of Capital
and its motivations will be conducted in Chapter 4). We believe however that
Uno does not realise how mistaken his criticism is. To introduce the matter,
which we will return to, we shall draw attention to the specific critical claim
that the alleged ‘unproven’ presupposition of the labour theory of value has,
in the context of Marx’s method. Let it be recalled that Marx’s exposition is
directly informed by the critique of fetishism. What Marx identified as the
object of the analysis – the capitalist mode of production and its bourgeois
interpretation – is implicitly presupposed at the beginning, even if not all of
the concepts that we need to characterise it can be made explicit. The expli-
cit or the semantic, i.e. the ‘meaning’ of a concept (such as ‘capitalist mode
99 ‘… already the simple forms of exchange value and of money latently contain the opposi-
tion between labour and capital etc’. Marx 1973, p. 248.
100 Uno by no means was the first to express concerns that the law of value hadn’t been
‘proven’ at its introduction in Chapter 1 of Capital Volume i. See Marx’s letter to Kugel-
mann, 11 July 1868, in which Marx refers to the ‘unfortunate fellow’ from Centralblatt – a
reviewer of Capital Volume i – who ‘does not see that, even if there were no chapter on
“value” at all in my book, the analysis I give of the real relations would contain the proof
and demonstration of the real value relation’. Marx 1988 [1868–70], p. 68.
101 In the English translation. In the German original, ‘Arbeitsprozess und Verwertungs-
prozess’, forms Chapter 5 of Capital Volume i.
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of production’) is postponed until the implicit or the pragmatic can be fully
thematised. This is quite uncontroversial: definitions of certain concepts – say,
‘city’ or ‘apple’, or ‘consciousness’ –presuppose a certain conceptual and logical
apparatus other than the concepts to be defined. In his study of Hegel’s dia-
lectic,DieterWandschneider calls this problemof the exposition the ‘semantic-
pragmatic discrepancy’:
For a theory of dialectic, two aspects seem to be of fundamental signific-
ance: on the one hand, the view … according to which every logical cat-
egory (with the exceptionof the final determination) contains a semantic-
pragmatic discrepancy (semantisch-pragmatische Diskrepanz). It consists
in the fact that the explicit meaning of a category does not express all
that is implicitly presupposed (präsupponiert) for its meaning. That this
must be the case immediately makes sense; since in order to explicate a
particular meaning, the whole apparatus of logical categories and prin-
ciples must be presupposed. This tension between the semantic content
and that which is pragmatically presupposed for the argumentative acts
(Argumentationsakte) that precede it,necessitates the introductionof cat-
egories by which this ‘pragmatic surplusmeaning’ (pragmatischer Bedeu-
tungsüberhang) is further semantically explicated [and diminished, ell].
In other words: the semantic-pragmatic discrepancy contained in a cat-
egory which, under specific conditions, can be exacerbated to a perform-
ative contradiction [‘being is not nothingness’], makes the necessity to
introduce ever new categories plausible, as long as the ‘pragmatic surplus
meaning’ remains.102
In Marx’s exposition, the matter is quite similar: the postponement of the
explicit meaning of a category is, however, successively closed in on by the
performance of the actual analysis. The pragmatic surplus meaning – the bag-
gage carried by the labour theory of value and the concept of abstract labour
as the ‘substance of value’ throughout the analysis – is thus successively shed:
with an ever deeper insight into the process of exchange between commodity
A (20 yards of linen) and commodity B (one coat), the appearance of simple
exchange as the predominant social metabolism loses its heuristic power. ‘It
becomes plain that it is not the exchange of commodities which regulates the
magnitude of their values, but rather the reverse, themagnitude of the value of
102 Wandschneider 1995, p. 26. The other ‘aspect of fundamental significance’ for the theory of
dialectic forWandschneider is the concept of ‘self-referential negation’ which, for reasons
of space, cannot be discussed here.
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commodities which regulates the proportion in which they exchange’.103 The
cognitive gain for Marx hence consists precisely in the emphasis on the pre-
supposed context of totality, in which isolated (‘autonomous’) concepts lose
their explanatory power: the obvious explanation in the category of ‘exchange-
value’ does not categorially redeem the complex relations which generalised
commodity exchange entails. For Marx, therefore, ‘the whole system of bour-
geois production’ is presupposed, so that a category like ‘exchange-value’ can
appear on its surface:
An analysis of the specific form of the division of labour, the conditions
of production on which it is based, and the economic relationships of
the members of the society to which these conditions of production are
reduced, would show that the whole system of bourgeois production is
the premiss for exchange value appearing on its surface as a mere point
of departure, and the process of exchange, as it unfolds in the simple
circulation, as a social exchange of matter, simple but encompassing both
the whole of production and the whole of consumption. It would transpire,
therefore, that already other, more complicated relations of production,
more or less conflicting with the liberty and dependence of individuals,
their economic relationships, are the premiss that, as free private produ-
cers in simple relations of purchase and sale, they should confront each
other in the process of circulation and should figure as its independent
subjects. But from the standpoint of the simple circulation, these relation-
ships are obliterated.104
Yet, Marx deliberately chooses to present the analysis of the value form in the
‘language of English economists’.105 And here is where Marx’s method of the
semantic-pragmatic cleft and his critique of fetishism comes full circle: for it is
precisely this ‘appearance on the surface’ which forms the standpoint of clas-
sical and neoclassical political economy that forms the target of his critique.
We can say that Marx’s target is doubled in our critical evaluation of Uno’s
intervention, which, as we will show, shares its methodological impetus with
classical and neoclassical political economy. Marx’s method of form analysis
thus consciously takes its vantagepoint from the simple categories of bourgeois
political economy– the commodity, exchange value, exchange at all – however,
103 Marx 1976, p. 156.
104 Marx 1987 [1857–61], p. 466.
105 Marx 1904 [1859], pp. 19–20.
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not to adapt its propositions unquestioned, but to analyse these forms towards
their form determinations, towards the characteristics that point beyond their
reductionisms.106
For Marx, the analysis of the ‘economic law of motion of modern society’107
is thus not a matter of providing definitions. It is, much rather, a matter of
reconstructing the object through its critique – a ‘forensic investigation’ into
the forgotten, obscured, and obfuscated implications of his very object, implic-
ations that make up the ‘pragmatic surplus meaning’, and therefore cannot be
made explicit at the beginning – but which nevertheless constitute the object
of the analysis. The capitalistmode of production and the social form of labour
that characterises it can only be made explicit by the successive analysis of
the fetishised categories that constitute the categories of conventional polit-
ical economy and its ‘science’. Herein lies the critical claim of Marx’s method.
We will show that Marx, in his exposition of the object of his study, and much
ignored by Uno and his followers, very deliberately steps into the pragmatic-
semantic discrepancy that is required at the beginning of any critical study of
a system, especially a dynamic one such as capitalism. In other words, we hold
that, for Marx, the proof of the ‘labour theory of value’ is in eating the pudding,
i.e. in performing the Critique of Political Economy. With this radically new
insight into the problematic of the categorial analysis of the capitalist mode of
production, putting the critiqueof fetishismat theheart of Marx’s intervention,
a new discipline is born: that of the categorial criticism of the real appearance
(realer Schein) of the social relations of production. To therefore understand
how the new object of investigation – an object that simultaneously informs
themethod of Marx’s analysis – emerged, we should first take a look at the the-
oretical formation of theories of value in Marx’s predecessors, notably Adam
Smith and David Ricardo.108 It would also certainly be rewarding to draw a dif-
ferent line of trajectory, e.g. from Proudhon toMarx. But this line which would
without doubt contribute to understand Marx’s negation of Proudhon’s equa-
tion of value and immediate labour timewould undermine the crucial point in
Marx: namely that the mature Marx was less interested in contrasting the cap-
italist mode of production with the utopias of socialism, but in contrasting the
bourgeois mode of production with its own claims. To better pinpoint Marx’s
theoretical formation of the new object of political economy, encompassing
106 Brentel 1989, p. 279.
107 Marx 1976, p. 92.
108 For the theoretical confrontation of Ricardo and Marx in the anglophone reception, see
Fine 1980, Himmelweit and Mohun 1981, Clarke 1994. For a broader discussion of Smith,
Ricardo, and the neoclassical tradition, see Foley 2006.
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the critique of all previous economic science, we should therefore remain with
the ‘bourgeois economists’, Smith and Ricardo. As mentioned earlier, Marx’s
labour theory of value is to be understood as the methodological heuristic for
the analysis of Marx’s central question: why and how do all products of labour
assume the fetishistic formof valueunder the conditions of the capitalistmode
of production, forms that constitute the categories of political economy? To
answer this question, Marx was specifically intent to recapitulate the process
of the constitution of the very objects of classical political economy themselves.
In the next chapter, we shall therefore recapitulate the value theories of Smith
and Ricardo to understand how Marx’s own theory was developed from their
critique.
1.2 The Aporias of Classical Political Economy109
The best points in my book are: 1. (this is fundamental to all under-
standing of the FACTS) the two-fold character of labour according
to whether it is expressed in use-value or exchange-value, which is
brought out in the very First Chapter; 2. the treatment of surplus-
value regardless of its particular forms as profit, interest, ground
rent, etc. … The treatment of the particular forms in classical polit-
ical economy, where they are forever being jumbled up together
with the general form, is an olla potrida!110
marx to Engels, August 24th, 1867.
∵
Marx’s radical breakwith the science of political economyconsists in laying the
foundation for a specific new object of investigation under the capitalist mode
of production: the social form of labour. His theory is therefore not merely an
‘extension’ or a ‘rearrangement’ of the economic theory of the classics, but the
invention of a completely new horizon for the critical analysis of the capitalist
mode of production. Marx’s own self-understanding of his intervention as the
109 Abridged versions of this chapter have previously appeared in Lange 2019a and Lange
2019b.
110 Marx 1987 [1864–8], p. 407.
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Critique of Political Economy is where his radical revolution – indeed, his ‘com-
munist Copernican turn’ – is embedded. As mentioned before, Marx’s project
therefore cannot be understood in abstraction from his critique of the clas-
sics. It is Marx’s reading of political economists – notably Smith and Ricardo –
andvulgar economists – Say, Bailey,Malthus, JamesMill,McCulloch,Destutt de
Tracy and many others – but also socialists like Proudhon, Owen, and others,
that formed the condition of possibility for his own theoretical development
that resulted in his magnum opus, Capital. Understanding the social form of
labour is precisely what Marx found wanting in conventional political eco-
nomy:
Political economy has indeed analysed value and its magnitude, however
incompletely, and has uncovered the content concealed within these
forms. But it has never once asked the question why the content has
assumed that particular form, that is to say, why labour is expressed in
value, and why themeasurement of labour by its duration is expressed in
the magnitude of the value of the product.111
… classical political economy in fact nowhere distinguishes explicitly
and with clear awareness between labour as it appears in the value of a
product, and the same labour as it appears in the product’s use-value.112
WhatMarx critically discerns as the specific lack in the theories of the classics is
the problem of the fetishism of the bourgeois relations of production – a prob-
lem not even fathomed to exist before Marx’s mature critique. The distinction
between abstract and concrete labour is the crucial critical distinction to clear
the path to a thoroughgoing critique of the capitalist relations of production
and its inverted self-representations. By determining the social form of labour
under these relations as value-producing abstract-general human labour and
distinguishing it from concrete labour as manifested in the commodity’s use
value, he also pierced the problem of form and content – the problem of fet-
ishism.
The specificity of abstract labour as the substance of value for Marx consists
in the fact that it always appears in a specific form – namely the value forms of
the commodity, money, capital, wage, profit, price, interest and rent, categories
that comprise the ‘science’ of political economy – in which it is always system-
111 Marx 1976, p. 174.
112 Marx 1976, p. 173.
36 chapter 1
atically obfuscated. Yet, it is precisely this phenomenological state of things –
that the essence or substance itself cannot appear but in an inverted, distorting,
and altogether spurious form – that goes unnoticed in the elaborations of clas-
sical political economy (not to speak of neoclassical theories after the demise
of the Ricardian School). In other words, before Marx, the science of political
economywas solely concerned with the forms of value as value’s mere appear-
ance – without giving a thought to the specific substance, i.e. the general social
formof labour, that give rise to these categories at all. Indeed,without giving any
thought to an ‘epistemological cleft’ between the appearance and the essence
of specific value forms at all, the classics had to remain on an a level of abstrac-
tion that has to tautologically resort to explaining form by form itself.
As noted earlier, the question of form in Marx can only be answered on
the basis of its analysis, as the method of form analysis. Marx’s method of
form analysis dissolves the fetishised objective dimension of a category like
‘exchange value’ or ‘the commodity’ as only appearing to be simple, ‘given’, and
indeed presuppositionless. The analysis of their form shows that they can be
fully grasped only as the result of a very specific social process, presupposing
both the relations of (re)production and class. The beginning of Marx’s ana-
lysis in Capital is therefore already an ideology critique in the strict sense, as a
critique of the self-representations and -legitimisations of the sphere of simple
circulation that constitutes the only object of bourgeois economy and its sci-
ence. Through a reconstruction of Smith’s and Ricardo’s theories of value in
this Chapter (1.2.), we will see how Marx developed his own critical theory of
value.
Not unlike the classical and vulgar political economistsMarx attacked,many
present-day Marxian theorists however reinitialise and repeat the tautological
convolutions of Marx’s predecessors. In the last section of Chapter 1, we will
therefore argue that, under the heading of ‘value form theory’, Marxian schol-
ars of the last decades have initiated an apotheosis of ‘form’ while conferring
a much lesser status to ‘substance’ or content, an intervention that is not only
quite contrary toMarx’s critical intention, but regresses to the ‘fetishisms of the
bourgeois relations of production’ that Marx was precisely out to deconstruct.
To first understand how the new object andmethod of investigation emerged
in Marx, we should first take a look at the theoretical formation of theories
of value in Marx’s predecessors, notably Adam Smith and David Ricardo. The
aporias at work in these theories considerably informed Marx’s critique of
them and gave rise to Marx’s own labour theory of value.
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1.2.1 Smith’s and Ricardo’s Aporia and the Birth of Marx’s Value Theory as
Critique
Of all the classical economists, Adam Smith and David Ricardo – along with
William Petty and Benjamin Franklin113 – were the most revered, but also the
ones most elaborately criticised by Marx. The praise they received was owed
to their attempts to systematically link a (albeit vague) concept of value to an
(equally vague) concept of labour. The criticism was owed to their respective
failures to be consistent in doing so. This, for Marx, was not a mystery, but was
accounted for by Smith’s and Ricardo’s ‘bourgeois consciousness’,114 which is
oblivious to the analysis of the social formof labour, predominantly in the form
of money and capital, i.e. the form of appropriation of alien labour without an
equivalent that is obfuscated in these forms. In fact, as we will see, because of
their failure to consequently establish the link between a social form of wealth
and the labour that produces it, neither Smith nor Ricardo can be said to have
had any ‘labour theory of value’ at all. This is especially true for Ricardo, who
never proposed an ‘embodied labour’ or ‘substantialist’ theory of value, butwas
interested solely in cost and production prices (in Marx’s terminology) from
the outset of his theory. Ricardo’s investigation hence only revolved around
magnitudes of ‘relative values’. In their respective theories of value, therefore,
precisely because they disengaged their discussions from a coherent and unified
ground of value in social labour, they resorted to aporia, exemplified in their
tautologies to explain labour values through the ‘value of labour’ (Smith), or in
their circular production price-determined understanding of value (Ricardo),
which effectively led to the collapse of a meaningful link between value and
the labour that produces it. Their endeavours finally resorted to explaining the
economic form of capitalism based on the theoretical framework of the circu-
lation, not the production sphere. What is more, the claim that Marx’s labour
theory of value is merely to be regarded as a ‘Classical residue in Marx’s value
theory’,115 a myth that haunts Marxologist debates even today, must be aban-
113 For a discussion of Marx’s reception of Petty and Franklin in light of the new mega, see
Hoff 2010.
114 Marx 1976, p. 175.
115 Itoh 1976, p. 312. This view was arguably inherited from Itoh’s teacher Uno: ‘… by directly
developing the labour theory of value, thehistorical viewpoint formally established for the
first time by Marx, falls back into the “failings” of classical political economy and cannot
even escape its dangers’. Uno 1974 [1962], p. 158. The same argument is made by Arthur:
‘… the introduction by Marx of a posited ground for labour before the form of value is
fully theorised represents a residue of classical political economy’. Arthur 2006, p. 10 and
Reuten: ‘[Marx’s] linking it [the ‘metaphor substance of value’] to embodiment seems to
derive from classical political economy’. Reuten 1993, p. 89.
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doned: not only on the basis that Marx’s theory was ‘social’ and ‘historically
specific’ while Smith’s and Ricardo’s were not, but on the basis that Smith and
Ricardo, in contrast to Marx, ultimately did not hold a labour theory of value
at all. The same is true for Marx’s concept of abstract labour as ‘the particular
form which labour assumes as the substance of value’116 – something of which
the classics had no notion. Hence, authors that claim Marx’s concept of the
substance of value in abstract labour or the labour theory of value were alto-
gether ‘derived’ (Geert Reuten) from classical political economy, are shown to
be wrong. This is all the more the case as, curiously, none of these interpreters
engageswith the ‘classics’ at all, whichmakes the thesis of the ‘classical residue’
even stranger and more inappropriate. The next sections will briefly demon-
strate Smith’s and Ricardo’s ‘circle of reasoning’ (Begründungszirkel)117 in their
respective theories of value. Only Marx, as I will show, had a consistent, social,
and a consistently social labour theory of value, a theory taking its vantage point
from the ‘double character’ of the labour represented in the commodity, a the-
ory that, in the concept of abstract labour as the specific social form of value,
gives coherence to both his critique of the ‘classics’ as well as his analysis of the
capitalist mode of production.
1.2.2 Conflicting Conceptualisations of Value inTheWealth of Nations
(1776)
Already in theTheory of Moral Sentiments (1759), Smith was concerned with an
objectivemeasure of valuemore profound than the notion of ‘utility’, position-
ing himself against David Hume. Nevertheless, the ‘new’ principle of value he
determines as ‘the machine or economy by means of which [the harmonious
movement of the system] is produced’,118 and therefore the concept of pro-
ductive activity, is derived from a strong subjectivist-ethical criterion, namely
‘approbation’. Yet, Smithwas the first tomove economic theory away froma ‘use
value’ centred standpoint to a theory linking ‘productive activity’ with value.
InTheWealth of Nations (1776), Smith undertakes three considerablemodifica-
tions of his earlier subjectivist-ethical qualification as labour as the sole stand-
ard for value. Here, next to a theory of the ‘toil of labour’,119 he holds a theory
116 Marx 1989a, p. 399.
117 Brentel 1989, p. 64.
118 Smith 2004 [1759], p. 216.
119 ‘The real price of every thing,what every thing really costs to themanwhowants to acquire
it, is the toil and trouble of acquiring it. What every thing is really worth to the man who
has acquired it, and who wants to dispose of it or exchange it for something else, is the
toil and trouble which it can save to himself, and which it can impose upon other people.
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of ‘relative prices’ (of which more below), from which follows an ‘component
parts’-theory of value. Ricardo will later resort to considerable modifications
as well, but in a different vein. To understand Ricardo’s and Marx’s critique of
Smith, let us first look at the problems in Smith conceptualisations. Early inThe
Wealth of Nations, Smith draws a close relation between the value of a good or
produce, and the labour time necessary to produce it:
In that early and rude state of society which precedes both the accumu-
lation of stock and the appropriation of land, the proportion between the
quantities of labour necessary for acquiring different objects seems to be
the only circumstance which can afford any rule for exchanging them for
one another. If among a nation of hunters, for example, it usually costs
twice the labour to kill a beaver which it does to kill a deer, one beaver
should naturally exchange for or beworth two deer. It is natural that what
is usually the produce of two days or two hours labour, should be worth
double of what is usually the produce of one day’s or one hour’s labour.120
But this relation is only valid in an ‘early and rude state of society’, a pre-
capitalist society. It was only before ‘the accumulation of stock and the appro-
priation of land’ that ‘labour’, measured in expenses (time), could meaning-
fully yield the standard of the proportions in which ‘different objects’ could be
exchanged for another. But this is not the conceptualisation of value Smith has
in mind for the liberal-bourgeois society he investigates. In it, the concept of
value, and therefore the relation between labour and value, becomes dramat-
ically different:
Everyman is rich or poor according to the degree inwhichhe can afford to
enjoy the necessaries, conveniences, and amusements of human life. But
after thedivisionof labour has once thoroughly takenplace, it is but a very
small part of thesewithwhich aman’s own labour can supply him.The far
greater part of them he must derive from the labour of other people, and
he must be rich or poor according to the quantity of that labour which
he can command, or which he can afford to purchase. The value of any
commodity, therefore, to the person who possesses it, and who means not
to use or consume it himself, but to exchange it for other commodities, is
What is bought with money or with goods is purchased by labour, as much as what we
acquire by the toil of our own body’. Smith 1846 [1776], p. 13.
120 Smith 1846 [1776], pp. 21–2.
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equal to the quantity of labour which it enables him to purchase or com-
mand. Labour, therefore, is the real measure of the exchangeable value of
all commodities.121
In bourgeois society, the value of commodities is no longer measured in the
labour expenses objectified in the commodities, but in ‘labour commanded’, in
the quantity of labour, which can purchase or ‘command’ a commodity. And
this is an entirely different thing than to say that the value of a commodity
consists in the labour ‘that it costs’: for now it is the value of labour someone
can command, and not labour values, that govern exchange relations. Marx
sees Smith’s tautology in the fact that Smith does not consistently follow the
concept of the ‘quantity of labour’ as the immanent measure of value in units
of time contained in a commodity and instead takes refuge in a concept of ‘the
value of labour’ which already contains a value-determined quantity. As wage
labour, ‘labour’ (the labourpower commodity)has value. But in consequence, it
cannot itself determine value: ‘The value of labour, or rather of labour capacity,
changes, like that of any other commodity, and is in no way specifically differ-
ent from the value of other commodities. Here value is made the measuring
rod and the basis for the explanation of value – so we have a cercle vicieux’.122
As a general logical prerequisite, it is obvious that what accounts for an entity
must be of a different category and quality than the entity itself. In the view of
Helmut Brentel, we are here confrontedwith the ‘circle of reasoning in classical
theories of value’,123 but we will see that present-day Marxologists stick to the
same illogical schema. Needless to say, for Marx, Smith’s original conception of
value as ‘labour commanded’ (= the value of labour) is not only tautological,
but anachronistic. Smith’s peculiar inversion of historical relations consists in
that, on the one hand, he assumes an objective theory of labour values in social
relations in which the conditions for production and reproduction have not yet
been subsumed under ‘objective’ exchange relations, i.e. exchange relations gov-
erned by social labour as the solemeasure of value – but as soon as he describes
capitalist relations, ironically, this determination no longer holds. Under capit-
alist relations, in which the ‘produce of labour does not always belong to the
labourer’, therefore, Smith merely assumes production prices that must ‘yield’,
i.e. substitute, ‘the profits of the stockwhich advanced thewages and furnished
121 Smith 1846 [1776], p. 13.
122 Marx 1988 [1861–3], p. 378.
123 Brentel 1989, p. 64.
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thematerials of that labour’, invested by the ‘owner of the stock’.124 Accordingly,
we find here a further specification of his ‘labour commanded’ theory of value:
The real value of all the different component parts of price, it must be
observed, is measured by the quantity of labour which they can, each of
them, purchase or command. Labour measures the value not only of that
part of price which resolves itself into labour, but of that which resolves
itself into rent, and of that which resolves itself into profit.125 In every
society the price of every commodity finally resolves itself into some one
or other, or all of those three parts; and in every improved society, all
three enter more or less, as component parts, into the price of the far
greater part of commodities.126 Wages, profit, and rent, are the three ori-
ginal sources of all revenue as well as of all exchangeable value.127
This further specification is, again, tautological: because allegedly, under capit-
alist relations, an explanation of ‘price’ based on labour values seems no longer
possible, Smith holds the view that the ‘price or exchangeable value’ of a com-
modity must be resolved into price-constituents: wages, profits, rent. Again, we
are confronted with a circular argument: the explanans is already contained in
the explanandum – price is explained by price. In both cases of circular reason-
ing, the theory of value is dissolved into a theory of relative price that already
encompasses the market and presupposes a general rate of profit. It thereby
resorts to the explanatory framework of the circulation sphere; yet another
inconsistency with regard to the initial claim. In consequence, Smith’s concep-
tualisation of ‘natural price’, resolving into (the price of) labour, capital and
land (i.e. wages, profit, and rent), has given the incentive to the (Sayian) theory
of the ‘factors of production’ – the ‘Trinity Formula’ in Marx’s dictum – that no
longer sees ‘labour’ as the source of value. The necessary unity of the substance
and the measure of value (which Marx’s labour theory of value accounts for)
remains altogether anathematic in Smith’s theory. To the contrary: Smith aban-
dons his initial determination of an immanentmeasure of value for an external
measure of value in a theory of ‘relative price’. Accordingly, by abstaining from
a reflection of inner coherence and sticking to the phenomenal form of price,
Smith (and Ricardo) were unable to develop a theory of the value forms as the
qualitative theory of the determination of money and price.
124 Smith 1846 [1776], p. 23.
125 Smith 1846 [1776], p. 23.
126 Smith 1846 [1776], p. 23.
127 Smith 1846 [1776], p. 24.
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1.2.3 Ricardo’s Conceptual Confusions
Ricardo’s improvement in value theory as against Smith’s concept of value as
‘labour commanded’ or the value of labour is obvious from the very first line of
his Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817):
The value of a commodity, or the quantity of any other commodity for
which it will exchange, depends on the relative quantity of labour which
is necessary for its production, and not on the greater or less compensa-
tion which is paid for that labour.128
This indeed seems closer to Marx’s later view. But other than Smith, whose
main aporia is owed to an anachronistic view of capitalist society, the precari-
ousness of Ricardo’s theory is owed to missing conceptual differentiations res-
ulting from a conflation of different levels of abstraction. From the start, Ricardo
identifies concrete and abstract labour (all labour for him is concrete labour),
labour and labour power, surplus value and profit, and – following from his
inability to understand the specificities of value-creating labour in the produc-
tion process – constant and variable capital. Instead, Ricardo merely differen-
tiates between ‘fixed’ and ‘circulating’ capital, ‘different forms arising out of the
process of the circulation of capital’129 – which effectively leads to Ricardo’s fail-
ure to explain the emergence of a uniform rate of profit on the basis of his own
value theory. The conflations of these terms can be deduced from Ricardo’s
incomprehension of 1) the specificity of value- and surplus value-producing
labour in the production process, measured in a variable working day,130 i.e. in
wages which represent necessary labour as against surplus labour, and whose
quantitative difference is the source of surplus value and, in deduced form,
profit, 2) in consequence, the unequal exchange between capital and labour.
All in all, Marx’s accusation of a ‘lack of the power of abstraction’ weighs heavy
on Ricardo’s economic theory. This becomes obvious right at the beginning of
Ricardo’s analysis where the rate of profit is ‘smuggled in’ – without a previous
explanation of the basis of profit in the first place. For it is entirely unclear how,
128 Ricardo 1969 [1817], p. 5. Marx praises Ricardo as having thus established ‘a unified theor-
etical holistic view of the abstract general basis of the bourgeois system’. Marx 1956, p. 54.
Own translation.
129 Marx 1989a, p. 401.
130 Ricardo’s failed attempts to find an ‘invariable measure of value’ (see Ricardo 1969 [1817],
Section vi, pp. 27–30) for which he had been mocked by Bailey, has its source ultimately
inmisrecognising the characteristic of wage labour as necessarily tied to a variable, not an
invariablemeasure. The measure of value is the working day.
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fromRicardo’s concept of value – depending on ‘the relative quantity of labour
which is necessary for its production’ – we should come to profit at all:
All Ricardo’s illustrations only serve him as ameans to smuggle in the pre-
supposition of a general rate of profit. And this happens in the first chapter
‘On Value’, while WAGES are supposed to be dealt with only in the 5th
chapter and profits in the 6th. How from the mere determination of the
‘value’ of the commodities their surplus value, the profit and even a gen-
eral rate of profit are derived remains obscure with Ricardo. IN FACT the
only thing which he proves in the above illustrations is that the prices of
the commodities, in so far as they are determined by the general rate of
profit, are entirely different from their values. And he arrives at this differ-
ence by postulating the rate of profit to be LAW. One can see that though
Ricardo is accused of being too abstract, one would be justified in accus-
ing him of the opposite: lack of the power of abstraction, inability, when
dealing with the values of commodities, to forget profits, a FACT which
confronts him as a result of competition.131
The real problem, according toMarx, is that, because Ricardo already confuses
value and production prices from the beginning of his inquiry, he never arrives
at the analysis of value. His vantage point ‘starts off too late’, so to speak, by
beginning with the superficial forms of appearance of value – ‘cost price’132
or (in Marx’s terminology) ‘production price’ – to investigate the effects of
a rise or a fall of wages on them.133 These effects are then naturally taken
to explain the general rate of profit. But we are left with a non sequitur:
wage itself is wanting of an explanation. Without a concept of the wage form,
his concept of profit is a deus ex machina. This problem becomes eminent
when Ricardo touches upon social reproduction. Here, he repeats Smith’s tau-
tological misconceptions to finally capitulate to the impasse, simultaneously
determining the value of a commodity by the socially necessary labour time
(‘the quantity of labour’) needed for its production, and the value of ‘labour’ in
exchange with capital. Ricardo’s inability to grasp not labour, but labour power
131 Marx 1989a, p. 416.
132 Cost prices consist of constant and variable capital and do not contain surplus value. Cat-
egorially, they belong to the level of production price (k + kp’). To explain both and how
they constitute a general rate of profit, we need a consistent theory of surplus value.
133 The effect of rising wages onto the different compositions of capital is the main theme in
the first section of The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation erroneously titled ‘On
Value’.
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as a commodity, and therefore to grasp the function of the wage-form, leads to
another tautology:
The power of the labourer to support himself, and the family which may
be necessary to keep up the number of labourers, does not depend on the
quantity of moneywhich hemay receive for wages, but on the quantity of
food, necessaries, and conveniences become essential to him from habit,
which that money will purchase. The natural price of labour, therefore,
depends on the price of the food, necessaries, and conveniences required
for the support of the labourer and his family. With a rise in the price of
food and necessaries, the natural price of labour will rise; with the fall in
their price, the natural price of labour will fall.134
Because Ricardo fails to determine the ‘value of labour’ by the money expres-
sion of wages – based on the labour time socially necessary for its reproduction,
and therefore variable – but by ‘natural price’, i.e. a fixed (‘from habit’) level of
wages warranting the reproduction of theworker and her family, ‘natural price’
again depends on theprice of ‘necessaries’. The ‘value of labour’ as labour’s ‘nat-
ural price’ therefore is determined by the use values necessary for the worker’s
subsistence, expressed in price of means of subsistence. Ricardo completely
disregards the constitutive function of the wage form – its unequal exchange
with capital –, which would require a value determination in terms of socially
necessary labour time, i.e. value, not in terms of use value.135 Ultimately, the
‘value of labour’, an expression of price, is explained by price.We find the same
‘circular reasoning’ that we have confronted in Smith’s determination of value
by ‘labour commanded’ or by the ‘value of labour’ which itself is wanting of
an explanation. Because both authors do not comprehend the necessity of a
concept of the substance of value, in which both the quality and the quantity
of that value is grounded – a concept of ‘absolute value’, ultimately, which first
of all explains relative values – they could not escape the tautological character
of their explanatory framework.What ismore, in their explanatory framework,
they remainon the level of appearance, of productionprice, and therefore resort
to the sphere of circulation. But let us briefly return to Smith, in order to see
more precisely why Ricardo theoretically lagged behind Smith himself. As we
134 Ricardo 1969 [1817], p. 52.
135 To further complicate the matter, Ricardo determines the value of labour power to be
equally dependent of ‘supply and demand’ as well as the ‘varying price of food and neces-
saries’ (Ricardo 1969 [1817], p. 8), further removing the concept of value from the initial
definition (and thereby provoking the mockery of J.B. Say).
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have seen, from the fact that, in capitalist production, theworker can no longer
‘buy back’ her own product, Smith draws the conclusion that the exchange
value of the commodities – under capitalist relations – is no longer determined
by the quantity of labour, but by its value. For Smith, the difference between
the quantum of labour that a commodity costs and the quantum of commod-
ities, which the worker can buy with this labour, is crucial. But why did Smith
resort to such a modification? Marx correctly sees that Smith ‘goes positively
mad’ (es ihn förmlich irremacht)136 over the problem of the exchange between
capital and labour on the basis of a formal validity of equivalent exchange.
Something else besides an exchange of equivalents – the exchange of labour
with its products – seems to be happening. Smith senses that, although he can-
not account for the reasons why, the law of value is transformed into a law of
appropriation. It is this very circumstance, this confrontation with a structural
antinomy – how the exchange between capital and labour can be explained
on the basis of the exchange of equivalents – that induced Smith to modify
his initial value theory, from a theory of materialised labour (vergegenständ-
lichte Arbeit) towards a theory of labour commanded that is itself wanting of
an explanation and caught up in circular reasoning. But whereas Smith ‘feels
some flaw has emerged’ and ‘senses that somehow – whatever the cause may
be, and he does not grasp what it is – in the actual result the law is suspended:
more labour is exchanged for less labour (from the labourer’s standpoint), less
labour is exchanged for more labour (from the capitalist’s standpoint)’ so that
the law of value ‘changes into its opposite’,137 Ricardo does not even ‘suspect
that this presents a problem’138 at all:
Ricardo simply answers that this is how matters are in capitalist produc-
tion. Not only does he fail to solve the problem; he does not even realise
its existence in Adam Smith’s work.139 Ricardo is satisfied with demon-
strating that the changing value of labour – in short, wages – does not
invalidate the determination of the value of the commodities, which are
distinct from labour itself, by the relative quantity of labour contained in
them. ‘They are not equal’, that is, ‘the quantity of labour bestowed on
a commodity, and the quantity of labour which that commodity would
purchase’.140 He contents himself with stating this fact. But how does the
136 Marx 1956, p. 56.
137 Marx/Engels 1988 [1861–3], p. 393.
138 Marx/Engels 1988 [1861–3]. p. 393.
139 ‘Er fühlt es nicht einmal bei A. Smith heraus’. Marx 1967, pp. 399–400.
140 English in the original.
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commodity labour differ from other commodities? One is living labour
and the other objectified labour. They are, therefore, only two different
forms of labour. Since the difference is only a matter of form, why should
a law apply to one and not the other? Ricardo does not answer – he does
not even raise this question.141
The identification of the value of labour with the labour product on the one
hand (i.e. the conflation of labour and labour power), as well as that of cost
price and relative value in Ricardo lead to considerable problems. These prob-
lems directly affect the emergence of a general rate of profit that Ricardo ini-
tially presupposes, but cannot explain.142While fromSmith’s theory of ‘produc-
tion costs’ or value component-theory (that Ricardo initially rejects), it follows
that the rise in one of the value components – labour – leads to a rise in all of
the components, which fatally contradicts the equal parts of value-assumption
of that theory, Ricardo was set to prove that, under certain circumstances, i.e.
when the proportion of fixed capital employed was relatively high, a rise in
wages effects a lowering of commodity prices. In The Principles of Political Eco-
nomy and Taxation, he therefore introduces another modification to his initial
‘labour theory of relative value’: no longer is the amount of labourmaterialised
in the commodity exclusively decisive for its value, but also the composition of
fixed and circulating capital, and therefore, the quantity of time that goes into
the production and the circulation process. Initially assuming that neither the
level of wages nor that of profit, but only the ‘quantity of labour bestowed on
them’ affects the relative value of commodities,143 in Section iv of his main
work, he ‘modifies’ his initial claim: ‘The principle that the quantity of labour
bestowed on the production of commodities regulates their relative value [is]
considerably modified by the employment of machinery and other fixed and
durable capital’.144 Were it the case that men ‘employed fixed capital of the
same value and of the same durability, then, too, the value of the commod-
ities produced would be the same, and they would vary with the greater or less
141 Marx/Engels 1989b, p. 34. In Chapter 4.2., we will come back to this problem in greater
detail.
142 Itmust benoted thatRicardo’s objectivewasnot to explain the sourceof anations’ ‘wealth’
per se, but the rules of distribution of the net product of wealth or value.
143 ‘No alteration in the wages of labour could produce any alteration in the relative value of
these commodities …Wages might rise twenty per cent, and profits consequently fall in a
greater or less proportion, without occasioning the least alteration in the relative value of
these commodities’. Ricardo 1969 [1817], p. 17.
144 Ricardo 1969 [1817], p. 18.
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quantity of labour employed on their production’.145 However, supposing that
two different capitalists employ different proportions of machinery (‘fixed cap-
ital’) in their production, the ones using a greater proportion of fixed capital
(e.g. manufacturers) would have to ‘obtain a further sum… for the profit’ which
they have invested in machinery, and consequently their goods must sell for a
higher price than, say, the produce of the farmers. Supposing then that a rise
in wages ‘squeezes’ the rate of profit from 10 to 9 percent, the product of man-
ufactured goods with a ‘higher’ organic composition of capital would yield a
smaller rate of profit, it would ‘fall relatively to corn or to any other goods in
which a less proportion of fixed capital entered. The degree of alteration in the
relative value of goods, on account of a rise or fall of labour, would depend on
the proportion which the fixed capital bore to the whole capital employed’.146
The higher the proportion of fixed and durable capital, the lower its relative
value. Regarding the fact that also the time necessary to bring the commod-
ities to the market, the time of production, as well as the turnover time,147
affects the relative value of a commodity, it follows that not only the ‘quant-
ity of labour bestowed’ determines the relative value of a commodity, but also
the composition of capital and the time within production and circulation;
factors independent of the actual labour needed to produce the commodity.
We can conclude that Ricardo’s basic methodological predicament, namely
the conflation of different levels of abstraction, accounts for Ricardo’s ‘modi-
fied’, and for Marx hence inconsequential labour theory of value.148 In sum,
Marx’s main points of criticism directed against Ricardo are: 1. an insufficient
categorial determination of specifically value creating and value determining
labour, 2. that instead of a differentiation of capital into variable and constant
capital, Ricardo merely considers the effects of ‘rises in the value of labour’
with regard to the secondary differentiation in ‘fixed’ and ‘circulating’ capital.
While for Marx, all of the phenomena Ricardo describes can be traced back to
a consistent ground in the specific social form of labour, the basis of which
both explains different individual rates of profit as well as the emergence of
a general rate of profit as a ‘transformed’, and hence already mystified and fet-
ishised form of surplus value,149 Ricardo takes refuge in the assumption of the
necessity of ‘modifications’ already in the basic theory of value – owed to the
145 Ricardo 1969 [1817], p. 19.
146 Ricardo 1969 [1817], p. 22.
147 This becomes thematic in the Section v. Ricardo 1969 [1812], pp. 24–7.
148 See Heinrich 1999, pp. 54–55 and Hoff 2004, p. 71.
149 This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.3. in the context of Marx’s ‘solution’ to
Ricardo’s transformation problem.
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missing conceptual distinctions or abstractions between ‘value’ and ‘cost price’
and ultimately, ‘price of production’ and (relative) value, delegating the exist-
ence of value/price to the sphere of exchange (market), andnot to the sphere of
production. Ricardo therefore, like Smith before him, fails in consequentially
explaining the existence of a social coherence in labour-based value. With the
previous discussion, we could see not only the aporia in Smith’s and Ricardo’s
theories of value, and their ultimate inability to explain the exchange of cap-
ital and labour on the basis of the formal validity of equivalent exchange,
we could also see – reconstructing Marx’s immanent critique of both posi-
tions – in what respect Marx was eager to distinguish his own value theory form
theirs: in a concept of the substance of value in abstract-homogenous, i.e. value
producing labour, measured in socially necessary labour time, as the unity of
both quality and quantity of value, and therefore an intrinsic measure to the
superficial and fetishised forms of value (natural price, relative value, etc.) that
Smith and Ricardo ultimately resorted to. It is therefore no less than absurd to
claim that Marx’s labour theory of value was a ‘Classical residue.’ It was pre-
cisely the critical tool of disclosure of the aporia in the classical conceptions of
value.
1.3 The Critical Function of Marx’s Labour Theory of Value. Against
Some Readings of ‘Form’ in Contemporary Value FormTheory
Authors of the Marxian tradition critically dealing with Marx’s labour theory
of value have not only disregarded the break with the classical conception of
value that constituted Marx’s Critique of Political Economy in the first place.
They have also been oblivious to the specific critical function of the differen-
tiation between abstract and concrete labour and the succeeding value form
analysis conducted in the first chapter of Capital, namely as being a critique of
the fetishismof simple circulationand its semblance, andhence their incompre-
hension of the specificity of money. As a consequence, they do not just misun-
derstand the specific use of crucial terms like (value) form, but fail to recognise
Marx’s method as an evolving critique of the fetishistic categories of classical
political economy, amethodwhichmust start from the assumptionof the total-
ity of the social form of labour that provides the coherence and the obfuscated
ground of the value forms (of money, capital, etc).
This chapter will critically deal with the criticisms of Marx’s method and
the offered alternative assumptions, namely (1) themethodological preference
of (value) form over the substance of value as guiding principle, (2) the hypo-
stasis of simple circulation (‘exchange’ or ‘the market’) as the foremost feature
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of the capital relation and the locus of value constitution, and (3) the call for
thenecessity of an ‘unmediated’ or ‘presuppositionless’ beginningof the expos-
ition. For reasons of space,we treat only briefly argumentswhich to discuss and
refute in detail would require a much longer chapter.
1.3.1 MisunderstandingMarx
In his work, self-defined as the ‘New’ or ‘Systematic’ Dialectic, Chris Arthur for
example insists that in the architecture of Capital, the ‘pure forms’ of capital
should be studied first – and especially ‘the value form (as the germ of capital)’
before its ‘grounding in labour’150 is analysed (1). He claims that ‘… the ques-
tion of form is so crucial that the presentation starts with the formof exchange,
bracketing entirely the question of the mode of production [sic], if any, of the
objects of exchange’151 (1 and 2). Arthur also thinks that Marx was unjustified
in introducing the concept of (abstract) labour prematurely:
It is notorious that Marx dives down from the phenomena of exchange
value to labour as the substance of value in the first three pages of Capital
and people rightly complain they do not find any proof there. So I argue
… that we must first study the development of the value form and only
address the labour content when the dialectic of the forms itself requires
us to do so (3).152
Arthur insists that for the analysis of capital, ‘an absolute beginning without
imposed conditions is needed’.153We will see howmisinformed such a claim is
as to the critical character of Marx’s ownmethod. Geert Reuten sings the same
tunewhenhe claims the value formof money as a ‘constituent of value’154 – and
therefore begs the question, because we want to know precisely why it is that
money represents value,whymoney can indeed buy all the other commodities.
Surprisingly, Reuten does not seem to find it necessary to engage with Marx’s
analysis. Instead, he meanders in tautological ‘clarifications’ (and ‘proofs’ of
the dispensability of the concepts of ‘abstract labour’ and ‘substance’ based on
word counts!)155 that rather serve to obscure than to illuminate the problem.
150 Arthur 2006, p. 10. For a full analysis and critique of Arthur’s book The New Dialectic and
Marx’s Capital (2004), see Lange 2016.
151 Arthur 2004, p. 86.
152 Arthur 2004, p. 12.
153 Arthur 2004, p. 158.
154 Reuten 2005, pp. 78–92.
155 ‘… after this chapter [Chapter One of Capital] the term ‘abstract labour’ disappears, with
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This becomes especially telling when Reuten denouncesMarx’s concept of the
substance of value in abstract labour as a mere ‘metaphor’.156 Yet, at no point
in the text does he state what the substance of value is a metaphor for. At the
same time, Reuten claims that the ‘classics’ held a ‘real embodiment’ of labour
theory of value, of which a ‘remnant’ existed in Marx: ‘Marx … was enmeshed
in the physical substance-embodiment metaphor inherited from Hegel (sub-
stance) and classical political economy (embodiment).’157 (1) However, either
labour as the substance of value is regarded as amere ‘metaphor’ or it is, indeed,
‘embodied’ in the commodity. But it cannot be both. It becomes all the more
strange when Reuten concludes that Marx suffered from ‘unclarity’, or a ‘lack
of clarity’ as to his own abstractions, a judgment more appropriate for Reu-
ten’s own argument.158 Reuten therefore not only misrepresents Marx’s theory
and is himself, indeed, unclear about Marx’s straightforward fetishism-critical
method, he goes on to explain that ‘value has no existence prior to the market’
(2).159This is indeed counterfactual toMarx’s ownanalysis, aswe shall see soon.
In the same vein, the Marxist theorist of money and finance Costas Lapavitsas
and Makoto Itoh of the Uno School see no reason to have to refer to abstract
labour at all when they try to explain howmoney becomes the universal equi-
valent of exchange (1).160 Itoh especially entangles himself in circularities and
four exceptions. In face of the Marxian discourse of the last twenty years, this cannot be
stressed enough’. Reuten 2005, p. 83. See also the long footnote commenting on the fre-
quency of Marx’s use of abstract labour and ‘substance’, p. 83, footnote 12. It is astonishing
that ‘word count’ serves as an argument in an informed philological discourse: ‘… even if
there were no chapter on value at all in my book, the analysis I give of the real relations
would contain the proof and demonstration of the real value relation’. Marx and Engels
1988 [1868–70], p. 68.
156 Reuten 1993, p. 89, p. 106, p. 110.
157 Reuten 1993, p. 110. The unintentional humour of this assertion consists in its implication
that Hegel and Smith held more or less the same theory.
158 Especially unclear is the differentia specifica for what Reuten terms ‘two meanings’ of
‘value form’: one defining ‘value’ as a ‘form itself ’ (or ‘genus’), the other one defining the
‘form of value’ to the species. (Reuten 1993, pp. 100–101). If both genus and species are
termed ‘form’ – a view solely invented by Reuten – then what could a meaningful distinc-
tion be? Marx was, to the contrary, very aware of the crucial distinction between value
and its form(s), especially viewed against his critique of Samuel Bailey. ‘The process of
exchange gives to the commodity which it has converted into money not its value but its
specific value-form. Confusion between these two attributes hasmisled somewriters into
maintaining that the value of gold and silver is imaginary’. Marx 1976, p. 185. In passing,
Marx here also implies that value is not something that ‘exists’ only in exchange, as Reuten
and others do.
159 Reuten 1993, p. 108.
160 See Lapavitsas 2005, Lapavitsas 2017, Itoh 1976. For a critique of Lapavitsas’s theory of
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truisms when he tries to explain the money form without recourse to abstract
human labour.161 Long before them, Uno Kōzō himself – as will be promin-
ently discussed – has expressed a strict preference for form over substance in
explaining the value forms, and thereby directly inviting a petitio principii (2):
Labour as ‘value forming substance’ abstracts (shashō) from every form
and is so to speak nothing more than something passive and abstract
(chūshōteki). As such, we cannot make it the foundation of value form.
In other words, [labour] is developed by the value form in the first place.
The value formof the commodity is rather grasped through the forms that
this substance itself passes through that is nothing else but the process of
commodity economic development. However, the formal determination
alone clarifies the fact of the assumption of ‘the physical form in the equal
objectivity of the products of labour as values’.162
Regarding the analysis of the value form, two crucial interventionsMarx aimed
at go completely unnoticed (or even rejected) by these authors: (i) thenecessity
of presupposing the totality of the capital relation from the beginning, inwhich
the category of the ‘commodity’ with which the analysis starts by no means
signifies the ‘simplest’, but themost complex determination, a ‘relation of total-
ity’,163 and (ii) the function of value-form analysis as deducing the fetishistic
semblance of simple circulation from the development of the commodity into
‘Money as a Monopolist of the Ability to Buy’, see Lange 2017. We argue that Lapavitsas
presents a functionalist theory of money with the implication that ‘money is whatmoney
does’ – unlikeMarxwhodevelops the functions of money from its being the ‘direct incarn-
ation of all human labour’ (Marx 1976, p. 187), i.e. money doeswhat money is.
161 ‘Marx does not regard the common property of commodities only as the embodiment
of abstract human labor. He emphasises that “commodities have a value-form common
to them all, and presenting a marked contrast with the varied bodily forms of their use-
values” … He means here the money-form or the price-form of commodities as the com-
pleted form of value, logically developed from the simple, elementary form of value’. Itoh
1976, p. 310. Not much is being said here except for the truism that the money-form is
developed from the simple form of value. The question is what constitutes the very simple
form of value from which the money-form, the ‘dazzling fetish’, can be developed at all.
162 Uno 1973 [1947], pp. 361–2. Quoted fromMarx 1976, p. 164.
163 ‘Totalitätsverhältnis’. Brentel 1989, p. 264. Reuten fails to see both the specific character
and function of the commodity: ‘… is this, the commodity, themost abstract all-embracing
concept for the capitalist mode of production? I doubt it. For example, does it embrace in
itself a notion of the activity of creation of useful objects in capitalist form?’ That, in fact,
it does, seems to escape Reuten’s comprehension, which is a consequence of his failure to
understand Marx’s method as such.
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money in their commongroundof abstract labour. By refusing to see the critical
intent already inherent in Marx’s very first, allegedly ‘innocuous’ analysis – that
of the commodity – the commentators mentioned above become unwitting
accomplices to an ideological approach, legitimising the sphere of appearance
of capital.
1.3.2 The Forensic Investigation of Political Economy: Presupposing
Totality
The reason for the ideological predicament of some approaches in value form
theory hence lies in the ignorance of the fact that already at the stage of value
form analysis, as mentioned earlier, the totality of capital – the ‘whole system
of bourgeois production’164 – is presupposed: the exchange between 20 yards of
linen and one coat does not denote a ‘simple exchange’, but the most abstract
sphere of bourgeois self-presentation. Consequently, the real and by nomeans
simple requirements which always already have to be fulfilled, so that simple
circulation can appear as the paradigmatic form of capitalist intercourse, and
exchange value can appear as a simple, presuppositionless economic form, do
not immediately present themselves ‘from an examination of the simple cir-
culation’, but ‘lie behind it as economic relations enclosed in the division of
labour.’165 Like investors in a criminal case, we must therefore reconstruct the
sphere of simple circulation fromwhat lies behind it. What is ‘forgotten’ in the
examination of simple circulation, on the one hand, is the ‘objective basis of
the whole system of production’, that it is not autonomous individuals who
meet ‘on the market’ to exchange their respective goods, but a relation that
‘already in itself implies compulsion over the individual’, in which the indi-
vidual is ‘entirely determined by society; that this further presupposes a divi-
sion of labour etc., in which the individual is already posited in relations other
than that of mere exchanger…’166Mainly, the presentation of simple exchange
as the point of departure of the analysis of capitalist exchange relations does
itself convey a critical intent in that it prepares the re-examination of the formal
validity of the lawof equivalent exchange in the caseof capital andwage labour.
It is therefore both presupposed and ‘overlooked’ (‘obliterated’)167 in the formal
characteristics of simple circulation:
164 Marx 1987 [1857–61], p. 466.
165 Marx 1987 [1857–61], p. 467.
166 Marx 1973, p. 248.
167 ‘… from the standpoint of the simple circulation, these relationships are obliterated’. Marx
1987 [1857–61], p. 466.
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What is overlooked, finally, is that already the simple forms of exchange
value and of money latently contain the opposition between labour and
capital etc. Thus, what all this wisdom comes down to is the attempt to
stick fast to the simplest economic relations, which, conceived by them-
selves, are pure abstractions; but these relations are, in reality, mediated
by the deepest antithesis, and represent only one side, in which the full
expression of the antithesis [between labour and capital] is obscured.168
Elsewhere,169 we have already shown that the methodological assumptions in
Marx’s critique of capital owe to Hegel’s method of constituting the object
through the inner relation of its parts at the level of the ‘Logic of Reflec-
tion’ (Reflexionslogik). The totality presupposed for developing the categor-
ies from the ‘poorest’ (being/nothingness) to the ‘richest’ (the concept/the
idea) is therefore constitutive to the object, a totality understood as ‘overgrasp-
ing subjectivity’170 (übergreifende Subjektivität). It must therefore begin with
mere semblance, with what is untrue.171 This also means that the independence
and ‘immediate truth’ of the categories will show themselves to be wrongly
assumed. Being and Nothingness are absolutely mediated categories that can-
not even be meaningfully determined when their ‘purity’ is assumed: taken in
isolation, they cannot account for their own constitution. The same goes for the
commodity and the semblance of simple circulation: we are here only confron-
ted with a distorted version of truth. The deeply problematic truth of capital
can only be elucidated as a complete critique of its constitutive categories, that
of political economy. It is therefore all the more strange that Marxist authors
claim that Hegel started from the premise of presuppositionlessness.172 The
168 Marx 1973, p. 248. The context inwhich the quote appears is the critique of Proudhon,who
is attacked as a deeply ‘bourgeois’ thinker in believing that exchange represents a ‘system
of universal freedom’ which has only been ‘perverted by money, capital, etc’. Marx 1973,
p. 248.
169 See Lange 2016, pp. 254–65.
170 Hegel 1991 [1830], p. 290.
171 ‘At this point, we could at once raise the question why, if that is the case, we should begin
with what is untrue and why we do not straightaway begin with what is true. The answer
is that the truth must, precisely as such, validate itself [muss sich bewähren], and here,
within logical thinking itself, validation consists in theConcept’s showing itself to bewhat
is mediated through andwith itself, so that it shows itself to be at the same time the genu-
inely immediate’. Hegel 1991 [1830], p. 134.
172 The matter is complicated by the fact that there are supporters (Arthur, Reuten) and
opponents (Murray) of Hegel’s alleged ‘presuppositionlessness’, but the claim itself is
never doubted. Murray e.g. says: ‘Marx does not leave the circle of Hegelian systematic
dialectics unbroken; he objects to the “presuppositionlessness” of Hegelian systematic
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contrary is true: in Hegel’s, like in Marx’s presentation, the development of the
idea deliberately begins from a completely mediated nexus that, in the begin-
ning, must show itself to be wrong precisely by taking the categories in isolation,
without presupposition, in themanner of ‘outer reflection’. Onemust even con-
cede that in the bourgeois economists, like the philosophers Hegel criticised
(we must of course think of Kant), precisely because their own categories were
conceptualised as unrelated, theywere contradictory.Wemust here return to the
question of form. In Chapter 1.1., we have already sketched the function of form
analysis as the specific method that reveals the obliterated genetic construc-
tion of the conventional categories (or ‘forms’), i.e. money, capital, wage, profit,
rent, etc., in their form.Marx’s impetus is veryHegelianhere: his concept of form
coincideswithHegel’s concept of the concept, namely in that it resolutely rejects
a mere ‘formal’ understanding of form. The concept of overgrasping subjectiv-
ity (mediation) entails a concept of form as form-content (Formgehalt), which
no longer stands in opposition to the content or ‘substance’ it designates. The
object of investigation (the social form of labour that generates the capital-
relation) is given as a processual total structure of economic forms and changes
of form (Formwechsel) whose ‘inner cord’ (‘innres Band’)173 presents the uni-
versal commonality to all particular forms labour assumes, as an ‘overgrasping’
relation. This is no easy task: because the form determinations only exist as
moments of the total nexus, Marx – and we, as his readers – must position
ourselves as the criminal investigators of political economy who reconstruct
the nexus from its mere (and sometimes outright inverted) appearance. The
general nexus of the totality of forms is therefore simultaneously the content
of this process, and in this sense, form is also content. Any analysis that pro-
claims a systematic scientific approach must therefore account for the mutual
‘overturning’ (Umschlagen) of form into content, and content into form.174 Let
dialectics and insists that science has premises, which he and Engels sketched in The Ger-
man Ideology’. See Murray 2000, p. 38. But at the time of The German Ideology, Marx has
not yet developed a theory of value at all! This early work is set within a radically differ-
ent methodological framework and has different objectives than Marx’s later, economy-
critical work.
173 Marx 2008, p. 27.
174 ‘Substance, therefore, is the totality of the accidents; it reveals itself in them as their abso-
lute negativity, i. e., as the absolute might and at the same time as the richness of all
content. The content, however, is nothing but this manifestation itself, since the determ-
inacy that is inwardly reflected into content is itself only a moment of the form, which
passes over into themight of the substance. Substantiality is the absolute activity-of-form
and themight of necessity, and every content is just amoment that belongs to this process
alone – the absolute overturning of form and content into one another’. Hegel 1991 [1830],
pp. 225–6.
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us see how this understanding can be made fruitful for a precise view of the
critical functions of value form analysis.
1.3.3 The Functions of Value FormAnalysis
Generally speaking, the foremost function of the analysis of the value form
is the critique of fetishism of the bourgeois relations of production. In the
analysis of the value form, Marx confronts this fetishism on different levels
of abstraction: a) in a logical-systematic reconstruction of the transition from
the sphere of simple circulation as the abstract and ideological sphere of bour-
geois production to the actual basis of that mode of production, b) in a theory
of value constitution through the analysis of form and content of the univer-
sal equivalent that appears as money (form) (against premonetary theories of
value) c) in the demonstration of the ‘law of value’ in terms of a successive
detachment from the intentions, wants and personal desires of the owners of
commodities as a law of ‘autonomisation’. We have already covered a) in the
previous analysis of the commodity as a ‘mediation of totality’ in which the
confrontation between capital and labour is obscured. In the following, for
reasons of space, our evaluation of some approaches in value form theory, has
to limit itself to b).
The deduction of the value formof money from the semblance of the simple
exchange of commodities to its constitutive content in human labour in the
abstract does not mean that the form of value is arbitrary, or even dispensable.
To the contrary: value has its necessary form of appearance in money. In other
words, in its ‘palpable’, material, objective, and therefore fetishised form, value
has no other existence than in money. Yet this does not mean that it is money:
it must however appear as such.175 In Forms ii–iv of value form analysis,
Marx has shown that money as the universal equivalent is the specific form
inwhich value functions as the synthesis of themediation of private labours in
a social context. However, the relation of content or substance (human labour
in the abstract) and form is not exhausted in a simplistic antagonism between
essence and appearance. Essence must appear (in the Hegelian sense), but in
a form in which its own fetishistic obliterations can still be identified as such.
175 ‘It is not money that renders the commodities commensurable. Quite the contrary. Be-
cause all commodities, as values, are objectified human labour, and therefore in them-
selves commensurable, their values can be communally measured in one and the same
specific commodity, and this commodity can be converted into the common measure
of their values, that is into money. Money as a measure of value is the necessary form of
appearance of the measure of value which is immanent in commodities, namely labour
time’. Marx 1976, p. 188. Emphasis added.
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The analysis of the form must therefore identify the content that grounds the
form in the form itself, against its semblance, and make it appear. This is the
casewhen the legitimisation strategies of simple circulation becomeentangled
in self-contradictions, and this only happens when money is treated as an
entity external to the exchange process: a mere means of the facilitation of
exchange, as means of circulation. However, money as the palpable form of
abstract labour then is the conditio sine qua non of general social exchange, so
that theories that suggest the dispensability of money in order to realise ‘equal
exchange’ contradict their own premises.176 But while the specific content is
indicative of a specific form, the reverse is also true: the form must indicate a
specific content. Saying that there is no such thing as value without a general
equivalent implies that only in the equivalent form, the real reduction of the
different labours to abstract-general human labour is always-already posited.
Value form analysis therefore also entails a theory of the constitution of value.
This is already clear in the specificity of the simple form of value (x commod-
ity A = y commodity B) that consists in its polarity, i.e. not merely indicating
a reversible relation, but mutually exclusive function, and that, as such, indic-
ates a specific content of the equivalent form. In it, no specific, concrete human
labour, but human labour in the abstract is the ground or content that enables
all the specific and concrete labours tomirror themselves in it, to ‘stand in’ for it.
Money therefore has the double function of representing all the commodities,
but none of them specifically. As a ‘thing’, it therefore represents human labour
in the abstract, all labours, but none of them in particular. This is indeed the
‘joint contribution of the whole world of commodities’.177 In this context, the
proposition thatMarx’s analysis ‘prematurely’ introduced a ‘posited ground’ for
value in labour becomesmeaningless. The requirement of the forms of value to
be ‘studied first’ is equally absurd: the forms of value are not self-explanatory.
A method that hypothesises the forms of value, instead of analysing them in
order to reveal their obfuscated content, ‘sticks fast to the simplest economic
relations’.
Value as a social totality can never be constituted in a mere Formwechsel of
C-M-C or M-C-M. The forms of circulation and exchange can never constitute
economic objectivity: ‘Simple circulation is not the autonomous sphere of the
economic constitution of objectivity – as such, it exists only in the ideological
semblance of legitimisation of bourgeois self-interpretation’.178 They are the
mere illusory forms with regard to the real basis of value constitution in the
176 This is Marx’s main point against Proudhon’s ‘People’s Bank’.
177 Marx 1976, p. 159.
178 Brentel 1989, p. 256.
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real subsumption of labour under capital. We can already become witness to
this in the ‘Contradictions in the General Formula’ in Chapters 5 and 6 of Cap-
ital Volume i. The Marxian authors we have discussed above, whose impetus
lies in distancing themselves from ‘traditional’, i.e. ‘embodied labour’-theories
of value have overstated their case, by resorting to formalistic theories of value
that are, at best, tautological like the theories of the classics (which they do
not even consider), and, atworst, an uncanny invitation of marginalist assump-
tions intoMarxian theory.However,Marx’s labour theory of valuewas designed
as an antidote to these views. The social form of labour whose economic form
character has been overlooked by ‘traditionalists’ and their opponents alike,
indeed surpasses theproblematic of amere antagonismbetween formand sub-
stance to open the horizon for a fundamental critique of the real semblance,
the fetishism, of capitalist self-presentation. With these preliminary remarks
on the problematic that Value Without Fetish addresses, we can return to Uno
Kōzō’s method and object regarding ‘political economy’ as a science. ‘Method’
thus forms the first, and ‘Object’ the second – and longer – part of this book.
In the following Chapter 2, with which the first part on ‘Method’ closes, we
will elaborate the specific ways Uno attempted to access the problem of the
logic and the history, and its presentation in Marx’s Capital. In the chapter,
we will critically deal with Uno’s sandankairon or the ‘Three-Level Method’ (or
‘Approach’) to political economy. Against its claim to provide the missing link
or linkage between the logic and the history of capital, we will show that the
Three-Level-Method remains external to its object, failing to account for both
its own constitution and the relation to the objects it addresses (Chapter 2.1.).
Our investigation into the ‘Limits to the Three-Level Method’ will also lead us
to question Uno’s interpretation of ‘Primitive Accumulation’ and its system-
atic locus at the end of Volume i of Capital. Because Uno’s method is situated
around two important claims, we will highlight the two methodological ‘axes’
of pure theory or genriron that Uno identifies for his own specific approach
to political economy: on the one hand ‘The Law of Population’, discussed in
Chapter 2.2., and ‘The Commodification of Labour Power’ on the other, dis-
cussed inChapter 2.3. Both ‘axes’, while intricately linked, significantly form the
vantage point for Uno’s analysis of capital, and will therefore be scrutinised –
and criticised – in detail. We will show that the axes, forming the ‘coordinate
system’ of Uno’s approach, do not only not adequately reproduce the Problem-
stellung of Marx’s own analysis, but that Uno’s particular angle even eliminates
Marx’s own critical analysis of accumulation, crisis, and the reproduction of
labour power under conditions of unequal exchange.
With the general evaluation of Uno’s methodological approach to capital as
the subject of political economy,we cannow turn inmoredetail to thequestion
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of value in Chapter 3, ‘Uno’s Theory of Value without Fetish’, introducing the
second part of the book. A close analysis of Uno’s 1947 monograph Value The-
ory (Kachiron) forms the centre of this chapter. The specific focus is on Uno’s
interpretation of value form analysis in Section 3 in the first chapter of Cap-
ital. Uno’s view of abstract labour as a particular form of concrete labour (to
be discussed in Chapter 3.1.), and his theory of value derived from the ‘want
of the commodity owner in the relative form of value’, introducing the motive
of methodological individualism (in Chapter 3.2) will be critically reflected, as
well as his theory of money that we find remaining in the framework of Samuel
Bailey’s nominalist theory of money (Chapter 3.3.). This chapter will also recur
to Uno’s view of capital as M-C-M’ – ‘Capital as Pure Form’ – and its exclusion
of the specific form of capitalist wage labour from this pure form, relocating
the ‘pure form’ of capital to merchant capital instead (Chapter 3.4.).
Chapter 4, the longest chapter, will finally address Uno’s theory of pure cap-
italism in his main work, Principles of Political Economy (1950/2 and 1964).
Here, Uno’s Great Three Laws of Political Economy, the law of value, the law
of population, and the law of the equalisation of the rate of profit, will be
taken up and addressed in the different contexts that they appear in this work.
The chapter will first provide a summary of the ‘Reconstruction of Capital’
(Chapter 4.1.) that is also indicative of the content with which Uno, in con-
trast to Marx, chooses to present his pure theory. For example, by directly
subsuming the ‘General Law of Capitalist Accumulation’ (Chapter 25 of Cap-
ital Volume i) to the ‘Reproduction Schemas’ of Capital Volume ii, Uno both
dislocates andproblematically realigns the specific locus andexplanatory func-
tion each respective theorem has in Marx’s architecture. This move however
allows Uno to formulate his ‘Law of Value as the Law of General Social Equi-
librium’ (Chapter 4.2.), which we reject and directly confront with Marx’s ‘Law
of Value as the Law of Crisis’ in Chapter 4.4. It is however not without Uno’s
own view of the nexus between values and prices, contrasting it with Marx’s
critique of the fetishistic forms of profit and price, that the radical opposition
between Uno’s and Marx’s approaches to political economy – the first as the
‘internal dream or fantasy of capital’,179 the second as its critique – becomes
fully transparent. The question of ‘Surplus Value and Profit: The ‘Transforma-
tion Problem’ in Uno’s Perspective’ (Chapter 4.3.) therefore provides the link
to the closing assessment of the disparity between Uno and Marx that is not
only indicative of a contrasting interest in the theory of capital, but also of
a disparate objective: while Marx’s intent was to disclose the fetishistic forms
179 Walker 2016, p. 164.
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that obscure the actual workings of the capital relation both in its agents and
theorists, in order to pave the way for its overcoming, Uno contents himself
with reproducing the fetishistic sphere itself, often digressing to the framework
of classical and vulgar economists and their form-theoretical, but never form-
analytical impetus. Because Uno’s work has received a vivid reception both in
Japan and internationally, which even accompanied the formation of his own
‘School’, Chapter 5 will discuss ‘Uno’s Legacy in Japan and Beyond’. Needless to
say, another 500-page book can be written about the reception of Uno’s value
theory in Japan alone, which is why we limit ourselves to a line of reception in
Japan that is most articulated in accentuating Uno’s theory of value in relation
to his theory of money, radicalising the ‘monetary approach’ lurking, but not
autonomously formulated, in Uno’s writings. We identify a ‘post-Uno School’
of Value Theory in Japan that, while being critical of Uno, is also consider-
ably informed by his major theoretical interventions – while drawing on the
works of proponents of the NeueMarx-Lektüre. Here will therefore also be the
place to direct some points of critique to its proponents Hans-Georg Backhaus
and Michael Heinrich.180 A critical discussion of two authors of the ‘post-Uno
School’ – Ebitsuka Akira and Mukai Kimitoshi – will be presented in ‘Money
Vs. Value? The “Monetary Approach” in the post-Uno School of Value Theory’
(Chapter 5.1.), delineating the trajectory Uno’s work has taken in Japan. From
here, we move to Uno’s Anglo-American reception, which arguably presents
the internationally best known line of the reception of Uno’s work to a non-
Japanese speaking audience. In ‘The “Dialectic of Capital” as the Apologetic
of Capital in the Anglophone Uno School’ (Chapter 5.2.), we engage with the
works of Uno’s student Thomas T. Sekine, through his translation work argu-
ably the founder of the ‘Uno School’ in the West, and Robert Albritton who
was the first proponent of the Uno School not to read Uno in the original. Sek-
ine’s work, though time and again emphasising capital as a ‘dialectical logic’,
is predominantly found to propose a linear approach to capital as an object
of investigation, consequently culminating in an ‘equilibrium’ theory of price,
which we have already problematised in Chapter 4.2. in relation to Uno. Albrit-
ton’s workwill be reflected against the background of the ‘logic’ and the history
of capital in Uno’s sandankairon and the disparity or gap that cannot be filled
by virtue of its own theoretical claim. This allows us to identify the specific
marks that Uno’s work has directly left on theories of capital inmostly English-
speaking countries.
180 Both Heinrich and Backhaus however also form crucial points of reference for this book.
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At a further remove, in the final chapter (Chapter 5.3.),wewill question some
recent historiographies of Japan that have beenmore or less directly influenced
by Uno, but have attempted to form their own approaches, most notably in
relation to the question of real subsumption. In ‘The Meaning of Real Sub-
sumption, or the Real Subsumption of Meaning: Aspects of Anglophone Uno
School Historiographies’ (Chapter 5.3.), the works of Harry Harootunian and
Gavin Walker, who have both recently published remarkable monographs on
Japan’s specific historical trajectory and Uno’s view of it, will be our topic of
interest. Here will also be the place to return to the overarching theoretical
problem thatwehave identified as ‘use value fetishism’ inUno’s ownwork. Both
Harootunian and Walker share a common theoretical basis that informs their
respective interventions: the disavowal of value as the organising principle of
modern capitalist social relations and, by the same token, the hypostatisation
of the use value aspect of the commodity form as the ‘positive’ aspect, which
allows us to either denounce real subsumption in favour of formal subsump-
tion (Harootunian), or even as site of resistance to capital (Walker). Precisely by
disavowing the status of value fromMarx’s critique – or eliminating the critical
object of the Critique of Political Economy altogether – we believe that both
approaches, faithful to Uno’s core theoretical emphasis of use value against
value, provide both theoretically and empirically counterfactual and politically
questionable explanatory attempts for the global rise of capital. By choosing to
ignore the nexus between value and fetish, the theorists in Uno’s vein, like Uno
before them, donot only leave the problemof fetishism intact – they reproduce
it on a higher scale.
This book is written for the people who continue to question the predicament
that is capital – capital not as a ‘fact’, as mere ‘object’, but as something that
draws and lives on the ‘life-blood’ of those who foster capital’s own fetishisms
and themany-fold strategies of its self-legitimisation. The true challenge, as we
are aware, is still ahead. This book hopes to blow a breach for those willing to
taken upon themselves this ‘almost irresolvable task’.181 Irresolvable it shall not
remain.
181 Adorno 1953, p. 63. Own translation.
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chapter 2
What’s ‘Pure’ about Capitalism? Uno’s Three-Level
Method and the Theory of Principles
The one-sidedness idealistically lamented as ‘economism’ … is an
abstraction not performed by the theorist, but by social reality.
alfred schmidt1
∵
This chapter will interrogate the method of a theory that makes ‘pure capit-
alism’ ( junsui shihonshugi) its object. Since the theory of ‘pure capitalism’ as
the theory of principles or genriron is embedded into the so-called ‘three level-
method’ (sandankairon no hōhō), we will first consider the extended frame-
work of that method and with it, Uno’s methodological reflections regarding
‘political economy’ (keizaigaku) as a science. Only after addressing what we
believe are the ‘Limits to the Three-Level-Method’ (Chapter 2.1.) will we move
on to the heuristic framework of pure theory or the theory of principles, which
Uno posits in the fundamental laws of capitalist reproduction, i.e. the law of
population (Chapter 2.2.) – one of the ‘Three Great Economic Laws that Gov-
ern Capitalism’2 – and the commodification of labour power (Chapter 2.3.).
Chapter 2 will reflect the general methodological outlook of Uno’s approach.
With the critical reflection of its framework, it will provide a discussion of the
context in which Uno’s ‘pure theory’ is set. While ‘pure theory’ – Uno’s theory
of value and money, social reproduction, capital, prices of production, crisis
etc. – constitutes themain object of the present volume, the critical discussion
of his generalmethod is paramount to grasping Uno’s specific interpretation of
Marx’s work. As we will see, the elimination of Marx’s specific Problemstellung
fromUno’smethod, i.e. the elimination of the problemof the autonomisation of
1 Schmidt 1968a, p. 33.
2 ‘Shihonshugi wo kisei suru sandaikeizai hōsoku’, the title of an essay in the 1969 collection The
Political Economyof Capital (Shihonronnokeizaigaku). Theother two laws concern theLawof
Value and theLawof theEqualisationof Profit Rates,whichwill become thematic inChapters
3 and 4, respectively.
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economic forms as empirically ‘given’ rather than sociallymediated categories,
or themethod of the Critique of Political Economy as the critique of the fetish-
isms of bourgeois relations of production, leads to an impasse for an adequate
understanding of the specificity of the capitalist mode of production. Hence,
what is questioned in this chapter is the usefulness of the ‘purification’ of the-
ory for adequately grasping what constitutes capitalist relations of production
as a theoretical problem.We counter Uno’s approach that treats capitalist ‘com-
modity economy’ as a given with a set of problems whose implications dir-
ectly relate to the epistemological dimension of the presentation of capital. The
method of the presentation of the ‘pure mechanisms’ or principles of capital-
ist reproduction, we argue, is methodically counterfactual to its object – the
capitalist mode of production –whose ‘operationalmode’ is constituted by the
antagonistic relation between essence and appearance mediating these ‘prin-
ciples’, and which is therefore never ‘pure’: moreover, it is precisely the ‘impur-
ity’ of the categories of political economy that is constitutive for capital’s actual
modus operandi.What is lost inUno’s theorisation therefore is preciselywhat is
crucial toMarx’s project: not the ‘correct’ presentation of how capitalism ‘really
works’, but the analysis and critique of the forms by which capitalism comes
to appear as a social formation in which ‘everything happens above board’3 –
while its essential constitutive nexus becomes increasingly obscured in the
progress from the category of the ‘commodity’ to that of ‘interest-bearing cap-
ital’. The attempts at the purification of capital’s principles thereforemisses the
crucial confrontation with the ‘deranged forms’ in which capital presents itself
in conventional interpretations – not only Marx’s times, but also today. As we
will see in later chapters moreover, the negligence of the critical dimension of
Marx’s project, equivocal to its overall incentive, results in a method akin to
that of political economists Marx predominantly criticised, e.g. Samuel Bailey
or David Ricardo who both, despite their disputes, shared a common disinter-
estedness in the problem of conceptual abstraction, collapsing appearance and
essence into one. Like them, Uno, by taking the immediate and ‘given’ forms
of appearance for the ‘purified’ process of capitalist relations – as we will for
instance see in his interpretation of ‘simple exchange’ – also digresses towards
conventional bourgeois economism, including its apologetic character. It is
therefore unsurprising that elements both of Bailey’s and Ricardo’s theories,
consciously or unconsciously, supplement the framework of Uno’s ‘pure the-
ory’ of principles. Hence, in Uno’s interpretation of the object of inquiry, the
3 According to a lecture Adorno gave in the summer term 1962 on ‘Marx and the Basic Con-
cepts of Sociological Theory’, quoted in Backhaus 2011, p. 506. Own translation (see also the
translation by C. O’Kane and V. Erlenbach in Historical Materialism 26.1 (2018), pp. 154–64).
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capitalist mode of production, Marx’s critical claim is lost. That Uno treats
capitalist commodity economy as a ‘given’ can also be seen in the theoretical
formation of the ‘three level-method’ from certain biographical and intellec-
tual interests on Uno’s side. Especially the rejection of historical materialism
as the foundation for the scientific reflection of the capitalist ‘commodity eco-
nomy’ constituted amajor trait of Uno’s theory-building. In the Foreword to the
1971 edition of Types of Economic Policies under Capitalism (Keizaiseisaku ron)
(1936), Uno reflects on his time as a lecturer of economic policy at Tōhoku Uni-
versity before the war, immersed in such classics as Marx’s Capital and Lenin’s
Imperialism:
In my isolated reflection … I was led to the conclusion that Capital essen-
tially advanced what I would call Genriron, or a logically closed (and
hencepure andgeneral) theoryof capitalism, and, in that light, I arrivedat
a dawning awareness of how Imight solvemany difficult problemswhich
had previously perplexed me …
Since a fully transparent explication of the ‘economic’ base of a soci-
ety, which the materialist conception claims to consist of the totality of
its production-relations, could be accomplished only in the light of the
Genriron, the pure theory of capitalism, it was economics that would val-
idate thematerialist conception of history (at least insofar as it pertained
to capitalism), and not the other way round.4
The critical view of the ‘materialist conception of history’ accompanied Uno
throughout his life. The challenge it presented for Uno would only be sat-
isfactorily confronted with the conceptualisation of the three level-method,
of which the earliest version was already formulated in the original version
of the Principles of Political Economy, arguably Uno’s main work, in 1950. As
such however, it has not yet become a thorough framework at this stage. The
work thatmost systematically presents Uno’s own reflection on the three level-
method–whichhe, aswewill see, considered superior toMarx’s of theCritique
of Political Economy– canbe found in a laterwork,TheMethodology of Political
Economy (Keizaigaku hōhōron), published in 1962. This work should therefore
introduce us to the three level-method, as conceived of by Uno.
The Methodology of Political Economy, or the Methodology in short, concep-
tualised as a monograph, is divided into four distinctive parts – Part i: ‘The
4 Uno 2016 [1971], p. xiii. See Uno 1974 [1971], p. 5. Sekine’s translation in Uno 2016 [1971] is
rather loose, e.g. the parentheses in the English rendition are added by the translator.
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Object of Political Economy’, Part ii: ‘The Analysis of the Study of Political
Economy’, Part iii: ‘Political Economy and Historical Materialism’; and Part iv:
‘Some Problems Concerning the Methodology in Capital’. Part ii also provides
a supplementary discussion on (A), ‘On the Refutation of the Claims of Bern-
stein’s Revisionist School in Kautsky’s Orthodox School of Marxism’, divided
into four subsections, and (B) ‘The Conflation of the Theory of Principles
and Stage Theory in Hilferding’s Finance Capital’. Of these, only Parts i and ii
(without the supplement) directly engage in a reflection of the three levels.
Oddly, parts iii and iv do not form a stringent argumentative whole with the
beginning of the book; while they can be said to discuss methodological prob-
lems of stage theory and the theory of principles respectively – albeit on very
distinct levels, one broadly philosophical, the other predominantly discuss-
ing minutiae in Capital’s value form analysis – they do not make Uno’s own
overarching methodological structure culminating in his three levels-theory
its specific object. However, the discussion in Part iii on the ‘materialist view
of history’ is one important original motivation for Uno’s conceptualisation of
the three levels-approach. Seen this way, the themes and levels of the thematic
discussed in this book are mildly disparate. In the discussion we will therefore
concentrate on parts i and ii of the Methodology, and draw instead on a later
work by Uno, The Political Economy of Capital (Shihonron no keizaigaku), pub-
lished in 1969. Indeed, while the bulk of Uno’s work is devoted to questions of
method and the status of political economy as a science, the first part of The
Political Economy of Capital is especially significant for the theme of our book,
since here Uno attempts to shine a broader light on the relation between his
ownmethod and that of Capital. Here, the section in which Uno expounds the
‘Three Great Economic Laws that Govern Capitalism’ offers a comprehensive
insight into the basic structure of the first level of the three level-method, that
of the theory of the principles or genriron. This becomes especially clear in
the ‘Law of Population’ which, next to the commodification of labour power
with which it is closely connected, will be thematised as one of the axioms
or ‘axes’5 of pure theory. The remaining two ‘Great Economic Laws’, i.e. ‘The
Law of Value’, and ‘The Law of the Equalisation of Profit Rates’ will be dis-
cussed in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively, while we draw on other texts in which
Uno expounds on these matters at greater length, namely The Theory of Value
(1947) in Chapter 3 and the Principles of Political Economy (Keizai Genron, sub-
sequently Principles) (1964) in Chapter 4. As indicated above, in the original
5 Uno calls the law of population one of the three ‘axes’ for the understanding of capitalism.
See Uno 1974 [1969], p. 25.
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edition of the Principles in two volumes (1950–2), we do not yet find a thor-
ough systematisation of the three level-approach. Yet, at the end of part two
of the Introduction, titled ‘The Method of Political Economy’ (Keizaigaku no
hōhō), we find a quote that briefly refers to the threefold ‘fields of research’ of
themethod, but the different terminology used in this short passage shows that
Uno has not yet settled on the principle of sandankaironwhich becomes emin-
ent in theMethodology and then,more poignantly, in the abridged 1964 edition
of the Principles. Here, in the 1951 Introduction, Uno already admits to the pion-
eering work – and influence – of Marx’s Capital as the ‘methodologically first
road of completion’ (hajimete kansei surumichi) of political economy since the
seventeenth century. Uno, however, insists that ‘the field of research’ of polit-
ical economy must be divided into different parts:
The field of research of political economy becomes separated into, first,
thepurely theoretical system, second, theworld-historical developmental
stages of capitalism, third, the three stages of capitalism in each single
country, or the concrete analysis of world capitalism. Furthermore, as
against the economic analysis of capitalist societies, I want to show the
economic history of pre-capitalist societies, or the individually appropri-
ate method for the study of socialism.6
We can see here that the focus on a threefold system already existed. It was,
however, not Uno’s primary concern when he worked on the Principles right
after the debates on value theory of the late 1940s – debates that formed Uno’s
primary interest in Marxian political economy at that time. Since this was the
only ‘step’ or ‘part’ of the systemheworkedout the details of, it deserves a closer
focus, even if it anachronistically predates thewider architectureUnoonly con-
ceptualised in the early 1960s. Accordingly, we first want to take a broad look at
the sketch Uno draws of the three level-method in the Methodology. However,
Part iv of TheMethodology, ‘Someproblems in themethodof Capital’, will again
become thematic in the discussion of Uno’s interpretation of the value form in
Chapter 3, so that this work forms a valuable source for approaching the gist
and intent of Uno’s theory in general.
The title of the work is not accidentally chosen by Uno.7 It coincides with
Section 3 of Marx’s ownmethodological reflections in the 1857 introduction to
6 Uno 1973 [1951], p. 18.
7 The term hōhōron could be translated both as ‘method’ and as ‘methodology’. The suffix -ron
in Japanese means ‘theory’, a ‘debate’ a ‘system’, or simply the scientific treatment of a prob-
lem – hence,Marx’s Capital is translated not as shihon, which would be a literal translation of
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the Grundrisse, the General Introduction to the Contribution to the Critique of
Political Economy, which was discarded in Engels’s later editions.8 As we will
see, the significance of this section for Uno – the Methodenkapitel which like
no other part of Marx’s work discloses his own methodological reflections at
the beginning of his economic-critical phase – is fundamental for the devel-
opment of Uno’s own three level-method. Because of the strong influence for
Uno, it could be said to take the same position in Uno’s work as the Methoden-
kapitel in that of Marx’s, and it is on this basis that the Methodology serves as
the main text of our analysis of Uno’s three level-approach. In ‘The Limits to
the Three Level-Method’ (Chapter 2.1.), wewill examine the content and intent
of Uno’s three-level approach in light of Marx’s method in Capital from the
vantage point of our commentary conducted in Chapter 1. We will specifically
counter Uno’s claim that Marx’s method insufficiently purified the ‘theory of
principles’ or genriron from its illustrations in particular historical or empir-
ical circumstances, as could be e.g. seen in the chapter on ‘So-called Primitive
Accumulation’, delivering an insufficient basis for a thorough ‘theory of prin-
ciples’. We will show why the form analysis of value must logically precede the
presentation of its historical generation, and also which critical function the
historical and the empirical illustrations in Capital serve. In this context, Uno’s
insistence on ‘uneven development’ against Marx’s conception of England as
the denominator showing the less advanced countries ‘the image of their own
future’,9 and Uno’s critique of the illustrative example of nineteenth-century
England, will be the object of critical examination. Critically targeted in par-
ticular will be Uno’s insistence on the importance of communal exchange as
a general economic principle – an insistence which pitches it in opposition to
‘primitive accumulation’ in their respective theorisations and in the empirical-
historical approach to the concrete case of Japan. Rejecting the presentation of
the violent process of primitive or original accumulation as part of the ‘prin-
the term ‘capital’, but as Shihonron.We decided to stay closer to the original stress on system-
aticity suggested by the suffix. This does not mean however that the Methodenkapitel (‘The
method of political economy’) could not be translated directly as Keizaigaku hōhōron. To dif-
ferentiate between the 1962 monograph and the subsection of the Introduction to the 1951
edition of the Principles, however, we chose a more literal translation of the respective titles.
It is telling that as early as in the 1951 edition Marx refers to the Grundrisse Introduction, the
same passage that becomes relevant again in the Methodology.
8 For a meticulous commentary on the evolution of Marx’s conceptualisation from the ‘six
book-plan’ and ‘capital in general’ towardswhatwe know today asCapital– of which, because
of the strong interventions and restructuring in Engels’s editing process, Michael Heinrich
claims it was not Marx’s, but Engels’s, work – see Heinrich 2011, pp. 155–93.
9 Marx 1976, p. 91.
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ciples’, Uno traces the formal origins of capital back to the form of merchant
capital and commodity exchange. For Uno, the exchange process is the pivotal
theoretical site in which the principles of a capitalist ‘commodity economy’,
regardless of its individual generative process, must be situated. Commodity
exchange as the ‘primordial’ principle of capitalist society accordingly func-
tions as the explanatory and systematic basis for the frame joint of pure theory,
the commodification of labour power and the formation of a relative surplus
population as the sinequanonof the capitalistmodeof production. In contrast,
Marx imbeds the discussion of the commodification of labour power in the
violence of primitive accumulation in which the sale and purchase of labour
power becomes ‘a relation inherent in production itself ’.10 Two aspects are cru-
cial to the discussion: a) the viability of a method that places such emphasis
on the formal aspects of capital, with the danger of succumbing to the fetish-
istic semblance of ‘simple exchange’ and disregarding the productive relations
enabling it, and b) the viability of a method that nowhere formulates a ‘stand-
ard’ of the level of ‘purification’ demanded from its own theory. This relates
to the problem of the structural unity of the three level-approach. We will ask
whether this method can in and of itself answer to what we believe are sound
criteria of method – criteria which necessarily presuppose the unity and the
interrelationof the ‘three levels’ as their conditionof possibility. In otherwords,
wewill ask onwhich encompassing ‘level’ the ‘three level-method’must be situ-
ated in order to present meaningful ‘levels of abstraction’ at all.11 Only if each
level can account for its own logical necessity in relation to the instance the
levels are abstractions of, can we maintain that Uno has developed a valid and
coherent systematic method.12 Chapter 2.2, ‘Pure Theory’s X-Axis: The Law of
Population’, and Chapter 2.3., ‘Pure Theory’s Y-Axis: The Commodification of
Labour Power’, discusses Uno’s insistence on the pivotal function of the law
of population specific to the capitalist relations of production and the com-
modification of labour power related to it, which both ground the theory of
principles as the study of the modus operandi of the capitalist mode of pro-
10 Marx 1978, p. 196.
11 In this context, it is useful topoint outUno’s denial of a ‘universal’ or ‘genus’ the three levels
form abstractions of, and the subsequent critique of Mita. See Kakuta 2009, p. 188: ‘Mita
argued that a denial of the concept of genus would fall into self-contradiction because to
deny the concept of genus is only to create a new concept of genus. To take an instance, a
concept of financial capital in general needs a concept of capital’.
12 This is also pointed out by Kakuta: ‘In Uno’s stage theory, there is nothing but the partic-
ular. Between the universal and the particular lies a crucial disjunction … Although Uno
said that the stage theory forms the medium, the medium is not related to the universal
theory’. Kakuta 2009, p. 283.
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duction.What fundamentally characterises capitalist societies, for Uno, is that
with the development of the forces of production, capital loses its grip on the
supply of labour power, because the labour power commodity cannot be dir-
ectly produced by capital itself. Being the only commodity that capital itself
cannot directly produce (alongside land), it marks a ‘disruption’ to the valor-
isation cycle and generates a slump or ‘depression’ (or ‘contraction’) in the
business cycle. Yet, capital finds ways to react to this cycle, producing a relative
surplus population from which it is able to generate a new period of accumu-
lation or growth, spurring the development of the forces of production afresh.
Uno places this theory in opposition to what he calls the ‘law of immiseration’
within the discussion of theGeneral Lawof Capitalist Accumulation inCapital,
Marx’s alleged misrecognition of labour power as a commodity capital cannot
itself produce, and its effects on thebusiness cycle.The central general assump-
tion or ‘axiom’ of pure theory, however, is the problem of the commodification
of labour power, assumed as the only commodity capital cannot ‘directly’ pro-
duce by its ownmeans. In our structure, the reason for the separate discussion
of the law of population (Chapter 2.2.) and the problem of labour power as
a commodity (Chapter 2.3.), despite their entangled position in Uno’s inter-
pretation, is to move from amore specific crisis-analytical framework of Uno’s
interpretation of the business cycle in relation to the absorption of the ‘indus-
trial reserve army’ towards the general theoretical framework underlying this
view of accumulation and crisis, which also requires a more general response.
This response, directly questioning Uno’s hypostasis of the aspect of use value
in the private consumption process of workers as an ‘obstacle’ to the valorisa-
tion cycle, will lead us to the discussion of Uno’s theory of value in Chapter 3.
In the following, we will first take up Uno’s criticism of the ‘law of immis-
eration’ and the General Law of Capitalist Accumulation to show, with Marx,
that the question of ‘too many or too few workers’ is beside the point of the
capitalist reproduction process. Uno’s view of the centrality of the private con-
sumption process of labourers as constitutive, yet uncontrollable by capital
itself – the ‘savage outside’ of capital – does not yield a meaningful contex-
tual analysis of the crisis tendencies of capitalist production as a whole. What
primarily concerns our analysis here is Uno’s thesis of the structural neces-
sity and simultaneous ‘impossibility’ of the commodification of labour power.
Because Uno remains tacit or implicit on the structural reasons for capital’s
alleged failure to directly produce the labour power commodity, we will draw
on Gavin Walker’s recent elaborate attempt13 to give coherence to this thesis.
13 Walker 2016, pp. 108–151.
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The discussion of Walker’s commentary further enhances our diagnosis that
the conceptual abstraction activated inUno’s view of capitalist production and
reproduction is limited to the realm of use value as the structuring principle
and remains irresponsive to the predicament imposed by the value nexus. This
is reflected in a, we believe, counterfactual positing of the consumption and
reproductionprocess of labour power as an ‘outside’ to the commodity relation.
In contrast, we will show that the real subsumption of labour under capital is
expressed in the monetary mediation in which capital alone relates to itself as
capital, and labour relates to itself as specifically capitalist labour. We believe
that the disavowal of the monetary nexus constitutive for the real subsump-
tion of labour under capital leads to a truncated view of the structuring force
of value as a real abstraction, reproducing its fetish-character, and leaving the
problems posed by the contradictory unity of capital as a theoretical object
unaddressed.
2.1 The Limits to the Three Level-Method (sandankairon)
2.1.1 The ‘Capitalist Commodity Economy’ as Given Data
Uno conceptualises the method of political economy – as we have briefly seen
in the 1950 Introduction to the Principles – as consisting of three levels of
abstraction that serve to understand the ‘commodity economy’ of capitalist
society, and which only in their totality deliver a complete understanding of
capitalistically organised societies and simultaneously their prospective over-
coming. On the first level of abstraction, we find the ‘purely theoretical system’,
i.e. ‘pure theory’, the ‘principles’, or, in the most often used idiom, ‘the the-
ory of principles’ (genriron). The theory of principles presents the lawfulness
(hōsokusei) of a ‘purely capitalist society’ ( junsui no shihonshugi shakai) as is
represented in any ‘commodity economy’ in a logical system. The term ‘pur-
ity’ refers to an utmost level of abstraction, which addresses the most general
categories as they are the result of non-empirical, i.e. strictly conceptual reflec-
tion, and which thus have validity for any concretely historical commodity-
economic mode of production. On the second level of abstraction, ‘stage the-
ory’ (dankairon)14 serves to present the concrete historical periods that form
14 We translate sandankairon as the ‘three-level method’ in contradistinction to ‘stage the-
ory’ (dankairon)which shares its Japanese characterswith sandankairon, and could hence
be translated as ‘level theory’. Since Uno emphasises the distinction of sandankairon and
dankairon – after all, dankairon only marks the second ‘level’ of three – we make use of a
variation in the English translation.
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the history of commodity-economic, i.e. capitalist societies, in their temporal
sequence: mercantilism from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century, liber-
alism from the seventeenth to the late nineteenth century and imperialism
from the late nineteenth to the twentieth century, alongwith their correspond-
ing forms of capital – merchant capital, industrial capital, and finance capital
respectively.15 On the third and last level of themethodof political economy, an
‘analysis of the actual phenomena’ (genjō bunseki) serves to evaluate the con-
crete political situation of different historical-economic epochs, as well as the
present.The third level,whichUnoalso calls the ‘ultimate aimof the researchof
political economy’, prepares the stage of direct ‘socialist practical action’ which
is not given in the principles and in the historical stages.16 However, it is the
stages theory that connects the principles to the ‘analysis’ and mediates levels
one and three: ‘The principles, mediated through the stage theoretical norms,
become the standard for analysis.’17
We here briefly digress to point to a terminological specificity in Uno’s the-
oretical writing. The term ‘commodity economy’ (shōhin keizai) is absolutely
central for Uno, since the commodity and its form are the main character-
istics of capitalist economy: ‘Our present economic life adopts the form of
15 In his evaluation of finance capital as a qualitatively new period of capital accumula-
tion, Uno leans on Hilferding and Lenin whose theory of imperialism (see Lenin 2010
[1917]) was directly influenced by Rudolf Hilferding’s Finance Capital (see Hilferding 1981
[1910]. For Hilferding’s influence, see Volume 39 of Lenin’s Collected Works, Lenin 1975).
This evaluation is closely connected to what Uno perceives as one of the ‘Three Great
Economic Laws Governing Capitalism’, namely the law of the equalisation of profit rates,
which is no longer easily achieved following the centralisation and concentration of cap-
ital already occurring, and analysed by him, inMarx’s time. As Shaikh explains, ‘Hilferding
argues that the rising scale and capital intensity of production makes it more difficult
for capital to enter and to leave certain sectors, which impedes the mobility of capital
needed to bring about equalization of profit rates’ to the disavantage of small- and large-
scale competitive industries. ‘But big capitals have the means to suppress competition
and raise their rate of profit through cartels, combines, consortiums, mergers, and ver-
tical integration. These capitals are also most closely linked to big banks that provide
them with the credit needed to make large-scale investments, and it is in the interest of
these banks to enhance the monopoly power of their clients. In the end, the big banks
end up controlling even the monopoly industries they finance, which is why Hilferding
calls this the phase of Finance Capital.’ Shaikh 2016, p. 353. Hilferding’s view is also shared
by Baran and Sweezy which Uno, for reasons unknown, largely ignores (see Sweezy 1942
and 1981). Sweezy explicitly refers to finance capitalism as ‘a new stage’ (Sweezy 1981,
p. 60).
16 For an overview of the overarching structure, see Uno 1974 [1962], p. 55 and pp. 60–1.
17 Uno 1974 [1962], p. 58.
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the commodity-economy, or, more precisely, that of the capitalist commodity-
economy’.18 At some points, Uno uses ‘commodity economy’ to indicate the
‘mechanism’ the capitalist mode of production ‘entails’,19 but ‘commodity eco-
nomy’ and ‘capitalist mode of production’ are largely identified, while Uno
rarely used the latter. Uno’s preference for the term ‘commodity economy’ over
‘capitalism’ and ‘capitalist relations of production’ is indicative of where Uno’s
interest differs from Marx: while, for Marx, capital is mainly characterised by
its contradictory relation to (wage) labour as a social relation, for Uno, the spe-
cificity of capital lies in its being a principally commodity-producing society,
functioning according to commodity-economic principles.20 See his opening
sentence to the 1964 Principles:
Political economy has developed as a science specifically designed to cla-
rify the variousphenomenapeculiar to a commodity-economy…political
economy studies a capitalist society whose economic functioning is gov-
erned by the peculiarly commodity-economic forms.21
It is Uno’s deep interest in the commodification of labour power as a problem
thatmotivates his preference of ‘commodity economy’ over ‘capitalist relations
of production’. Only when ‘workers are compelled to sell their labour-power in
order to purchase their means of livelihood as commodities’, i.e. ‘only when
this commodity-economic relation thus descends to the core of society, i.e. to
the very process of reproduction of its direct producers, is the capitalist mode
of production well established’.22 Accordingly, in ‘The Three Great Economic
Laws Governing Capitalism’, he explains his choice of terminology:
Because I think that, in reality, the fundamental and general laws (hōsoku)
that dominate a commodity economy have for the first time been proven
18 Uno 2016 [1971], p. 2.
19 Uno 2016 [1971], p. 2.
20 In some places, Uno argues that the interests of the workers were not necessarily opposed
to that of ‘capitalist policies’: ‘Marxism cannot, of course, simply endorse an economic
policy that contributes to the development of capitalism; but that does not mean that it
should oppose any capitalist policy as automatically incompatiblewith the interests of the
working class. Since the aim of a socialist party is to change society bymeans of an organ-
ised politicalmovement, it should either support or oppose economic policies, depending
on their usefulness to its strategic aim.’ Uno 2016 [1971], p. 24.
21 Uno 1964, p. 1.
22 Uno 2016 [1971], p. 6. Uno 1974 [1936], p. 17.
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in the commodity exchange relations between capitalists and workers,
they become the standard (kijun) of commodity exchange …23
The class antagonism, for Uno, is more fundamentally embedded in the laws
of commodity exchange, so that ‘commodity economy’ as the Spezifikum of
the capitalist mode of production becomes the preferred term. We will come
back to this soon. To add to terminological specificities, Uno, unlike Marx,
rarely speaks of ‘the capitalist mode of production’. Instead, he uses ‘capital-
ist society/societies’ (shihonshugi shakai) or simply, ‘capitalism’ (shihonshugi),
a concept Marx has used only a few times in Capital.24 As we learn from the
Methodology, the three level-method serves a multiple function: to highlight
the shortcomings of the inner Japanese ‘debate on capitalism’ of the 1920s–30s
between the jcp’s Kōza-ha and the Rōnō-ha,25 to demonstrate the methodolo-
gically deficient character of Hilferding’s Finance Capital of 1910 and, last but
not least, to provide the ‘final judgment’ on the relation of basis and super-
structure in Marx’s ‘materialist view of history’ as exemplified in The German
Ideology of 1845–6 and the Preface to the Contribution to the Critique of Polit-
ical Economy of 1859. For our purposes, not all of these functions are equally
important. To understand the specific problematic of Uno’s theory in light of
Marx’s Critique of Political Economy, the latter function is apparently themost
instructive. Needless to say, the ‘relation between basis and superstructure’ as
a substantial topic in Marx’s early works and arguably a prerequisite to his
turn towards the categorial analysis of political economy as a science from
the 1850s, has not lost its methodological relevance in Capital.26 However, as
23 Uno 1974 [1969], p. 12. In the same passage, Uno does not miss the chance to point to the
alleged deficiency of Marx’s introduction of the labour theory of value: ‘Because Marx
proved the law of value – as the general law of the commodity economy – for the first time
directly from the consideration of the ‘commodity’ and from the commodity exchange of
two commodities, his labour theory of value could not escape various disputes’.
24 The reduction of the capital-relation to a ‘commodity economy’ has also been noticed by
Kakuta: ‘[Uno] rejected the law of surplus value, too; for him, the law of value only exists
because he reduced capitalist economy to commodity economy’. Kakuta 2009, p. 282.
25 Because for reasons of space, it is impossible to reproduce this now famous debate, further
reading is advised. Arguably the best study in a Western language on the Kōza-ha-Rōnō-
ha debate is Germaine A. Hoston’sMarxismandThe Crisis of Development in Prewar Japan
(Hoston 1986). For French and English languagematerials on the debate, see also Sugihara
1987, Itoh 1980, C.A. Gayle 2003.
26 The basis-superstructure model is mentioned once in the whole work in a footnote in the
chapter on the ‘FetishCharacter of theCommodity and its Secret’whereMarxquotes from
the Preface to the Contribution: ‘My view is that each particular mode of production, and
the relations of production corresponding to it at each given moment, in short “the eco-
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a critique of capitalist social relations – and not only bourgeois society and its
ideology – the critical analysis of political economy’s basic categories as the
fetish-characteristic forms of value has replaced the mere critique of ‘super-
structural ideology’. In this sense, themethod of Capital incorporates historical
materialism as a tacit premise on which it builds. The materialism of the Pre-
face to the Contribution is thus not discarded. But it has been taken over by
a more fundamental problem consciousness. In his economy-critical works,
starting with the manuscripts of what would later become Capital in the mid-
1850s,Marxwould growmore interested in the social form that labour assumes
under the conditions of capitalist mode of production, forms that themselves
constitute the ‘fetishistic’ approach, and in which the relation to its social con-
ditions is obfuscated. Here, the fetish-character of value that infects the self-
understanding of the capitalistmode of production and its ‘interpreters’ is itself
the precise and foremost expression of ‘the mode of production of material
life conditions’ to which corresponds a ‘definite form of social consciousness’.
The conceptual heuristic of ‘basis’ and ‘superstructure’ is, in Adorno’s word,
rendered ‘trite’ by the complex of fetishism as a structural law.27 The analysis
and critique of the concepts of vulgar and classical political economy – ‘cost
price’, ‘wage’, ‘capital’ or ‘profit’, etc. – thatMarx performs inCapital, thoroughly
outshines the previous framework of historical materialism, as to be found
in, e.g., The German Ideology (1845–6), as it indicates a new terrain of critique.
In The German Ideology, the critique of the superstructure merely asserts the
existence of a definite relation between material conditions of production and
its corresponding social ‘ideological’ consciousness – thereby leaving open the
question of the constitution and the reproduction of the economic basis and the
central mechanism by which it generates a ideology.28 Needless to say, when
writing the Grundrisse, Marx has neither thoroughly developed his monetary
nomic structure of society”, is “the real foundation, on which arises a political and legal
superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness”, and that
“the mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, polit-
ical and intellectual life” ’. Marx 1976, p. 175n. The quote is taken from AContribution to the
Critique of Political EconomyMarx 1987 [1857–61], p. 263.
27 Adorno et al. 1976, p. 116. Adorno also calls the fetish-character of the commodity the ‘pro-
ton pseudon’ and a ‘structural law’.
28 Other than Sohn-Rethel, who claims that ‘the basic law of historicalmaterialism is the law
of value’ (Sohn-Rethel 1970, p. 27), and ‘the law of value becomes the basic law of histor-
ical materialism over the epochs of class society’ (Sohn-Rethel 1970, p. 28), we hold that
the law of value is not only specific to capitalist relations of production (and not just ‘class
society’), but in its critical function surpasses the epistemological limitations of the basis-
superstructure model.
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labour theory of value nor his theory of surplus value, and it wouldn’t be until
the second draft of A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy in the
late 1850s, which even then was yet an incomplete account.29 But to say, as
Uno does – informed as he is on the content of Capital – that the relation
between basis and superstructure still forms a vital problem for the method
of political economy in Capital which can be circumvented by the three level-
method, fundamentally disregards and misrepresents the critical potential of
the method of Capital itself.30 It is evident also from the structure of the eco-
nomic manuscripts since the late 1850s that the continuous criticism of the
fetish-characteristic forms of value – from the critique of value theories of cir-
culation or ‘simple exchange’ in the drafts to the Contribution to the critique
of the ‘Trinity Formula’ in The 1864–5 Economic Manuscripts – constitute the
golden thread to Marx’s process of inquiry. It is Uno’s theoretical disavowal
of the fetish problematic that also impels us to question the function of the
three-level approach. More fatally however, Uno’s approach, if viewed in light
of Marx’s critique of the basic categories of classical political economy and the
fetish-character they generate, fails to address the issue of critique in general.
Hence, Uno’s attempt is exhausted in elucidating the ‘norms’ and ‘laws’ of a
‘commodity producing’ society to give coherence to the mechanism of repro-
duction, termed by Uno the ‘law of value’, as a rightful object of science. What
is at stake therefore, for Uno, is not by which structural failures, gaps and blind
spots the conventional categories of bourgeois political economy inform and
constitute a fetishistic view of capitalist reproduction – a project that delivers a
precise critical content – but how to formulate both ‘norms’ and ‘laws’ which
scientifically represent capitalist commodity-economic activity. The epistemo-
logical problem of object constitution, which informs the Marxian project from
its earliest stage is eschewed fromUno’s programme.This approach to the ‘com-
modity economy’ as given data, and therefore its positivistic implication, is
29 For a good overview of the different stages in the development of Marx’s economy-critical
writings, see Heinrich 2011.
30 Paul Mattick Jr. already questions the prevalence of the basis-superstructure model in
Marx’s early critique in the Contribution: ‘It is worth remembering that they [Marx’s
remarks on the relation between basis and superstructure in the Preface to the Contri-
bution] represent a highly abbreviated residue of (the last part of) Marx’s projected intro-
duction to his critique of economic categories when we ask, as is rarely done, what is the
significance of their presence at the head of the Contribution, beyond their announced
purpose of demonstrating that Marx’s views “are the outcome of conscientious research
carried on over many years” (ibid., 265)’. Mattick Jr. 1997, pp. 70–1. Mattick Jr. quotes from
Marx 1987 [1857–61].
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further substantiated in Uno’s crucial terminological distinction between the
‘norms’ (gensoku) and the ‘laws’ (hōsoku) of the ‘economy’:
In political economy, the economy’s general norms (keizai gensoku) and
its specific laws (keizai hōsoku) must be clearly distinguished, while of
course they are not unrelated. To the contrary: only in the laws specific to
a commodity-economy, the general norms of an economy express them-
selves for the first time. For example, when an economically advantage-
ous machine is adopted [in the production process], this machine itself
technically employs natural-scientific laws that reduce human labour
power (ningen no rōryoku). Its economically advantageous adoption is a
general economic norm. However, in a capitalist commodity-economic
society, this norm, bound to commodity-economically adapt this
machine to its advantage, is restricted by commodity-economic laws. Its
adaptation is not decided on the basis of human economic activity as a
mere economic norm. Generally, as the norms that assume the basis of
any [economic] activity, they rule as laws by force. As the same time that
political economyas a sciencebecomespossible at this point, it elucidates
capitalism’s economic superiority against previous societies. Moreover, it
demonstrates the emphatic basis of socialism, which should realise the
conscious planning of direct producers as subjects, instead of the realisa-
tion of general norms as commodity-economic laws.31
While Uno admits the historically specific character of capitalism, he insists
on its deeper embeddedness in the formalistic requirements of ‘economic
life’, in the sense of a progressive development towards socialism. ‘Capitalism’
becomes a necessary stage of human development whose ‘laws’, at a certain
point of its history, simply become the object of the ‘study’ of ‘a historical pro-
cess in which the purposive and conscious activities of men form a social rela-
tion’.32 Not only does it not occur to Uno that the specificity of capitalist social
relations is precisely not constituted by ‘the purposive and conscious activities
of men’, but by the ‘logically unconscious’ (Reichelt) process of naturalisation
and reification. The object constitution of capitalist social relations, too, is not
‘given’ in its categories: these ‘givens’ are only the beginning of the scientific
inquiry that precisely seeks to expose what is inherently ‘not given’. More gen-
erally, the difference betweenUno’s scientific interest and approaches invested
31 Uno 1964, pp. 4–5.
32 Uno 1980, p. xxv. Uno 1964, p. 5.
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in a reconstruction of Marx’s critique must be noted. In his comparative study
of Uno and Isaak Illich Rubin, Joe Hyeon-Soo contends:
In contrast to Uno’s conception of political economy as an independent
social science and the examination of pure capitalism as a ‘self-sustaining
scientific system’, as well as historical materialism as a merely hypothet-
ical ideology, for Rubin, political economy means a ‘theoretical’ science
subordinated to historical materialism while the latter provides a basis
for the critical analysis of social relations in a commodity economy.What
interestsMarx in the ‘Critique of Political Economy’ [according to Rubin]
is to reveal the social relations that find their fetishised expression in
political economy. His intention is therefore not to ‘add to’ (bereichern)
the science of economy (Wirtschaften). For Marx, the theory of value
is not an empirical description of capitalist relations, but the scientific
expression of these relations which are comprehended (begriffen) by the-
oretical abstraction.33
According to Hyeon-Soo, while Rubin’s theoretical interest lies in the social
relations that constitute capitalist society as an object, undergirding their ‘fet-
ishised expression inpolitical economy’,Uno seeks to ‘purify’ political economy
as a science, extracting the specific ‘economic laws’ that give coherence to
the ‘capitalist commodity economy’ as an object of investigation. The crucial
term of the ‘social form of labour’ in specifically capitalist relations of produc-
tion, denoting the heuristic framework for the de-mystification of the forms
that value assumes in this mode of production, remains anathematic in Uno’s
approach. The question we should follow up on is the relevance and incentive
of the claim to ‘purity’ for Uno’s overall method.
2.1.2 Purities and Impurities
At the beginning of the Methodology, Uno addresses what he presumes is the
specific problem in Capital’s method of presentation: the insufficient reflec-
tion on the relation and tension between the pure principles and capitalism’s
developmental history:
The hypothetical purity of capitalist society was a matter-of-fact (mochi-
ron no koto) in Smith and Ricardo, and it was no less so in Marx’s own
times. For Marx, the development of capitalist society in reality – more
33 Hyeon-Soo 1995, p. 40.
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than in Smith’s in Ricardo’s era – meant a continuous approximation
towards a pure capitalist society which had to be theoretically assumed
as a hypothesis. And as something that increasingly approaches purity,
it was a justified hypothesis. This is how finally a systematisation of eco-
nomic theorywaspossible, even if in actuality, the problemof the relation
between theory and history remained the same. What Marx could not
predict when he wrote Capital was the further development of capital-
ism, and that we no longer simply approach a pure capitalist society in
capitalism’s development.34
One fundamental point of critique for Uno is hence Marx’s alleged hypothesis
of gradual approximation towards a ‘pure capitalist society’, which as a hypo-
thesis couldonly be justifieduntil thedevelopment showedother factorswhich
no longer pertain to the hypothesis of purity. Marx’s lacuna to predict par-
ticular deviating developments – e.g., the evolution of finance capital in the
age of imperialism – renders his theory ‘impure’, according to Uno. For if the
principles of pure theory – or the theory of pure principles – are to be gen-
erally valid, one must assume an ‘ideal’, hyper-abstract object that can justify
its ‘laws’ regardless of any specific historical formation. Uno insists throughout
his critical discussion of Marx’s method that Marx insufficiently distinguished
between the pure and the impure elements of presentation, referring to three
crucial instances: thepresentationof the ‘WorkingDay’, thepresentationof ‘So-
called Primitive Accumulation’, and the ‘theory of immiseration’, all of which
we will refer to in the discussion below. Therefore, while Marx by and large
managed to establish a system of pure principles, Uno advocates supplement-
ing them by stage theoretical considerations that allow for the ‘impure’ factors
leaving their mark on capitalist sociation in its actual historical and political
development. We will come back to this point soon.
Another point of Uno’s critique is Marx’s alleged insufficient differentiation
between the pure and general principles of his analysis on the one hand,
and the concrete phenomena of capitalist economy and policy on the other,
as they, for instance, occurred in England at the time of Marx’s writing. In
Uno’s view, Marx conflated them, subordinating specific policies and histor-
ical restrictions to the ‘theory of principles’ in Capital that did not account
for the uneven development taking place in late developing countries such
as Japan. As is well known, in the Preface to the first edition of Capital, Marx
contends that nineteenth-century England has been ‘the locus classicus’ of the
34 Uno 1974 [1962], p. 21.
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‘capitalist mode of production, and the relations of production and forms of
intercourse’, hence Marx’s decision to present it ‘as the main illustration of
the theoretical developments’ he makes.35 Uno however does not consent to
Marx’s following remark, namely that England shows the less developed coun-
tries only ‘the image of their own future’. Since the development of capitalism,
e.g. in Germany, but also in Japan, has taken a different path than in England,36
Marx had underestimated the problem of uneven development and the non-
capitalist factors that remained a constant condition in lesser developed societ-
ies, even as capitalism has begun to emerge. It therefore requires a stage theory
that incorporates and theorises the hampering factors of capitalist develop-
ment, and the different path to ‘primitive accumulation’ in these countries.
This assessment is a coremotivation of his three level-method. To proceed sys-
tematically, we shall first consider the motive for the first level, the theory of
principles, or pure theory that makes a ‘pure capitalist society’ its object. First,
we will see that ‘pure capitalism’ in Uno oscillates between a non-historical,
ideal-typological and radically abstract object, in order to comply with its own
claims, and a historical one most paradigmatically linked to the era of indus-
trial or ‘laissez faire’ capitalism in the nineteenth century, the time of Marx’s
writing. This oscillation in our view also vitiates Uno’s claim to purity and the
ideal-typical standpoint of the principles. Rather than hold this against him,
35 Marx 1976, p. 90.
36 Though Uno often compares Japan to the late-developing Germany, perhaps Japan’s com-
parison to Russia would be more appropriate. Russia’s Absolutism and Japan’s Tennōism
is a case in point, while Germany’s ‘constitutional monarchy’ since 1871 had a different
political structure, which also allowed for different economic functions of governmental
institutions. In that sense, Trotsky, in his ‘Pecularities of Russia’s development’, points out
the role of European capital and Absolutism for the introduction of the particular form
of Russian capitalism, both also crucial factors in Japan’s capitalist development. As Ash-
man notes, ‘European finance plays a central role in Russia’s development in two ways.
First, in loans made to the state, which then lead European financiers, whilst supporting
bourgeois democracy in Europe, to support Absolutism’s survival as it is the only force in
Russia, which can guarantee their rate of interest. Second, European capital, in the form
of large shareholding companies, provides funding for industry, attracted by Russia’s nat-
ural resources and its hitherto unorganized labour power. Heavy industry (metal, coal, oil)
especially “was almost wholly under the control of foreign finance capital, which had cre-
ated for itself an auxiliary and intermediate systemof banks in Russia”. (Trotsky, History of
the Russian Revolution, vol. 1, ch. 1)’. Ashman 2012, p. 63. Peter the Great’s modernisation
of Russia (military, the forging of an Absolutist state, the establishment of a handicraft
industry largely confined to rural areas) bears significant similarities with Japan’s Meiji-
eraTennōismand the emphasis of handicraft production tied to agriculture, as against the
division between town and country characteristic for eighteenth and nineteenth century
Europe.
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however, we will, second, follow up with a discussion of the rationale for the
‘limits to the dialectical presentation’ in Capital, and the arguments for Marx’s
deliberately ‘impure’ employment of empirical and historical illustrations, e.g.
in the presentation of ‘TheWorking Day’ (Chapter 10 of Capital Volume i) and
‘So-called PrimitiveAccumulation’ (Part Eight of CapitalVolume i). Contrary to
Uno’s beliefs, these serve a specific informational content as to the epistemolo-
gical status of the lawof value.Herewewill be able to detect a first radical break
of Uno’s methodwithMarx’s mode of presentation: while the hypostasation of
‘pure capitalism’ requires a theory of principles that does not comply with any
specific historical formation, but assumes the capitalist productive system as
a hyper-abstract ‘ideal’ without any correspondent in reality, Marx to the con-
trary presents the modus operandi of the capitalist exploitative and appropri-
ative cycle as it happens in its concrete actuality, with the incentive of precisely
illustrating the impact of an abstract ‘law’ – the law of value – i.e., its actual
implementation, into a specific social formation. This, as one may suggest, is
also the incentive behind the presentation of the violent process of ‘primitive’
(or ‘original’) accumulation, the historical birth of capitalism in the separa-
tion of the direct producers from themeans of production in fifteenth-century
England. Not only will we, against Uno, who excludes this presentation from
the ‘principles’ of ‘pure capitalism’ as an ‘impure’ element, insist on its stra-
tegic locus within Marx’s work at the end of the first volume of Capital, but we
will show, third, why Uno’s alternative framework, the beginning of commodity
exchange between communities as the ‘point zero’ of capitalist accumulation,
fails to address what is the linchpin of valorisation and the means by which
the relation between capital and wage labour, and not that between different
‘traders’, becomes the defining relation of the capitalist mode of production.
Uno’s preference for ‘modes of exchange’ over ‘modes of production’37 for the
presentation of the forms of capital also begs the claim to ‘purity’ as the heur-
istic framework for the theory of principles: bywhat criteria should commodity
exchange signify a ‘pure’ approach to the formation of capitalism? Fourth, and
more significantly, by what criteria do the theory of principles, the theory of
developmental stages of capital accumulation, and the ‘conjunctural analysis’
(Walker) of the present – in a word, the three level-method – form a structur-
ally completewhole? In the following four sections,wewill address these topics
separately.
37 As will be later re-applied as the interpretative framework for The Structure of World His-
tory (2014) by Uno’s student Karatani Kōjin. For a critique of this work, see Lange 2015.
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2.1.3 The Paradox of Pure Capitalism Both as Historical and
Non-historical Entity
Uno’s theory of principles (genriron) that takes the economic laws of a hypo-
thetical ‘pure capitalist society’ as its object – andhence itself must be qualified
as ‘pure’ – forms the structural basis of the method of political economy. Inter-
estingly, Uno explains his motive for establishing the hypothesis of ‘pure capit-
alism’with reference to an aside inChapter 10CapitalVolume iii inwhichMarx
discusses ‘The Equalisation of the General Rate of Profit through Competition’,
a passage where the concept of competition is prepared as an analytical tool
for explaining the equalisation of profit rates in the ‘real economy’.38 Ironic-
ally therefore, Uno orients himself toward a passage in whichMarx has already
departed from the abstract and general presentation of the ‘essential’ form
determinations of capital that constitute the object of Volumes i and ii and
the first part of Volume iii of Capital (including Chapter 7), as the critique of
the conventional categories of (commodity) value, money, capital, wage, pro-
duction price and profit. Beginning with ‘The Transformation of Profit into
Average Profit’ (Part Two of Capital Volume iii or Chapters 8–12), Marx’s text
no longer takes the ‘hidden abode’ of the theoretical production of the cat-
egories underlying capitalist accumulation as his object, but the superficial
self-presentations of capital itself, or the study of the ‘apparent movement of
capital, in which interest capital, etc., and credit etc. will be examined in more
detail’.39 These are designated in categories such as average profit, market (pro-
duction) price, commercial profit, and the various formsof interest.40However,
38 We will discuss Chapter 10 of Capital Volume iii in further detail in the context of the
value-price transformation inChapter 4.3. It is needless also topoint out that ‘competition’
as a heuristic tool for the explanation of the emergence of a general rate of profit has been
problematised byMarx previously as early as in theGrundrisse: ‘Competition executes the
inner laws of capital;makes them into compulsory laws towards the individual capital, but
it does not invent them. It realizes them. To try to explain them simply as results of com-
petition thereforemeans to concede that onedoesnotunderstand them.’Marx 1973, p. 752.
For the fetishism of competition in Ricardo and Ramsay, see also ‘Competition generally,
this essential locomotive force of the bourgeois economy, does not establish its laws, but
is rather their executor. Unlimited competition is therefore not the presupposition for the
truth of the economic laws, but rather the consequence – the formof appearance inwhich
their necessity realizes itself ’. Marx 1973, p. 552.
39 Marx 2015 [1864–5], p. 360. Original emphasis.
40 One may argue that ‘The Law of the Tendential Fall in the Rate of Profit’ in Part Three
of Volume iii belongs neither to the ‘essential’ nor the ‘superficial’ or ‘self-presentational’
categorical objects, but forms a category unto itself. This is true insofar as it is both non-
empirical, as well as the result of a specific analysis, i.e. a ‘law’. But the systematic locus
of the ‘Law’ has been questioned. For Heinrich, e.g., it is only a ‘large mass of remarks,
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Uno is right to identify this passage as the only one in Capital in which Marx
suggests capital’s historical approximation towards ‘purity’:
In theory, we assume that the laws of the capitalist mode of production
develop in their pure form. In reality, this is only an approximation; but
the approximation is all the more exact, the more the capitalist mode
of production is developed and the less it is adulterated by survivals of
earlier economic relations with which it is amalgamated.41
Other than Marx however, who does not further elaborate on this point, Uno
draws an almost authoritative significance from this claim. It is adopted byUno
for his own view of capital’s historical formation in the course of its develop-
ment towards an increasing level of ‘purity’. This movement towards purity –
i.e. capital’s development towards a state in which the ‘law of value’ operates
increasingly ‘unhampered’ by extra-economic forces, such as an e.g. mercant-
ilist policy – also marks the point of the emergence of political economy as
a science. For Uno, it is not a coincidence that classical political economy has
only been able to establish itself from the secondhalf of the eighteenth century.
The development of productive forces during the lifetime (and time of writing)
of classical economists William Petty (1623–87), Adam Smith (1723–90) and
David Ricardo (1772–1823) led to an increasing ‘purity’ of capitalist production,
progressively unrestrained bymercantilist policies, so that capitalism in and of
itself could eliminate the ‘remnants’ of previous social modes of production.
Accordingly, the continuous approximation towards capitalist society’s ‘purity’
was the condition of possibility for the ‘systematisation of political economy’
that was able to conceptualise the paradigms of its own economic reality.
[To eliminate all the mixtures and impurities of the capitalist mode of
production emerging from the remnants of previous economic condi-
tions] is what the developmental process of capitalist society shows. For
the development of theoretical economy as a science, this was of utter-
most importance. It forms the historical foundations of the development
additions, and argumentative approaches, in unelaborated and incomplete form’. Hein-
rich 1996–7, p. 459. Engels’s heavy intervention thereforemade it lookmore coherent than
it was. It is difficult to maintain however that Marx was incoherent in the presentation of
Volume iii as the ‘surface’ of capitalist self-presentation, when the ‘Law’ had also been
accepted by bourgeois economists, e.g. Ricardo – however differently it was explained.
We will return to the significance of the law in Chapter 4.4.
41 Marx 1981, 275.
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of economic theory as a science, represented in Petty, Smith and Ricardo.
Commodity economy, as capitalistic commodity economy (shōhinkateki
shōhin keizai), by showing the gradual approximation towards a pure cap-
italist society which is an absolutely necessary hypothesis in theoretical
research, clarifies in this point the specific character of the method of
political economy and the special emphasis we must put on it.42
Uno views Marx as an ‘heir’ to Smith and Ricardo who has ‘further elaborated
the progress of classical political economy as the systematisation of their the-
oretical insights’. However, he sees a distinction, albeit a mild one: ‘But where
the classics understand capitalism itself as an ultimate society, Marx sees it as
a historical process and critically absorbs classical political economy itself ’.43
One feature that justifies the hypothesis of ‘pure’ capitalism is that the ‘tend-
ency for purification in the developmental stages (hasseiki) of capitalism is
given an objective basis in which commodity economy is developed as a logic
which completely dominates society’.44 The commodity form of capitalist soci-
ety is therefore its distinctive feature which justifies its being ‘pure’. Moreover,
without the hypothesis of purity demarcated by the logic of commodity eco-
nomy, we would not be able to explain the principles of capitalist society at all,
according to Uno, even if in reality, the pure commodity economic logic does
not occur:
… for us who know the era of finance capital, as it was forMarx, the devel-
opment of capitalism cannot be taken as a historical process that increas-
ingly approximates towards a pure capitalist society. The principles of a
historical process-forming society must be clarified. This society emerges
at a certain epoch, and at another epoch yet again, its purification is
obstructed. In other words, it is definitely not realised in reality (genjit-
suteki ni ha kesshite jitsugen shienai), and it cannot be more than just an
ever-increasing approximation, but if we don’t make pure capitalist soci-
ety a theoretically necessary hypothesis, we cannot explain the principles
of capitalist society.45
But if it is not realised in reality, what do we take as the model we can abstract
from? For Uno, the era of industrial capitalism marks the model, and yet, as
42 Uno 1974 [1962], p. 20.
43 Uno 1974 [1962], p. 35.
44 Uno 1974 [1962], p. 28.
45 Uno 1974 [1962], p. 27.
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we will see, and against which his principal objection against Marx’s method
in Capital is directed, it does not. On the one hand, Uno emphasises the char-
acter of pure theory as ‘nothing but the elimination of factors which hamper
the development of the principles’, but on the other hand, he includes non-
commodity economic and ‘impure phenomena’ which are part of a partic-
ular country’s capitalist economy in a particular time.46 That is because the
performance of abstraction should not be carried out ‘mechanistically’.47 The
model for pure theory should therefore not abstract ‘away’ the perturbing
factors, even in industrial capitalism, which ‘is the closest to the theory of
principles of pure capitalism’.48 Marx however ‘exaggerates’ the meaning of
industrial capitalism, because if the principles should be universally valid as
principles that explain all forms of commodity-economy, regardless of histor-
ical epoch and region, we cannot assume industrial capitalism, least of all the
way it developed in mid-nineteenth century, post-industrial revolution Eng-
land, will serve as the theoretical model.
If, according to Uno, the principles of political economy become the prin-
ciples of industrial capital as one of the developmental periods of capitalism,
and the era of industrial capitalism becomes hypothesised as the object of the
principles, the fact of the closest approximation to a pure capitalist society will
be exaggerated, and the meaning of the principles misunderstood.49
In other words, pure theory does not coincide with the era of industrial
capitalism. At the same time, however, industrial capitalism ‘enables’ the puri-
fication of theory as an abstraction:
The demonstration of the conditions ( jōtai) which have increasingly
approximated a pure capitalist society thatmakes the theory of principles
its hyposthesis presents nothing but the elimination of factors which
hamper the development of the principles … This is the purification pro-
cess ( junkanokatei) as the formationof a uniform, commodity-economic
society. There can therefore be no doubt that for the first time, a sys-
tematic development has been enabled by the so-called era of industrial
capital of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century England.
The model-like character of industrial capital, serving as the ‘blueprint’ for the
commodity-economicprinciples,maybe close to apure capitalist society, but it
46 Uno 1974 [1962], p. 41.
47 Uno 1974 [1962], p. 41.
48 Uno 1974 [1962], p. 51.
49 Uno 1974 [1962], p. 33.
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also contains various ‘phenomena’ that cannot be simply idealistically abstrac-
ted from:
However, this is not simply an abstraction from the various phenomena
of this era. These are recognised within the processual development of
the capitalist commodity economy since the 17th century, and they are
abstracted as the tendency of commodity-economic purification. Assum-
ing the various commodity-economic phenomena of the era of so-called
industrial capital, the principles are not arrived at in such away as to hold
on to the elimination of perturbing factors or to the so-called ‘average’. In
the era of industrial capital, the so-called ‘ideal average’ of the various
phenomena, by its tendency of commodity-economic purification, dis-
closes the principles, generally speaking, in their details as well as their
general outline. Butwhen it comes to the era of financial capital, the tend-
ency to developmental purification is repeatedly obstructed.50
Uno nowhere convincingly argues by which criteria industrial capital should
indicate an (approximate) level of ‘purity’. As a historical society, it should
mark themost appropriatemodel, but why and how the commodity-economic
principles should best conform to industrial capital, we do not hear. Since
Uno surely does not negate the historical ‘impurities’ of this era – phases
of class struggles, the formation of workers’ organisations and unions in the
mid-nineteenth century – one wonders why this era should most accurately
describe a model in which ‘capitalists have it their way’. Furthermore, if the
genriron do not simply ‘eliminate the perturbing factors’, what is their func-
tion? How do we even discriminate the ‘pure’ from the ‘perturbing’ factors?
Accordingly, the theory of principles is suspended inmid-air. On the one hand,
they indicate a general abstraction from any particular commodity-economy
social formation. On the other hand, it is the era of industrial capitalism, of all
possible periods, which marks the most distinctive level, without providing a
convincing argument for either this decision, or the criteria or standard that
define its relative ‘purity’ as against other periods. Not only is a solution to that
paradox missing; so too are the very criteria for ‘purity’51 – and this is a funda-
50 Uno 1974 [1962], pp. 40–1.
51 Among other theoretical gaps in the ‘pure’ principles, i.e. the missing explanation of the
contradiction of the relations with the forces of production, and the non-existing ref-
erence to the capitalist mode of production as a system of the appropriation of unpaid
human labour, Mita Sekisuke (1906–75) has criticised the non-explanation of the stand-
ard for ‘purity’ of the principles. The work dealing most critically with Uno’s method and
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mental problem we can detect also in the ‘stages theory’ of the Anglophone
Uno School (see Chapter 5.2.). More important for Uno’s theoretical forma-
tion however is the critique of Marx. According to Uno, Marx was wrong to
assume that ‘capitalism in its development would gradually approach a theor-
etically supposed increasingly pure capitalist society’ that ‘would be given as
the objective basis of economic research’.52 But Uno does at no point argue
whether Marx has ever made claims to any ‘pure’ understanding of capital-
ism in its industrial phase or whether Marx had ever claimed ‘pure’ theory as
bearing a specific Erkenntnisinteresse on his theory at all. To complicate mat-
ters further, in the 1970 Introduction to The Types of Economic Policies Under
Capitalism [1936], Uno argues that ‘the idea of a purely capitalist society … is
an objective reality’.53 There seems to lurk a pervasive indecisiveness as to the
epistemological status of theobject of his theory,whether as a tentative approx-
imation, or ‘ideal-type’ model54 of a particular historical society, or an actually
existing ‘logic’ manifesting itself in the ‘objective reality’ workings of capital-
ist society itself. The ambiguity is further extended to sentences such as that
from the same Introduction: ‘… the conceptual framework of economic the-
ory is fundamentally determined by the purely capitalist society towardswhich
the actual process of development of capitalism pointed …’,55 thereby suggest-
ing that the theory of principles does not merely hypostasise economic laws
without empirical equivalent, but addresses the actual workings of a capital-
ist economy. However, the ambiguity is remarkable for someone so interested
in questions of economic method. In the following, we shall investigate Uno’s
accusation thatMarx had ‘insufficiently’ separated the ‘pure’ presentation from
specific empirical and historical instances occurring in Marx’s time and in the
specific locus of England. We shall take a closer look at Marx’s radically differ-
ent approach to the capitalist mode of production as an object of cognition in
which not their ‘purity’, but their semantic ‘impurity’ with regard to the inform-
ational content they obscure, becomes the standard of analysis. By deliberately
transcending the ‘pure’ presentation of the capitalist mode of production into
the realm of the ‘real’, Marx also indicates a new terrain of the inquiry: from the
theoretical to the practical.
theory of value in the 1960s and 1970s is arguably Uno Theory and Marxist Political Eco-
nomy (Uno riron to Marukusushugi keizaigaku) (1968). See Mita 1968.
52 Uno 1974 [1962], p. 37.
53 Uno 2016 [1971], p. 30.
54 While Uno rejects the idea that this is the case for ‘pure theory’, he accepts a Weberian
framework for the stages-theory. See Uno 2016 [1971], p. 31.
55 Uno 2016 [1971]. p. 31.
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2.1.4 The ‘Limit to the Dialectical Presentation’: The Irruption of the Real
In a letter to Ferdinand Lassalle in early 1858, Marx famously declared that
‘[the] work i am presently concerned with is a Critique of Economic Categor-
ies or, if you like, a critical exposé of the system of the bourgeois economy. It is
at once an exposé and, by the same token, a critique of the system’.56What does
‘by the same token’ (zugleich)mean here?To answer this, we should refer to the
correspondences, but also the crucial differences between Marx’s and Hegel’s
method of presentation. First, we shall preliminarily draw on theHegelian pre-
sumptions according to which Marx, like Hegel in his critique of metaphysics,
saw the unfolding of the system as the critique of approaches that apply a par-
ticular method onto an ‘external object’. Next, we will investigate the ‘limit to
the dialectical presentation’ that separates Marx’s method from Hegel’s – with
grave political consequences, as we will see. As Michael Theunissen points out
in his seminal Sein und Schein – Zur kritischen Funktion der Hegelschen Logik
(1980), Hegel, like Marx after him, proposed that the Logic is, ‘according to the
methodological idea that constitutes it, the unity of critique and presentation
of metaphysics’.57 Michael Heinrich stresses in this context that the legacy of
Hegel should not be so much sought for in the ‘adoption’ of a vague concept
of ‘dialectic’ into Marx’s method in Capital, but rather in a particular ‘level of
problem setting’ (Stand der Problemstellung)58 that can be found both in Hegel
and inMarx. This particular Problemstellung, as Iwill argue, consists not only in
the ascendingmethod of retrieving the ‘inner cord’ that gives coherence to the
capitalistmode of production as an object of thought,while it acknowledges its
basic contradiction, but necessarily presupposes that the reconstruction of the
system must permeate the forms of appearance of its categories, e.g. money,
toward their essence – and only a fundamentally critical method can perform
such a task. What, then, is the systematic function of conceptual critique for
both Marx and Hegel? Generally, it consists not so much in the demonstration
of particular ‘contradictions’ in the basic concepts that characterise the capital-
istmodeof production in general, the observationof which automatically leads
to their solution in a ‘higher’ concept59 – e.g. the contradiction of use value and
value that ‘necessitates’money – but rather in that the critique of the categories
56 Marx 1983, p. 268. English phrase in the original.
57 Theunissen 1980, p. 16.
58 Heinrich 1999, p. 170.
59 This trivialising understanding of an ‘applied dialectic’ in Marx’s method can be found
almost without exception in all Anglophone interpretations that thematise the relation
between Marx and Hegel, predominantly however in Sekine and Albritton, to which we
will come in Chapter 5.2.
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of classical political economy is not externally applied: it must result from the
conceptual-dialectical presentation of these categories itself. In other words,
the critique of the categories of bourgeois economics cannot be separated from
the critique of the capitalist mode of production itself.60 Hence, what is valu-
able in this estimation for the critique of categories is not that e.g. money is the
‘solution to a contradiction’, but that the money form to the contrary presents
the ‘fundamental contradiction’ in the capitalist mode of production, a contra-
diction that is necessarily obfuscated or ‘extinguished’:
It is not at all apparent on its face that its character of being money is
merely the result of social processes; it ismoney. This is all the more diffi-
cult since its immediate use value for the living individual stands in no
relation whatever to this role, and because, in general, the memory of
use value, as distinct from exchange value, has become entirely extin-
guished in this incarnation of pure exchange value.Thus the fundamental
contradiction contained in exchange value, and in the socialmode of pro-
duction corresponding to it, here emerges in all its purity.61
By virtue of bringing the fundamental contradiction of the social mode of
production dominated by (exchange) value to the fore ‘in all its purity’, the
derivation of the concept of money from the ‘fetishistic semblance’ of simple
exchange itself becomes paradigmatic for disclosing the relation between this
social mode of production’s essence and appearance. In this sense, it makes
for a conceptually strong and ‘instructive’ beginning of Marx’s analytical enter-
prise, ‘ordering’ the intent and character of the succeeding presentation of the
value forms. In the constellation of simple commodity exchange and money,
the problem of e.g. how value ‘necessitates’ a type of commodity ‘existing out-
side and alongside it’, money, receives a new dimension, performed byMarx in
his analysis of the value form: money is disclosed as the mystification of value,
while value relates to a category that originallyappeared to bear no relation to it
at all, namely (abstract) labour. The fetishistic semblance of ‘simple exchange’
disappears. The real beginning of Capital therefore assumes fully fledged cap-
italist relations of production, relations that form the basis to the appearance
of free and individual ‘commodity owners’ as a theoretical subject in the first
place, as the ‘premiss’ to its critical deconstruction. In Marx’s words:
60 ‘The critique of the bourgeois categories is no abstract scientific business, but insepar-
able from the presentation of the relations of production’. Heinrich 2005, p. 74. Original
emphasis.
61 Marx 1973, pp. 239–40.
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An analysis of the specific form of the division of labour, the conditions
of production on which it is based, and the economic relationships of
the members of the society to which these conditions of production are
reduced, would show that the whole system of bourgeois production is
the premiss for exchange value appearing on its surface as a mere point
of departure, and the process of exchange, as it unfolds in the simple cir-
culation, as a social exchange of matter, simple but encompassing both
the whole of production and the whole of consumption. It would transpire,
therefore, that already other, more complicated relations of production,
more or less conflictingwith the liberty and independence of individuals,
their economic relationships, are the premiss that, as free private produ-
cers in simple relations of purchase and sale, they should confront each
other in the process of circulation and should figure as its independent
subjects. But from the standpoint of the simple circulation, these relation-
ships are obliterated.62
That the first chapter could only be a positing (Setzung) of presuppositions –
albeit presuppositions that supplement each other – as a structural necessity
makes its understanding so difficult. However this structural necessity of pre-
suppositions is not a defect of Marx’s method, as most traditional and recent
criticisms of the labour theory of value assume, including Uno, but a merit,
since it delivers ‘a particular grounding nexus (Begründungszusammenhang)’
that shows how the ‘succession of categories, the “transition” fromone category
to the next, is not a result of didactics, but has in itself a specific informative
content’.63 Marx moves from complex units to simple ones – from the com-
modity via money to capital – to show how their presuppositions are not only
contained in them, but their specific presupposed content is also denied: their
appearance is taken for their essence (see e.g. Ricardo’s identification of sur-
62 Marx 1987 (mecw 29), p. 466. Original emphasis.
63 Heinrich 1999, p. 173. Emphasis added.While itmust be noted that ‘transition’ (Übergang),
at the level of the Hegelian dialectic, only accounts for the Logic of Being, the theoretical
claim of Marx’s project is much rather embedded in The Logic of Essence that holds the
category of reflection as the mode of categorial development. This is where the concept
of contradiction finds its theoretical locus of discussion. What is significant is its relation
to totality that indicates both Hegel’s andMarx’s methodological sophistication: ‘To naive
everyday thought, respectively to the philosophers before Hegel, the different and ant-
agonistic determinations and their presupposed objects seem to exist as independent,
existing in-themselves, as though the determinations themselves were merely determ-
inedby their [immediate] content, andnot by the total structure (Gesamtstruktur) of their
objective reflection’. Brentel 1989, p. 334.
what’s ‘pure’ about capitalism? 89
plus value and profit64 or Bailey’s identification of value with its form).65 Marx
paradigmatically demonstrates this in his theoretical unfolding of the concept
of surplus value in the production process via ex negationis of value theor-
ies of exchange or circulation. ‘Buy cheap and sell dear’ – theories of surplus
value supposemoney as ameans of exchange. At this stage, however, it remains
only an assertion. Only after we have analysed money as a means of exchange
(in Chapter 5), can we see why money in capitalist relations essentially dif-
fers from the ‘obvious’ (apparent) view: it secures the formal dominance of
capital over labour. But this remains only a assertion until we have seen the
complete process, in which capital assumes dominance over labour as a social
relation. In this sense, the ‘impurity’, or rather, the inaccuracy of the concepts
becomes a structural necessity, not to move to increasingly ‘purer’ ones, but to
follow the movement of thought (Bewegung der Gedanken) from misconcep-
tions at the level of appearance to a growing comprehension at their essence.
This is also why the ‘impure’ concepts are not simply invalid: in and by them-
selves they deliver the key to their ‘real’ understanding – but only in correlation
with other, more developed categories. This is why the commodity andmoney,
self-explaining as theymay seem, are only disclosed in correlationwith the sub-
stance of their value, abstract human labour. With this in mind, it is a matter
of course that ‘[w]ith the exception on the section on the form of value … this
volume cannot stand accused on the score of difficulty’.66 But the ‘labour of
the concept’ – the movement which value assumes in its various fetishistic
expressions – is what has to be tackled if we want to understand the com-
plete mechanism by which the capitalist mode of production generates not
only itself, but the way it conceals its relation to value as its objective struc-
turing nexus – and that can only be grasped by the totality of the exposition. In
this way, Capital presents a ‘conceptual developmental relation’ (begriffliches
Entwicklungsverhältnis),67 but one that in its procession toward completion
retroactively constitutes the former, the previously insufficiently determined
concepts. Here, the opposition of essence as against appearance in our view
still proves useful for a heuristic approach to the categories ‘as they appear on
the surface’, even though, asHeinrichhas emphasised,Marxdoesnothypothes-
ise any ‘philosophy of essence’ (Wesensphilosophie): ‘What it meant by essence
(Wesen) are not normative standards (Vorstellungen) which oppose empirical
reality, but non-empirical conceptual formations which make the comprehen-
64 Marx 1973, p. 753.
65 See Marx 1976, p. 141, footnote.
66 Marx 1976, p. 90. Emphasis added.
67 Heinrich 1999, p. 175.
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sion of the empirically given (des empirisch Erscheinenden) possible in the first
place’.68 Uno’s adherence to the empirically ‘given’, that is likewise the result of
an abstractive performance, should precisely present the object of critique, not
an absolutised reservoir for constructing an ideal-type presentation of ‘pure
capitalism’. Needless to say, however, Marx’s object of critique, the capitalist
mode of production and the fetishised forms of value onwhich it is based, does
not coincide with Hegel’s object, the forms of thought themselves. Moreover,
this is theprecise sense inwhichMarx’s categories cannot, andarenot supposed
to correspond to the standard of purity that Uno demands for the sake of ‘sci-
entificity’. The ‘limits to the dialectical presentation’ are taken very seriously
by Marx, as we will see soon. To introduce this crucial point at which Marx’s
project methodically differs from Hegel’s, we shall briefly refer to Marx’s con-
ceptual differentiation between the conditions (Bedingungen) and the presup-
positions (Voraussetzungen) for scientific presentation. In a much overlooked
passage in the Grundrisse, where he discusses the ‘Original Accumulation of
Capital’, Marx argues for the differentiation between the conditions of a certain
fact which are logical or given qua the requirements of that fact itself and the
presuppositions of that fact which are always historical:
While e.g. the flight of serfs to the cities is one of the historic conditions
and presuppositions of urbanism, it is not a condition, not a moment of
the reality of developed cities, but belongs rather to their past presup-
positions, to the presuppositions of their becoming which are suspended
in their being…Therefore, the conditions which preceded the creation of
surplus capital i, orwhich express the becoming of capital, do not fall into
the sphere of thatmode of production for which capital serves as the pre-
supposition; the historic preludes of its becoming, they lie behind it, just
as the processes by means of which the earth made the transition from a
liquid sea of fire and vapour to its present form now lie beyond its life as
finished earth.69
That does not mean that the historical has a subaltern position in the expos-
ition of the facts. Quite to the contrary: ‘… our method indicates the points
where historical investigation must enter in, or where bourgeois economy as a
merely historical form of the production process points beyond itself to earlier
historical modes of production’.70 Hence the necessity to incorporate the pro-
68 Heinrich 1999, p. 175. Original emphasis.
69 Marx 1973, pp. 459–60.
70 Marx 1973, p. 460.
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cess of ‘So-called Primitive Accumulation’ in the main text of Capital. Simul-
taneously, the presentation of the historical process that led to the generation
of the free wage worker ‘in the double sense’ – the expropriation of the direct
producers from the means of production in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century
England – cannot occur in a strict categorial and deductive, ‘dialectical’ man-
ner: ‘His (the free labourer’s) existence’, Marx writes in the Urtext, ‘is the result
of a protractedhistorical process in the economic formation of society. It shows
at this point decisively how the dialectical form of presentation is correct only
when it knows its own limits’.71 Therefore, while the historical narrative is an
essential ingredient for the total graspof theobject in question, it hasno critical
relevance in separation from the categorial analysis preceding it. It is thus the
latter that gives the former its specific significance for analysing the historical
emergence of the capital relation at all. For example, only when the reproduc-
tion process of capital is explicated to necessarily depend on the quantitative
difference between the use value and value of labour power and not, e.g., on
the employment of specific machines, can the adequate historical sequence be
presented which indicates the ‘beginning’ of the ‘original sin’, namely the sep-
aration of the direct producers from their means of production in the violent
process of accumulation (in the form of the Enclosures Act, the Blood Legis-
lation, etc.) – and not, e.g., the introduction of the steam engine in industrial
production in the 1740s.With regard to themethodological setting of ‘So-called
Primitive Accumulation’ at the end of Capital i therefore, the historical in its
presentation strategically requires the previous analytical content of the object
of research – in this case, the capital relation as the dominance of capital over
labour – as a prerequisite for determining the central historical process which
has led to the capital relation in the first place.72
Only on the basis of the analysis of the capitalist mode of production
it becomes therefore clear that the separation of direct producers from
their means of production (and not, as could be assumed, the hoarding
71 Marx 1953 [1857–8], p. 945. Our translation.
72 This also conforms to Reichelt’s view that ‘Marx relates to the process of original accumu-
lation, bywhich the free labouring force is produced in the first place,while the systematic
treatment of this process is determined by the immanent logic (immanente Logizität) of
the categorial presentation. In order to specifically set this “actual history of the relations
of production” apart from the categorial presentation, wemust not only be clear about the
structure of the categorial architecture, intowhich this “actual history” extends at particu-
lar junctions, but the exact conceptual grasp of this “history of the relations of production”
can only proceed on the basis of the knowledge of the inner logic of the movement of
value. The concept of capital is therefore presupposed in order to reconstruct the his-
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of money treasures in the hands of few [or the introduction of specific
means of production, ell]) is the central historical precondition for the
capitalist mode of production … only after the analysis of the basic struc-
ture of the capital relation, it becomes clear which historical processes
have to be presented when the generation of the capital relation is them-
atic.73
Determining the expropriation process of the peasants as the crucial historical
factor that brought about the central condition for the capital relation therefore
requires the previous categorial analysis Marx presents us with in the chapters
that precede ‘So-called Primitive Accumulation’. The previous conceptual ana-
lysis is the prerequisite for organising the empirical material we are confronted
with. Were this not the case, the material would present us with indeed a ‘pal-
impsest’ of manifold information, which cannot simultaneously deliver the
means by which to evaluate it. As Heinrich observes, historical or ‘empirical’
presentations of the material belong to the object of research precisely only
if a further conceptual deduction is impossible. It is true that Marx’s present-
ation of, e.g., the ‘The Working Day’ (Chapter 10 of Capital Volume i) and its
limits can only be understood on the basis of historical and factual evidence.
Yet again, this presentation is preceded by a conceptual analysis, namely the
insight that the demand of the capitalist and the demand of the wage labourer
are ‘equal rights’: the first has the right to consume the full use value of the
labour power commodity, the latter has the right to demand a higher price for
the one commodity he has to offer.
Herewe can detect another, altogether different, but no less crucial function
of Marx’smethod inCapital, namely the ‘translation’ of the failure of ‘sublating’
conceptual contradictionswithin the terrain of speculation, and its overcoming
in the practical realm. By insisting on the limits of the dialectical presenta-
tion, Marx’s method, we contend, in and out of itself generates the practical
and political terrain that political economy shuns to address: the openness
and ‘decisive indecisiveness’ of class struggle. In this sense, Nikolaos Tzanakis
Papadakis suggests that
Marx uses the dialectic of the basic economic categories, i.e. their neces-
sary and inner contrariness, in order to translate the political-economic
torical genesis that led to capitalism, and therefore to the specific relations on the basis
of which the formulation of this concept [of capital, ell] is possible at all’. Reichelt 2001
[1970], p. 147.
73 Heinrich 1999, p. 178.
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discoursewith exact conceptual necessity… into a different one.This per-
formance of translation … takes its vantage point from the failure of the
processing of contradictions of the economic categories.74
What could thismean – andwhat political relevance does it indicate? It is clear
from the lengthy elaborations on the conditions of the working class, includ-
ing the frequent reference to empirical sources, factory inspectors’ reports, etc.
that Marx, in the chapter on ‘TheWorking Day’, parts from the presentation of
conceptual development and supplements it by an illustration of the actual,
the ‘violent’ history that accompanies the determination of the length of the
working day. Because, in theory, both the capitalist and the labourer insist on
their respective rights – the one to consume the full use-value of the commod-
ity he purchased on themarket, the other to receive the equivalent for the value
she produces – Marx contends: ‘Between equal rights, force decides’.75 Here is
where the real irrupts as the transformation from the theoretical presentation
of the categories towards its practical content: not reflection will undermine
the capital relation, only the insistence of the right of the worker to demand
the full equivalent of her labour power, i.e. class struggle. By transcending the
terrain of theory, Marx deliberately leaves the ‘sublation’ of the contradiction
between capital andwage labour open, breaking down the false comfort of dia-
lectical speculation. ‘The contingent elements, which Marx necessarily integ-
rates into his immanent presentation bymeans of their rupture, therefore refer
to systematic places of indeterminacy and contingency, situations of historical
openness, in which it is freshly decided how and if the society of capital will
continue to exist’.76This isMarx’s call to arms–a crucialmotivedirectly inform-
ing his presentation that is completely evaded and even rejected by Uno. It is
precisely the indeterminateness of the value of labour power and the indef-
initeness of the implementation of the working day that motivates Marx to
‘digress’ to historical and empirical material, indicating the moment in which
theoretical deduction hits its limits, in which history has to bemade. Papadakis
is therefore right to say that the ‘excursus’ on theworking day iswrongly termed
an ‘illustration’,
[because] illustrations in the strict sense ‘visualise’ a fixed and concep-
tually determinate fact. But if Marx’s historiography really ‘illustrates’
something at this point, it is the indeterminateness, which evolves from a
74 Papadakis 2017, p. 50.
75 Marx 1976, p. 344.
76 Papadakis 2017, p. 51.
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contradiction that can no longer process merely in the realm of thought,
a contradiction that – precisely because it can no longer process – can
no longer be thought. At this point, the active class struggle occurs as
something contingent and singular, which is why it cannot be thought
of in the framework of purely economic discourse.77
This method in its critical claim towards the practical dimension completely
surpasses Uno’s fixation on ‘purity’ and ‘principles’ that systematically eschews
the political by virtue of its positivist framework.Wewill return to its problem-
atisation in Chapter 5.3.
To acknowledge ‘the limits to the dialectical presentation’ however does not
mean a conflation of the levels, since the limits themselves owe to the con-
ceptual determinations that organise the empirical material. This correlation
between the logical-systematical and the historical has nothing to do with a
‘constant mixing’ of conceptual deduction and empirical material or ‘incom-
mensurate temporalities’, as, e.g., Harry Harootunian suggests: ‘The tension
[between ‘capital’s abstract categories’ and ‘the materiality of contemporary
history’ as presented e.g. in the chapter of TheWorkingDay inCapitalVolume i]
shows that the structure of capitalism is not reducible to a ‘categorial begin-
ning’ but instead constitutes a constant mixing of the historical material and
the conceptual expositions from the start, which points to incommensurate
temporalities’.78 The ignorance of the critical function related to the presenta-
tion of thematerial in thismanner is astonishing: the historical itself marks the
translation from the speculative to the realm of openness, to where the purely
economic discourse is transferred to the level of human collective, and by
necessity contingent, action. However, with regard to Marx’s deliberate aban-
donment of the categorial presentation, there is a third ‘irruption of the real’
that delivers a critical informational content to the presentation of the cat-
egories: the ‘Transformation of Money into Capital’. In order to adequately
differentiate the concept of capital from that of the commodity and money,
the presentation of ‘self-valorising value’ in the formulaM-C-M’ is not only not
enough, its insufficiency bears the symptom of the mode of presentation of con-
ventional political economy itself. By deliberately ‘running up the score’ of the
tautological form of valorisation – henceM-C-M’ is only a formula, i.e. without
content – Marx indicates that the actual process of valorisation requires the
disclosure of that which is not strictly confined to conceptual reflection. In order
77 Papadakis 2017, p. 54.
78 Harootunian 2015, p. 32.
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for ‘Moneybags’ to be able to purchase his fantastic, and very useful, source of
value, a complex set of historical productive relations must be presupposed.
However, that the presentation of this presupposition only occurs at the end
of the conceptual presentation is, as we have seen, owed to the necessity for
the explanation which precisely determines the subsumption of labour under
capital as the specificity of the historical formation that manifests as capitalist
relations of production – and not, as we have seen, the employment of the
steam engine or the hoarding of riches in the hands of the few. With regard
to the methodological setting of ‘So-called Primitive Accumulation’ at the end
of Capital Volume i, therefore, the historical in its presentation strategically
requires the previous analytical content of the object of research – in this case,
the capital relation as the dominance of capital over labour – as a prerequisite
for determining the central historical process which has led to the capital rela-
tion. Brentel concludes:
The relation between the ‘logical’ and the ‘historical’ is neither to be
grasped with the ‘illustration thesis’, nor the ‘historisation thesis’. By no
means does Marx perform a ‘historisation of the logical’. Rather, he refor-
mulates the ‘logical’ in a specific way, so that now, to the contrary, histor-
ical formations can be understood, categorised and differentiated from
the point of view of the ‘purely logical’ problematic of the value form,
from the ‘logic’ of the facts.79
Alfred Schmidt, in his ‘On the Concept of Cognition in the Critique of Polit-
ical Economy’ (1968), argues in this context that Marx’s mode of presentation
strictly sets itself apart from the Hegelian identity of object and method. This
is clear from Marx’s own insistence on the ‘formal’ differentiation between
themode of inquiry (Forschungsweise) and themode of presentation (Darstel-
lungsweise) in the postface to the second edition of the first volume of Cap-
ital.80 Schmidt argues that
while the ‘inquiry’ orients itself toward the actual process of the history
of theory (Theorie-Geschichte), the ‘presentation’ takes the opposite path:
it advances from the immediate ‘being’ towards the mediating ‘essence’,
i.e., in the sense of the Hegelian Logic: it proceeds from Being towards
Essence, returning to the ‘Ground’ of Being. Marx, in other words, brings
79 Brentel 1989, p. 364.
80 See Marx 1976, p. 102.
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to life (verlebendigt) the historical process of the past which has sedimen-
ted itself in the thing-like concepts of an (empirically inhibited) bour-
geois economy … Only the 24th chapter, which treats the centuries of
‘original accumulation’, debates the historical presuppositions of all that
which is already constitutive for the commodity and its analysis (as well
as everything following from it).81
In the following, we shall see how the violence of original accumulation is
abstracted away in Uno’s account which relegates and limits the beginnings
of capital to the realm of commodity exchange.
2.1.5 Beyond Uneven Development: Commodity Circulation as the Origin
of Capitalism
In the following, we will address how Uno prepares his own theoretical setting
of the theory of principles that brings forward early commodity circulation as
the founding principle of the capital relation. Uno follows a radically different
evaluation of the historical origins of capitalism, one that abstracts from the
history of the expropriation of the peasantry and the Bloody Legislation in the
era of merchant capitalism in England, as described by Marx in both Capital
and in the Grundrisse, and focuses on the purely formal category of exchange.
As we will see and discuss in Chapter 3, the theory of principles that takes a
‘pure capitalist society’ as hypothesis will give up on the necessarily correlating
and interdependent determinations of abstract labour and value which struc-
turally undergirds the concept of capital. Instead, Uno’s reshifting of the focus
emphasises the predominant form in which abstract labour appears, money
and exchange, discarding the analysis of its conditions of possibility, to become
a theory of ‘value without fetish’ in the strict sense.
As for all the criticism of Marx’s method, Uno largely orients himself time
and again in the Methodology towards the Methodenkapitel in the 1857 Preface
to theGrundrisse, and here, especially to the preliminary plan for the prospect-
ive Critique of Political Economy that has been discarded in the 1859 edition:
Theorder obviously has to be (1) the general, abstract determinantswhich
obtain in more or less all forms of society, but in the above-explained
sense. (2) The categories which make up the inner structure of bourgeois
society and on which the fundamental classes rest. Capital, wage labour,
and landed property. Their interrelation. Town and country. The three
81 Schmidt 1968a, p. 38.
what’s ‘pure’ about capitalism? 97
great social classes. Exchange between them. Circulation. Credit system
(private). (3) Concentration of bourgeois society in the form of the state.
Viewed in relation to itself. The ‘unproductive classes’. Taxes. State debt.
Public credit. The population. The colonies. Emigration. (4) The inter-
national relation of production. International division of labour. Inter-
national exchange. Export and Import. Rate of exchange. (5) The world
market and crisis.82
Unobeginshis ownelaborationonmethodby referring toMarx’s self-reflection
‘of rising from the abstract to the concrete’, sidestepping Marx’s criticism of
Hegel, continuing that the ‘most abstract determination of capitalist economy’
is the commodity. The correct presentation should therefore begin with it. Yet,
as prefigured byMarx, ‘capitalist society, made up by the three classes of work-
ers, capitalists, and land owners, is reproduced as something concrete’,83 that is,
as a society which is systematically developed as the logic of commodity eco-
nomy itself. ‘Insofar as in this society the economic principles are carried out
by the commodity form, it has to follow it, and the lawfulness (hōsokusei) of
the principles of the commodity should thus be clarified’.84 According to Uno,
this ‘principle’ of the commodity form alone serves as the basis for Marx’s plan
accomplished – however imperfectly – in Capital. In other words, for Uno, only
point (2) qualifies as the content of Marx’s mature work.
Marx did not differentiate between the theory of principles and stage the-
ory in his supplement (sic) in the Introduction to the Critique of Political
Economy. What corresponds to the theory of principles are (2) …, while
(3),… (4),…and (5)…aremerely given.Thepurificationof Marx’sCapital,
82 Marx 1973, p. 108. This is, however, only the first rudimentary sketch, further illustrated as
the 6-book-plan in the 1859 introduction to the Contribution. As Rolf Hecker says, ‘In mid-
1857, Marx drafted the structure of his planned work in the “Introduction” mentioned by
him, which he – in a letter to Ferdinand Lassalle on Feb 22nd, 1858 – extended towards
a six-book-plan: capital, landed property, wage labour, the state, foreign trade, the world
market. The first volume, according to a letter written to Engels on April 2nd, 1858, was
supposed to cover “capital in general”, competition, credit and stock market capital’. (See
the Introduction to the Marx-Engels-Werke (Works of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels),
Volume 13, Berlin: Dietz. p. xv). Heinrich argues that Marx had entirely given up on the
six-book-plan and conceptualised a completely new structure while drafting the second
instance of the formation of the Critique of Political Economy in the early 1860s, resulting
in the manuscripts to Capital. See Heinrich 2002.
83 Uno 1974 [1962], p. 28.
84 Uno 1974 [1962], pp. 28–9.
98 chapter 2
too, as a theory of principles, is obstructed.What is left is an inconsistent
theoretical development.85
In hoping to complete Marx’s initial plan and to give a more coherent method
to the manifold assignment that the Critique of Political Economy represents,
Uno develops his stage-theoretical methodological approach – not without
claiming that neither ‘taxes and state debt’, just like finance and the ‘interna-
tional relations of production’ cannot become a part of the theory of prin-
ciples.86 In order therefore to move to the topic of, e.g. international trade,
a stage theory is necessary. There is, however, an even stronger motivation
for Uno to make stage theory a distinct methodological approach. As men-
tioned earlier, Uno objects toMarx’s understanding of England at the historical
present of Marx’s own writing in the mid-nineteenth century as the model for
the development of world capitalist formation, a development according to
which England would only show the less developed country ‘the image of its
own future’.87 As a methodological approach, it was therefore wrong of Marx
to use England as amodel, when it did not strictly belong to the theory of prin-
ciples that abstracts from all given historical and empirical realities. A stage
theoretical approach is needed:
For example, whenGermany and other late developing countries (kōshin-
koku) introduced capitalism (shihonshugika suru), they generated various
discrepancies, dependent on whatever world historical developmental
stage of advanced capitalism they occupy, brought forward by an ad-
vanced country like England. These discrepancies according to the devel-
opment of capital, if they uniformly draw near a pure capitalist society
which hypostatises the theory of principles, are already extinguished …
If we assume a stage theory that clarifies the stages of world historical
development of a capitalism that makes England an advanced and Ger-
many a late developing country, we can for the first time clarify whether
we can reconstruct the way in which the developmental stages that the
advanced country has experienced are abbreviated, changed, or doubled.
In the case of Germany where capitalism was introduced belatedly, our
country and others, there occurred various and even more complicated
problems regarding this point.88
85 Uno 1974 [1962], p. 54.
86 Uno 1974 [1962], p. 43.
87 Marx 1976, p. 91.
88 Uno 1974 [1962], pp. 38–9.
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In other words, for Uno, the principles Marx identifies in Capital as general,
account only for England’s particular history, notably the history of ‘primitive
accumulation’ characterising the emergence of the English proletariat, the ‘free
worker in the double sense’. It should be recalled though that, for Marx, the
presentation in Capital does not indicate a ‘higher’ or ‘lower’ grade of develop-
ment of social antagonisms, which ‘spring from the natural laws of capitalist
production’.89 Rather, the presentation in Capital, as we learn from the Pre-
face to the first edition, focuses on ‘these laws themselves, of these tendencies
winning their way through and working themselves out with iron necessity’.90
By choosing England as the model of presentation, Marx aims to deliver an
informative and pragmatic content to this methodical decision: ‘If, however,
the German reader pharasaically shrugs his shoulders at the condition of the
English industrial and agricultural workers, or optimistically comforts himself
with the thought that in Germany, things are not nearly so bad, I must plainly
tell him: De te fabula narratur!’91 What scandalises Uno is that the process of
primitive accumulation that accompanies the introduction of the capitalist
mode of production in different areas, has been realised in different ways. The
expropriation of the direct producers, as it took place in fifteenth- to sixteenth-
century England, cannot therefore be generalised as the basic mechanism
enabling the implementation of capitalist relations of production, according
to Uno.
One cannot say that ‘The country that ismore developed industrially only
shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future.’ The process of
the primitive accumulation of capital is different everywhere. As long as
the disintegration of the rural villages isn’t thoroughly executed, we may
observe the advancement of capitalist large-scale industries. If it reaches
an ever closer approximation to pure capitalism as it is hypostatised by
the theory of principles, it is because, alongwith the development of cap-
italism, after all both the late and the advanced countries present the
same image (yōsō). But in fact this is not the case. Especially in the era
of finance capital, every single county presents a different image.92
We will show in the following that Uno doubly errs in his evaluation. The first
error concerns Uno’s strict separation of the ‘logic’ of the ‘pure principles’ and
89 Marx 1976, p. 91.
90 Marx 1976, p. 91.
91 Marx 1976, p. 90.
92 Uno 1974 [1962], p. 40.
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the stages-developmental presentation resulting from this claim. The second
error follows from the devaluation of the emergence of the capital-labour rela-
tion and its substitution for the emphasis on the ‘commodity form’.
Indeed, that the history of the origins of capitalism evolved differently in
different global regions is a truism with no analytical cognitive gain as to the
specific mechanism by which capitalism is in effect as a social and historical
fact. ‘The Explanatory Value of the Theory of Uneven and Combined Devel-
opment’93 as we can find it, e.g. in Trotsky, may lie in explaining deviations
of regional, but mostly national, economic development – but it can only do
so on the basis of assessing the common features of the different regions, the
basis of which explains the ‘deviations’ in the first place, and without which
the thesis of ‘uneven development’ would remain tautological. This not only
holds for the assessment of the relation between theory and history whose
strict separation Uno advocates on a logical level. This has also been confirmed
by geographers and historians of uneven development.94 A case in point is
Neil Smith, whose Uneven Development. Nature, Capital and the Production of
Space (1984) takes a less schematic approach than Uno’s, arguing that uneven
development, far frombeing an ‘obstruction’ to the conception of a ‘pure capit-
alist’ development, is one of the structural conditions of possibility for capital’s
claim to ‘levelling’ and universality. Uneven development precisely consolid-
ates capital’s inherent contradiction in the process of production of abstract
wealth and the conditions of its realisation, an inherent contradiction not only
logically, but also geographically and historically, implemented in the character
of the law of accumulation. In that sense, Smith argues that uneven develop-
ment ‘is the geographical expression of the contradictions of capital’.95 This
contradiction however must be manifest in the relation that constitutes the
capitalist of production as a historically specific economic formation, i.e. the
relation between capital and labour, not only as the common basis of all cap-
italist societies, also as the discernible locus of geographical difference, so that
‘[as] uneven development becomes an increasing necessity in order to stave off
crises, geographical differentiationbecomes less and less a by-product,more an
inner necessity for capital’.96 Uneven development, in other words, ‘acts out’
the contradictory character of the logic of accumulation (in e.g. a national eco-
nomy) in its global and developmental implementation:
93 See http://www.historicalmaterialism.org/blog/explanatory‑value‑theory‑uneven‑and‑co
mbined‑development.
94 See David Harvey’s The Limits to Capital (1982).
95 Smith 2008 [1984], p. 202.
96 Smith 2008 [1984], p. 203.
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If the equalisation of global space results from the universal tendency
of the wage-labor relation, then the main axis of geographical differenti-
ation at this scale is the differential determination of the value of labour
power, and the geographical pattern of wages thus effected … Capital has
no choicewhether to expand into pre-capitalist societies, but it does have
a ‘choice’ about how it does this. On the one hand, the developed, highly
centralized capitals must constantly search not just for the physical ele-
ments of production – the necessary use-values – but for cheaper and
cheaper sources of these materials, especially new materials and labor
power. In the expanding search for relative surplus value, capital is driven
to convert these external, relatively undeveloped spaces into places of
production and accumulation. On the other hand, driven by the constant
threat of over-accumulation, capital attempts to convert these places into
markets for its goods, places for consumption. But it cannot do both,
because it can convert these undeveloped societies into places of con-
sumption only by developing them and by raising wages to facilitate con-
sumption. There is a contradiction between the means of accumulation
and the conditions necessary for accumulation to proceed, and it has a
trenchant geographical shape.97
This diagnosis lies behind the ‘development of underdevelopment’ that forms
the basis for uneven development and accumulation. For the present discus-
sion, the insight that capital’s drive towards accumulation precisely requires a
‘non-linear’, ‘uneven’ state of various global regions and hence in its very logic
expresses or ‘acts out’ a ‘stage developmental’ theorisation, is key. Uno’s objection
to Marx’s ‘insufficient’ differentiation between the two errs in failing to see the
capital-relation as a basically contradictory social formation, both in its logic
and its historical implementation. The ‘purity’ aimed at by Uno – which, as we
will see, is extended to social reproduction as the production of general equilib-
rium – fails to grasp what is essential about the capitalist mode of production,
forwhich theproductionof non-equilibriumandunevenness is a constant con-
dition.
With this inmindwe shall come toUno’s second error, the rejection of ‘prim-
itive accumulation’ as a generalisable heuristic framework for the emergence
of the capital relation and its substitution by the ‘commodity form’.
97 Smith 2008 [1984], pp. 187–8. However, whether this is capital’s ‘choice’ is dubious. Just
as little as capital ‘decides’ to develop the forces of production and expand globally, does
it ‘decide’ to aim at both maximum profitability and the devaluation of labour to a min-
imum.
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For Uno, since the history of primitive accumulation as included by Marx
at the end of Capital does not only not represent a global phenomenon, but
has no bearing on pure theory either, it must be substituted for a different
scenario: rather than expropriation, commodity exchange between communities
exemplifies the formal roots of capitalism in a hitherto non-capitalist society.
In its formal purity, this scenario legitimises its incorporation into the theory
of principles. Indeed, the first part of the Principles (both the 1950–2 and the
1964 edition) thematises ‘The Doctrine of Circulation’, not Production, as the
most abstract and generally valid form of the ‘commodity economy’, since ‘the
primary concept in political economy is neither a product not production; it
is the form of the commodity’.98 The first part hence thematises the commod-
ity, money and capital, without once referring to abstract human labour, hence
disavowing the fetish-critical dimension of Marx’s conceptualisation of the
‘commodity form’ from the outset, as we will discuss in Chapter 4. For now, we
shall reconstruct Uno’s justification of commodity exchange as the appropri-
ate theoretical locus for the conceptualisation of capital. Commodity exchange
between rural communities at the periphery of commodity exchange – histor-
ically to be set at the beginning of merchant capitalism in the early fifteenth
century – signifies the principalmechanismbywhich capitalism as a commod-
ity economy entered the social edifice for Uno. Marx’s quote in ‘The Exchange
Process’ of Capital Volume i, succeeding the analysis of the value form and
the thematic introduction of the fetishism-problematic, here serves as a but-
tress for Uno’s view that capitalism has taken its beginning in inter-communal
exchange: ‘The exchangeof commodities beginswhere communities have their
boundaries, at their points of contact with other communities, or with mem-
bers of the latter’,99 and comments:
Whatever the fact of the emergence of commodity exchange, I think
in these words the fundamental side to the character of commodity
economy is revealed. Regardless of methods of production and the sys-
tem dominating inside the community, the fact that their products are
exchanged as commodities with other communities develops the specific
commodity relation.100
In a striking move, Uno evaluates this ephemeral remark in Marx’s evaluation
of exchange as an explanatory framework of commodity exchange as the most
98 Uno 1980 [1964], p. 3.
99 Marx 1976, p. 182.
100 Uno 1974 [1962], p. 11.
what’s ‘pure’ about capitalism? 103
basic and general rule of human social behaviour, strongly reminiscent of the
axioms of classical political economy and their methodological individualism
functionalised for the determination of transhistorical and transsocial human
characteristics. At length, Uno reproduces Marx’s argument why general com-
modity exchange presupposes the liberation from extra-economic constraints
we find in ancient communalities:
The first way inwhich an object of utility attains the possibility of becom-
ing an exchange-value is to exist as a non-use-value, as a quantum of
use-value superfluous to the immediate needs of its owner. Things are in
themselves external toman, and therefore alienable. In order that this ali-
enation (Veräusserung) may be reciprocal, it is only necessary for men to
agree tacitly to each other as the private owners of those alienable things,
and, precisely for that reason, as persons who are independent of each
other. But this relationship of reciprocal isolation and foreignness does
not exist for the members of a primitive community of natural origin,
whether it takes the form of a patriarchal family, an ancient Indian com-
mune, or an inca state.101
Instead of being faithful toMarx’s intent, namely explainingwhy liberty, equal-
ity, and private property serve as preconditions for commodity exchange –
which Marx without further ado ascribes to individual and ‘private owners’ of
commodities, again presupposing we have read the previous chapter in which
this constellation is disclosed as a fetishistic semblance –Uno reads something
strikingly different, if not contrary, to Marx’s purpose: first of all, for Uno, as is
clear from the quote, the principal condition for commodity exchange is in the
production of non-use values for oneself (surplus production) that becomes a
‘use value for others’, a principle that can be generalised for whenever different
communities emerged as against others. ‘Direct need (chokusetsuteki yokubō)’
becomes the ‘object of commodity exchange.’102 Hence, private ownership of
the means of production may serve as an accompanying condition of com-
modity exchange, but not its cause. ‘It is right to say that commodity exchange
at least directly eliminated the inner norms from a community. At the same
time, the parties of exchange have tacitly agreed “to each other as private own-
ers” and as “persons who are independent of each other”. In this relation, the
101 Marx 1976, pp. 181–2.
102 Uno 1974 [1962], p. 11.
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community already has some kind of extra-economic norms which have no
relation to the produced product, and are connected to pure economic form’.103
However, Uno says that
this purely economic character of commodity exchange forms nothing
but the passive requirements of economic analysis. The active provision
for themotif of economic analysis, as seen previously, is the phenomenon
of the discovery of the specific lawfulness that the commodity form con-
tains. The use value of a product is not directly the object of the satisfac-
tion of a need. It is so only indirectly, that is, when it receives commodity-
social control (shōhin shakaitekina kisei), that it becomes the aim of the
original satisfaction of needs for the first time. But that necessitates a spe-
cific analysis.
Counterfactually to the Marxian analysis, Uno relates the emergence of ‘com-
modity-social control’ as centred around the provision of use values aimed for
the satisfaction of social needs. In a later passage, Uno adds how the commodi-
fication of labour power, first and foremost, required a particular way of the
exchange of use values, rather than a particular way of their production, ori-
ented toward value.Without making an explicit reference, Uno sees the ‘direct
need’ for use value as the main cause for general exchange on a social scale,
starting with communities. The principle of exchange therefore has to be char-
acterised as the most abstract determination of how capitalism became the
dominant principle:
In the various pre-capitalist societies, a society close to increasing puri-
fication as in the development of that which enables the theory of prin-
ciples of political economy, is probably unlikely. But also capitalism has
only shown this tendency until a particular stage of its development. I’ve
come to think that by the emergence of a commodity economy between
communities, by permeating them, and by commodifying labour power,
for the first time a nexus was established in which a capitalist society
became the dominant social form. Here, the specific abstractness (toku-
yūnaru chūshōsei) and generality of the principles of political economy is
shown.104
103 Uno 1974 [1962], pp. 11–12.
104 Uno 1974 [1962], p. 40.
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For Uno, contrary to Marx’s analysis, the commodification of labour power
becomes a specific feature of commodity exchange, not vice versa. With that
implication, he can argue that, since the universal principle of commodity
economy characterises capitalist societies as a totality, all criteria that do not
belong to it should be eliminated. As we have seen before, the labour power
commodity for Uno is the pivot of industrial capital, but it cannot be directly
produced by it. Therefore, even the commodification of labour power presup-
poses the principal structure of an original society of exchange. One must not
forget however that for Uno, too, the separation of the producers from their
means of production is a historical fact that, even if it cannot be universalised
at all historical times to mark the foundation of capitalism, was tantamount
to a particular development, as, e.g., taking place in England.105 But even this
process of expropriation was based on the principle of exchange, as we can
see in the quote above. At the level of his stage theory, Uno therefore sees cap-
italism’s first stage in that of exchange that characterised the era of merchant
capital, accompanied by the policy of mercantilism. Here is also whywe find in
Uno’s theory of genriron, the only level in his three-levelmethodheworkedout,
that the pure forms of movement of merchant capital – the commodity,money
and capital – should be theorised before the character of production is taken
into account. The forms of circulation, unlike those of production, are already
existent both historically and theoretically. This is a fundamental departure
from Marx, who, as Schmidt correctly notes, presents in the history of prim-
itive accumulation the ‘historical presuppositions of all that which is already
constitutive for the commodity and its analysis (as well as everything following
from it)’.106 Uno howevermisses the point of the chapter on primitive accumu-
lation, its precise Begründungszusammenhang from the previous analysis of
the real subsumption of labour under capital in the form of wage labour that
explains which historical ‘event’ is responsible for the emergence of the capital
relation in the first place. Neither the industrial revolution of the early eight-
eenth century, nor the hoarding of wealth, nor the emergence of colonies and
world trade can sufficiently explain the mechanism of the commodification
of labour power underlying the total production and reproduction process of
capital. It is therefore quite counterfactual that, as Uno believes, the commodi-
fication of labour power was owed to a specific relation of exchange. To the
contrary:
105 Uno 1974 [1962], p. 45. After stating that sheep wool industries were a specificity of the
developmental stage of capitalism in merchant capital, Uno says it was based on the sep-
aration of direct producers from their land.
106 Schmidt 1968a, p. 38.
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In point of fact, capitalist production is commodity production as the
general form of production, but it is only so, and becomes ever more
so in its development, because labour itself here appears as a commod-
ity, because the worker sells labour, i.e. the function of his labour-power,
and moreover, as we have assumed, at a value determined by the costs
of its reproduction. The producer becomes an industrial capitalist to the
same extent that labour becomes wage labour; hence capitalist produc-
tion (and thus also commodity production) appears in its full extent only
when the direct agricultural producer is also a wage-labourer. In the rela-
tion between capitalist and wage-labourer, the money relation, the rela-
tion of buyer and seller, becomes a relation inherent in production itself.
But this relation rests fundamentally on the social character of produc-
tion, not on the mode of commerce; the latter rather derives from the
former. It is typical of the bourgeois horizon, moreover, where business
deals fill the whole of people’s minds, to see the foundation of the mode
of production in the mode of commerce corresponding to it, rather than
the other way around.107
When in the Principles, Uno contends that ‘Marx’s Capital, for the first time in
the history of political economy, consciously begins … with the concept of the
commodity’,108 he completely misrecognises Marx’s intent to begin with the
commodity in order to deconstruct the fetishistic semblance of the commod-
ity and its form, which presents itself to us as though it were the predominant
form of capitalist sociation. In reality however, in the commodity, the relation
between capital and labour is already, however ‘latently’, contained. With a
clear awareness of this, Marx says, ‘it would transpire, therefore, that already
other, more complicated relations of production, more or less conflicting with
the liberty and independence of individuals, their economic relationships, are
the premiss that, as free private producers in simple relations of purchase and
sale, they should confront each other in the process of circulation and should
107 Marx 1978, p. 196. Emphasis added.
108 Uno’s assessment, however, is inaccurate.Marx ‘at first’ consciously reproduces the English
economists’ view of the commodity, before he deliberately demonstrates its systematic
blindness towards the productive relations that constitute the ‘commodity form’, i.e. their
systematic blindness of value, as against use value. In the Contribution, Marx says: ‘A com-
modity is first of all, in the language of English economists, anything necessary, useful, or
pleasant in life’, an object of human wants, a means of existence in the broadest sense of
theword’.Marx 1904 [1859], pp. 19–20. Emphasis added. InCapital,Marx refers the broader
passage to Nicholas Barbon’s (1640–98) ‘A Discourse on coining the newmoney lighter. In
answer to Mr. Locke’s Considerations etc.’, London 1696.
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figure as its independent subjects’.109 From the standpoint of commodity circu-
lation that Uno holds, however, ‘these relationships are obliterated’.110 It may be
useful at this point to recall Robert Brenner’s seminal ‘Critique of Neo-Smithian
Marxism’ in his influential ‘Origins of Capitalist Development’ (1977). In his cri-
tique of ImmanuelWallerstein’s, Paul Sweezy’s, and André Gunder Frank’s the-
ories of ‘commercial networks’ grounding the emergence of capitalism within
the ‘world system’ between core and periphery, we find a similar constellation
as discussed here, although what interests us is not so much the explanation
for uneven development, but Uno’s and Wallerstein/Sweezy/Frank’s congru-
ent view of the origins of capitalism.111 Wallerstein argues that the capitalist
mode of production and the unevenness that characterises it derive from a
‘trade-induced world division of labour’ and, like Uno, sees this development
originating in merchant capital. ‘The trade-induced world division of labour
will, in turn, give rise to an international structure of unequally powerful nation
states: a structure which, through maintaining and consolidating the world
division of labour, determines an accelerated process of accumulation in cer-
tain regions (the core), while enforcing a cycle of backwardness in other (the
periphery)’, as Brenner paraphrases.112 Frank takes a similar outlook on the
impact of mercantilism and world trade: ‘… a commercial network spread out
from Italian cities such asVenice and later Iberian andNorthwestern European
towns to incorporate theMediterraneanworld and sub-Saharan Africa and the
adjacent Atlantic Islands in the fifteenth century … until the entire face of the
globe had been incorporated into a single organic mercantilist or mercantile
capitalist, and later also industrial and financial, system …’113 Brenner’s cru-
cial objection lies in his understanding of the capitalist mode of production
as primarily based on the class character of the society in which it operates,
and not on forms of trade. Economic development – or, more precisely, the
development of the forces of production – Brenner argues, can neither origin-
ate from ‘the expansion of trade…nor the transfer of surplus…nor the special-
izationof labour control systems leading to amore effective ruling-class surplus
extraction’, because none of these can determine ‘the rise of a system which
“develops itself spontaneously”, which can and must continually “revolution-
109 Marx 1987 (mecw 29), p. 466.
110 Ibid. Original emphasis.
111 Comparisons between Uno andWallerstein’s/Frank’s positions shall not prove to be very
fertile, not least because the latter clearly recognise the capital relation as a problematic
one, i.e. assume a different theoretical position than Uno.
112 Brenner 1977, p. 30. SeeWallerstein 1974, pp. 16–20.
113 Frank 1969, pp. 14–15. Quoted in Brenner 1977, p. 28.
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ize out andout the technical processes of labour and composition of society”.114
The latter, for Brenner, is only guaranteed by the specific form of surplus value
accumulation assumed by the capitalist mode of production, namely the pro-
duction of relative surplus value and the reproduction of the class structure this
form of production entails.115 Trade, therefore, ‘is not at the origin of capitalist
economic development, because trade cannot determine the transformation
of class relations of production’.116 Like Uno, Wallerstein et al. ‘assume away’
the transformation of the class relation of production in the transformation
from the serf-lord feudal relations to capitalist wage labour. They, as Brenner
argues, no longer see the rise of ‘distinctively capitalist class relations’ as the
‘basis for capitalist development, but as its result’.117 In a trenchant analysis of
the feudal state’s economic disposition, i.e. the simultaneity of serfdom with
merchant capital and a beginning world market (which is impossible to repro-
duce in detail), Brenner demonstrates that in feudal states, trade at no point
formed an incentive to develop the productive forces: ‘For the serf-lords’ sur-
vival simply did not depend on their relationship to themarket’.118 Indeed, ‘the
serf social relations, under the impact of trade, tended to entrain a stagnant,
often regressive, pattern of overall societal development, making a mockery of
the optimistic Smithian model …’119 Decisive factors hampering the develop-
ment of productive forces were a) the immobility of land and labour deriving
from serfdom b) the self-lords’ interest in short-term surplus extraction over
long-term growing productivity, c) that demand, not being a category of the
market, was confined to the realm of the landlords’ wants for ‘limited numbers
of expensive luxury products, goods which could in no way enhance rural pro-
duction’.120 In this economic climate, the highly restrictive economic policies
of the guilds, which came to dominate manufacturing, could flourish, as could
trade. But neither the guild system nor the establishment and widening of the
world market could change the class composition of feudal society. In his pun-
gent critique of Sweezy, who, like Uno, wrongly identifies the ‘development of
trade’ with the ‘emergence of capitalism’, Brenner observes:
114 Brenner 1977, p. 31. Brenner quotes fromMarx 1976, p. 645ff.
115 For a more detailed discussion of the function of the production of relative surplus value
in relation to the real subsumption of labour under capital, see Chapter 5.3.
116 Brenner 1977, p. 38.
117 Brenner 1977, p. 39.
118 Brenner 1977, p. 45.
119 Benner 1977, p. 45.
120 Brenner 1977, p. 47.
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… Sweezy’s error is two-fold. It is to posit that the producers’ relation-
ship to the market determines their operation and development and,
ultimately, their relationship to one another – rather than vice versa. Cor-
relatively, it is to locate the system’s potential for development in the
capacities of its component individual units … rather than in the sys-
tem as a whole – specifically, in the overall system of class relations of
production which determine/condition the nature of the interrelation-
ships between the individual units and, in this manner, their operation
and development.
We will see in the next chapter how the dismissal of the standpoint of the sys-
tem as a whole, like in Sweezy, informs Uno’s methodologically individualistic
commentary on Marx’s value form analysis. The insight to be gained here is
that Uno’s emphasis on inter-communal commodity exchange and mercant-
ilism as the Urform of capitalist relations – and the first level in the stages
theory of capitalist development – disregards the evolution of specifically cap-
italist relations of production as the condition of this Urform, in other words,
the dependence of the market on a mode of production in which the surplus
is produced as surplus value, and is thus given a specific social form originating
with the emergence of wages or the freedom from the ‘objective conditions’
of their labour. Merchant capital, in this sense, only becomes capital proper
when it encounters ‘the conditions where free labour can be purchased only
when this labour has been released from its objective conditions of existence
through the process of history’.121 Moreover, the question how Uno’s altern-
ative approach to the ‘point zero’ of capitalist social relations in commodity
exchange exalts a ‘purer’, i.e. ‘more general’ level of abstraction, remains com-
pletely open. As we have shown, it fixes the immediate semblance of simple
commodity exchange as the essential feature of the capital relation, and hence
imitates themethodological approach of bourgeois political economy, endors-
ing its use value-centred understanding of the function of the commodity as
‘the satisfaction of needs’. Similar to the transhistorical presentations of clas-
sical bourgeois interpreters, Uno excludes the savage history of the emergence
of capitalist relations of production from the general and ‘pure’ principles,
cleansing its seemingly innocuous concepts – the commodity, money, cap-
ital – from the structural embeddedness of their violent historical genesis.
Contrary to what Uno thinks, history is not an ‘external’, ‘contingent’ accom-
panying theme which has no place in the theory of principles (nor in stages
121 Marx 1973, p. 505.
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theory) – it is constitutive for the theory of principles themselves. By hypo-
stasising the ‘lawfulness’ of the commodity form, and therefore the priority of
formsof exchange over formsof production, ignoring the critical functionof the
presentation of the relations of production for the fetish-characteristic form of
the commodity that Uno, like conventional political economy, ‘sticks fast to’,
Uno assumes a position close to bourgeois political economy and its disavowal
of the fetish problematic in toto. In order to wrap up the ‘Limits of the Three-
Level Method’, we should reconsider its overall function and briefly turn to a
more general evaluation of its methodological persuasiveness.
2.1.6 ATheory of Levels of What? The Question of the Object of Cognition
Before embarking on the ‘axes’ or ‘frame joints’ as regards the thematic con-
tent of pure theory – the law of population and the commodification of labour
power –we should reconsider the overallmethodological function of the three-
levelmethod or sandankairon.What is of interest in this context is the persuas-
iveness of the three-level method for the evaluation of the historical advance-
ment of capitalism, especially, as we have seen, as the process of primitive
accumulation is anathematic to its schema.
Uno did not fully theoriseMarx’s ‘omissions’ of what Uno saw as the stages –
theoretical points in Marx’s plan in the 1857 Introduction. For Uno, the point of
Marx’s plan to work out how the ‘Concentration of Bourgeois Society in the
Form of the State’ should incorporate the different epochs of ‘each and every
country’ with their respective conditions, and the influence of the develop-
ment of capitalism in the advanced countries on the emergence of capitalism
in the late developers. Stage theory however does not exhaust the task of cla-
rifying the ‘beginning, emerging, developmental stage and stage of demise’ of
world capitalism, individually for every country in every situation ‘and in their
mutual conditions and relation’.122 Uno insists on the necessity of the supple-
ment with the ‘analysis of the actual conditions’, and pure theory, together
forming the three level-method:
The world-historical significance of the countries who occupy the ‘lead-
ing position’, presenting ‘the Concentration of Bourgeois Society in the
Form of the State’ with their industry, is rather embedded in the analysis
of the actual phenomena (genjō bunseki), instead of the stage theoret-
ical norms that explain their leading influence. In the same way as they
do not present the principal-theoretical norms, they cannot be stand-
122 Uno 1962, p. 49.
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ardised as the analysis of the actual conditions. Of course, the historical
process of the emergence, development, and demise of capitalism is to be
developedbya specific lawfulness.The advancedcountries’ process forms
the model (tenkei) as against that of the late developer. However, this is
the object of the theory of principles. In contrast to the laws of move-
ment of a pure capitalist society, [stage theory] forms the development
as the process of the permeation of capitalist society against a more or
less non-commodity economic, non-capitalist economy realised through
domination over the so-called heterogeneous things.123
The information stage theory therefore delivers remains limited to the ‘puri-
fication’ process. In its concrete formulation, it does not present more than a
more or less arbitrary division of historical epochs without any information
on the social significance of capitalism’s development. This lacuna becomes
crucial in the missing evaluation of real subsumption. Along with the histor-
ical process of capital’s original formation in the separation between capital
and labour as two distinctive social classes, the dynamic of the development
of the forces of production is bizarrely excluded fromUno’s legitimate interest
in the relations and specific individual developments of capitalism’s develop-
mental stages.124 We are therefore equally legitimised to ask what theoretical
insightswedo gain fromUno’s periodical compartmentalisation of capitalism’s
world-historical stages.Whowould doubt thatmerchant capitalism developed
in the sixteenth to seventeenth century and subsumed the production process,
accompanied by the stage of mercantilism, with the sheep wool industry as its
main product? Or that, after the industrial revolution of the eighteenth cen-
tury, industrial capitalism came to dominate in the era of liberalism, focussing
on the production of cotton goods? How is the claim that it was followed by
the nineteenth-century ‘late developer’ Germany’s, as well as England’s, imper-
ialism, standing on the firm basis of finance capital and its heavy industries, a
particularly controversial one, delivering critical insights to a probably dated
conventional view? More promising would be an elucidation of the interrela-
tionbetweenpure theory, stage theory and the analysis of the actual conditions,
i.e. their common denominator. This would both throw a light on how the
principles can account for the general development ‘in each and every coun-
try’ and also rationalise the elimination of ‘impurities’ that find their way into
stage theory. However, such a common ground for both levels of abstraction is
123 Uno 1974 [1962], pp. 49–50.
124 However, neither do we find that the theorisation of the capital-labour relation was cent-
ral even to pure theory. This will become thematic in Chapter 4.
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missing in Uno’smethodological reflections, and so is their relation to the ‘ana-
lysis of the actual conditions’. To be sure, where Uno sees his stage theory as
a ‘supplement’ or further theoretisation of the basis-superstructure metaphor
that constitutes historical materialism, it could enhance the determination of
the specific material content to particular stages. But the fact that merchant,
industrial and finance capital form the economic basis, while mercantilism,
liberalism and imperialism form the respective forms of superstructure, ends
up in a tautology. In sum, Uno’s theory of stages elucidating the specific role of
late developers in the historical progress of capitalism’s self-expansion does no
more than assert stages while leaving open their connection to capital’s logic
that forms the object of the theory of principles. In other words, the historical
stages Uno determines stand without correlation to the insights of the theory
of principles, aside from presenting the denominator of their respective levels
of ‘purity’, for which the theory of principles in turn delivers the level of con-
ceptual abstraction. This fatal inconclusiveness of theThree Level-Methodwas
also noted by Simon Clarke:
… the Uno approach remains formalistic, since the basis of this abstrac-
tion, and the corresponding division of levels between the basic the-
ory, the stages theory, and historical analysis, is essentially arbitrary. The
demarcation and specificationof thebasic theory is determinedbypurely
analytical criteria, which define which historical tendencies correspond
to the inner logic of capitalism, and which correspond to contingent
factors introduced at the level of the stages theory or at the level of histor-
ical analysis. The result is that the pure theory is insulated from contact
with the real world by stages theory, which provides the link between the-
ory and history. However, the stages theory derives neither from the pure
theory nor from historical abstraction, but essentially from the need to
build a bridge between the two, so that the only escape from a scholastic
formalism is provided by a stages theory which is at best undeveloped,
and at worst arbitrary … the result is that the theory provides no coher-
ent purchase on the historical process of capitalist development, on the
one hand, and no political guidance, on the other.125
Over and aboveClarke’s evaluation however, the deliberate disavowal of Marx’s
specific Problemstellung from the three level-method is to be problematised in
Uno’s approach. Against Uno, we have seen that themere commodity form and
125 Clarke 1989, 134.
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mere commodity circulation are never constitutive of economic formdetermina-
tion, and hence canneithermark the beginning of capitalism’s historical origin,
nor the purely theoretical vantage point by which capitalist relations of pro-
duction are considered. To the contrary: hypostatising the ‘lawfulness’ of the
commodity form as the theoretical point of departure imitates classical bour-
geois economists’ view of the commodity as the natural(ised) vantage point,
in which its relation to the specific relations of production, especially the rela-
tion between capital and labour, is extinguished. Marx’s presentation of the
historical origins of the process which made the emergence of the commodity
form possible at all critically inverts the unproven presuppositions, the natur-
alistic fallacies, and the ideological hypostatisations of the ‘commodity form’
as the point of departure of political economy. In this critical presentation,
any refuge in ‘different levels of abstraction’, which do not coherently demon-
strate by their own exposition as to what instance they are abstractions of, is
superfluous. Rather than that Marx’s historical account of primitive accumu-
lation ‘stands outside of the pure principles’, as Uno argues, Uno’s historical
stages of mercantilism, liberalism and imperialism bear no relation to the con-
stellation that structures the capital relation in the first place. This is not to
say that ‘different historical stages’ are secondary to understanding the present
capital relation and the ‘uneven way’ it has subsumed labour under capital.
They indeed show how capital has incorporated different material relations –
and concretely, different kind of products under different production meth-
ods, accompanied by their corresponding different political interventions –
in each case. But it raises the question what insights we get for understand-
ing the present predicament of capital – e.g. children’s labour in vast parts of
the southern hemisphere even in the twenty-first century, poverty, the rise of
a new ‘surplus’ precariat, and the eradication of civil liberties – if a formal-
istic ideal-type theory of ‘pure’ principles of capitalist commodity-economy is
assumed as the methodological vantage point for which a no less schematic
stage theory assumes a chromatic of increasing/decreasing levels of ‘purity’.
Indeed, as Clarke observes, ‘pure theory is insulated from contact with the real
world’. Acknowledging this, we can however point to a more general epistem-
ological, and hence, fundamental misrecognition of Marx’s method in Uno’s
sandankairon. This concerns the problem of Uno’s ‘pre-critical’ (vorkritischer)
standpoint. So strong is Uno’s rejection of Marx’s ‘meshing’ of different levels of
analysis that Uno fails to see its critical function. It consists precisely in demon-
strating the grip of the law of value and the valorisation postulate over the
real life of humans, the production and the reproduction process, as a reality-
structuring force. In Uno’s method, the capital relation is never problematised
because sandankairon is systematically obstructed from determining what the
114 chapter 2
law of value ‘has to do’ with the actual world, with the actual societywe live in.
The law of value is restricted to a hyper-abstract ‘pure theory’ in which ‘equal
exchange’ and an ‘equilibrium of supply and demand’ prevails. It is therefore
banned from its theoretical extrapolation in the actual economy. This is quite
to the contrary of Marx’s project. Instead of themutual externality of pure the-
ory and stage theory, Marx deliberately presents the actual cruelty, the actual
violence, the actual devastation in effect by a society that subordinates all social
exchange to the law of value.Marx’s project in Capitalwas to show how the law
of value prevails precisely in a historically real economy – and his elaborations
of ‘TheWorking Day’ are a formidable example. Themethodological objection
and resentment against demonstrating the intrinsically devastating effects of
the law of value, or rather surplus value, in a real historical situation, which
wasMarx’s incentive formany of his elaborations in Capital, bears a significant
symptom of the inherently apologetic character of Uno’s and the Uno School’s
contribution. This however is closely related to Uno’s insufficient grasp of the
epistemological status of value. As a real abstraction, it is not merely the res-
ult of a thought process about an object called ‘the capitalist economy’, but in
effect structures the actualworkings, the realmechanisms bywhich people live
and work and organise their daily survival, and, among the more privileged,
think and thematise the concept of society itself. It is the autonomisation of
value as a real process, and no longer – if it ever was – value as amere ‘thought-
abstraction’ that is the primary cause for the subordination of human needs
to the value nexus. As Marx famously stated: ‘Those who consider the auto-
nomization [Verselbständigung] of value as a mere abstraction forget that the
movement of industrial capital is this abstraction in action’.126 Needless to say,
in its hyper-abstract ideal-type formalisation, the theory of principles found-
ing the three level-methodmay be considered the ‘internal dream or fantasy of
capital’,127 a state which can never materialise concretely, but must neverthe-
less be assumed, and which may well be merely the idealisation of capital by
capital itself. For Uno therefore, this conceptualisation may indicate a ‘dream’.
For Marx, it is a nightmare.
126 Marx 1978, p. 185. Emphasis added.
127 Walker 2016, p. 164.
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2.2 Pure Theory’s X-Axis: The Law of Population
Uno’s re-conceptualisation of the law of population serves two functions that
imply each other: an intervention againstMarx’s theory of ‘immiseration of the
working class’ (rōdōsha kaikyū no kyūbōka) and, more specifically, the explan-
ation of labour power shortage in the long term, and the operations of the
industrial cycle (boom, crisis, recession) in the short term. Labour power short-
age is a vital problem in Uno’s theory of the business cycle. For Uno, it should
be addressed through the ‘law of population’, one of the ‘ThreeGreat Economic
Laws that Govern Capitalism’, as his 1969 text contends (along with the Law of
Value and the Law of the Equalisation of Profit Rates). The law of population,
forUno, explains thenecessity of crisis.Wewill see how this viewof crisis, steer-
ing away from the inherent contradiction in the laws of the creation of surplus
value with the laws of its realisation, and resetting it in the realm of work-
ers’ reproduction as independent variable, significantly leaves unaddressed the
insights drawn fromMarx’s ‘General Law of Capitalist Accumulation’.
With the development of the productive forces and the rise of the organic
composition of capital, Uno contends, we do not merely confront a growing
relative surplus population, but also a relative surplus of capital:
Of course, because a higher organic composition of capital forms a rel-
ative surplus population against capital, capital does not always need to
directly improve its forthcoming productionmethods. In otherwords, the
improvement of capital’s production methods may lead to an increase of
the production of means of production and means of subsistence along
with the advance of capital accumulation, but because this is not accom-
paniedbyan increase in the labouringpopulation…this leads to a relative
surplus in capital as means of production and means of subsistence, as
against labour power.128
Not only the formation of a relative surplus population, but its absorption in
times of boom, and the concomitant production of surplus capital relative to
the working class, forms a problem of accumulation and one of the ‘contra-
dictory’ tendencies of capital. According to Uno, capital reacts to labour power
shortage with a crisis, triggered by the wage rise resulting from labour power
shortage in times of boom, which fluctuates back into capital’s necessity to
expel labour power in times of depression. This tight relation between fluc-
128 Uno 1974 [1969], pp. 21–2.
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tuations in the availability of labour power and the economic cycle was in
Uno’s view too perfunctorily analysed by Marx. Especially, in this context, the
concept of the value of labour power is reconsidered by Uno, as a dependent
variable considerablymodified by the law of population itself. Towards the end
of this chapter (2.2.), revisiting Marx’s ‘General Law of Accumulation’, we will
see on what grounds Uno’s critique is justified, and whether the ‘availability of
labour power’ – a ‘commodity that cannot be directly produced by capital’ –
forms an adequate angle by which to meaningfully address capital’s contradic-
tion. Before we come to Uno’s reconceptualisation of the ‘law of population’ as
regulating the value of labour power through the cyclical process of capitalist
accumulation, we shall first considerUno’s critique of Marx’s law of population
as a ‘law of immiseration’.
2.2.1 Against ‘The Law of Immiseration’ …
One of the two main incentives for Uno’s re-conceptualisation of Marx’s the-
ory of population in the wider context of general accumulation theory is to
counter the theory of immiseration.129 For Uno, while the ‘law of population’
belongs to the framework of the principles, it must be ‘purified’ from the his-
torical contingencies of immiseration theory. As we have seen, Uno’s concep-
tualisation of pure theory or the theory of principles builds upon a level of
abstraction in which the historical tendencies of capital should be excluded.
In contrast to Marx, who deliberately includes these processes into the logic of
the abstract rule of value, Uno demands separate spheres of capital’s theorisa-
tion. We should therefore first present a problematisation of this view, before
turning to what we believe is Marx’s original motivation for the central, if not
single most crucial theorem in Capital, the General Law of Capitalist Accumu-
lation and crisis. In the Methodology, Uno quotes from the 1864–5 Economic
Manuscripts:
In theory, we assume that the laws of the capitalist mode of production
develop in their pure form. In reality, this is only an approximation; but
the approximation is all the more exact, the more the capitalist mode
of production is developed and the less it is adulterated by survivals of
earlier economic relations with which it is amalgamated.130
129 Also see the article originally published in Keizai Kenkyū (Studies in Political Economy) in
1957, ‘On the So-called Law of Immiseration’ (‘Kyūbōka no hōsoku ni tsuite’), in Uno 1974
[1957], pp. 111–21.
130 Marx 1981, p. 275.
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Uno strongly emphasises this small passage, and it occurs repeatedly over
his theoretical writings. As what Uno thinks forms the basis to Marx’s general
method, on the one hand, it serves to justify Uno’s own approach – capital-
ism’s development toward increasing ‘purity’ – andon the other hand forms the
basis of his critique of the ‘purity’ of the era of industrial capitalism. Yet, Uno
assumes that Marx could not help being wrong: ‘At the end of the 19th century,
it becameclear that this development [of an increasing approximation towards
pure capitalism] would not take place. The systematic purity of the theory of
principles could not be fully completed’.131 Theweakness of Marx’smethodwas
the failure to grasp the extent to which the law of population had penetrated
the principles, and, within it, Marx’s failure to understand the significance of
the commodification of labour power as capital’s crisis-inducing ‘impossibil-
ity’. Instead, Marx, according to Uno, had developed a theory of ‘immiseration’
that not only did not meet the requirements of pure principles, but would
be proven wrong precisely because Marx did not attribute sufficient import-
ance to the law of a relative surplus population and the leverage function it
can have in economic cyclical crisis. Here, in the context of the three levels,
Uno gives only a brief sketch of the importance he ascribes to the law of pop-
ulation for pure theory. In the present context, we will briefly reproduce his
argument while keeping in mind Uno’s specific law which will be discussed
in the context of the reconstruction of Capital (Chapter 4.1.) and the theory
of crisis (Chapter 4.4.). At the bottom of Uno’s argument lies the contention
that Marx’s theory of immiseration, discussed in the context of Marx’s own
theory of population in Chapter 25 of Capital Volume i, ‘The Progressive Pro-
duction of a Relative Surplus Population or Industrial ReserveArmy’, was faulty
since it did not and could not take into account the era of finance capital and
its different trajectories towards outer spheres, the incorporation of an as yet
non-capitalist periphery thatwould render the theory of immiseration redund-
ant – since capitalismwouldnot producemisery inone countrynecessarily and
logically, but instead produce an uneven development of the standard of living,
according to the level of capitalist reproduction. It is true, Uno admits, that
Marx’s theory of a relative surplus population could be held accountable for
England at a specific stage of capital accumulation – the nineteenth century –
but as such it does not stand as a pure principle. ‘Therefore’, Uno writes, ‘the
theory of principles in Capital as the developmental stage of capitalism [i.e. in
which capitalism has overcome the previous non-commodity economic forms
of small-scale production, etc.] can be thought of as the principles of industrial
131 Uno 1974 [1962], p. 37.
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capitalism. But a systematic purification of the theory of principle does not take
place’.132 In the case of finance capital, ‘mechanic heavy industry based on the
stock exchange system and the relatively frequent improvement of capitalist
production methods are always shown in the application of surplus popula-
tion’. For Uno, it is ‘the special feature of this era’.133 For late developers, such
as Japan, finance capital, stock markets and heavy industries played a more
important role than inEngland, so that the capitalist lawof population received
an increasing importance for understanding the trajectories determining such
a case as Japan:
Through the law of population, capitalism comes into possession of
mechanisms or apparatuses which allow the (im)possibility of the com-
modification of labour power to pass through (‘muri’ wo tōsu kikō). This
is precisely the point on which capitalism historically forms itself into a
determinate form of society, and further, is what makes it independent
in pure-economic terms. Like land, it is a so-called given for capitalism,
one that is given from its exterior, but unlike land it can be reproduced,
and bymeans of this reproduction becomes capable of responding to the
demands of capital put forward through the specific phenomenon of cap-
italism called crisis.134
The law of population, for Uno, generates stages of development of capitalism
by the extended reproduction of the labour power commodity. Uno also con-
trasts this with the narrative of primitive or original accumulation: once the
labour power commodity has been established and can be reproduced by its
own means, it is able to determine the development of capitalism, as well as
the speed of higher development of the productive forces by itself:135
The stages of development of capitalism are themselves determined
through the mechanism of the extended reproduction process of labour
power as a commodity. Capitalism in its beginning has, in its necessity
for labour power for its own development, in contrast with consolid-
ating and going through the so-called accumulation process of capital,
gone through the circulation of cyclical economic boom in its develop-
mental phase. This is guaranteed by the higher development of the con-
132 Ibid. Emphasis added.
133 Uno 1974 [1962], p. 46.
134 Uno 1974 [1970], pp. 426–7. Translated and quoted inWalker 2012, p. 170.
135 Uno 1974 [1962], p. 36.
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solidation of capital and the formation of a relative surplus population.
As a deliverer of labour power, capitalism itself becomes autonomous.
However, with increasing speed, higher development accompanies the
growth of productive forces and at all times allocates the additionally
necessary surplus population by itself.136
In ‘TheThreeGreat EconomicLaws’, Unoadds another aspect to the lawof pop-
ulation overlooked byMarx, whichwould render its pessimistic, immiseration-
theoretical impetus obsolete: original consumption. Because ‘the consumption
and production of labour power is of course to be thought of on the basis of its
difference to the consumption and production of “things” ’,137 it is ‘strange’ to
omit the original consumption of things for the daily reproduction of labour
power as an ‘economic object’.138 The strange ‘externality’ of the reproduction
of labour power both constitutes and withdraws itself from the law of popula-
tion, as the angle fromwhich the ‘peculiar’ norms of a capitalist societymust be
viewed. We will return to this point soon. As we have seen, the problem of the
method inCapital, asUno sees it, is thatMarx conflates the levels of thepresent-
ation of pure theory with historical contingencies so that they do not stand to
the requirements of the principles of pure capitalist society. This allegedly also
renders his ‘law of immiseration’ problematic, as it is reflected inMarx’s alleged
conflation of the theory of relative surplus population with the historical situ-
ation in mid-nineteenth-century England – a conflation, which brings about
a ‘theory of immiseration’ and the concept of the ‘industrial reserve army’ of
labour as an ‘absolute general law’. ThoughUno does not quote the full passage,
he specifically refers to a passage in the section on ‘Different Formsof Existence
of the Relative Surplus Population. The General Law of Capitalist Accumula-
tion’ in Chapter 25 of Capital Volume i:
The greater the social wealth, the functioning capital, the extent and
energy of its growth, and therefore also the greater the absolute mass of
the proletariat and the productivity of its labour, the greater is the indus-
trial reserve army. The same causes which develop the expansive power
of capital, also develop the labour power at its disposal. The relativemass
of the industrial reserve army thus increases with the potential energy
of wealth. But the greater this reserve army in proportion to the active
labour-army, the greater is themass of a consolidated surplus population,
136 Uno 1974 [1962], p. 28.
137 Uno 1974 [1969], p. 21.
138 Uno 1974 [1969], p. 21.
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whosemisery is in reverse ratio to the amount of torture it has to undergo
in the form of labour. Themore extensive, finally, the pauperized sections
of the working class and the industrial reserve army, the greater is official
pauperism.This is the absolute general law of capitalist accumulation. Like
all other laws, it is modified in its working by many circumstances, the
analysis of which does not concern us here.139
It is however precisely the ‘modifications’ by ‘many circumstances’ that interest
Uno here. According toUno,Marx places insufficient emphasis on the ‘renewal
of constant capital, so that the law of population as the special leverage of
modern industry [serves as] the basis for the range of economic boom’.140 It is
clear from this observation that Uno is more interested in the ‘positive’ effect –
positive for the intents of capital to accumulate a surplus – of the dynamics
of population than he is in the prospects for poverty on a general scale. The
accumulation of wealth ‘at one pole’ that is ‘at the same time accumulation
of misery, the torment of labour, slavery, ignorance, brutalization and moral
degradation at the opposite pole, i.e. on the side of the class that produces
its own product as capital’141 plays an insignificant role for the law of popula-
tion within the pure principles. In Uno’s view, this cannot be generalised for
late developing countries with their stronger emphasis on great industry, steel
production and the absorption of greater masses of the working population.
Quite to the contrary: the law of population can of its own accord determine
the extent of capitalist accumulation via extended reproduction at a certain
level of capitalist development. Two aspects go unnoticed in Uno’s refutation
of Marx’s law of accumulation as an explanation for general impoverishment:
a) that extended reproductiondoesnot denote a ‘step’ takenat a certain stageof
thedevelopment of capital, but that, under the conditionof the capitalistmode
of production, ‘simple reproduction’ already presents ‘extended reproduction’,
139 Marx 1976, p. 798. Original emphasis. The last two sentences quoted in Uno 1974 [1962],
p. 23.
140 Uno 1962, p. 23. It is interesting to see how this observation is directly informed by Hil-
ferding’s assessment of the business cycle in connection with population growth: ‘The
cycle begins with the renewal and growth of fixed capital, which is the main source of
the incipient prosperity’, stimulated by such factors as ‘the opening of new markets, the
establishment of new branches of production, the introduction of new technology, and
the expansion of needs resulting from population growth’. The boom in demand and the
shortening of the turnover time of capital raises the rate of profit as the result of ‘improved
conditions for the valorisation of capital’. Clarke 1994, p. 35. Clarke quotes fromHilferding
1981 [1910], pp. 258–61.
141 Marx 1976, p. 799. Emphasis added.
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and b) that, to the contrary, the ‘stage’ of production on a greater scale his-
torically and empirically was not able to absorb a greater mass of the working
population. To begin with the latter: as Marx presents in Chapter 15 of Capital
Volume i, at the beginning of the introduction of new technologies in trans-
port and communication – Marx counts ‘gas-works, telegraphs, photography,
steam navigation, and railways’ among the ‘chief industries’ of this kind – ‘the
total number of persons … employed in these five new industries amounts to
94,145’.142 As Aaron Benanav and John Clegg point out, they were all ‘highly
mechanised and relatively automated processes’. With the total employment
in these lines amounting to less than 100,000 workers, ‘compared to over amil-
lion in the textile and metal industries whose workforce was then shrinking as
a result of the introduction of machinery’, they continue:
From these statistics alone it is clear that the industries of the second
industrial revolution had not absorbed anything like as much labour as
those of the first in the moment of their initial appearance. In chapter 25
Marx provides additional statistical evidence that, from 1851 to 1871, em-
ployment continued to grow substantially only in those older indus-
tries in which machinery had not yet been successfully introduced. Thus
Marx’s expectation of a secular trajectory of a first relative then absolute
decline in the demand for labour was born out by the available evidence
in his time.143
Grasping this contradictory secular development of the production of a per-
manent relative surplus population on the one hand and higher shares in
profitability (concentration and centralisation of capital), i.e. greater accu-
mulation on the other hand, in terms of the ‘cyclical demand’ for labour, in
the sense of a ‘compensation’144 for a previous phase of higher unemploy-
142 Marx 1996 [1867], p. 449.
143 Benanav and Clegg 2014, p. 592. For the statistical evidence, see Marx 1976, pp. 802ff. For
more statistical evidence of the most recent trajectory, see Benanav and Clegg’s theorisa-
tion of deindustrialisation of the last decades, theoretically building on Marx’s theory of
immiseration, in Benanav and Clegg 2018.
144 In fact, Marx directs his critique of ‘business cycle’-style understandings of capitalist
reproduction and accumulation directly against its aspect of ‘compensation’: ‘Although
machinery necessarily throws men out of work in those industries into which it is intro-
duced, yet it may, notwithstanding this, bring about an increase of employment in other
industries. This effect, however, has nothing in commonwith the so-called theory of com-
pensation. Since every article produced by a machine is cheaper than a similar article
produced by hand, we deduce the following infallible law: If the total quantity of the
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ment, falls short of understanding what Benanav and Clegg term ‘the crisis of
the reproduction of the capital-labour relation’,145 and what we would term
capital’s crisis of valorisation. The crisis of valorisation is conditioned by its
own contradictory incentive of minimising labour inputs, while holding fast
to (abstract) labour as the only source of value. In this sense, simple repro-
duction, conditioned by the wage form, is already extended reproduction: ‘Just
as labour must return to the labour market to replenish its fund of wages,
so too capital must return to the capital market to reinvest its profits in an
expansion of production’.146 The extended reproduction of labour power as a
commodity at no point denotes the independent variable enabling different
scales of capitalist accumulation and development.Wages, that component of
productive capital which alone enables valorisation, and hence, the capital-
ist form of production, forms the quantitatively dependent variable, which is
crucially shown in capital’s indifference to the accumulation of poverty ‘at the
opposite pole’.147 In fact, the quantitative ratio of the working population to
the industrial reserve army at no point indicates a problem for the valorisa-
tion and profitability needs of capital. We will return to this in more detail in
our conclusion at the end of the section. Uno however reduces Marx’s notion
of the industrial reserve army and the ‘specifically capitalist law of popula-
tion’ to a theory of the fluctuation of the working populace in relation to the
accumulative demands of capital. If this were the whole story, Marx’s ideas
wouldbe easily adjustable to the Schumpeterian theory of cyclic growth (which
Uno, in fact, adopts). But business cycles can never explain the general sec-
ular and especially irreversible tendency of capitalist accumulation, in that
times of ‘recovery’ mean a recovery for capital, but not a general recovery for
article produced bymachinery, be equal to the total quantity of the article previously pro-
duced by a handicraft or by manufacture, and now made by machinery, then the total
labour expended is diminished. The new labour spent on the instruments of labour, on
the machinery, on the coal, and so on, must necessarily be less than the labour displaced
by the use of the machinery; otherwise the product of the machine would be as dear, or
dearer, than the product of the manual labour. But, as a matter of fact, the total quantity
of the article produced by machinery with a diminished number of workmen, instead of
remaining equal to, by far exceeds the total quantity of the hand-made article that has
been displaced’. Marx 1996 [1867], p. 445.
145 Benanav and Clegg 2014, p. 586.
146 Benanav and Clegg 2014, p. 587.
147 Marx 1976, p. 799. See alsoMarx 1976, p. 770: ‘To put itmathematically: the rate of accumu-
lation is the independent, not the dependent variable; the rate of wages is the dependent,
not the independent variable’. We will come back to this important passage at the end
of this chapter, and discuss it in more detail in the context of Uno’s theory of crisis in
Chapter 4.4.
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employment. The industrial reserve army is not a ‘pool’, which can be poten-
tially exhausted, as Uno thinks. Its constitution is based on its inexhaustability,
i.e. on the development of an absolute redundancy of labour against capital
in the course of concentrated accumulation. As Marx makes clearer in the
French edition of CapitalVolume i, ‘the higher the organic composition of cap-
ital, themore rapidlymust accumulation proceed tomaintain employment’.148
However, the effect of accelerated accumulation itself is the growing redund-
ancy of labour, lesser demand for it. Because capital cannot invert its level
of the development of the productive forces, it cannot invert its repulsion of
labour. The ‘renewal of constant capital’ that Uno holds as a leverage factor in
the phase of depression is not revoked as soon as profitability is restored: the
workers ‘set free’ in this phase do not return to their workplace, once capital
valorises its invested share. One does not have to recall the ‘digital revolu-
tion’, platform capitalism, full automation, etc., to see this manifestation of the
redundancy of labour expended in the production process. Hence, the estab-
lishment of a permanent industrial reserve army is an irreversible tendency
inherently constituting the contradiction in the law of valorisation. ‘Labour
power shortage’, which Uno identifies as the primary cause for crisis, has, in
fact, nothing to do with it. In this sense, Anwar Shaikh reminds us that, incid-
entally, ‘[the] labor supply is not the ultimate limiting factor for production
precisely because involuntary unemployment is normal’.149 But in the course
of its chronic manifestation, the redundancy of labour expresses itself also as
the redundancy of the unemployed. In other words, the working class produces
its own conditions of possibility as the conditions of its impossibility. It there-
fore reproduces its ownabolition as theworking class and, hence, its conditions
as paupers, as surplus proletariat, or in short, as the proletariat.150 Marx con-
cludes:
Finally, the law which always holds the relative surplus population or
industrial reserve army in equilibrium with the extent and energy of
accumulation rivets the worker to capital more firmly than the wedges
of Hephaestus held Prometheus to the rock. It makes an accumulation
148 Marx 1989 [1872–5], p. 552. Quoted in Benanav and Clegg 2014, p. 591, without reference to
the source. I’d like to thank Riccardo Bellofiore for his help in determining the source.
149 Shaikh 2016, p. 639.
150 ‘Proletarian’ must be understood to mean, economically speaking, nothing other than
‘wage labourer, the man who produced and valorizes “capital”, and is thrown onto the
street as soon as he becomes superfluous to the need for valorization possessed by “Mon-
sieur Capital”, as Pecquer calls this person’. Marx 1976, p. 764, footnote.
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of misery a necessary condition, corresponding to the accumulation of
wealth. Accumulation of wealth at one pole is, therefore, at the same time
accumulation of misery, the torment of labour, slavery, ignorance, brutal-
ization andmoral degradation at the opposite pole, i.e. on the side of the
class that produces its own product as capital.151
The stakes of Marx’s argument lie in the fact that it is on the side of the class
that ‘produces its own product as capital’ that the ‘accumulation of misery’ takes
place. The emphasis lies on the claim that if there exists a class which ‘pro-
duces its ownproduct as capital’, i.e. which, by virtue of selling its labour power,
renounces all property titles to the final product it has created, which has
always-already withdrawn its ‘natural right’ to the use value of the product, the
aggravation, intensification and extension of misery and pauperism becomes
a general social and historical fact. Theoretically, therefore, the process of the
working class’s own ‘superfluous-rendering’ (as surplus proletariat, as pau-
pers, as ‘Lumpenproletariat’) must be understood from the wage relation as
the relation between capital and labour itself, even though, strictly speaking,
the unemployed ‘surplus proletariat’ no longer exists in this relation. Indeed,
one cannot understand the formation of the surplus proletariat in abstraction
from thewage form. Here, Benanav and Cleggmake the important observation
that ‘[wage] labour is inseparable from the accumulation of capital, from the
accretion of labour-saving innovations, which, over time, reduce the demand
for labour’.
It might seem that the abundance of goods, which results from labour-
saving innovations, must lead to an abundance of jobs. But in a society
based on wage-labour, the reduction of socially necessary labour-time –
which makes goods so abundant – can only express itself in a scarcity of
jobs, in a multiplication of forms of precarious employment.152
Michael Heinrich in this context thematises the intensity vs. the extensity of
immiseration in the course of the capitalist accumulation process. Against the
traditional understanding of immiseration theory (Verelendungstheorie) of an
either absolute or relative immiseration of the working class153 in terms of
151 Marx 1976, p. 799.
152 Benanav and Clegg 2014, p. 593.
153 An absolute immiseration would imply wage reduction and the general deterioration of
the living conditions of the working class, while a relative immiseration theory would
argue that despite wage rises and the improvement of the living conditions of the work-
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intensity – i.e., in terms of the scale or level of the deterioration of its repro-
ductive conditions – he posits the interpretation of the general law of capitalist
accumulation indicating a greater extensityof pauperisation.With regard to the
Marx quote, he argues that ‘whether the misery of these “pauperized sections
of theworking class” (LazarusschichtenderArbeiterklasse) increases in the long
run, is not addressed byMarx at all. In this sense, it is not an “immiseration the-
ory” in the above sense [as a theory of the intensification of the misery of the
working class, ell]. The “general law of capitalist accumulation” much rather
signifies the extensity of these poorest layers of the proletariat as a result of the
extension of the industrial reserve army’.154 Hence, Marx’s notion of the ‘accu-
mulation of misery’ refers to the expansion of the industrial reserve army in the
course of accumulation. It is this process, the increasing extensity or expansion
(quantity, not quality) of the relative superfluousness of the working class pro-
duced by the working class itself, that Marx identifies as the ‘law of population
peculiar to the capitalist mode of production’, namely, that the working pop-
ulation ‘produces both the accumulation of capital and the means by which
it is itself made relatively superfluous; and it does this to an extent which is
always increasing’.155 Pure theory’s ‘business cycle’ approach,whichUnomobil-
ises against the general law of capitalist accumulation, excludes the insights
drawn from Marx’s elaborations not as a ‘contingent’ historical manifestation
of the capital relation, but its logical consequence –whichmanifests itself con-
cretely and historically. This however is not an effect of the historical tendencies
of capitalism’s actualmanifestations, but rather an effect of the implementation
of a social form of production directed solely at (surplus) value, not at use value.
Uno underestimates the contradictory character of the accumulation of wealth
that necessitates the accumulation of the irreversability of poverty – ‘Accu-
mulation of capital is therefore multiplication of the proletariat’156 – and its
theoretical significance for evaluating the empirical evidence of mass poverty,
regardless of its geographical andhistorical embeddedness. In sum,Uno, fatally
ignoring the purpose and aim of the capitalist mode of production and the
growing redundancy of labour indicated by the wage form itself, rejects the
general lawof capitalist accumulation as a faulty ‘lawof immiseration’, pointing
to the leverage function of fluctuations in the working population determined
around the wage as an independent variable. This latter point will now receive
ing class, social wealth has accumulatedmore quickly, so that in relation to general social
wealth, the conditions of the working class have deteriorated.
154 Heinrich 1999, p. 325.
155 Marx 1976, pp. 783–4. Emphasis added.
156 Marx 1976, p. 764.
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greater attention. In the following, we shall therefore examine the second func-
tion of the law of population in Uno’s interpretation in more detail: the new
determination of the value of labour power. Because, for Uno, the capitalist
(re)production process hinges on the fact that the commodification of labour
power (as the consumptionprocess of workers) cannot beperformedby capital
itself, labour power shortage presents an impediment to valorisation, leading to
crisis. For Uno, this is the more general framework to the law of population.
From here, we can elaborate in more detail on our objection to Uno’s claim
that labour power shortage should play a role in the crisis tendencies of cap-
ital by pointing to its truncated grasp of the contradiction of the law of value
itself, which is not located in the sphere of consumption. It is located in the direct
contradiction of the laws of the creation of surplus value with the laws of its
realisation.
2.2.2 …For the ‘Law of Population’ as a NewDeterminant of the Value of
Labour Power
As the methodological reference point for the theory of principles, the ‘law of
population’ as a rejection of the theory of immiseration and the new determin-
ation of the value of labour power are closely related. For example, in the sec-
tion on ‘The Three Great Economic Laws that Govern Capitalism’ in The Polit-
ical Economy of Capital (Shihonron no Keizaigaku), Uno notes that the realm of
consumption has been treated ‘external to the objects of political economy’.157
Uno is here primarily motivated by an objection to Marx’s determination of
the value of labour power as ‘the labour-time necessary for the production, and
consequently also reproduction, of this specific article’:158
Marx … determined the value of the labour power commodity by the
labour time required for its reproduction, but while doing it, as if to add,
corrected it by saying that this resulted in the labour time needed for the
production of the workers’ means of subsistence. However, the workers’
means of subsistence are neither qualitatively nor quantitatively con-
stant. For Marx, they are on the one hand determined by natural circum-
stances, and on the other formed by historical ones. But I think that these
historically formed circumstances are determined by the law of popula-
tion.159
157 Uno 1974 [1969], p. 21.
158 Marx 1976, p. 274.
159 Uno 1974 [1969], p. 21.
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The latter point is decisive: Marx has pointed to the ‘historical and moral
element’ of the value of labour power determining various levels of ‘need’ of
the workers throughout the history of civilisation (and also due to natural, i.e.
‘climatic’ conditions). But according to Uno, Marx has never successfully man-
aged to determine this very level, or indeed, the nature of the modifications of
the wage level itself. For Marx,
[theworker’s] natural needs, such as food, clothing, fuel and housing vary
accordingly to the climatic and other physical particularities of his coun-
try. On the other hand, the number and extent of his so-called necessary
requirements, as also the manner in which they are satisfied, are them-
selves products of history, and depend therefore to a great extent on the
level of civilisation attained by a country; in particular they depend on
the conditions inwhich, and consequently on thehabits andexpectations
with which, the class of free workers has been formed. In contrast, there-
fore, with the case of other commodities, the determination of the value
of labour-power contains a historical and moral element.160
Uno sees a blind spot at work in Marx’s determination of the level of the value
of labour-power or thewage, whichUno’s theorisation of the law of population
can supposedly fill. As for the fluctuations in the emergenceof a relative surplus
population adjusted to capital’s accumulative demands, the essay ‘The Value
and Price of Labour Power. On the Specificity of the Labour Power Commod-
ity’ (Rōdōryoku no kachi to kakaku. Rōdōryoku shōhin no tokushusei ni tsuite),
published in 1958, provides further speculation:
Capital is something that cannot directly produce the labour power com-
modity, but through the formation of a relative surplus population in its
accumulation process, it can indirectly produce it, so to speak. [By the
formation of a relative surplus population], the demand for the labour
power commodity is released from the constraints of the natural popu-
lace. This is the development of what Marx called the law of population
specific to capitalism.161
We have seen that what Uno refers to as the ‘adjustment’ of the flows in the
availability of labour power to the demands of capital is not what Marx refers
160 Marx 1976, p. 275.
161 Uno 1974 [1958]b, p. 132.
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to as the ‘law of population’, but the irreversible tendency of the redundancy of
labour in the development of the forces of production. Uno however insists on
the wage as independent variable ‘accustomed’ to the accumulation demands
of capital through the lawof population.Tounderstand and subsequently com-
ment on this, let us briefly recapitulate the previous. Above, we have seen how,
for Uno, the development of the forces of production leads not only to surplus
capital, but to labour power shortage, because the labouring population cannot
absorb the ‘relative surplus of the means of production and means of subsist-
ence’.162 He relates this phenomenon to the cyclical flows of accumulation, in
which the wage level acts as determinant, and which alone can induce a ‘crisis’,
or rather depression.With the relative surplus of capital against labour power,
labour power shortage (hitode busoku) in the so-called boomperiod leads
to awage rise. This eventually forms a surplus of capital (shihonnokajō) in
the original sense. Because just as the accumulation of capital progresses,
the surplus value earned as profit diminishes, and this is the fundamental
element of the specific phenomenon of the capitalist commodity eco-
nomy known as crisis. It is usually thought that crises occur because cap-
ital has produced too many commodities it is unable to sell. But even
though such things may occur, in the anarchistic production that is the
productionof capital, still theprice of abundantly producedcommodities
falls, whereas the price of commodities not sufficiently produced, rises.
In between the two, capitalist production is socially regulated through
the movement of price, so that at this point, it is regulated by the law of
value.163
The ‘anarchist’ productionof capital, forUno, stillmust obey some rules, e.g. the
law of value. Behind this is Uno’s assumption of equilibrium price ‘forging’ the
law of value as one of the ‘Three Great Economics Laws Governing Capitalism’.
Hence, Uno directly rejects what he discerns as a contradiction, as formulated
by Engels in the Anti-Dühring, between the social and the private character of
production, in that what the capitalist mode of production produces socially
is privately appropriated by the capitalist class:164 ‘This explanation fails to
162 Uno 1974 [1969], p. 22.
163 Uno 1974 [1969], p. 23.
164 ‘The means of production, and production itself had become in essence socialised. But
they were subjected to a form of appropriation which presupposes the private produc-
tion of individuals, under which, therefore, everyone owns his own product and brings it
to market. The mode of production is subjected to this form of appropriation, although
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explain why periods of boom and periods of crisis occur repetitively’.165 While
we will return to the conception of the law of value as the law of equilibrium
price at a later point,166 here, the problemof labour shortage and crisis interests
us: because contrary to Marx’s view, the development from formal to real sub-
sumption is accompanied by unabsorbable surplus capital, rather than an
unabsorbable ‘industrial reserve army’, high wages can squeeze profits, so that
capital is obliged to readjust its production techniques. What is crucial to Uno
is that the incentive to technological innovation is not givenby capital’s drive to
accumulation as the independent variable, but by the pressures a diminishing
working population can place on the valorisation postulate. These pressures,
then, are wage pressures, whichmanifest themselves as the ‘historical element’
of successful social reproduction imposed from the outside of the direct produc-
tion process. The wage, in other words, presents the independent variable for
Uno. It is the reproduction of labour-power as the ‘outside’ of capital’s valor-
isation need that imposes a structural challenge to successful extended repro-
duction, and hence, valorisation. Moreover, because capital cannot ‘directly’
produce the labour power commodity, Uno sees a non-capitalist factor at work
that infiltrates capitalist reproduction to an extent that can generate cyclical
crisis. It is here that the commodity economy in the strict sense, namely a com-
modity economy in which labour power is forced to reproduce itself, thereby
presupposing and continuously re-activating a sphere that allegedly lacks sub-
sumption by the capital relation, governs and ‘dominates’ capitalist societies:
Both the commodification of labour power and the de-skilling of labour,
forming the internal basis to the law of population specific to capital-
ism that is the formation of an industrial reserve army, at last does not
suffice for one social system. From the outset, labor power, which can-
not be a product of the commodity economy itself, is passing through
an ‘impossibility’ in order to be commodified like any other product. The
basis of this passing through is given to a certain degree. In otherwords, as
something historically limited, the commodity economy canbynomeans
concretely ‘commodity-economise’ (shōhin keizaika suru) the whole of
society …167
it abolishes the conditions upon which the latter rests. This contradiction, which gives to
the newmode of production its capitalist character, contains the germ of thewhole of the
social antagonisms of today’. Engels 1987 [1887–8], p. 258.
165 Uno 1974 [1969], p. 23.
166 In Chapter 4.2. of this volume.
167 Uno 1974 [1959], p. 12.
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From here, Uno develops a general theory of business cycles directly from
the relation between the fact that labour power is not produced by capital and
the formation of a relative surplus population:
… the basis of the establishment of capitalist society, the fact that the
commodification of labour power is not a product of capital, as a contra-
diction that develops the crisis phenomenon from capital itself, clarifies
the process by which capital, through forming a relative surplus popula-
tion by the improvement of production methods during times of reces-
sion ( fukyōki) actually leads to a solution. Here the necessity (of crisis)
can be proven for the first time.168
The nexus between labour power as a non-product of capital, capital’s accu-
mulation process, labour shortage, and, ultimately, crisis, hence constitutes the
‘historical element’ of the determination of wage level:
The relation between workers and capitalists determined within the in-
dustrial cycles of boom, depression, and recession, in other words, within
the movement of the wage, now also clarifies the historical element of the
determination of the wage itself. The value of the labour power commod-
ity, even if reduced to one fixed amount of the value of the means of sub-
sistence, is quantitatively andqualitatively determinedby changeswithin
the process of the industrial cycle. As such, for the first time, as Marx has
said, the average circumference of the necessary means of production is
determined.169
Marx, according to Uno, hadn’t sufficiently considered the industrial cycle and
its initial dependence on the availability of labour power, as well as the wage
pressure accompanied by it. In this sense, Uno identifies the primary source of
crisis in the fact of ‘too few’ labourers, inwhat capital cannot immediately influ-
ence by its own means. Instead, Marx had resorted to the ‘theory of immisera-
tion’, which had no bearing on the mechanism of capital that pure theory sets
out to designate. To the contrary: it may have had some relevance for 1830s–40s
England, but it could not provide a general scheme of the actual significance of
the law of population, in that it explains the origin, occurrence, and repetitive
schema of the business cycle.
168 Uno 1974 [1969], pp. 23–4.
169 Uno 1974 [1969], p. 24.
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However, does labour power shortage, which Uno identifies as the ultimate
source of crisis, really pose an obstacle to capital’s valorisation needs? Before
we return in more detail to this question in the context of Marx’s theory of
crisis, we shall draw a general outline of TheGeneral Lawof Capitalist Accumu-
lation, which Uno rejects as the general framework of accumulation, as well as
theoretically underlying themore ‘specific law’ of the Lawof theTendential Fall
in the Rate of Profit. The General Law of Capitalist Accumulation, we believe,
provides not only a more convincing and thorough answer, but conceptually
traces the contradictory mode of the appropriation of surplus value – and not
the static conception of business cycles and ‘internal dynamics’ and ‘external
limits’ – to its general founding principle, namely the law of value and its dis-
position to quantification of increasing levels of abstract wealth.
The general take of Marx’s analysis is that neither the shortage of labour
power nor wage rises present an impediment to accumulation. In fact, the view
of accumulation as dependent on ‘the numbers of the working population’170
presents a fetishismwith regard towhat enables accumulation in the first place.
It is not an ‘external relationbetween capital and the supply of labour-power’,171
but ‘only the relation between the unpaid and the paid labour of the same
working population’,172 the first of which capital appropriates as surplus value.
Therefore, Marx explains the wage rise phenomenon in completely different
terms than Uno, not as a consequence of labour shortage induced by the form-
ation of ‘surplus capital’, but as an adjustment mechanism bringing labour
power supply back into line with capital’s accumulation needs, as labour is dis-
placed by the displacement of dated technologies in favour of more advanced
productive methods. The accumulation process therefore does not meet an
obstacle in the form of rising wages, but on the contrary, rising wages meet an
obstacle in the form of capital’s accumulation needs:
If the quantity of unpaid labour supplied by the working class and accu-
mulated by the capitalist class increases so rapidly that its transformation
into capital requires an extraordinary addition of paid labour, thenwages
rise and, all other circumstances remaining equal, the unpaid labour
diminishes in proportion. But as soon as this diminution touches the
point at which the surplus labour that nourishes capital is no longer sup-
plied in normal quantity, a reaction sets in; a smaller part of revenue is
capitalized, accumulation slows down, and the risingmovement of wages
170 Marx 1976, p. 771.
171 Clarke 1994, p. 253.
172 Marx 1976, p. 771.
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comes up against an obstacle. The rise of wages is therefore confined
within limits that not only leave intact the foundations of the capitalist
system, but also secure its reproduction on an increasing scale.173
In the context of Smith’s concept of the effect of different wage rates on profit,
Marx discusses two alternative scenarios implied by a ‘rise in the price of
labour’, i.e., a diminishing supply of labour power and its effects on accumu-
lation, to show that the former does not interfere with the latter. First, the price
of labour keeps on rising, but the progress of accumulation is intact. Marx
quotes Smith to show that ‘there is nothing remarkable in this’, for after the
profits are diminished, ‘stock may not only continue to increase, but increase
much faster than before … A great stock, though with small profits, generally
increases faster than a small stock with great profits’.174 The second scenario
would be slackened accumulation as a result of the rise in the price of labour,
because ‘the stimulus of gain is blunted’. Here, accumulation lessens, but this
simultaneously implies that the cause of that lessening itself vanishes, ‘i.e. the
disproportion between capital and exploitable labour-power’,175 through the
introductionof labour-disposing techniques.Marx contends that neither of the
two scenarios implies changes in the availability of labour-power or the work-
ing population:
We see therefore that in the first case it was not the diminished rate,
either of the absolute or of the proportional increase in labour-power, or
the working population, which caused the excess quantity of capital, but
rather the converse; the increase in capital made the exploitable labour-
power insufficient. In the second case, it was not the increased rate, either
of the absolute or the proportional increase in labour-power, or the work-
ingpopulation, thatmade the capital insufficient, but rather the converse;
the relative reduction in the amount of capital caused the exploitable
labour-power, or rather its price, to be in excess.176
Marx follows that ‘the rate of accumulation is the independent, not thedepend-
ent variable; the rate of wages is the dependent, not the independent vari-
173 Marx 1976, p. 771.
174 Marx quotes from the French translation, Smith 1802 [1776], p. 189. Quoted in Marx 1976,
p. 770. ‘Stock’ = ‘capital’. E.g., some capitals make short-term ‘profits’ by selling below its
average rate, but above the initial price of their productive capital.
175 Marx 1976, p. 770.
176 Marx 1976, p. 770.
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able’.177Marx however develops this from themore basic insight that ‘the aimof
capital’ is never to produce use value, but value, and more specifically surplus
value, and that it is this specific mechanism of the quantification of the ‘work-
ing population’ for its own valorisation needs, that undergirds its ‘hunger’ for
profit. Wage rises or the ‘profit squeeze’ mechanism, as Marx notes twice in
this passage, ‘can never go so far as to threaten the system itself ’.178 In con-
sequence, ‘[the] mechanism of the capitalist production process removes the
very obstacles it temporarily creates’.179 Crisis is therefore at no point induced
by an ‘external’ or ‘outside’ realm to the valorisation postulate – the ‘precarious’
supply of labour power, the allegation that the reproduction of labour power
was an ‘element that capital itself cannot in essence control’180 – but by its
innermechanism itself: in that abstract labour remains the only source of value
while disposing of it in the search for maximum profitability. In this context,
Clarke reminds us that theories of the ‘absolute overaccumulation of capital’,
as the ‘outline of a theory of crisis based on overaccumulation with respect to
the supply of labour power’,181 fall short of determining the primary pattern
of accumulation. Uno’s assessment that ‘unless this industrial reserve army is
formed by capital itself, capitalism cannot posit the social foundations of its
own establishment as one historical form of society’,182 equally misrecognises
the form and function of the industrial reserve army, not as a ‘pool’ presenting
the sine qua non of accumulation, but an effect of the immediate process of
accumulation that has no bearing on capital’s drive to lower production costs
and input levels, particularly labour, ‘at all costs’. In a direct comment to Uno’s
thesis, GavinWalker contends that ‘[t]he fact that capital cannot itself produce
the additional supply of labour power demanded for progressive accumula-
tion places a restraint on its internal development’.183 This view, too, derives
from a truncated reading of capital’s crisis tendency that we have discussed:
the availability of labour power – ‘too few’ here or ‘too many wage-workers
in existence’ there184 – cannot present a limit to valorisation, because the
only limit to valorisation is the limit to surplus value that capital places upon
itself in its drive towards maximum profitability. This notably happens in the
intra-sectoral competition forcing down themarket price of productive capital
177 Marx 1976, p. 770.
178 Marx 1976, p. 769.
179 Marx 1976, p. 770.
180 Walker 2016, p. 115.
181 Clarke 1994, pp. 253–4.
182 Uno 1973 [1952], p. 497. Quoted inWalker 2016, pp. 130–1.
183 Walker 2016, p. 138.
184 Marx 1976, p. 771.
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under its real value, forcing new productive methods that further accelerate
the downward spiral. The barrier to the capitalist mode of production presents
itself as both the falling rate of profit, conditioned by the crisis tendency ana-
lysed in the ‘General Law of Capitalist Accumulation’, and the verymode of the
appropriationof surplus value itself. For capital, everything stands and fallswith
the question of not howmuch labour-power capital can absorb in terms of the
absoluteworking population, but howmuch unpaid labour it can absorb in the
immediate process of production. Because capital’s sole interest is in the pro-
portion of paid to unpaid labour and not that between ‘production and social
needs, the needs of socially developed human beings’,185 the conditions of the
production of surplus-value collide with that of its realisation, i.e. the barrier to
the realisation in the form of money. Yet, capital’s movement shows that it is
forced to absorb less and less labour power, and therefore systematically pro-
duces a surplus population it cannot absorb. In other words: capital’s drive to
extended reproduction finds a limit in extended reproduction itself. Neverthe-
less, the inability of capital to ‘control’ the reproduction, availability, and supply
of labour power, remains the main axis of Uno’s theorisation of pure theory. In
the following, we shall discuss in a more epistemologically framed context the
thesis of the commodification of labour power as the ‘savage outside of capital’,
of that which is ‘not really subsumed’ under the commodifying and totalising
structure of capital’s drive to valorisation. The focus will be on the epistem-
ological status of the notion of ‘externality’ in relation to the capitalist mode
of production. Especially targeted will be the thesis, recently brought forward
by GavinWalker, of Uno’s ‘pure capitalism’ as an abstract, unreal ‘closed circle’
that, because of the externality of labour power reproduction, has no bearing
on reality, but must nevertheless pretend to posit a ‘perfect smooth circle’ for
its self-functioning. This will allow us to invert this diagnosis of the capitalist
predicament: it is not the ‘closed logic’ of capital that is the illusion, but the
idea that it is ‘open’ – that there exists a use value-mediated realmwhich is not
yet subordinated to the capital relation and therefore ‘opens up’ the ‘space’ for
resistance. We term this a use value fetishism emerging from the conditions
of capitalist mediation itself. This rough sketch of our argument will now be
addressed in more detail.
185 Marx 1981, p. 367.
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2.3 Pure Theory’s Y-Axis: The Commodification of Labour Power
2.3.1 Production and Consumption
… in 1956, after more than thirty years of intensive research into Marx’s
Capital, Uno Kōzō argued that he had discovered its theoretical essence,
itsmicroscopic expression, in the formof its fundamental ‘mantra’ or pure
axiomatic distillation: ‘the impossibility of the commodificationof labour
power’ (rōdōryoku shōhinka nomuri). This ‘mantra’ theoretically concret-
izes the problem that lurks behind every aspect of capitalist society, the
essential and foundationalmoment that distinguishesMarx’s advances in
the critique of political economy put forward by Ricardo, Smith, Quesnay,
and others.186
In the light of the previous, this seems like a strange proposition indeed. Not
only has Marx at no point made this argument, but to the contrary: for Marx,
this commodification is not only not impossible, but the basis to the actual
modus operandi of capital. Neither has Marx therefore used the term of ‘the
impossibility’ of the commodification of labour power, but instead rejected
views in his critique of the ‘economists’ who interpret the phenomena of accu-
mulation in terms of the availability of the labour power commodity.187
From where, then, does Uno draw the alleged importance of the conditions
of the reproduction of labour power as a theoretical problem for Marx? For
Uno, this problem was rather insufficiently scrutinised in Capital, which pre-
cisely gave Uno the incentive to reassess the ‘historical element’ in the level of
the value of labour power through the law of population, at once also declaring
the redundancy of the ‘law of immiseration’. Yet, the question arises whether
this alleged omission is an omission caused by the insufficient emphasis on the
reproduction of labour power as an ‘impossibility’ for capital, or its basic neces-
sity. For Uno, as we will see, it presents an omission of the interrelatedness of
the two. In Chapter 2.1., we have seen that the ‘remnants’ of previous societies
will be eliminated with the development and increase of the forces of produc-
tion. This is crucial for Uno, because it provides the objective basis to capitalist
society as an ‘established fact’ in and out of itself. However, for an autonomous
economy commodity to be established as a historical society,
186 Walker 2016, p. 115.
187 Marx 1976, p. 771.
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it is neither simply the fact that products are exchanged as commodities,
nor the fact that, as commodities, they are produced for exchange, but
the fact that labour power becomes a commodity and production itself
becomes organised through capital, that commodities produce commod-
ities,188
which is decisive. It is only with such a kind of society that all the previous
social relations have been eliminated. The ‘total grasp of the reproduction pro-
cess’,189 which the theory of the commodity economic principles must show
puts the emphasis on the commodification of labour power as the ‘basis’ and
the ‘presupposition’ of capitalist society.190
Uno conceptualises the purchase of labour power as a commodity as the key
feature of the capitalist production process:191
The production process of capital is not merely the purchase of the
so-called means of production that are raw materials, instruments, ma-
chinery etc. as commodities. Through capital, the production process of
things (mono) itself becomes the production process, because labour as
such cannot be purchased as a commodity, and ‘the power to work’, or, in
Marx’s dictum, labour power is also purchased as a commodity.192
On theother hand,what constitutes a ‘commodity economy’ forUno is the rela-
tion betweenworkers and capitalists: ‘I think that the fundamental and general
law also governing a commodity economy is for the first time proven in the
exchange process of commodities between the workers and the capitalists. As
a standard for commodity exchange, the so-called law of value, too, forms one
of the three great laws of capitalist society …’193 Uno derives the ‘fundamental
188 Uno 1974 [1962], p. 27.
189 Uno 1974 [1962], p. 44.
190 Uno 1974 [1962], p. 46.
191 See also ‘The Value and Price of Labour. On the Specificity of the Labour Power Commod-
ity’, originally published in ShakaiRōdōKenkyū (Studies in Society andLabour), inUno 1974
[1958]b, pp. 122–42.
192 Uno 1974 [1969], p. 13.
193 Uno 1974 [1969], p. 12. It is interesting to note here that after the SecondWorldWar there
emerged an inner-Marxist, specifically ‘Japanese’ version of a debate about what was
called the ‘transformation problem’ (tenka mondai) which had nothing to do with the
theoretical transformation of values into prices of production, but everything to do with
the transformation of money into capital, i.e., the sale and purchase of labour power. As
Okuyama Tadanobu notes, ‘The debate about the transformation of money into capital
was a deep controversy bifurcating the Uno School into the theory of pure capitalism and
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contradiction of capital’ not from the law of value, but ‘from the conversion
of labour-power into a commodity’.194 Here however, Uno conceptualises a
twist in the determination of the labour power commodity as the ‘angle’ from
which the capitalist nexus has to be viewed. What is matter-of-factly behind
the sustenance of labour power, the source of surplus value which is the ‘main
objective of capital’, are the means of subsistence needed to reproduce labour
power. The substantial requirement for the appropriation and accumulation of
surplus value – to which Unomysteriously does not refer to in these passages –
is not production as such, neither its vicissitudes, nor its continuing process of
optimising the extraction and appropriation of living labour, but the acquisi-
tion of necessaries (food etc.) and other means of subsistence that guarantees
the allocation of labour power:
This point has certainly been neglected in political economy before. The
production of labour power, the consumption of the daily necessaries,
depends on consumption in the original sense (honrai no imi de no shōhi
ni yoru mono) and surpasses the realm of commodity relations. By virtue
of this point, the commodification of labour power is the commodifi-
cation of something that originally should not have been commodified.
Capitalism thereby becomes a strange thing that integrates the totality of
the production process into commodity relations.195
The capitalist process of production, for Uno, therefore hinges on the ‘original’
consumption process of labour power as a commodity that is not directly pro-
duced by capital:196
the theory of world capitalism. In this debate, both the theorists of pure capitalism as
those of world capitalism assumed the understanding that the form of merchant capital
and of metallic money capital were unstable at the roots of social existence. It was even
said that these two do not go together with the law of commodity economy in the form of
capital’. Okuyama 2016, p. 1.
194 Uno 2016 [1971], p. 19.
195 Uno 1974 [1969], p. 21.
196 ‘As a matter of fact, labour power is not originally produced as a commodity. It is not a
commodity directly produced by capital, it is not a product of capital. In order for labour
power to be sold as a commodity, it must be produced through buyable means of subsist-
ence (seikatsu shiryō), so that theproductionof labourpower in contrast to theproduction
of commodities is nothing but the result of the original consumption process (honrai no
shōhi katei). This point becomes clear in extended reproduction.’ Uno 1974 [1962], p. 26.
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Labour power turns into a commodity, but even so it is not a product of
capital. Generally, it is not a product (seisanbutsu) produced by the pro-
duction process. Rather, by the consumption process of things (mono) we
reproduce in our own human lives. Of course, as with other products and
themeans of production and labour power producedby the consumption
process, Marx was right to say that production is also immediately con-
sumption. However, I think that the difference between the production
and the consumption of things must as a matter of course be considered
in contrast to the consumption and the production of labour power.197
Uno’s brief reference toMarx’s reflections of the nexus of production, distribu-
tion, and consumption in the Introduction to theGrundrisse is useful here, as it
arguably presents the longest andmost coherent passage inMarx’s oeuvre dis-
cussing the nature of consumption. However, the point of the whole passage,
disguised as aHegelian ‘unfolding of moments’ of the reproductive totality, is to
designateproductionas theprimary locusof themediation.198Hence, the ‘simple
identity’ between production and consumption is not that easily stated, not
least because the ‘consumption of labour power’ denotes the actual produc-
tion process of capital, as the specifically capitalist labour process. The identity
of production and consumption is therefore a Hegelian fallacy for Marx, pos-
ited both ‘by socialist belletrists’ and ‘prosaic economists’ like J.B. Say, ‘in the
form that when one looks at an entire people, its production is its consump-
tion. Or, indeed, at humanity in the abstract’.199 But this abstract, or, more
precisely, transhistorical view, disregarding the specific social form of produc-
tion implied by the capital relation, crucially misses that consumption or the
realm of use value is never the aim of capitalist production. Again and again,
Marx emphasises this, a point to which we will return again as the differentia
specifica of Uno’s conception of the capitalist production process. For Marx,
consumption in the private lives of workers is subsumed to the form determ-
ination of the production process. Hence, even the form of consumption is
ultimately determinedby the formof production.This is the actual significance
197 Uno 1974 [1969], p. 21.
198 This is not to say thatHegel’s dialectics sublates the conceptualmoments ‘as equals’. Being
and Nothingness, e.g., are not sublated into ‘Becoming’ as equals: it is Being that receives
a ‘stronger’ semantics here in the form of further determined ‘Being’. In this sense, the
first book of the Logic is the Logic of Being, not the Logic of Nothingness, giving predom-
inance of the former over the latter. This semantic predominance of one moment of the
contradiction over the latter is precisely the motif for the conceptual movement. Were
they merely ‘equal’, no conceptual movement could take place.
199 Marx 1973, pp. 93–4.
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of Marx’s famous statement that ‘[hunger] is hunger, but thehunger gratifiedby
cooked meat eaten with a knife and fork is a different hunger from that which
bolts down raw meat with the aid of hand, nail and tooth. Production thus
produces not only the object, but also the manner of consumption, not only
objectively, but also subjectively’, to conclude: ‘Production thus creates the con-
sumer’.200 In an economic mode of production that draws the legitimacy of its
modus operandi from the single objective of maximum profitability, workers’
consumption cannot form any kind of incentive. They cannot consume more
than they earn in the form of the monetary wage, which presents only a frac-
tion of the productive capital at the initial production cycle. Though this is not
the place to discuss the question of the origin of surplus (we will return to it in
Chapter 4.2.), what is important here is that consumption presents a moment,
albeit anecessarymoment, in the cycle of valorisation–but it cannotunsettleor
undermine it.201 Here is whereMarx emphasises production as ‘predominating’
not only ‘over itself … but over the other moments [consumption, distribu-
tion] as well’.202 Consumption’s subordination to the form of production, in
which the latter is the ‘actual point of departure and hence also the predomin-
ant moment (das übergreifende Moment)’ is however not only confined to the
capitalist mode of production, although here, it is wholly removed from the
realm of this mode’s incentive. Long before any form of organised production,
in periods of conquest and pillage, production subordinated consumption or
distribution and thus goes back as far as human societies existed:
It is a received opinion (althergebrachte Vorstellung) that in certain peri-
ods people lived from pillage alone. But, for pillage to be possible, there
must be something to be pillaged, hence production. And the mode of
pillage it itself in turn determined by the mode of production. A stock-
jobbing nation, for example, cannot be pillaged in the same manner as a
nation of cow-herds.203
For Uno however, the realm of consumption counterfactually becomes the
primary locus of the ‘possibility’ of capital, namely as its ‘impossibility’, its ‘out-
side’, or that which threatens to disconnect or unsettle the ‘smooth circuit’ of
accumulation. In the following, we will show why this view is mistaken.
200 Marx 1973, p. 92.
201 Unless of course under the nonsensical hypothesis that all wage workers starve to death.
202 Marx 1973, p. 99.
203 Marx 1973, p. 98.
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2.3.2 The Reproduction of Labour Power as the ‘Savage Outside of
Capital’?
While Uno leaves the reader in the dark as to the reasons for the ‘impossibility’
that labour power should be a product of capital – he merely asserts it – it is
quite useful at this point to draw onGavinWalker’s extensive study,204 because
it presents a far-reaching attempt at a political conceptualisation and theoret-
ical explanation of labour power’s ominous status of ‘impossibility’ or ‘muri’.
As early as in ‘The Specificity of The Labour Power Commodity’ (1948), Uno
imperturbably asserts:
Labour power cannot be produced as an original commodity (honrai shō-
hin). This is because, according to Marx, labour power is ‘the aggregate of
those mental and physical capabilities existing in the physical form, the
living personality, of a human being, capabilities which he sets in motion
whenever he produces a use-value of any kind.’205
The labourer must sell it as a commodity, because he cannot himself ‘pro-
duce a use-value of any kind’. That what the labourer himself once used is no
longer useful to him and has instead turned into a commodity, is the ultimate
standpoint from which the development of the commodity society has to be
grasped.206 What is decisive for Uno is that labour power, a sum of physical
andmental capabilities, cannot be produced by capital, but only by the worker
herself. But the specific, and indeed fascinating, capability of the specifically
capitalist fromof production, aswewill counter, is that only in capitalism, these
‘physical and mental capabilities’, by being quantified in the form of monetary
wage, become a product of capital itself. In the face of Uno’s omission of a the-
oretical elaboration of his thesis, in the course of the following argument, we
will proceed on the basis of the arguments presented by Walker in defense of
Uno’s crucial thesis.
ForUno, ‘the goal of the selling of labor power is the acquisition of the neces-
sary means of subsistence, i.e. the process of C-M-C’.207 ForWalker however, it
is still impossible to argue that, in C-M-C, ‘this initial C itself is produced as a
commodity; here, what the laborer attempts to obtain, means of subsistence,
are repeatedly cyclically consumed in order to nourish the body, that is, in order
204 Walker 2016. We will return to a more in-depth discussion in Chapter 5.3.
205 Marx 1976, p. 270.
206 Uno 1973 [1952], p. 486.
207 Uno 1973 [1952], 487. Quoted inWalker 2016, p. 117.
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to live’.208 Somuch is true. But on what grounds doesWalker insist that the ini-
tial C is not produced as a commodity? Is ‘C’ (or ‘W’ [Ware] both in the German
original and Japanese rendition) not precisely the symbol for the commodity,
indicating that the products of the immediate process of capitalist production
which is the object of Marx’s analysis obtain commodity form, possessing both
use value and value?Counterfactually,Walker argues thatmeans of subsistence
‘cannot already exist as value’.209 He continues:
Unlike any other commodity, the value of the means of subsistence that
the labourer consumes is not at all converted into and retained as val-
orized in the form of labor power as a commodity as it appears in the
production process. In other words, Uno argues, ‘the exchange process
between C’ and C is interrupted, not by the production process, but by
the consumption process’.210
But saying that production is both temporally and spatially ‘interrupted’ by
consumption is trivial: workers eat in the cafeteria during their lunch break,
they shop for groceries when they do not operate machines, sell medicine,
teach schoolchildren, or write books, simply because it is physically (and prob-
ably also physiologically) impossible, not to say dangerous, to operate a belt
loader or fly a passenger plane and shop for groceries at the same time. More
importantly however, what does this ‘mutual externality’ of production and
consumption prove? On this, we hear little from either Uno or Walker. What
is decisive however is that the means of subsistence the workers consume are
primarily produced as values:211 as a particular product share in a national eco-
nomy which Marx in Volume ii of Capital calls Department ii, the Means of
Consumption,212 that is exchanged for money, and therefore presents an irre-
ducible share in the rate of profit for the capitalists of Department ii. In other
words, it is crucial to this discussion that capitalistmediation is amonetaryone:
the means of subsistence or consumption, like that of production, are monet-
arily mediated, i.e. exchanged for money, not for other use values. This under-
standing of the capitalist circuit is imperative for grasping Marx’s intervention
208 Walker 2016, p. 117.
209 Walker 2016, p. 117. Original emphasis.
210 Walker 2016, p. 117.
211 Marx even suggests that the means of subsistence ‘are a particular form of material exist-
ence inwhich capital confronts theworker before he acquires them through the sale of this
labour-power’. Marx 1976, p. 1004.
212 Marx 1978, p. 471.
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against classical political economy, as it is sadly missing from both Uno’s and
Walker’s elaborations. In this vein, Walker continues: ‘Even if it appears this
way to the capitalist, who purchases labor power as if it were a commodity
like any other, who consumes or uses up this labor power as if it were a com-
modity input in the production process, labor power is itself “the embodiment
[Inbegriff ] of those mental and physical capabilities existing in the corpor-
eality [Leiblichkeit] and living personality of the human being” ’.213 True – but
this conceptualisation of labour power in no way contradicts or even contests
that ‘thosemental and physical capabilities existing in the corporeality and liv-
ing personality of the human being’ can – and indeed must – be bought with
money, and hence quantified for its use in the production of surplus value. This is
the whole point of Marx’s double determination of the value of labour power
as both the ‘socially necessary labour time’ needed to (re)produce the labour
power commodity, as well as the ‘socially necessary labour time’ needed to
produce itsmeans of subsistence: in a formof social production based onmon-
etary exchange, the former cannot be produced in abstraction from the latter.
The latter however is only appropriated through money, and it is money alone
that at once quantifies the means of subsistence needed for the production of
the labour power commodity, and, by the same token, quantifies its input into
the production-as-valorisation process as variable capital. By consuming the
means of subsistence, the worker does not only reproduce herself, she repro-
duces capital. In this sense, the whole point of the wage form as the monetary
expression of the value of labour power is that the quantification of reproduc-
tion simultaneously quantifies production, and that this is its capitalist monet-
ary form: ‘If production has a capitalist form, so toowill reproduction’.214 There
is no ‘baffling paradox’ or ‘circular logical moment’215 in this determination of
the reproduction of labour power, asWalker would have us believe. To the con-
trary: leaving aside themonetary formparticular use values assumebynecessity
in their fetishistic mode of existence as their common expression –which alone
gives them their particular capitalist form – is to misrecognise the specificity
of the capitalist form of production:
Money is the crucial mediating form through which the order of value is
actualised concretely and penetrates into the order of use value in its ‘self-
sufficiency’, which is why for the Marx of 1844 it signals the ‘corporeal exist-
ence’ of alienation. In practical terms, the social autonomisation of the value-
abstraction in money is expressed in the fact that, in the capitalist ‘stage of
213 Walker 2016. p. 118. Walker quotes fromMarx 1996 [1867], p. 177. Translation modified.
214 Marx 1976, p. 710.
215 Walker 2016, p. 118.
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production’, it is money that mediates all commodity exchanges (in the meta-
morphoses, C-M, M-C, etc.), acts as the nexus through which the essential ele-
ments of the reproduction process are brought into relation, ‘forms the starting
point and the conclusion of every valorisation process’, and, crucially, schem-
atizes future and past (or abstract and concrete) labour in the exchange of
labour-power for wages.216
Leaving asidemoney alsomeans to regress behind theuse value-centric con-
ceptualisations of social reproduction we find e.g. in Malthus and Say, but also
inRicardo’s ‘corn-model’ of reproduction inwhichwages arenotpaid inmoney,
but exclusively in corn as a direct means of subsistence.217 As a result, with the
separation of the means of production and the emergence of the free wage
labourer – in other words, the emergence of the capital relation – social val-
idation is tantamount to monetary exchange. Nothing that capital, in its drive
for surplus value, can commodify, is exempt form this law – in fact, if there is
something that capital cannot commodify, it has no social value, neither object-
ively nor subjectively. As Andrés Sáenz de Sicilia emphasises: ‘Under capitalist
social conditions, all things stand in relation to one anotheras values, andbeing
such a thing is the condition for “social” existence’.218Walker further insists that
what the form of labour power shows us is that capital’s essence consists in this
‘as if ’, this fundamental expression of its ‘putative’ or ‘presupposed’ character,
because capital must treat labour power ‘as if it were a commodity like any
other’. To this we answer that capital at no point ‘treats’ labour power ‘as if ’ it
were a commodity – labour power, in its very form determination, is in fact a
commodity. If the relation between capital and labour is constituted by an ‘as
if ’, what would be the ‘actual’ essence of that ‘as if ’? It is only on the basis of this
actual, and by nomeans ‘putative’ or ‘presupposed’ existence, that its capitalist
form determination can be made both the object of analysis and critique. But
Walker insists on the presupposition problem:
… the individual’s life-existence depends fundamentally on the means
of subsistence, which in capitalist society already ‘presupposes’ that the
production of this means of subsistence is undertaken by means of the
commodity labour power.219
216 Sáenz de Sicilia 2016, pp. 141–2.
217 See Ricardo 1969 [1817], pp. 58–9.
218 Sáenz de Sicilia 2016, p. 139. Emphasis added.
219 Walker 2016. pp. 118–19.
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But where is there a problem of presupposition? Without labour inputs in
the form of the source of value in exploitable labour power, there would be no
capitalist social relation to speakof.This is precisely thekey structureof the real
subsumption of labour under capital and the ‘formalisation’ of labour taking
place under the conditions of the capitalist mode of production.Walker’s con-
tention that labour power is ‘retrospectively made to have existed only during
the process of production itself ’220 is not a logical ‘impasse’, but has practical,
and therefore very rational reasons: the labourer, when contracted for a par-
ticular kind of work, usually provides an advance on the consumption of her
own labour power in the process of production, because the wage is paid only
after a particular unit of time (usually a month) has passed in which she has
already expended her labour power.Mostwageworkers receive their pay check
for January in February. This is neither a ‘gap’, a ‘void element’, an ‘impossibil-
ity’, nor an ‘impasse’ in the labour power commodity, not to speak of ‘lacking a
stable presence’, or any kind of ‘interruption’ to the process of production, but
its conventional form.221 Here,Walker alsomentions ‘the existence of sufficient
inputs of labor power’ as yet another ‘impossibility’, ‘the creation of a circuit of
reproduction in which no outside, no space of slippage, remains’, and which
is characterised precisely by that ‘slippage’ or ‘outside’, namely ‘the existence
of excess labour that can be employed in future rising levels of production’.222
But we have seen that the question of ‘too many’ or ‘too few workers’ is beside
the point of capitalist valorisation, because what interests capital alone is the
ratio between paid and unpaid labour, not the ratio between the working popu-
lation and the industrial reserve army. Bizarrely, Walker leaves the production
of relative surplus value completely unaddressed in this context, and hence
also capital’s need not to employ, but to expel as much living labour as possible
from the production process, substituting it for technology etc. As a general
diagnosis for Uno’s conceptualisation of the ‘impossibility’ of the reproduction
of labour power and Walker’s subsequent commentary, we therefore detect a
blind spot of money and, following from it, the specific quality of the capitalist
form of social (re)production precisely consisting in the quantification of its
relation to labour as wage labour that is missing from both Uno’s andWalker’s
views.
But is this necessity of inner coherence, asWalker insists, really only an illu-
sion? At least if we consult Marx’s work, nowhere is the consumption process
220 Walker 2016, p. 119.
221 All of these expressions, seeWalker 2016, p. 114; 118–20.
222 Walker 2016, p. 128.
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of labourers addressed as an obstacle that may or may not undermine cap-
ital’s appropriation of surplus value (which is ultimately capital’s only interest),
simply because the consumption process of labourers itself depends on the
moneyed mediation enabling valorisation. For Marx, this is a consequence of
the capitalist reproduction process itself. The internality of the reproduction
process to the process of valorisation is the great strength of Marx’s analysis.
Walker’s view that ‘the means of subsistence – which would include not only
food, clothing, and shelter but also necessary regimes of training, medical care,
education, forms of subjectivation (sic), and so forth –must contain or encom-
pass numerous qualitative aspects that exceed or cannot be reduced purely to
quantity’223 is quite mistaken.224 For it is precisely the direct expression of the
dominance of law of value that it quantifies all social relations as ‘relations
among things’.225 The value abstraction as an objective, and simultaneously
purely social real abstraction imposes itself on the qualitative (i.e. use value)
to transform it into ‘units of measure’ (i.e. money) in which alone capital can
relate to itself as capital. This impositionof value in its specificmonetary expres-
sion onto the qualitative, i.e., use value aspect of social relations is precisely
what characterises the capitalist production and circulation mode – and the
latter cannot be separated from the former.We therefore argue againstWalker
that the diagnosis of the predicament must be inverted: the ‘illusion’ does not
consist in the ‘smooth circuit of capitalist accumulation’226 or capital’s ‘unin-
terrupted interiority’,227 but to the contrary: it exists in the hypostatisation of a
‘realm’ that ‘cannot be reduced purely to quantity’. Indeed, this is the ‘dream’ or
‘fantasy’ that capital fosters of itself – that it does not hinge on the pure quan-
223 Walker 2016, p. 141. Emphasis added.
224 Though Walker’s theorisation is far from consistent: a shift from the presumption of the
‘outside’, ‘excess’, or impossibility (muri) of capital as form or ‘site’ of resistance – ‘… this
impossibility [of the commodification of labour power] points us toward the field of res-
istance, a resistance-to-come that demands an endless and repeating production of the
commons’ (Walker 2016, p. 140) – towards the promotion of the self-abolition of the pro-
letariat, which must assume capital as a contradictory unity, can be noticed: ‘The “limit
point” of this boundary is precisely the commodification of labour power, and therefore
we can see directly that the self-elimination of the labour power commodity is the essen-
tial and ultimate aim of revolutionary politics’. Walker 2016, p. 150.While we present here
our objection to the first view, we agree with the latter. It must be confirmed however
that the first and the latter imply very different, if not oppositional conceptualisations of
capital.
225 Walker 2016, p. 141.
226 Walker 2016, p. 134.
227 Walker 2016, p. 140.
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tification of all social relations, that there is a ‘savage outside’228 which would
exempt ‘life’ from the valorisation imperative, in short: that the fetish-character
of capital was an accidental moment, not the very instance enabling the circle
of valorisation. Regimes of training, medical care, education – why not men-
tion the recreation and entertainment of the working class – are however
exchanged as units of commodities, exchanged for units of money. To claim, as
Walker does, that the ‘indirect’ production of the labour power commodity ‘is
located paradoxically outside commodity relations’,229 is absurd. Quantifica-
tion, as we have seen, is the only way that capitalist society relates to itself,
namely through the value form of money.230 It is the qualitative or use value
dimension evoked by both Uno andWalker, the ‘savage outside’ of capital, that
should rather be diagnosed as grounding reductionist (i.e. circulationist) cri-
tiques of the capital relation that, to borrowWalker’s term, ‘paradoxically’ pro-
long the existence of value as the structuringmodus operandi of the economic
form of the society we inhabit. The ‘illusion’, in other words, consists in the
non-recognition of the deadly totality the value nexus enforces. The romantic
desideratum of hypostatising an ‘excess’ or a ‘rupture’ to the monetary nexus
insteadmarks a regressive standpoint with regard to the actual predicament, a
predicament more fatal than Uno’s critique of Marx’s dares to suspect. In this
context, a certain common objection to the real subsumption of labour under
capital, or concrete under abstract labour, can be noted. In humor, social repro-
duction feminist Tithi Bhattaracharya comments that ‘[if] this were the whole
story of Capital, then celebrations of its 150th birthday would be held at Wall
Street’.231 She probably does not realise just how humorous this comment is,
especially for people readingCapital as aCritiqueof Political Economy, andnot,
as she obviously does, as Political Economy’s Apologetic. The actual and real
subsumption of use value under the quantifying real abstraction of value and
socially necessary labour time is formulated as a critiquebyMarx, not as a cause
for celebration. Although we will come back to the analysis of social reproduc-
tion, comparing Uno’s and Marx’s views in Chapter 4, as well as to problem-
atising the supposed ‘resistance’ labour’s private consumption process yields
against capital in Chapter 5, we shall here briefly recapitulate and summarise
Marx’s view of consumption and the reproduction of workers, so as to posit it
against Uno’s (and Walker’s) view that counterfactually transforms capitalist
228 Walker 2016, p. 109.
229 Walker 2016, p. 146.
230 This is also the main thesis of Engster’s groundbreaking, as well as groundbreakingly
extensive, study of money as ‘measure, means, and method’. See Engster 2014.
231 Bhattaracharya 2019, p. 113.
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reproduction into the reproduction of use values. It not only forgets that the
production of use values as the theoretical site of analysis is beside the point for
the specifically capitalist relations of production – i.e. for a historically determ-
ined form of production whose raison d’être is the ‘limitless appropriation of
abstractwealth’, i.e. value – but that labour power as the source of surplus value
itself becomes a formalised function of labour, with the effect that its own use
value precisely consists in producing value, subordinating a form of produc-
tion directed at needs to a formof production directed at the class-conditioned
appropriation of profit. Therefore, there is no such thing as an ‘independent
existence of living labour’232 under capitalist relations of production. Themuri
of the commodification of labour power cannot be upheld as the site of ‘rup-
ture’ or ‘break’ (much less ‘resistance’) to the law of value, because it is itself
constitutive of this very law. To briefly discuss this point and thus sum up the
previous critique usingMarx’s own text, wewill drawon thenotion of the form-
alisation of labour constituting the labour power commodity in its essence.
As we have seen, the problem of quantification is precisely the problem of
capital’s measure, as that which makes capital relate to itself as a specifically
historical form of production. This is the primary insight from Marx’s critique
of the fetish-character of the value form of money, that it quantifies what ‘by
nature’ is impossible to quantify: the metabolism and the mental regenera-
tion of humans. Under capital, this ‘capacity’, as the use value of labour power,
receives a social form determination as the quantifiable labour power com-
modity, thereby serving its only function to become capital’s source of profit. In
this sense, the use value of labour power, the ratio of which to its value marks
the direct source of surplus value, appearing as ‘natural’ and use value medi-
ated, is directly mediated by capital’s valorisation needs.What here appears as
‘external’ to capitalist valorisation (the workers’ consumption) is the same as
that which makes the exchange between capital and labour appear as ‘equal’,
as though the use value of labour power were an aspect exempt from com-
modification, a contradictio in adiecto. Just because the capitalist pays for the
value, not the use value of labour power, does not indicate that the site of
the reproduction of that use value were ‘outside’ the valorisation nexus. The
use value of labour power is reproduced by market commodities, purchased
with the monetary equivalent of the labour power commodity’s value. Sáenz
de Sicilia here points to a ‘double subsumption’ of labour under capital, the
‘generalized subsumpton of use-value to exchange value’ and the commodi-
232 As, unfortunately, Sáenz de Sicilia maintains in a non-sequitur argument to his previous
excellent analysis of real subsumption. Sáenz de Sicilia 2016, p. 231.
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fication of labour power as ‘the primary mode of socialisation’.233 Because of
this double nature to subsumption, ‘rather than consumption needs and pro-
ductive capacities directly constituting the unity of the social process … they
now become “universallymediated” and unified by the abstraction of value.’234
The formalisation of labour as the labour power commodity therefore precisely
consists in its wage form: ‘It is what enables the transition from labour’s sub-
sumption under commodity-value to its subsumption under capital, because
the purchase of labour-power is the basis for its subsequent determination as
activity… [it] is themeans bywhich theworker, qua living labour… is incorpor-
ated into capital, functionally determined as one of the elements (the essential
element in fact) of its life-process: variable capital’.235 In Uno, the monetary
expression of the value of labour power is structurally and epistemologically
misrecognised and counterfactually substituted for ‘original consumption’ in
the use value-nexus. He thus posits what is strictly internal and constitutive to
the capital relation (the wage) as an ‘outside’ phenomenon, something ‘out
of the scope’ of capital. Against this, Marx has time and again emphasised
the wage system’s centrality, also against the trivialising attempts of Bastiat to
declare the wage as ‘irrelevant’ to the capital relation,236 as the ‘same-self ’ of
capital:
Capital andwage labour (this iswhatwe call the labour of theworkerwho
sells his own labour capacity)merely express two factors in the same rela-
tion. Money cannot become capital without being exchanged for labour
capacity as a commodity sold by the worker himself. Labour, on the other
hand, can only appear as wage labour when its own objective conditions
meet it as egoistical powers, as alien property, value existing for itself and
holding fast to itself, in short as capital. So if capital can only consist from
the material point of view – or from the point of view of the use val-
ues in which it exists – of the objective conditions of labour itself, these
objective conditions must from the formal point of view confront labour
as alien, independent powers, as value – objectified labour – to which
233 Sáenz de Sicilia 2016, p. 138.
234 Sáenz de Scilia 2016, p. 140.
235 Sáenz de Sicilia 2016, pp. 144–5.
236 As Marx notices in a footnote: ‘One can therefore conclude from this what an F. Bastiat
understands of the essence of capitalist production when he declares the wage system to
be a formality, external to capitalist production and irrelevant to it, andmakes the discov-
ery “that it is not the form of the remuneration which creates this dependence for him
(for the worker) …” ’ Marx 1994 [1861–4], p. 414.
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living labour is the mere means of its own preservation and expansion.
Wage labour, or the wage system, is therefore a necessary social form
of labour for capitalist production, just as capital, potentiated value, is
a necessary social form which the objective conditions of labour must
assume for the labour to bewage labour.Wage labour is therefore a neces-
sary condition for the formation of capital, and it remains the constantly
necessary presupposition for capitalist production. So although the first
process, the exchange of money for labour capacity, or the sale of labour
capacity, does not enter as such into the direct production process, it does
in contrast enter into the production of the relation as a whole.237
Already under the conditions of the formal subsumption of labour, the buyer
of labour power confronts the seller as the owner of the objective conditions
of labour (objektive Arbeitsbedingungen). As such however, as Marx says in
the Results, the ‘objective conditions of labour (the means of production) and
the subjective conditions of labour (the means of subsistence) confront [the
labourer] as capital, as the monopoly of the buyer of his labour power’.238 The
means of subsistence, as the subjective conditions of labour confronting the
labourer as capital, are never exempted from the value nexus. Arguably the
most radical formulation of the inherent ‘incorporation’ of the ‘natural con-
ditions’ for the reproduction of labour power into the valorisation nexus is to
be found in Marx’s remark that
[it] is not a case of the worker buyingmeans of subsistence andmeans of
production, but of the means of subsistence buying the worker, in order
to incorporate him into the means of production.239
In this sense, the conventional allegorical notion that ‘at no point a labour
power [sic] rolls off the assembly line’240 shows a deep misrecognition of the
237 Marx 1994 [1861–64], pp. 413–14.
238 Marx 1976, p. 1026.
239 Marx 1994 mecw 34, p. 411. In the original: ‘Es ist nicht der Arbeiter, der Lebensmittel
und Productionsmittel kauft, sondern die Lebensmittel kaufen den Arbeiter, um ihn den
Productionsmitteln einzuverleiben’. Marx 1988 [1863–7], p. 78. The Penguin edition here
provides a fatal (andnonsensical)mistranslation: ‘It is not theworkerwhobuys themeans
of production and subsistence, but themeans of production that buy the worker to incor-
porate him into the means of production’. Marx 1976, p. 1004.
240 Gonzales and Neton 2014, p. 152.
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monetary function of the wage form, as that moment in the production pro-
cess ‘as a whole’, which directly incorporates (einverleibt) and ties the worker
into the labour-as-valorisation process that is the specifically capitalist form
of social production. We should here also note that the category of use value
(as ‘original consumption’), being essentially mediated as a form determina-
tion of capital by its real subsumption under (exchange) value, is inadequate
for ‘opening up’ a ‘space of resistance’ to capital.241 Yet, in Uno, through the
law of population and the ‘impossibility’ of the commodification of labour
power, the category of use value presents the axis fromwhich the ‘pure theory’
or the theory of principles of a ‘pure capitalist society’ should be comprehen-
ded. In the following, we should therefore turn more precisely to the central
notion this volume critically analyses, and which had hitherto formed a con-
stant shadow in the background of our investigation: Uno’s theory of value. So
far, we have noticed certain aspects of its theoretically inadequate treatment
in Uno: first, in the dismissiveness of value’s epistemological status in Uno’s
‘three-level-method’, which we have shown is inconsistent with regard to its
own object of inquiry. Second, as the ‘axis’ of the theory of principles, Uno’s
treatment of the law of population as the explicatory framework of crisis fun-
damentally misrecognises the primary pattern of accumulation and the logic
of valorisation. Third, our analysis has shown that the diagnosis of the con-
sumption process as capital’s outside must be inverted – capital’s illusion or
‘fetishism’ consists precisely in hypostatising this ‘outside’, where the sphere of
consumption is presented as independent of the direct capital relation. The
monetary expression of the value of labour power or thewage however ‘always-
already’ subsumes the means of subsistence which confront the labourer as
capital, as well as themeans by which they are appropriated to the functioning
of valorisation.Wenamed this the ‘formalisation’ of labour under capital. Uno’s
use value-oriented view of the capital relation, in contrast, presents a fatalmis-
recognition of value as the at once objective and social nexus that is constitutive
of the exchange relations under capitalist relations of production. In the next
chapter,wewill demonstrate howUno furthermobilises the sphere of use value
against value in his examination of simple circulation.Wewill see how the apo-
theosis of the use value aspect of the commodity is exacerbated with regard
to his basic theory of value, omitting what is crucial about Marx’s own theory:
the critique of the fetish character of the value forms. In our view, Uno’s sub-
alternisation of the analysis of the value forms of the commodity, money, and
capital constitutes a theory of ‘value without fetish’, a theory of value disposing
241 We will return to this discussion, andWalker’s conceptualisation of it, in Chapter 5.3.
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of the critique of the capitalist relations of production. We will argue that it is
precisely this disavowal of the fetishproblematicwhichnot only leads to a trun-
cated and distorted reading of Marx’s crucial criticisms of bourgeois political
economy, but itself regresses to the bourgeois theoretical framework thatMarx
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chapter 3
Uno’s Theory of Value – Value without Fetish
(1947–69)
I do not deny Marx’s labour theory of value. I only have doubts of
the method of its proof.
uno kōzō, 19651
…
(In economic theory), the confusion in the issue of money is for a big
part characterised bywhat is understood by ‘capitalism’ – regardless
whether the corresponding position is affirmative or critical.
ingo stützle2
…
Circulation, or the exchange of commodities, creates no value.
Capital Volume i, p. 266.
∵
Of the earlyworks,ValueTheory (Kachiron, 1947) presentsUno’smost pertinent
study in the substance ( jittai), the form (keitai) and the ‘essence’ (honshitsu)
of value (kachi). It also contains his first thoroughly conceptualised theory of
money, set within a close commentary on the first 6 chapters of Volume i of
Capital, opening an outlook onto Capital Volume ii, and his main thesis to be
elaborated in his later work, the Principles (Keizai Genron), about the theory of
value as a theory of social reproduction. The discussion inValueTheory belongs
to the ‘theory of pure principles’ or ‘pure capitalism’ within the framework of
stage theory, as discussed in the previous chapter, even though the conceptual-
isation of stage theory as such is only outlined in the early 1950s. In this chapter,
1 In the foreword to the 1965 edition of Value Theory, Uno 1973 [1947], p. 196.
2 Stützle 2015, p. 177.
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we therefore evaluate Uno’s earlier theoretical work to reconstruct his motiva-
tion for the theory of principles or pure theory, that introduces the second part
of the present volume, ‘The Object of the Critique of Political Economy’.
Saying thatValueTheory is representative of the theory of principles inUno’s
three levels-approach is justified on the basis that Uno has not made signi-
ficant changes to his basic theory of value throughout his entire career. Later
works such as the Principles (1950/52), in which the theory of pure capitalism
is prominently discussed, but also the 1966 text ‘Two Specific Terminologies in
Marx’s Political Economy: Fetishism andMetamorphosis’ fundamentally draw
on Uno’s early results and even defend the position maintained in Value The-
ory. The monograph therefore informs Uno’s theory of value as such and is not
restricted to an ‘early period’ of his theoretical interest. In this chapter there-
fore, we will discuss the ideas developed in Value Theory in broad connection
to his later value-theoretical approach.
Value Theory also forms the argumentative basis to the ‘Debate on the Value
form’ (Kachikeitai ronsō) taking part within important figures and research-
ers of Marxist and classical political economy of the Capital Studies Group3
at Hōsei University in Tokyo in 1947 which was first documented in a script of
the roundtable discussion in a special series of the journalHyōron that became
known as the ‘Value Debate’ (Kachiron ronsō) of JapaneseMarxism.4 The script
for Hyōron was re-published as the two-volume monograph Shihonron kenkyū
(Studies in Capital) with Kawade Shobō in 1948 and 1949, subtitled ‘The Com-
modity and The Exchange Process’ (1948) and ‘The Circulation Process’ (1948),
co-edited by Uno and Sakisaka Itsurō.5 Because of this debate’s theoretical and
3 Apart from Uno Kōzō, the discussion group consisted of political economists Aihara Shigeru
(1909–93), ArizawaHiromi (1896–88), Okazaki Saburō (1907–90), Kuruma Samezō (1893–82),
Sakisaka Itsurō (1897–85), Suenaga Shigeki (1908–77), Suzuki Kōichirō (1910–83), Tsushima
Tadayuki (1901–79), and Tsuchiya Takao (1896–88).
4 The first six ‘Capital Studies’ roundtable sessions were numbered 1–6 and the last three issues
supplemented with subtitles, starting in January 1947 with issue 9 of the Hyōron (pp. 69–98
of the issue), and continued until April 1947 with issue 12 (Capital Studies, no. 4). After a
break in May and June, the next issue appeared in July (issue no. 13) of ‘Capital Studies’ no. 5
(pp. 37–64, with the separate title ‘The Fetish Character of the Commodity’). The discussion
was taken up again between September and November (issues 14–16, with the sequence of
subtitles: ‘The Measure of Value’, ‘Means of Circulation’, and ‘Money’) and concluded with
the New Year’s edition of January 1948 (issue 17), subtitled ‘The Transformation of Money
into Capital’ (literally: ‘The Capitalisation of Money’). The members of the group were tak-
ing notes during the discussion, which were the basis for the Hyōron edition. Many special
thanks to Namiko Holzapfel for gathering the detailed information from the Hōsei Research
Library.
5 Itwas re-published in 1958with Shiseidō.The original version is not to be confusedwithUno’s
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contemporary proximity toUno’sValueTheory, some of the debates’ significant
claims, made by Uno and others, regarding the method of value form analysis
and the ‘role of the commodity owner’, will also bementioned in this chapter. I
will not take up a detailed analysis of the argument that has taken place espe-
cially betweenUnoandKurumaSamezō that has been the subject of a previous
article.6 Since both aspects – the method of value form analysis and the role of
the commodity owner– formcrucial aspects of Uno’s value theory, theypresent
the cornerstone of our subsequent evaluation.
We will see why Uno’s assumption that in order to understand the form of
value, one has to bring in the commodity owner of the commodity in the relative
formof value, has devastating consequences for Uno’s understanding of Marx’s
project inCapital. This theoretical basis, informedby the emphasis on use value
against value and the mode of circulation against that of production in Marx’s
conception, does not only affect the labour theory of value. It also prominently
represents Uno’s theory of money as a nominalist theory of functional relations,
reminiscent of Samuel Bailey’s functionalist theory of value as a forerunner of
marginalist neoclassical economy, as well as echoing in some strands of Ana-
lytical Marxism that attempt to separate the labour theory of value from the
theory of money, or discard them both as ‘intellectually bankrupt’.7We will see
that inMarx’s conception, the separation of the labour theory of value from the
theory of money precisely dismisses the problem of fetishism, and thus ironic-
ally invites a fetishistic interpretation of value. In this chapter, we will present
Uno’s emphasis onuse value and the circulationprocess to prepare thepresent-
ation of value theory as a theory of social reproduction based on the reproduc-
tion of use values, that is the permeating claim of his later work, the Principles,
and indeed the major hypothesis of the theory of ‘pure capitalism’. The aim
of this chapter is to show how Uno’s intervention results in a theory of value
without fetish, a theory stripped of the critical core of Marx’s own theorisation
of the capitalist mode of production, regressing to the pre-critical (vorkritisch)
framework of classical political economy’s theories of value and money.
The analysis of the capitalistically produced commodity forms the setting to
Marx’s analysis of the value form in Section 3 of the first chapter of Capital. The
monograph Studies in Capital (Shihonron no kenkyū) that had been published with Iwanami
in 1949.
6 See Lange 2014.
7 Elster 1986, p. 192. See also: ‘The labour theory of value and the theory of the falling rate of
profit are very poor specimens of deductive reasoning’. Jon Elster 1986, p. 188. This objection
shows where Elster’s insight into Marx’s method is poor: Marx did not undertake any kind of
‘deductive reasoning’ to develop his key theorem. The opposition ‘deductive-inductive’ falls
flat with regard to the analytical logic Marx uses in Capital. See Chapter 1.
158 chapter 3
aim of the analysis is to determine ‘how, why, and by whatmeans a commodity
becomesmoney’.8 Becausemore pertinently than in a commodity, valuemani-
fests itself in money or gold, ‘value-as-such’, constituting the ‘dazzling’ fetish
character of the value forms, it forms the object of the inquiry in this crucial
section. Marx therefore defines the task of the analysis of money as something
never even attempted by bourgeois economics. That is, we have to show
the origin of this money-form, we have to trace the development of the
expression of value contained in the value-relation of the commodities
from its simplest, almost imperceptible outline to the dazzling money-
form. When this has been done, the mystery of money will immediately
disappear.9
The ‘important corrective to Marx’ Uno allegedly made in determining a ‘shift
from Marx’s fetishism of commodities to the more fundamental fetishism of
money (and ultimately the fetishism of capital itself)’10 will show itself instead
to be a derivation of Marx’s ‘three particularities arising from the equivalent
form’, which serve as the explanans to money. Money itself is therefore not an
explanans, but an explanandum that needs to be based on the particularities
of the equivalent form that it assumes in the exchange of commodities, i.e. as
‘value’. This specific Problemstellung informs Marx’s analysis of the value form
in the third section of the first chapter of Capital Volume i. Therefore, Marx
expresses the task of the analysis of the value form in the need ‘to show the
origin of this money form’, in the (apparently simpler) form of the commod-
ity, and its double determination of use value and value. In other words, in
declaring the concept of money instead of the commodity form as the basis
of fetishism, Uno mistakes the object of the analysis – the ‘dazzling money-
form’ – for the analysis of the object. By conducting the analysis of the money
form from the vantage point of the ‘double character of labour represented in
the commodities’,11 Marx tracks down the fetish-character that the commod-
ity form already assumes, and which finds a ‘more complete’ form in money.
Excluding the commodity form from the analysis of fetishism, however, espe-
cially the inversion of concrete-useful and abstract-general human labour in
the equivalent form of value, would therefore lead to a fatal misconception of
8 Marx 1976, p. 186.
9 Marx 1976, p. 139. Emphasis added.
10 Walker 2016, p. 12.Walker refers to Karatani Kōjin’s appropriation of Uno’s ‘important cor-
rective to Marx’.
11 ‘Doppelcharakter der in denWaren dargestellten Arbeit’. See Marx 2008, p. 949.
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the fetishism already at work in money, from which the ‘automatism’ of the
capital fetish can only be insufficiently explained. As we will show in more
detail, Uno, in his demand for a strictly formal approach to a theory of money,
an approach that brackets the significance of abstract labour to refer it – in
very dubious fashion – to the production process, gives way to a functional-
ist reading that disregards the problem of the material expression of abstract
labour already effective in the category of money. The theory of value, money,
and capital however do not exhaust the topics of Value Theory. Building on
his interpretation of value in a ‘pure capitalist society’, Uno concludes that the
production of the means of livelihood (use values) is at stake in the reproduc-
tion process of capital, so that labour power always has to be readily supplied,
even though it cannot be ‘directly produced’ by capital itself. This is the ‘axis’
of pure theory, as we have seen in the previous chapter, and what Uno occa-
sionally – though not in Value Theory – terms the muri of labour power. At
the heart of Uno’s value theory lies the idea that the guarantee for capital’s
self-sustenance must be provided by the laws of capital circulation itself. In
a nutshell, therefore, Uno’s value theory is a theory of social reproduction in
the ideal abstract of ‘pure capitalism’, but not a critique of how that social
reproduction is organised.12 In the following, we will examine the value the-
oretical basis for this assumption, starting with Uno’s perspective on abstract
labour.
3.1 The Problem of Abstract Labour in Uno’s Theory of Value
3.1.1 Transhistoricity or Historical Specificity?
Value Theory in large parts assumes the form of a commentary on the first five
chapters of Capital Volume i, while omitting the Fetish Chapter in Chapter 1
that only appears in the ‘Conclusion’ and anticipating the formulae of the
circuits of the three different forms of capital (money, productive and com-
modity capital) in Capital Volume ii. In the extensive introductory chapter to
Value Theory,13 in a section called ‘Two or three Warnings about the Object
and Method of Value Theory’ (subheaded ‘The Use Value of the Commodity’),
Uno proposes that use value contrasted with value in the ‘two factors’ of the
commodity must not simply be reduced to the status of the ‘material bearer of
exchange value’, but has a social function as ‘use value for others’:
12 This is howWerner Bonefeld characterises what is ‘at the center of the critique of political
economy’. Bonefeld 2014, p. 1.
13 Uno 1973 [1947], pp. 201–65.
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… when the commodity form is given as against use value, we can dis-
cuss the commodity for the first time. Accordingly, a use value which acts
as the bearer of exchange value can no longer be viewed [simply] as use
value. Instead, we have to think of it as the use value of the commod-
ity, as that which undergoes a transformation. A simple use value cannot
become the bearer of exchange value. What kind of use value is the use
value of the ‘two factors of the commodity’ against value? Needless to say,
it is a ‘use value for others’ (tanin no tameno shiyō kachi).14
This thesis is indeed programmatic, as we will see.
In ‘The Labour that constitutes Value’, the first section of the first chapter
of Value Theory (‘The Substance of Value’), Uno attempts to undermine Marx’s
argument about the ‘two-fold character’ of labour, abstract labour and concrete
labour, being productive of value anduse value, respectively. For this, Uno takes
upMarx’s elaboration on different forms of production, fromRobinson Crusoe
stories of classical political economy to the ‘association of free men’ we find in
the Fetish Section in the first chapter of Capital.15
… it is not right to interpret [the production of use values and of value]
by the double character of ‘abstract human labour’ and ‘concrete-useful
labour’. We need to acknowledge that, also for Marx, the meaning of the
former lay in the point that it appeared as the thing that formed the com-
modity value. At the same time, the useful labour producing use value
cannot be called ‘useful labour’ plain and simple … in Marx’s example
of Robinson Crusoe, but also in the ‘association of free men, working
with the means of production held in common, and expending their
many different forms of labour-power in full self-awareness as one single
social labour force’,16 this ‘abstract human labour’ and the ‘concrete-useful
labour’ cannot be said to have an antagonistic character as in commodity
production.17
Uno admits that abstract labour is the specific form of labour of commodity
production as a social relation, especially in the production process, but criti-
cises Marx for conceiving of abstract labour as a distinct feature or aspect of
labour in general, as its physiological aspect:
14 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 218.
15 Marx 1976, pp. 169–70.
16 Marx 1976, p. 171.
17 Uno 1973 [1947], pp. 271–72.
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On the one hand, all labour is an expenditure of human labour-power in
the physiological sense, and it is in this quality of being equal, or abstract,
human labour that it forms the value of commodities. On the other hand,
all labour is an expenditure of human labour-power in a particular form
and with a definite aim, and it is in this quality of being concrete useful
labour that is produces use-values.18
Uno accuses Marx of failing to see the specificity of abstract labour in the pro-
duction process of commodities. The physiological and transhistorical aspect of
abstract labour as ‘essentially the expenditure of human brain, nerves, muscles
and sense organs…whatevermay be its nature or its form’,19 serves as proof for
Uno that Marx had failed to grasp the specificity of abstract labour in the pro-
duction process of a ‘commodity-economy’. Though the above Marx quote has
often served as the ‘proof’ of the physiological, ahistorical character of abstract
labour, if read carefully, the context in which it is set emphasises to the con-
trary that this ‘physiological aspect’ – being the content (Inhalt) or ‘nature’
of the determinants of value – is not that from which the ‘mystical charac-
ter’ of the commodity, and hence, its social character, springs: ‘The mystical
character of the commodity does not therefore arise from its use-value. Just
as little does it proceed from the nature of the determinants of value’.20 Abstract
labour, in other words, understood as the ‘expenditure of human brain, nerves,
muscles and sense organs’, misses the point of the obfuscation taking place
in the social character of abstract labour: namely its representation in money.
The stakes, therefore, of Marx’s meticulous analysis of the value form in Sec-
tion 3 of Chapter 1 consist in showing that abstract labour is money, a fact
that has not only been missed in Uno, but in the better part of what in recent
years came to be known as the ‘abstract labour debate’. This debate can be
roughly divided into the advocates of the ‘physiological’, or better, ‘transhis-
torical’ reading of Marx’s theory of abstract labour, in which the latter entails
‘the material determination of that which in capitalist society is socially rep-
resented in the form of value’21 and those propagating abstract labour as the
capitalist, i.e. historically specific social form of labour which has nothing to
do with any physiological ‘expenditure of labour power’, but is ‘purely’ social
18 Marx 1976, p. 137.
19 Marx 1976, p. 164, quoted in Uno 1973 [1947], p. 267. See also p. 271.
20 Marx 1976, p. 164. Emphasis added.
21 Starosta 2008, p. 16. See alsoKicillof and Starosta 2007 and 2011,Wolf 2008a, Carchedi 2011,
Saitō and Sasaki 2013.
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and constituted in exchange.22 It is important to stress however that Starosta,
Saitō and Sasaki et al. do not deny the social dimension of abstract labour. Cap-
italist labour, they contend, requires a further specification, however, namely
being ‘private’ and ‘independent’ labour performed in a social context of gen-
eral commodity exchange.23 The conditio sine qua non for value is therefore
not abstract, but ‘private’ labour, whereas abstract labour is a transhistorical
feature of labour in general, and therefore also a feature of labour in capitalist
societies. But neither fraction seems to be interested in the specific methodolo-
gical question that framesMarx’s investigationof abstract labour, and that is the
origin of money. Marx traces it back from the cell-form of the bourgeois eco-
nomy, the commodity. For only becausemoney ‘ismerely the reflection thrown
upon a single commodity by the relations of all other commodities’,24 can it
function as that which enables the exchange of these commodities. The labour
needed to produce a commodity is concrete-useful labour, so that the labour
that makes these commodities relate to one another as commodities, i.e. the
relation of all commodities, cannot be one particular sort of labour needed to
produce one particular sort of commodity. It is, instead, labour in the abstract,
labour that represents25all the concrete-useful labours, butnoneof them in par-
ticular. It is money. Yet, without the concept of abstract labour as money – as
the necessary appearance of value, namely its ‘palpable’ form – one could also
not confront the justified objections by the ‘transhistoricity’-faction against
the ‘purely social form’-faction. This is reflected in Bonefeld’s failed attempt
to escape the ‘physiological’ trap by determining abstract labour as the time
socially specific to capitalist production. While he acknowledges objections
of the ‘transhistoricity’-faction, he leaves them unaddressed, leaving the two
interpretations unreconciled. But only by risking one’s professional integrity
can one deny that Marx has repeatedly determined abstract labour physiolo-
gically, as ‘human labour pure and simple’, in the first chapter of Capital.26
22 Heinrich 1999,Murray 2000, Postone 1993,Arthur 2004, especially Bonefeld 2010.A further
objection to the ‘transhistorical’ reading can be found in Ellmers 2017. His reception-
historical objection contends that after the demise of the Ricardian school, subjective the-
ories of value (Bailey et al.) were further ‘gaining ground’ (Ellmers 2017, p. 94), so thatMarx
felt the need to resist ‘circulation theories of value’ by stressing thematerial-physiological
character of value-creating human labour. This however does not explain the schism in
the historical/transhistorical determination of abstract labour following from this inter-
vention.
23 This is especially emphasised in Starosta 2017.
24 Marx 1976, p. 184.
25 ‘Represents’ here refers to all concrete-useful labours as they enter into the sphere of cir-
culation.
26 ‘Products of labour’ in abstraction from their ‘useful properties’ are ‘merely congealed
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How is this paradox – the social form determination of abstract labour spe-
cific to value and surplus value production in capitalism on the one hand, and
its physiological, hence transhistorical determination, on the other – solved?
We believe it is only solved by carefully regarding the intent of Marx’s analysis
of the value form, and that, as we have demonstrated above, is ‘to show the ori-
gin of the money form’. It is in money, and money alone, that abstract labour,
the ‘expenditure of human labour-power in the physiological sense’, without
regard to the specific concrete use values it creates, receives social validity, and
that is its historically specific, capitalist form. Only because abstract labour, as
themuscle-burning of sugar, regardless of the specific kind of expenditure, rep-
resents all the concrete single labours, and yet none of them specifically, can
it obtain a physical form in money. In the abstract labour debate, Uno would
assume a third position: abstract labour is both a feature of labour in general, as
a transhistorical mode of labour, existing alongside concrete labour (but never
in opposition to it), and specifically capitalist by virtue of the production pro-
cess. In its capitalist form, the difference between abstract and concrete labour
comes to the fore in the process of production. Abstract labour and concrete-
useful labour, as well as value and use value, are not specific to capitalist dis-
tribution, however, because in every society, the distribution of useful labours
must bemeaningfully adjusted.What is specific to the capitalist economy is its
form of (mass) production. Uno’s intervention therefore consists primarily in
denying the relevance of abstract labour for the process of exchange and distri-
bution. His position is hence in opposition not only to both the ‘transhistorical’
and the ‘historically specific’ fractions, but, more problematically, at odds with
Marx’s analysis of the value form showing money to be abstract labour.
In the section ‘The Labour Creating Value’ in Chapter 1 of Value Theory, Uno
takes up the question of the character of labour creating value and the value
determination of the commodity. He refers to the depiction of Robinson Cru-
soe in Marx’s Fetish Chapter, claiming that ‘while we certainly cannot say that
what Robinson has obtained by his own labour are commodities’,
… these [the products of Robinson’s work] are on the one hand use val-
ues, while at the same time they, being products of ‘average labour time’
quantities of homogenous human labour’ (Marx 1976, p. 128); as such, they present the
‘commodity values [Warenwerte]’ (ibid.), ‘… the value of a commodity represents human
labour pure and simple, the expenditure of human labour in general’. Marx 1976, p. 135.
‘On the one hand, all labour is an expenditure of human labour-power, in the physiolo-
gical sense, and it is in this quality of being equal, or abstract, human labour that it forms
the value of commodities’. Marx 1976, p. 137.
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also clearly have another aspect (betsu no ichimen) … hence, it is not at
all strange that ‘those relations [between Robinson and the objects of his
‘self-created wealth’] contain all the essential determinants of value.’27
What, for Uno, are the ‘essential determinants’ of value? When products
assume commodity form, ‘necessary labour time in the average’ (heikinteki ni
yō suru rōdōjikan) becomes the standard for the relativemeasure of each single
product, and this is when these ‘products’, or ‘things’ (mono) are regarded as
‘values’. In the same way that Robinson must distribute ‘his total activity’ into
single useful-concrete labours, a total commodity society must do the same.
This is not a problem for the labour of one single individual, but for the indi-
vidual labour in a society, distribution poses a problem indeed. But ‘necessary
labour time in the average’ alonedoesnot turn a ‘thing’ into value.What renders
a thing capable of possessing value is that ‘necessary labour time in the aver-
age’ turns the labour of the individual into ‘labour that is demanded by society
(shakaiteki ni yō suru rōdōjikan)’.28 Throughout the text, Uno relies heavily on
Marx’s contention that ‘… nothing can be a value without being an object of
utility. If the thing is useless, so is the labour contained in it; that labour does
not count as labour, and therefore creates no value’.29 Fromhere, Uno attempts
to show that there cannot be an opposition between human abstract product-
ive of value and concrete-useful labour that produces particular use values:
Wemust therefore understand ‘The Double Character of the Labour Rep-
resented in the Commodities’, which Marx explains in the second sec-
tion of the first chapter of Capital, from this point of view: so-called
concrete-useful and abstract human labour do not present two oppos-
itional aspects. As an antagonism, they only come to the fore in their
specific form in commodity production, a point of which we must be
attentive.30
In the same vein that Uno brackets abstract labour for the question of distribu-
tion, he assumes the aim of the production of commodities to be the satisfac-
tion of social needs, not the valorisation of value, i.e. inmoney.With this comes
the dubious insight that concrete-useful and abstract labour donot present cat-
egories of value, distribution and exchange, but mere categories of a specific
27 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 268. Quote fromMarx 1976, p. 170.
28 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 269.
29 Marx 1976, p. 131. Quoted in Uno 1973 [1947], pp. 270 and 280.
30 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 269.
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formof production that implies large-scale, homogenous, and deskilled labour.
Abstract labour loses its value-theoretical relevance in Uno’s interpretation.
As we will see in the following section, Uno derives this conception of
abstract labour as denoting a particular form of homogeneous, simplified and
contentless labour from the idea that it coincides with the technical develop-
ment of the capitalist production process. He thereby conflates abstract labour
with a particular sort of concrete labour, namely – to echo Ingo Elbe’s critique
of Christian Iber’s very similar argument – ‘unqualified manual activity, or at
least concrete labour in general. With it, abstract and concrete labour are no
longer two different kinds of labour, but one and the same’.31 Consequently, for
Uno, both abstract and concrete labour have existed in every historical society
in one form or another. Abstract and concrete labour are therefore both social
kinds of labour and not opposing factors in the determination of social medi-
ation in the capitalist process in particular. Hence, for Uno, the introduction of
and the one-sided stress on abstract labour at the outset of Capitalmuddles the
meaning of the value form. Anticipating the discussion of the methodological
objectionUnomakes against the ‘premature’ introduction of abstract labour in
Marx’s Capital, we will see in the following how Uno defends his claim32 that
only in the difference between dead and living labour in the production pro-
cess (as described byMarx in Chapter 7 of CapitalVolume i) can the distinction
betweenabstract and concrete-useful labour beproven. First, however,we shall
concretise Uno’s idea of abstract labour.
3.1.2 Deskilling and Simplification as the Historically Specific Aspects of
Abstract Labour
Onemust especially be careful of Uno’s understanding and definition of ‘social’
here, an understanding that informs his central thesis in Value Theory: ‘social’
does not primarily denote the encompassing mechanism of the total struc-
ture of both the production and the circulation process. It rather denotes the
function of abstract labour to produce a value that is essentially ‘use value for
others’. In being use value for others consists the social dimension of abstract
labour:
In the commodity, useful labour was not united with abstract human
labour as such. Rather, the same labour came to be united in the antag-
onistic relation of being on the one hand already useful labour for others,
31 Elbe 2008b, p. 242.
32 Uno 1973 [1947], pp. 349–50.
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on the other hand one’s own human labour that had to be realised ( jitsu-
gen seraru beki) in the useful labour for others.33
Uno contrasts concrete useful labour as ‘private’ and abstract labour as ‘social’ –
its difference to useful labour being expressed by themonotonous, contentless
character it asssumes in capitalist production. This is also how he differenti-
ates ‘individual production’ (kojinteki seisan), directed at self-subsistence, from
‘social production’ (shakaiteki seisan) in which the owner of the commodity,
by bringing it to the market, mediates the social nexus ‘for others’, since the
commodity has no use value for him. Uno quotes Marx: ‘[Labour as the cre-
ator of use values] is an eternal natural necessity whichmediates the metabol-
ism betweenman and nature, and therefore human life itself ’, omitting Marx’s
important addition that labour, as the creator of use-values, ‘is independent of
all forms of society’ and cannot therefore present what is characteristic about
capitalist society.34 For Uno however, because abstract and concrete labour do
not form opposing aspects, he is at pains to argue the social status of value in
specifically capitalist societies. Indeed, Uno refuses to shareMarx’s objective in
showing why ‘the aim of producing capital is never use value’.35 To paraphrase
Uno, if abstract labour has a social function, it must be its function as produ-
cing use value for others. Hence,
[to] sum up, the labour that produces commodities transforms the two
aspects of concrete-useful and abstract labour into the double character
of private and social labour.36
Needless to say, also forMarx social production is production ‘for others’, i.e. for
all members of society, but he clearly separates the content of ‘social produc-
tion’, which concerns all historical epochs, from the social form in which this
takes place under capitalist conditions: ‘[i]t is self-evident that this neces-
33 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 269.
34 Marx 1976, p. 133.
35 Marx 1973, p. 600. The perversity of capital’s self-illusion, pretending to be interested in
use value rather than value, came forward in the news of Nov. 8, 2016 when Adidas
announced the market release of sneakers made entirely from ocean plastic. Rather than
showing how capital’s ‘voracious hunger for profit’ does not halt at profiting from its
own waste-producing logic, it suggests that the purchase of these sneakers was an envi-
ronmental act. https://www.globalcitizen.org/fr/content/adidas‑teases‑first‑ever‑sneaker​
‑made‑from‑ocean‑p/ (last access Aug 13th, 2020).
36 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 272.
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sity of the distribution of social labour in specific proportions is certainly not
abolished by the specific form of social production; it can only change its formof
manifestation’.37 In this sense, Ernst Michael Lange correctly emphasises that
Marx’s rejection of the Smithian dogma of the allegedly natural ‘propensity to
exchange’ is not so much motivated by his critique of fetishism, but rather,
in viewing ‘the only legitimate realisation of the human-specific disposition
of the “ability-to-produce-for-others” in the immediate, direct socialisation of
labour’.38 This immediate, direct socialisation of labour however is achieved
by money, a form of value that contains ‘not an atom of use value’.39 For Uno,
the conditions of capitalist social production also mark the difference to the
‘Robinsonaden’ in which the social cannot be expressed in ‘use value for oth-
ers’, but is an individual product ‘out of necessity’ (hitsuyō ni semararete).40
However, this aspect of necessity, insofar as it is not confined to one indi-
vidual, is understood as the common factor with commodity production. From
the previous, we have seen Uno’s tendency to collapse the difference between
abstract labour and concrete labour, aswell as value anduse value, in his under-
standing of ‘social’ as ‘production of use values for others’, by disregarding the
form of social production in capitalism. The transhistorical concept of both
abstract and concrete labour is repeated in the Principles where Uno claims
that
[since] Marx first referred to this dual property of labour as ‘the two-
fold character of labour embodied in commodities’ (Capital i, p. 41),
it has often been misunderstood that only the labour that produces a
commodity is endowed with this duality. On the contrary, labour in all
societies possesses this property in common. As will be explained later,
however, this duality of labour in general is manifested in a more specific
form under the regime of commodity production, such that the concrete
aspect of labour produces a specific use-value and the abstract aspect a
magnitude of value.41
What structures Uno’s determination of abstract labour is the rejection of the
view that abstract human labour creates value no matter what:
37 Marx 1988 [1868–70], p. 68. Original emphases.
38 Lange 1978, p. 30.
39 Marx 1976, p. 128.
40 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 270.
41 Uno 1980, p. 32. See also Hyeon-Soo 1995, p. 102.
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The view that abstract human labour creates value no matter what is an
inversion of Smith who sees the relation between humans and nature as
that of commodity exchange. But it is also notMarx’s view.Moreover, this
would absolutely misrepresent the formation of the law of value as such.
While the ‘essential determinants of value’ are included here, it has an
effect as the ‘law of value’, but this determination as such does not appear
as value.42
What, then, is required for abstract labour to be productive of value, if abstract
labour ‘as such’ does not forma sufficient condition?To answer this, Unomoves
on to the issue of the ‘Simplification of Labour by theDevelopment of the Divi-
sion of Labour’ in the development of the productive forces of capital.
In this section, following up on and concretising the previous section ‘The
Labour that CreatesValue’, Uno argues that the character of specifically capital-
ist abstract human labour consists in de-skilling, homogenisation, and stand-
ardisation as a prerequisite for ‘socially necessary labour time’, which in turn
serves as the determinant of the magnitude of value. He thus introduces the
content of developed (industrial) production, so that with the historical devel-
opment of capitalist economy, standardisation, de-skilling (simplification),
homogenisation and mechanisation come to function as the primary qualities
of labour in production, related to the development of the division of labour:
This development of the division of labour exerted influence onto ab-
stract-human labour, as the labour that creates value, by its concrete real-
isation (gutaiteki jitsugen).43
According to Uno, it was the exchange between communities that enforced
the development of the division of labour in society, as opposed to manufac-
ture, which already largely generated the division of labour at the workplace.44
Both have become integral to the development of capitalist economies. In this
sense, ‘labour as such’ has subsumed the social division of labour in agricul-
ture and industry as an ‘inner social division of labour’, from which we can
differentiate another form, the division of labour at the workplace, first tak-
ing place in manufacturing.45 The separation of town and country, as Marx
42 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 274.
43 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 274.
44 See Marx 1976, pp. 471–2.
45 See Uno 1973 [1947], p. 275.
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states, has been a driving force behind this development.46 In medieval soci-
eties, handicrafts still demanded work of dexterity and skill and expressed
individual and regional differences. The self-sustenance of rural villages was
guaranteed by blending in both artisanal products and the biggest part of agri-
cultural produce – thesewere not ‘naturally’ separated.Marketswere only local
or consisted in scattered overseas merchandise. Merchants did not dominate
production, and exports were individually and regionally confined. Quantit-
atively, there was also a natural limit to export. The social division of labour
first took place as the separation of agriculture from other kinds of produc-
tion also through overseas trade. Here, the pivotal role of merchant capital can
be seen. This development went hand in hand with the transformation of the
productive forces from the emphasis on quality (dexterity and skill) to quant-
ity (mass), so that guild-based artisan organisations lost their foundation. In
came the birth of manufactures. According toUno, the social division of labour
transformed its character according to the division of labour at the workplace.
Artisans lost their independence and became part-time artisans, and parts of
labour that required skill became increasingly separated from parts of labour
that were simple to do:
The aspect of mechanisation, the depletion of content (munaiyōka) and
the quantification of labour was first realised on the basis of mechan-
ised large-scale industry that established the specific capitalist produc-
tion method.47
This development had subsequently also encompassed agriculture, ‘which
could not escape capitalisation’, because the peasants no longer produced their
ownmeans of subsistence, but had to acquire these means as commodities by
becomingwageworkers.48This development of the subordination to industrial
production of every productive sector however had direct consequences on the
nature of labour, which accompanied this trajectory:
Regarding abstract-human labour as the labour that creates value in com-
modity production, i.e., the commodity form, it first of all begins from
46 ‘The foundation of every division of labour which has attained a certain degree of devel-
opment, and has been brought about by the exchange of commodities, is the separation
of town from country. One might well say that the whole economic history of society is
summed up in the movement of this antithesis’. Marx 1976, p. 472.
47 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 279.
48 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 279.
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whatwe call the commodification of the surplus produce in a natural eco-
nomy,which is nothing but external and accidental. The commodity form
has made the transition through the division of labour in the professions
of themiddle ages, and lastly became an internal necessity as the capital-
ist commodity economy. Onemust understand the essential basis, which
has gradually materialised during this historical development …
By the expenditure of simplified human labour power made possible
by mechanised large-scale industry, different forms of labour have been
realised. The expenditure of simplified labour power became key to the
establishment of this system of production.49
Not only does Uno identify capitalist labour with a specific ‘type’ of labour
under the conditions of mechanised large-scale industry. This view also has
consequences for the ‘two-fold character’ of labour, abstract and concrete-
useful labour: ‘When capital expropriated the direct producers from themeans
of production, just as the means of subsistence were commodified, the two-
fold character of labour already became as one, namely productive labour
which does not simply have two aspects. The labour that created value became
the active, while the labour that created use values had to become the pass-
ive aspect’.50 In the process of the development of the productive forces, use
value is rendered passive and loses its importance. Hence the advancement of
abstract humanagainst concrete-useful labour in the capitalist productionpro-
cess, which expresses itself as simplified, contentless and homogenous labour,
and reaches its peak in large-scale industry. Two aspects appear as problematic
in Uno’s conceptualisation. First, Uno sees the negligence of use value originat-
ing from the character of the labour process (becoming simplified, contentless,
meaningless, quantified), not as a social necessity enforced by the specifically
capitalist ‘automatic subject’ of value that posits itself as the aim of produc-
tion/circulation. The new quality of labour under the condition of the division
of labour and private ownership of themeans of production is howevermerely
an empirical fact and in itself not yet an explanation for what makes abstract
labour productive of value. Second, Uno’s explanatory framework does not
conceptually derive themeaning of abstract labour from the opposition to con-
crete labour. By choosing, instead, an empirical observer status, the concept of
abstract labour that is pivotal to the theory of value, remains obscure: abstract
labour may then take on this form or another, without being grounded on
49 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 279.
50 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 278.
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its distinction to concrete labour. In this sense, Uno conflates the concept of
abstract labour with examples of the character labour can assume under con-
ditions of mechanisation, such as being ‘simplified’, ‘homogenous’, ‘de-skilled’,
or ‘standardised’ labour. However, the homogenisation of labour in standardisa-
tion processes of production and abstract human labour are not the same.51 Two
lopsided identifications take place: first, the identification of abstract labour
with an empirical and sensuous process (simplified labour in production). This
invites the structure of the fetish by identifying a social phenomenon with its
natural, observable qualities (and indeedwith its transhistorical implications).
Here we can detect what Rubin has criticised in the ‘vulgar economists’ as a
symptom of their fetishism, namely the ‘identification of the material process
of production with its social form’.52 Following from this, the second problem-
atic identification is that of abstract labour with a specific variant of concrete
labour. But, as Bonefeld has pointed out, ‘[abstract] labour is not concrete
labour, however homogenised, monotonous, repetitive, senseless and boring
it might be. That is, boring assembly line work is boring concrete labour, not
abstract labour’.53 Abstract labour, as argued before, has no ‘labouring exist-
ence’, because it ismoney. It cannot be expended in the sameway that concrete-
useful labour is, because it only represents the social value, the social validation
of labour in the context of all-encompassing commodity circulation.
The magnitude of its value-creating substance, socially necessary labour
time, only receives this specific meaning in exchange for money. This however
does not mean that ‘value’ is created in exchange:54 precisely because of the
‘reduction of the products of labour to a homogenous value-objectivity dis-
tinct from their multiple various use value-objectivity’ (bei der Reduction der
Arbeitsprodukte auf eine von ihrer bunt verschiednen Gebrauchsgegenständlich-
keit unterschiedne gleichartigeWerthgegenständlichkeit),55 i.e. the condition of
possibility for universal exchange, value is a category belonging to the produc-
tion process, as the ‘expenditure of the self-same human labour power’56 of
any individual expenditure of labour. But the difficulty lies in comprehending
that despite its creation in the process of production, value does not takematerial
shape unless it is converted into money in the process of exchange. This is where
51 See Chibber 2013 who points to the same conflation of abstract with homogenous labour
e.g. in the works of Dipesh Chakrabarty, and Lisa Lowe and David Lloyd.
52 Rubin 1973 [1928], p. 28.
53 Bonefeld 2010, p. 260.
54 The valorisation process is ‘entirely confined to the sphere of production’. Marx 1976,
p. 302.
55 Marx 1987 [1872], p. 4.
56 Marx 1987 [1872], p. 4.
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the identity of circulation and production, and production and valorisation
finds its exact expression. The difference between material content and social
form, concrete labour and abstract labour, and use value and value, which
is crucial for an understanding of the specificity of the capitalist production
mode, as well as the fetishisms it creates, is however absent in Uno’s discus-
sion. By identifying abstract with concrete labour (and accordingly, value and
use value) and claiming its transhistorical existence, though not in the form
of ‘homogenisation’ typical for advanced capitalist societies, Uno’s hypothesis
fatally stays behind Marx’s own critical concept. For Marx, abstract labour
encompasses the totality of labour organisationunder the conditions of private
ownership of themeans of production,wage labour, competition etc. – in other
words: under the conditions of capital as a social relation. In Rubin’s words: ‘We
cannot correctly understand a single statement inMarx’sCapital if we overlook
the fact that we are dealing with events which take place in a particular soci-
ety’.57 The dissolution of the relation between exchange value-positing abstract
labour (tauschwertsetzende abstrakte Arbeit) and money, as enforced by Uno,
and his deferral of themethodological locus of abstract labour from value form
analysis to the ‘Production and Valorisation Process’, have their origins in this
truncated understanding of Marx’s own crucial problematic of abstract labour.
In the following, we shall see how Uno conceptualises the production pro-
cess against the background of the previous analysis. Does his explanation of
abstract vs. concrete labour in the particularly capitalist process of production,
tantamount to valorisation, stand to reason?
3.1.3 Abstract as Dead Labour in the Process of Production
In the 1969 text ‘The Three Great Economic Laws that Govern Capitalism’,58
i.e. the ‘law of value’, ‘the law of population’, and ‘the law of the equalisation
of profit rates’, in the section on value, Uno complains that Marx had failed to
specify the kind of labour that went into the production of corn and iron, so
that the ‘common denominator’ defined as ‘labour’, or ‘labour time’, was alto-
gether arbitrary. The labour theory of value, in short, cannot be deduced from
the exchange process of two commodities, but must be deferred to the capital-
ist production process itself:
Unlike the products which are exchanged for another according to the
necessary labour for their production, where the productive relations
57 Rubin 1973 [1928], p. 3. This is of course Postone’s main argument. Postone 1993.
58 ‘The Three Great Economic Laws that Govern Capitalism’, in Uno 1974 [1969].
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under which they are produced is unknown, as in Marx’s exchange
between corn and iron (Marukusu no ageta komugi to tetsu to no kōkan
no yōni dōiu seisankankei de seisan saretano wakaranai), we should make
the production process itself the foundation. In other words, we make
the relations fundamental in which capital could produce corn by the
labour power it has bought, and also iron, and then these products are
first exchanged between the workers. On this basis, it is then extended to
the exchange relations between capitalists.59
Moreover, Marx’s mistake of ‘proving’ the labour theory of value from the
exchange process fatally informed the Stalinist doctrine of simple commod-
ity production, according to Uno: ‘… Marx himself was out to prove the value
of the commodity directly from the process of exchange, which brought about
the Stalinist (Suitārinteki), exaggeratedly clear, but false conclusion [of simple
commodity production]’.60 Not only is Uno’s failure to grasp Marx’s method
of abstraction astonishing – so is the sleight-of-hand reproach against Marx’s
introduction of the labour theory of value of having contributed to Stalinist
‘violence’ (ranbō). Rather, we have reasons to believe that this strong accus-
ation is owed to a no less fatal misconception of Marx’s own fetish-critical
method. To recapitulate: the exchange relations described as the ‘bourgeois
sphere of self-legitimisation’, i.e. simple exchange at the beginning of Capital,
concern capitalist relations of production, and these alone. Bypiercing through
the self-representations and fetishisms of simple exchange – as though the
exchange between corn and iron were a process unpresupposed by ownership
relations, division of labour, competition, etc., merely presupposing ‘commod-
ity owners’ – and presenting the specific commodity producing labour as the
common denominator, Marx delivers the critical means by which to demystify
this ideological sphere. It is by no means the ‘estimation’ of commodity own-
ers, which gives value to commodities. It is a social process taking place behind
their backs. In his presentation, Marx increasingly concretises this social pro-
cess that gives rise to the illusion of ‘simple exchange’. The presentation of this
process however, as we have explained at length in Chapter 1, presupposes cap-
italist exchange relations and analyses them by starting from the most superfi-
cial or abstract, and moving towards its concrete manifestations or fetishisms
where its origin in abstract commodity producing labour is obliterated. We
have seen that this is precisely the function of the analysis of the value form.
59 Uno 1974 [1969], p. 17.
60 Uno 1974 [1969], p. 20.
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Since the problem of fetishism intrinsic to this analysis is anathematic to Uno’s
reconstruction, not only his criticism, but also his own theorisation of abstract
labour in production is inflicted with serious shortcomings, as we shall see.
In the last chapter of Value Theory, ‘The Essence of Value’ (Kachi no hon-
shitsu),Unoat last presents his exhaustive conceptualisationof abstract labour.
For Uno, because abstract labour cannot be derived from the ‘simple exchange
of commodities’ in the analysis of the value form, itmust be elucidated fromthe
production process of Capital. As we will see, in his interpretation of Chapter 7
of Capital Volume i, ‘The Labour Process and The Valorization Process’, Uno
tacitly identifies abstract with dead labour and concrete with living labour.
This identification, we contend, is highly problematic. It not only conflates
two problem complexes – value as the form in which abstract labour receives
material existence, with the ‘unity’ of the production and the valorisation pro-
cess in which living labour alone produces value – but perverts themeaning of
abstract labour to dead labour that is precisely not productive of value. Dead
labour in the production process – capital in its forms of material existence of
the means of production, ‘past labour in its objectified and lifeless form’61 –
‘absorbs’, or better ‘sucks in’ (einsaugen/aufsaugen) living labour to produce
more dead labour-as-capital, be it new means of production or means of con-
sumption. The reason for shifting the discussion of abstract labour away from
the analysis of the value form toward the ‘real treatment of the production-
process of capital’ can also be found in the Principles, where Uno maintains
the logical priority of the circulation forms over the forms of production. It
is the former alone in which the general commodity economic norms reveal
themselves. The production process, in contrast, ‘conforms to these circulation
forms’, because it has been subsumed by the process of circulation:
The forms of human relation peculiar to commodity exchanges … influ-
ence the production-processes by reaction, sink slowly into them, and
finally take possession of them; the commodity economy thus secures
the substantive base of its operation in a production-process by gradu-
ally encroaching upon it from the outside.62
Therefore, the analysis of production must succeed the analysis of the ‘pure
circulation forms’ of the commodity, money, and capital. Accordingly, abstract
labour can only be thematic in the context of production.
61 Marx 1976, p. 302.
62 Uno 1980, p. xxiv.
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Let us take a look at the details of his argument. First, Uno takes up Marx’s
example of the spinning process of cotton yarn in ‘The Valorization Process’:
If 6 hours of labour produce 10 kin63 of yarn, then in 10 kin of yarn a cer-
tain amount of raw cotton and machinery has been used as against the
newly added product of the six hours of labour. Hence, the used 10 kin of
raw cotton is the product of labour of 20 hours, and if we assume that the
wear and tear of the machine costs 4 hours of labour, then the yarn is the
product of 30 hours of human labour.64
Here Uno introduces an important factual distinction:
But to clarify the newly added labour in this case, according to Marx, it
has a double character. Of course, the worker doesn’t perform two kinds
of labour, but the same labour is in effect in two different aspects: in one
aspect, there is the so-called concrete, purposeful labour (yūyō rōdō) that
turns raw cotton into yarn. In the other aspect, there is the newly added
labour of six hours that as a part of the 30 hours of necessary labour for
the production of 10 kin of yarn, stands against the 24 hours necessary
for the production of the raw material and the machinery. In the former,
(Marx) shows that the raw cotton andmachinery are not merely used up,
but productively consumed (seisantekini shōhi seraretaru). In the latter, he
argues that the consumed rawcottonandmachinery are added to thenew
labour as the products of the same labour, and they are produced as the
objectifications of the labour of a certain amount of yarn.65
In the production of new value, two aspects are in effect: on the one hand, the
past labour of thematerials andmachines, on the other hand, the living labour
that ‘productively consumes’ the materials and machines as a fraction of the
total value of the product (i.e. as 6 hours of a total of 30 hours of labour that
are necessary to produce 10 kin of yarn as a final product).
Uno sees these two aspects of the same labour process reflected and verified
in Marx’s central argument that living labour alone is productive of new value
63 A kin usually refers to a weight measure of about 600 grams (= 160 monme) in Japan, or a
‘loaf ’ of bread of about 300–400 grams. Other references tomonmewere also known. See
the Kōjien, ed. by Shinmura 1979, p. 596.
64 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 347. For Marx’s original example, see Marx 1976, p. 293ff.
65 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 347. Emphasis added.
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while at the same time it transfers the value of themachines and rawmaterials
to the new product. Let us consider Marx’s argument quoted by Uno:
The labour-time required for the production of the cotton, the rawmater-
ial of the yarn, is part of the labour necessary to produce the yarn, and is
therefore contained in the yarn. The same applies to the labour embod-
ied in the spindle, without whose wear and tear the cotton could not
be spun.66 Hence in determining … the labour-time required for its [the
yarn’s] production, all the special processes carried on at various times
and in different places which were necessary, first to produce the cotton
and the wasted portion of the spindle, and then with the cotton and the
spindle to spin the yarn, may together be looked on as different and suc-
cessive phases of the same labour process.67
It is sometimes rewarding to note what is omitted in quotations. In his quote,
Uno omits the small, but nevertheless important nuance of Marx’s identifica-
tion of ‘value’ with the ‘labour-time required for its [the yarn’s] production’ver-
batim: ‘Hence in determining the value of the yarn, or the labour-time required
for its production …’ This passage however presents an important concretisa-
tion of the labour theory of value in the context of the valorisation process,
emphasising the unity of the labour and the valorisation process in commodity
production: living labour alone is productive of new value. Uno also disregards
this crucial remark from the following passage:
All the labour contained in the yarn is past labour; and it is a matter of
no importance that the labour expended to produce its constituent ele-
ments lies further back in the past than the labour expended on the final
process, the spinning. The former stands, as it were, in the pluperfect, the
latter in the perfect tense, but this does not matter. If a definite quantity
of labour, say thirty days, is needed to build a house, the total amount of
labour incorporated in the house is not altered by the fact that thework of
the last day was done twenty-nine days later than that of the first. There-
fore the labour contained in the raw material and instruments of labour
66 Marx interjects a footnote here, referring to Ricardo’s title of Section iii of the chapter
on value in the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation: ‘Not only the labour applied
immediately to commodities affects their value, but the labour also which is bestowed
on the implements, tools, and buildings with which such labour is assisted’. Ricardo 1969
[1817], p. 13.
67 Marx 1976, p. 294. Quoted in Uno 1973 [1947], pp. 374–8.
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can be treated just as if it were labour expended in an earlier stage of the
spinning process, before the labour finally added in the form of actual
spinning.68
Against the background of the analysis of Uno’s tacit identification of living
with concrete and deadwith abstract labour, this point,made byMarx, is decis-
ive.
Let us just dwell here for amoment and considerwhat terminological uses of
living and dead labour in the context of the labour and the valorisation process
we find in Marx. For Marx, living labour and dead labour signify the two com-
ponents of production in general, while they receive a very special meaning
in capitalist commodity production in which the production process simul-
taneously functions as the process of valorisation. In the first sense, these two
concepts pertain to social production as such. In his reflections on ‘The Labour
Process’, which is the only chapter in the systematic architecture of Capital
that does not exclusively assume capitalist commodity production as its object,
Marx says: ‘Amachinewhich is not active in the labour process is useless…Yarn
withwhichweneitherweavenor knit is cottonwasted. Living labourmust seize
on these things, awaken them from the dead, change them from merely pos-
sible into real and effective use-values’.69 In a society where the production of
use values is not the aim of production, as in capitalism, living labour however
belongs to a different nomenklatura. Its consumption is now synonymouswith
the production of value. Hence:
By turning his money into commodities which serve as the building
materials for a newproduct, and as factors in the labour process, by incor-
porating living labour into their lifeless objectivity, the capitalist simul-
taneously transforms value, i.e. past labour in its objectified and lifeless
form, into capital, value which can perform its own valorization process,
an animated monster which begins to ‘work’, ‘as if its body were by love
possessed’.70
Living labour therefore has two meanings, a general one pertaining to social
production as such, and a specific one applying exclusively to a system of pro-
duction where surplus value becomes the ultimate goal of social production.
The ‘incorporation’ of living, active labour into dead or past labour, capital,
68 Marx 1976, pp. 294–5.
69 Marx 1976, p. 289.
70 Marx 1976, p. 302.
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in the process of production, is nothing but the process of valorisation, and
presents the character of capital as dead labour feeding on the blood of living
labour like a vampire.
Living labour is therefore value-creating labour. In what way does the ter-
minology then inform us of a different meaning from that of abstract labour,
as the ‘value-forming substance’?
In short, the terminology refers to two different moments of the methodo-
logical explication: while living labour refers to the kind of labour performed
in the production and valorisation process in differentiation to dead labour in
the form of machinery and other constant capital, abstract labour denotes the
substance of value expressed in the fetish-characteristic form it takes asmoney,
as the predominant form of value. While we can sensually experience living
labour in its actual process, abstract labour as the value substance is nothing
that can be experienced apart from its fetishistic expressions inmoney, capital,
profit, rent, interest, etc. Because it is always-already materialised in a form,
which no longer seems to correspond to its origin, it is obliterated or ‘hidden’
in value’s different forms. That does not mean that abstract labour has nothing
to do with production, as shown above. Abstract labour however encompasses
both production and circulation to figure as the very mode in which the total
organisation of capitalist society revolves around value.
However, Uno levels a momentous criticism against Marx’s ‘premature’
introduction of the concept of abstract labour in the simple exchange of com-
modities, which also figures as Uno’s critique of Marx’s ‘proof’ of the labour
theory of value. Uno prefers a ‘clear’ determination of abstract labour in the
context of capitalist production/valorisation. But by deferring the presentation
of abstract labour until after the significance of dead and living labour are elu-
cidated in the analysis of production, Uno conflates the two methodological
levels of the explication of living labour and abstract labour, and introduces a
hyperbolic interpretative move that renders his ‘relocation’ of the locus of the
‘proof’ of abstract labour from the simple exchange process to the production
process dubious:
As the products of labour, they [the commodities] are products of labour
in the sense that they are embodiments of a certain amount of labour.
But while we can acknowledge that, in the above example of spinning
labour, the labour of the cultivation of the new cotton is a different
kind of labour. I want to clearly differentiate this point in which the raw
cotton and the spindle and other machinery appear as the products of
another labour process in the spinning labour. For example, the product-
ive forces of spinning are doubled, and not 10 kin per 6 hours, but 20
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kin are produced (in the same time). There are 20 kin of raw cotton and
a doubling of the previous wear and tear of the machinery, but, and as
against the 10 kin of yarn as the product of 30 hours of labour, there is
no product of labour of 60 hours, but merely a product of labour of 54
hours. Plus, the machinery used in the spinning process … is used as a
whole. In contrast, not all of the raw cotton did in fact make the yarn.
The raw cotton that is scattered around in the production process does
not become yarn. However, since this scattering cannot be avoided in the
process of producing the yarn, the labour that went into producing the
scattered raw cotton becomes a part of the labour necessary to produce
the yarn.
The labour needed for the production of the necessary means of produc-
tionaspast labour is altogetherdifferent formthe labourof the consumption
of labour power in the spinning process. That is, past labour external [not
contained in] the spinning process is forming the necessary labour quantity
for the production of the yarn as the result of the concretely useful labour
of living labour in the spinning process.71
We can witness here, first, Uno’s identification of ‘concretely useful labour’
with living labour that becomes a precondition for the production of the yarn.
For Uno, the labour necessary for the means of production is to be separated
analytically from the labour as the consumption of living labour in the actual
spinning process. It is past labour, but as such directly contributes to the value
of the yarn. What then is ‘general abstract labour’? Abstract general labour for
Uno is the labour of the cultivation of the cotton, the manufacturing of the
spindle, etc., which is considered as a step in the active process of the pro-
duction of yarn: but as past, as dead labour. Living labour, in contrast, is the
concrete production process of the yarn as concrete-useful labour, as the value
transfer process. At the same time, however, it counts as abstract labour (like
the labour materialised in the means of production) when it is regarded as a
value adding component of production. With this denomination of abstract
labour to past labour and the value-adding component to living labour, Uno
believes the explication of the distinction between the two, allegedly ‘prema-
turely’ introduced byMarx in the analysis of the value-form, is only justified in
the analysis of the production process. In the Principles, he announces that
71 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 349. Emphasis added.
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[labour] in the spinning process … functions on the one hand as what
Marx calls concrete-useful labour in that, as it converts raw cotton into
cotton yarn, it also preserves the labour time embodied in the means
of production such as raw cotton and the spinning machine used up in
the process as part of the total labour-time required to produce the yarn.
Simultaneously, the same labour functions on the other hand as what
Marx calls abstract-human labour in that it adds the spinning hours of
labour to the labour hours already materialised in the means of produc-
tion, regarding themashomogenous components of the total labour-time
embodied in the final product. The same labour, in otherwords, possesses
two entirely different aspects, the one being quite specific and the other
perfectly abstract. In the present example, the former aspect requires that
the labour should be suitable for the production of the cotton yarn; the
latter aspect requires that it should not be different, as the expenditure of
human labour, from that which is embodied either in the raw cotton or in
the spinning machine. A production-process can furnish various specific
products only with labour that possesses this dual character.72
In the former case, the labour of spinning, the ‘concrete’ labour in Uno’s view,
is regarded as a part (ichibubun to suru) of the whole product, whereas all of
the components of the whole labour process, as well as that of past labour, are
regarded as one (issō) in the case of ‘abstract-human’ labour. In this reading,
machines, tools, any forms of fluids, substances, and additives, i.e., means of
production, is understood as theproduct of abstract labour,while the expendit-
ure of living labour, in preserving the value of these, forms its concrete-useful
part. The latter assumes the character of abstract labour, however, on the con-
dition that it is ‘equal’ to the labour materialised in the means of production,
which for Uno is abstract-human, dead, or past labour.
But the respective attributions are lopsided: if anything, it is living labour
alone that correlates with abstract labour, for only living labour as a part of
the production process of capital, is productive of value, and only as abstract
labour – in contradistinction to concrete, use value producing labour – can it
be quantified in socially necessary labour time, regardless of the specific pur-
poseful activity it performs. This form of labour, abstract labour, has nothing
to do with the dead labour materialised in constant capital, and the latter
does not form any kind of precondition for living labour to count as abstract-
homogeneous labour.
72 Uno 1980, p. 24. See also Uno 1964, pp. 51–2.
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To clarify, we should return to Marx’s terminology and the specific twist he
attributes to the subsumption of labour under capital in the valorisation pro-
cess. What is crucial in this context is Marx’s preliminary distinction between
new or added value (Neuwert-Zusetzung) and value preservation (Werterhal-
tung). Value preservation is not a function of abstract labour, as Marx emphas-
ises: ‘… the worker preserves the values of the already consumed means of
production or transfers them to the product as portions of its value, not by
virtue of his additional labour as such, but by virtue of the particular useful
character of that labour, by virtue of its specific productive form’.73 The process
of value adding or producing new value however requires that it is ‘labour in
general, abstract human labour’ taking place during a ‘definite length of time’.74
Here socially necessary labour time forms the directive, as quantifiable labour
that must be exchanged for a certain amount of money. Ultimately, for Marx,
the specificity of value-creating labour is the unity of value preservation and
the creation of new value. For, in value’s ‘metempsychosis’ from the means of
production to the new product, the worker
is unable to add new labour, to create new value, without at the same
time preserving old values, because the labour he adds must be of a spe-
cific useful kind, and he cannot do work of a useful kind without making
products intomeansof productionof anewproduct. Theproperty therefore
which labour-power in action, living labour, possesses of preserving value,
at the same time that it adds it, is a gift of nature which costs the worker
nothing, but is very advantageous to the capitalist since it preserves the
existing value of his capital.75
In other words, we can notice a specific way that the subsumption of labour
under capital comes to the fore in the valorisation process: because here, value
preservation and adding new value coincide. Not concrete-useful, but abstract
labour becomes the actual denominator, subsuming the form and function
of any concrete-useful labour process, in its purpose for quantification in the
process of exchange. The specific ‘useful’ kind of labour is rendered automat-
ically abstract by virtue of the specific mode of production, in which ‘making
products’ means to turn them into means of production for the next produc-
tion cycle, labour power included. It is production-for-production.
73 Marx 1976, p. 308.
74 Marx 1976, p. 308.
75 Marx 1976, pp. 314–15. The emphasis relates to where the translation has been amended
to fit the original.
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Uno, however, insists that abstract labour, though being labour’s value-
creating property, does not belong to the actual process of production, but is a
manifestation of past labour materialised in the means of production.
This analytical segmentation of the components of productive capital to
attribute them conceptually to concrete vs. abstract labour in the production
process is however problematic, or at least designates where Uno falls short
of the insight of the subsumption of concrete under abstract labour in the pro-
cess of valorisation. For it is precisely the coincidence of value adding and value
preservation thatmarks the specificity of abstract labour, labour that produces
value. In Uno’s constellation, which grapples with the value-adding compon-
ent of dead labour, this specific mark gets lost. Accordingly, what is crucial
in Marx’s conceptualisation of the labour-as-valorisation process, namely that
dead labour is never productive of value, remains unnoticed. Especially the
insight that the production of value depends on the production of surplus value,
through the specific properties of the labour-power commodity, is anathem-
atic for Uno. The production of surplus value, for Uno, is rather something that
benefits all of society via its production of use values: the reduction of neces-
sary and the increase of surplus labour makes it ‘possible for society to acquire
more surplus-products of varioususe-values’.76Whatunderstandingof ‘society’
is behind this contention? In capitalist society, the production of surplus value
is not ‘measured’ in use value, it is measured in value, i.e. socially necessary
labour time. Its production is not an ‘option’ (among many) for labour-power.
In its specific capitalist form determination, the difference between the paid
and the unpaid component of its value product is the sine qua non of capital.
Abstract labour, the form determination of concrete-useful labour in its spe-
cific capitalist form, has therefore nothing to do with the value component of
constant capital. Uno however still owes the proof for the claim hemade at the
beginning of Value Theory, namely that abstract labour has nothing to do with
being a ‘common denominator’ in the exchange process of two commodities
with different use values. He returns to this point to maintain that
the spinning labour itself is on the one hand the labour of the cultivation
of the cotton, and,while being different from the labour of the fabrication
of the spindle, it is general abstract labour. The spinning labour process
itself passes through these two aspects. It becomes the production of cot-
ton yarn as the product of a certain amount of labour. Thus, we can see
that the fact of wheat and iron that ‘both are equal to a third thing, which
76 Uno 1980, p. 24.
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in itself is neither the onenor the other’ is of course not simply an abstrac-
tion in the exchangeprocess, nor is it an abstraction in thought, but is only
known as a proof [from the analysis of] the production process itself.77
To sum up: Uno’s dissociation of the concept of abstract labour from the prob-
lem of money and the fetishism of exchange, and its deferral to a ‘clearer’
demarcation against concrete labour in the analysis of the production process,
is inflicted with two grave shortcomings:
1) It misrecognises the specific cognitive interest Marx related to his analysis
of the value form. We have already seen in Chapter 1 that the critical
function of abstract labour consists in the dissolution of the fetish of
simple commodity exchange. By representing only the bourgeois sphere
of exchange, the level of abstraction introduced by simple commodity
exchangehowever implies that ‘alreadyother,more complicated relations
of production, more or less conflicting with the liberty and independ-
ence of individuals, their economic relationships, are the premiss that, as
free private producers in simple relations of purchase and sale, they should
confront each other in the process of circulation and should figure as
its independent subjects’.78 The crucial distinction between abstract and
concrete labour hence serves the dissolution of the fetishistic sphere of
simple exchange, in showing – in the process of the analysis of the value
form– the gradual dissociation of the value of the commodity in the equi-
valent form from its use value.
2) Unlike Uno believes, use value is not the motivation for exchange rela-
tions. As the equivalent form of value (or the value expression of the
commodity in the relative formof value), it assumes themoney-form.Not
concrete-useful, therefore, but abstract labour,whichhasno equivalent in
any actual labour process, is therefore the substance of value, necessarily
expressed in money.
With the preceding discussion of Uno’s lopsided identifications, the ‘clearer’
demarcation of abstract labour in the context of production has, to the con-
trary, become more confused. If, then, the persuasive power of Uno’s ‘deferral’
of the discussion of abstract labour to the analysis of production has suffered
in the hands of the above discussion, does Uno’s criticism of Marx’s ana-
lysis of the value form and the labour theory of value recover a more sub-
stantial ground with the introduction of the commodity owner as a heuristic
77 Uno 1973 [1947], pp. 349–50.
78 Marx 1987 [1857–61], p. 466.
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motive?We shall now turn to the unfolding of Uno’s direct criticism of Marx’s
analysis of money.
3.2 Uno’s Theory of Value: Methodological Individualism and the
Fetishism of Use Value
In Chapter 2 of Value Theory, ‘The Form of Value’, Uno develops his interpret-
ation of Marx’s value form analysis that the value relation of x commodity A
= y commodity B (20 yards of linen = 1 coat) cannot be understood in abstrac-
tion from the commodity owner of A. According to Uno, if it were not for the
commodity owner of A (of the linen), the value of the linen, expressed in the
use value of B (the coat), cannot be comprehended meaningfully. Only with
the commodity owner can the linen commodity be understood to occupy the
position of the relative form of value, and the coat to occupy the equivalent
form. Hence, as Uno remarks in Capital Studies, Section 3 of Chapter 1 of Cap-
italVolume i, ‘TheValueFormorExchangeValue’, andChapter 2, ‘TheExchange
Process’, should not be discussed separately, but in unison:
It’s not that I don’t understandwhy ‘The Exchange Process’ and ‘TheValue
Form’ are separated in such a way, but as a method, I think it is a problem
… If there is something like a general use value that is separated from
abstract and individual wants, I cannot understand it. I believe that it
becomes clearer if we introduce the owner of the commodity in thedevel-
opment from the beginning of the value form to the money form. I think
that for example in the relation between the linen and the coat, when the
value of the linen should be expressed, for the first time we can under-
stand the expression in the use value [of the coat], if we consider thewant
of the linen owner for the coat.79
Only if we assume the personal want of the commodity owner can we under-
stand why a particular commodity – here, linen – is in the relative form and
the coat in the equivalent form.80 Otherwise, Uno contends, there would be
no difference between the relative and the equivalent form and the polarity so
important forMarx’s exegesis would disappear: ‘If the commodity owner of the
linen did not desire the coat, there would be no expression in the form of the
79 Uno and Sakisaka (ed.) 1948, p. 142.
80 See Uno and Sakisaka (ed.) 1948, p. 160.
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use value of the coat’, so that ‘which commodity stands in the equivalent form
is decided by the commodity owner of the relative value form’.81 Uno insists
that only the role of the commodity owner helps to firmly establish the ‘mutual
exclusivity’ of the relative and the equivalent form: ‘If therewerenocommodity
owner of the linen, there would neither be a use value of the commodity in the
equivalent form nor a want (yokubō) of the coat. Then the linen and the coat
would express their respective value through each other …Which commodity
stands in the equivalent form is decided by the owner of the commodity in the
relative form of value’.82 Indeed, for Marx, the polarity of the value expression
e.g. ‘20 yards of linen = 1 coat’ must be upheld, if we want to understand how
the form of value emerges from the value expression in the equivalent form.
But this does not mean the equation cannot be reversed, or the meaning of
‘equation’ would be lost. Hence, the argument for polarity Marx makes is an
entirely different one than Uno (and his followers today)83 believe: it merely
requires that two qualitatively different commodities oppose each other in the
value expression, so that we do not end up with the tautology of having to
equate the linen with the linen or the coat with the coat – which would be
meaningless:
Of course, the expression 20 yards of linen = 1 coat, or 20 yards of linen are
worth 1 coat, also includes its converse: 1 coat = 20 yards of linen, or 1 coat
is worth 20 yards of linen. But in this case I must reverse the equation, in
order to express the value of the coat relatively; and, if I do that, the linen
becomes the equivalent instead of the coat. The same commodity cannot,
therefore, simultaneously appear in both forms in the same expression of
value. These forms rather exclude each other as polar opposites.84
81 Uno and Sakisaka (ed.) 1948, p. 166.
82 Uno and Sakisaka (ed.) 1948, p. 166.
83 That the polarity of relative and equivalent form of value must be guaranteed by an ‘offer
to sell’ that depends on the intervention of the owner of the commodity in the relative
form, hence, a market participant, has recently also been emphasised by Lapavitsas in
Lapavitsas 2005 and Lapavitsas 2017 and other Uno School theorists, such as Sekine in
Sekine 2013 [2009]. For a critique of this position, see Lange 2017.
84 Marx 1976, p. 140. Note E.M. Lange’s careful objection with regard to the perspectiveMarx
takes here. According to Lange, Marx’s perspective in (what Lange terms) formula i, ‘x
commodity A = y commodity B’, oscillates between a neutral observer’s position and
one of the involved parties. The latter is indicated by the formulation ‘… in this case I
must reverse the equation …’ Asymmetry can however only be attributed to what Lange
terms formula ii, ‘x commodity A is worth y commodity B’. According to Lange, this form
‘describes the perspective of action (Handlungsperspektive) of the commodity owner of
A who must find out or consider … for what amount of commodity B he wants to (or
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In the appendix ‘TheValueForm’ in the first editionof Capital i, this becomes
even clearer:
Let us consider the exchange between linen-producer A and coat-pro-
ducer B. Before they come to terms, A says: 20 yards of linen are worth
2 coats (20 yards of linen = 2 coats). But B responds: 1 coat is worth 22 yards
of linen (1 coat = 22 yards of linen).
Finally, after they have haggled for a long time they agree:
A says: 20 yards of linen are worth 1 coat,
and B says: 1 coat is worth 20 yards of linen.
Here both linen and coat are at the same time in relative value-form and in
equivalent form. But, nota bene, for two different persons and in two differ-
ent expressions of value, which simply occur (ins Leben treten) at the same
time. For A his linen is in relative value-form – because for him the initiat-
ive proceeds from his commodity – and the commodity of the other person,
the coat, is in equivalent form. Conversely from the standpoint of B. Thus
one and the same commodity never possess, even in this case, the two forms
at the same time in the same expression of value.85
With this clarification, the assumption thatwithout the commodity owner, one
cannot understandwhy one commodity is in the relative and one is in the equi-
can) exchange his commodity A. If a relation of exchange is to be described by the per-
spectives of those involved in the process of exchange, however, then formula ii must be
supplemented by formula iii, ‘y commodity B is worth x commodity A’. Marx however
ignored this asymmetry of the perspective and rather identifies the perspective of one of
the parties involved in formula iiwith the neutral observer position in formula i. As Lange,
however, admits, the reasons for this may go deeper than just being a slip of mind. In
Marx’s understanding, ‘the subject’ of the relation is neither oneof the involvedpartiesnor
the observer – and also, as he points out in the Randglossen, ‘neither “value” nor “exchange
value”, but the commodity’.Marx 1987 [1875–83], p. 358. ‘What is contained in this reference,
on the one hand, is that it has a critical punch line if Marx thematises commodities, and
not their producers or their owners. The qualification of the commodity as subject sup-
poses that in this society things, namely commodities, are subjects, not their producers
and/or their owners’. Lange 1978, p. 13. For a more detailed discussion, see Chapter 1, and
also Lange (Elena Louisa) 2014.
85 Marx 1983 [1867], p. 765. The Appendix to the first edition of Capital Volume i was trans-
lated byMike Roth andWal Suchting in Capital and Class, 4 (1978): 130–50, now inMohun
1994, pp. 9–34 and https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867‑c1/appendix.htm
(9 July, 2019). We refer to the Roth and Suchting translation.
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valent form, is shown to behighly problematic.86Which commodity is inwhich
form solely depends on which commodity’s value is to be determined.
To proceed to understand Uno’s particular intervention, let us consider the
development of Uno’s argument carefully. In Value Theory, Uno starts by say-
ing that the two factors of the commodity represent value as the active aspect
(sekkyokuteki men) and use value as the passive aspect (shōkyokuteki men).87
‘But value that has the active aspect is not in itself autonomous and, in real-
ity, we cannot accept it as the “natural form” of the commodity itself ’.88 Hence,
value does not appear as such, ‘directly and by itself ’.89 If we view the com-
modity from outside, we can only see its natural form, to infer its use value.
Uno therefore concludes that ‘the commodity is originally a commodity for
its owner. That is, while for the purchaser it is a use value, to the extent that
it is a commodity for the owner, it has ceased to be directly a simple use
value (for the owner)’.90 Being a commodity for its owner, the owner is inter-
ested not in its use value, but in its value. But in order to use it, any com-
modity must be bought. This of course touches upon Marx’s original ques-
tion: why can use values under the conditions of capital only be obtained
through value? In other words – why does every product of abstract human
labour first and foremost assume the form of value? Yet, Uno does not seem
to be very interested in this question. For him, the specificity of the commod-
ity economy as the object of his interest concerns the fact that ‘the value of
a commodity only expresses itself in the use value of another’ while ignor-
ing the specific Problemstellung already pointing at the inversion of use value
and value, and hence, of the fetish character of value in the relation of simple
exchange. Uno’s misrecognition of the nature of the problem goes further,
however. For Uno, the equation serving as the basis for the analysis of the
value form, X commodity A = y commodity B denotes a concrete situation
86 In Studies in Capital, Uno insists that ‘[if] there were no commodity owner of the linen
wanting the coat, then [value] could not be expressed in the form of the use value of the
coat. Abstracting from the want [of the owner of the linen] would mean that the value of
the coat itself were expressed in the linen, and they would express each other relatively.
But this is not the meaning of “being relative”. Uno and Sakisaka (ed.) 1948, p. 162. ‘For
example, if there were no owner of the linen, there would neither be a use value of the
commodity in the equivalent form nor a want (yokubō) of the coat. Then the linen and
the coat would express their respective value through each other. … Which commodity
stands in the equivalent form is decided by the owner of the commodity in the relative
form of value’. Uno and Sakisaka (ed.) 1948, p. 166.
87 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 289.
88 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 289.
89 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 289.
90 Uno 1973 (1947), pp. 289–90.
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between commodity owners. But, as pointed out earlier, Marx’s presentation
of the analysis of the value form is already itself a critical presentation of the
superficial mode of ‘individuality’, represented in the commodity owners. As
we will see later in more detail, it is not an analysis of the exchange process,
but an analysis of the preconditions of generalised commodity exchange; pre-
conditions which no longer appear as such in the actual exchange process. As
the analysis of the preconditions of exchange, it is the analysis of money. Per-
haps a passage from the Contribution shows more clearly in what way Marx’s
presentation is critical, not affirmative, from the beginning:
The commodity owners entered the sphere of circulation merely as
guardians of commodities.Within this sphere they confront one another
in the antithetical roles of buyer and seller, one personifying a sugar-loaf,
the other gold, just as the sugar-loaf becomes gold, so the seller becomes
a buyer. These distinctive social characters are, therefore, by no means
due to individual human nature as such, but to the exchange relations of
persons who produce their goods in the specific form of commodities. So
little does the relation of buyer and seller represent a purely individual
relationship that they enter into it only in so far as their individual labour
is negated, that is to say, turned intomoney as non-individual labour. It is
therefore as absurd to regard buyer and seller, these bourgeois economic
types, as eternal social forms of human individuality, as it is preposter-
ous to weep over them as signifying the abolition of individuality. They
are an essential expression of individuality arising at a particular stage
of the social process of production. The antagonistic nature of bourgeois
production is, moreover, expressed in the antithesis of buyer and seller in
such a superficial and formal manner that this antithesis exists already in
pre-bourgeois social formations, for it requires merely that the relations
of individuals to one another should be those of commodity owners.91
In the following, we will show how the methodological individualism Uno
inviteswithhis insistenceon the role of the commodity owner confrontsMarx’s
position of a socially mediated totality, of which ‘commodity owners’ only
present the ‘superficial and formalmanner’ of amuchmorepertinent confront-
ation: that between capital and labour.
91 Marx 1987 [1857–61], p. 331.
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3.2.1 The Role of the Commodity Owner in the Simple Form of Value
For Uno, the commodity owner in the relative form of value (linen) cannot
express the value of his commodity in so-and-so-many hours of socially neces-
sary labour time.Uno: ‘Wherever one takes it, one cannotweigh it (hyōryō shite)
as something objective. But still, the commodity owner must express the value
of his commodity’.92 The linen owner, for Uno, wants to express the value of the
linen in another commodity, e.g. the coat, a relation in which the coat already
has the same quality as the linen, as the ‘form assumed in common by the val-
ues of all commodities’,93 in the ‘coagulated state’ of human labour power.94
Nevertheless, this poses the problem that the labour of the linen cannot auto-
matically count as that of ‘labour of human beings’ in general:
[Theownerof the linenowns] linenas value, or as something thatmust be
exchanged with another commodity. As use value, it may be the product
of linen-producing labour, but as value, it is nothing but the product
of homogenous human labour that produced another commodity. As
regards the commodity owner of the linen, the value of the linen is given
in the foundation (konkyo) expressing the value of the other commodity,
but it is impossible to compare and measure the labour of others produ-
cing other products, such as the labour of making their own goods, as the
labour of human beings. Hence, only thewant of the linen owner can suf-
ficiently determine the ambiguity regarding this ‘homogeneous’ expres-
sionof labour in general in the equivalent form (i.e. the coat)with the spe-
cific value expression of the relative form, i.e. the linen. The labour that
produces linen becomes valuable only in its product, linen. At the same
time, as different from the linen itself, the other commodity also has ‘com-
mon objectivity’ [kyōtsū shita taishōka / gemeinsameGegenständlichkeit],
but we cannot grasp this ‘objectivity’ as such. The linen owner expresses
the value of his linen in wanting to exchange his linen for another com-
modity, for example in a coat.95
Uno quotesMarx tomake his point: ‘As a use value, the linen is something palp-
ably different from the coat; as value, it is identical with the coat, and therefore
looks like a coat’96 and ‘The value of the linen, by assuming the expression in
92 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 290.
93 Marx 1976, p. 159. The original term is gemeinsameWertgestalt. Marx 2008, 81.
94 Marx 1976, p. 142. Paraphrased in Uno 1973 [1947], pp. 290–1.
95 Uno 1947 [1973], p. 291.
96 Marx 1976, p. 143. In the original: ‘… alsWert ist sie “Rockgleiches” und sieht daher aus wie
ein Rock’. Marx 2008, p. 66.
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the coat, takes on an expression separate from its use value’.97 This is true as far
as Uno’s observation goes. Yet, and this is crucial, Uno misses to acknowledge
the inversion taking place in this particular correlation, namely that, the ‘first
peculiarity which strikes us whenwe reflect on the equivalent form is this, that
use-value becomes the form of appearance of its opposite, value.’98 One point
to acknowledge therefore, and to which we will return in greater detail, is that
Uno regards the analysis of the value form as an analysis of exchange relations
between commodity owners, and not as an analysis of the money form of the
commodity.
In Section 3 of Chapter 1 of Capital Volume i, known as the ‘analysis of
the value form’, Marx demonstrates the gradual dissociation of value from use
value, hence the emergence of the equivalent form or ‘value’, by analysing four
steps in the development of the equivalent form (the simple form of value →
the expanded form of value → the general form of value → themoney form). As
wewill see, this gradual dissociation of value from the use value of the equival-
ent form is what informs the theory of money, precisely as ‘value as such’, value
that bears ‘not an atom’ of use value.
Uno’s interpretation of the necessity of the commodity owner of the linen,
however, misjudges the specific theoretical question involved in the analysis,
namely an analysis of the necessity of money for the possibility of generalised
commodity exchange, not an analysis of individualwants of commodity owners
bringing about ‘exchange’. This misjudgement becomes especially clear in the
treatment of quantities. For Uno, the indispensability of the commodity owner
is proven where the justification is demanded for the claim that ‘20 yards of
linen are worth exactly 1 coat’, and not five, or two. Already in Marx’s time,
this had been an important objection that has ‘[misled] Bailey and many of
his predecessors and followers into seeing the expression of value as merely a
quantitative relation whereas in fact the equivalent form of a commodity con-
tains no quantitative determinant of value’.99 Later in the Principles, Uno adopts
this position:
It is not, letme stress, the value of the ‘twenty yards’ of linen, but the value
of linen as such that is expressed here [in the simple value form]. Twenty
yards are judged appropriate by the linen-owner to express the value of
his linenbecauseagivenquantityof theuse-value of the coat iswanted.100
97 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 291.
98 Marx 1976, p. 148.
99 Marx 1976, p. 148. Emphasis added.
100 Uno 1980, p. 8. Emphasis added.
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But it is altogether independent of the want of the commodity owner if the
value relations are expressed this way: in the further development of the value
form, ‘[t]he accidental relationbetween two individual commodity owners dis-
appears. It becomes plain that it is not the exchange of commodities which
regulates the magnitude of their values, but rather the reverse, the magnitude
of the value of commodities which regulates the proportion in which they
exchange’.101 Admittedly, this becomes clear only in the ‘total or expanded form
of value’ (Form (b)). However, what are we to make of the commodity owners
once this becomes clear in retrospect? Uno is far from discarding the method-
ological setting of the want of the commodity owner in the further analysis.
How, then, is Uno’s argument to be understood? To be sure, were the quant-
ity of linen doubled, say, 40 yards instead of 20, and the labour productivity
of both weaving and tailoring unchanged, 40 yards of linen would be worth
2 coats. In the equivalent form, the coats can only express the value of the
linen, but they could not express their own value. The value of the coats can-
not be addressed in a value expression where the coats are in the equivalent
form. It is, however, irrelevant if the coat or the linen is in the equivalent form
as a type of commodity – the magnitude of value is always determined by the
socially necessary time required for its production: ‘But as soonas the coat takes
up the position of the equivalent in the value expression, the magnitude of
its value ceases to be expressed quantitatively. On the contrary, the coat now
figures in the value equation merely as a definite quantity of some article’.102
Uno quotes this passage to demonstrate that the quantitative determination is
always assumed by the commodity in the relative form of value. But Uno for-
gets that this relation does not require the hypothesis of a commodity owner to
become socially evaluated or acknowledged. Uno however continues to adhere
to his reading of the linen counting as a particular amount of use value for the
owner. This is because, for Uno,
[the] amount of linen as use value is of interest to its owner only so
far as it has value (sic), while the definite quantity of the coat as use
value is as such (sono mama) expressed as the value body (kachi tai). But
then the commodity in the equivalent form of value cannot assume this
expression.That is because the equality is already establishedwithout any
relation to the commodity owner. With this conception, we can neither
101 Marx 1976, p. 156.
102 Marx 1976, p. 147. Quoted in Uno 1973 [1947], p. 293.
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understand the linen in the relative formof value nor the coat in the equi-
valent form.103
This argument rests on an insufficient grasp of the methodological vantage
point of Marx’s analysis: of course, the equality between the linen and coat is
already established, as we are dealing with the presupposed totality of capital-
ist relations, in which the equation of different products of different concrete
labours has already taken place.104What interests Marx’s analysis is the condi-
tion of possibility for this equality. In his analysis, he comes to show that value
(abstract-human labour) presents this condition, not value ‘bare and simple’,
but in its specific fetishistic form, in its material expression as money. How
money, however, comes to fetishistically obfuscate and simultaneously ‘repres-
ent’ abstract-human labour and ‘socially necessary labour time’ (value’s mag-
nitude), cannot bedemonstratedabovo– it has tobe shown in theprocessof the
analysis of the capitalist production process and bourgeois political economy’s
blind spots. Here also lies the significance of Marx’s polemical exclamation
(about a reviewer of Capital Volume i in the German regional paper Central-
blatt) in the famous letter to Kugelmann:
The chatter (dasGeschwätz) about the need to prove the concept of value
arises only from complete ignorance both of the subject under discus-
sion and of themethod of science. Every child knows that any nation that
stopped working, not for a year, but let us say, just for a few weeks, would
103 Uno 1973 [1947], pp. 293–4.
104 In an often underappreciated passage, Marx honours the scientific endeavours of his pre-
decessors in their attempt to demonstrate the economic relations post festum, and yet
points to their inability to apply this method to the ‘absurd form’ that money takes the
position of the ‘collective labour of society’: ‘Reflection on the forms of human life, hence
also scientific analysis of those forms, takes a course directly opposite to their real devel-
opment. Reflection begins post festum, and therefore with the results of the process of
development ready to hand … Consequently, it was solely the analysis of the prices or
commodities which led to the determination of the magnitude of value, and solely the
common expression of all commodities in money which led to the establishment of their
character as values. It is however precisely this finished form of the world of commod-
ities – the money form – which conceals the social character of private labour and the
social relations between the individual workers … If I state that coats or boots stand in a
relation to linen because the latter is the universal incarnation of abstract human labour,
the absurdity of the statement is self-evident. Nevertheless, when the producers of coats
and boots bring these commodities into a relation with linen, or with gold or silver (and
thismakes no difference here), as the universal equivalent, the relation between their own
private labour and the collective labour of society appears to them in exactly this absurd
form’. Marx 1976, pp. 168–9.
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perish (verreckenwürde)…Where science comes in is to showhow the law
of value asserts itself. So, if onewanted to ‘explain’ from the outset all phe-
nomena that apparently contradict the law, one would have to provide
the science before the science. It is precisely Ricardo’s mistake that in his
first chapter, on value, all sorts of categories that still have to be arrived
at are assumed as given, in order to prove their harmony with the law of
value.105
Yet, to contend that themethodological introduction of the role of commodity
owners changes the ‘arbitrariness’ of the labour theory of value, only indicates
Uno’s problematic understanding of Marx’s ownmethod and introduces other
methodologically dubious presuppositions, as the following will show.
One of Uno’s main divergences from Marx’s presentation is that the linen
possesses the function of ‘use value in a particular amount’ for the owner of
the linen. Uno understands that the linen in the relative value form expresses
value quantitatively: ‘The linen, the commodity in the relative value form, that
expresses value quantitatively, does not express its value by a fixed amount of
its use value, but through the opposition to the commodity in the equivalent
form, a fixed amount of the coat’.106 Uno argues that if the commodity in the
equivalent form can only be a ‘fixed amount’, and if the value of the relative
value form-commodity rises or falls, it must be expressed in a ‘fixed amount’
of this particular equivalent value form. But then only the amount of the relat-
ive value form changes. For Uno, if the value of the coat rises or falls, the linen
is subject to change: ‘… if, on the contrary, the value of linen sinks by the half
or the value of the coat is doubled, then it will take on the expression of 40
yards of linen = 1 coat’.107 However, linen does not express its value quantit-
atively. The linen does not express value at all – it is the coat that expresses
the linen’s value. Regardless of whether the value of the linen rises or falls, it is
always expressed in the coat. Uno’s interpretation distorts the meaning of the
value equation as the expression of the value of a particular quantity of a given
commodity. To this problem, Marx gives a pertinent answer in the subsection
on ‘The quantitative determinacy of the relative form of value’ (which is not be
confused with any value expression of the relative from of value). Here, Marx
105 Marx 1988 [1868–70], pp. 68–9. Reichelt’s bizarre interjection that Marx’s polemical tone
indicates that he believed himself to have been ‘caught red-handed’ (Reichelt 2013, p. 108)
only reveals Reichelt’s own shortcomings in understanding Marx’s method, against
Reichelt’s better insights in The Logical Structure of the Concept of Capital (2001 [1970]).
106 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 293.
107 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 293.
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states that, as a matter-of-fact, 40 yards of linen = 1 coat can be expressed as
20 yards of linen = ½ coat: if the value of the coat rises (or is doubled, as in
Uno’s and Marx’s example), 20 yards of linen are expressed in ½ coat. If the
value of the coat falls by half, 20 yards of linen = 2 coats. In other words: if the
value of the linen is doubled, then 20 yards of linen = 2 coats, if its value falls by
half, then 20 yards of linen = ½ coat. The value of the quantity of the linen is
expressed in the coat. What Uno seems to be missing is Marx’s statement that
‘Hence, if the value of the commodity A remains constant, its relative value,
as expressed in commodity B, rises and falls in inverse relation to the change
in the value of B’.108 In other words, Uno maintains that the coat cannot rep-
resent the value of the linen without the assumption of the commodity owner,
because the linenmust change quantitatively, according to its own value, as use-
value of a particular amount. But inMarx, it is the coat that expresses this value,
and it is irrelevant whether we express the value of the linen in 20 yards = ½
coat or 40 yards = 1 coat. How couldwemeasure the value of the linen if not the
coat, but the linen changed itsmagnitude? If the equivalent formwere a certain
given amount, be it 1, 2, or 100, we would absurdly have to adjust the amount of
the linen to its particular expression in the coat to know the value of the linen.
What we will then know, however, is the reversed relation – the coat would be
in the relative, and the linen in the equivalent form!Wewould still not know the
value of the linen.
108 Marx 1976, p. 145. Interestingly, one of Marx’s contemporaries, John Broadhurst, who
attempted to ‘cut away the ground’ from Ricardo’s labour theory of value, made a sim-
ilar argument to Uno’s that Marx refers to in a footnote to the second edition: ‘The vulgar
economists have exploited this lack of congruence between the magnitude of value and
its relative expression with their customary ingenuity. For example: “Once admit that A
falls, because B, with which it is exchanged, rises, while no less labour is bestowed in the
meantime on A, and your general principle of value falls to the ground … If he [Ricardo]
allowed that when A rises in value relatively to B, B falls in value relatively to A, he cut
away the ground on which he rested his grand proposition that the value of a commod-
ity is ever determined by the labour embodied in it; for if a change in the cost of A alters
not only its own value in relation to B, for which it is exchanged, but also the value of B
relatively to that of A, though no change has taken place in the quantity of labour to pro-
duce B, then not only the doctrine falls to the ground which asserts that the quantity of
labour bestowed on an article regulates its value, but also that which affirms the cost of
an article to regulate its value”. (J. Broadhurst, Political Economy, London 1842, pp. 11 and
14). Mr Broadhurst might just as well say: consider the fractions 10/20, 10/50, 10/100 etc.
The number 10 remains unchanged, and yet its proportional magnitude, its magnitude in
relation to the numbers 20, 50, 100 continually diminishes. Therefore, the great principle
that the magnitude of a whole number, such as 10, is “regulated” by the number of times
the number 1 is contained in it falls to the ground’. Marx 1976, pp. 146–7.
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Another grave inconsistency of Uno’s interpretation is his insistence that
the value expression in particular magnitudes is not caused by the measure
of socially necessary labour time, but motivated by choice.
Uno’s objection against socially necessary labour time as the ‘immanent
measure of value’ because of the variability of the value expression (not value
itself) recalls Bailey’s polemic against Ricardo’s ‘invariable’ and ‘immanent’
measure of value inherent in the commodities exchanged, namely that ‘it
(value) cannot alter as to one of the objects compared, without altering as to
the other’.109 This is quite true. However, this does not present an argument
against an immanent measure of value. Quite to the contrary, as Marx points
out in his extensive discussion of Bailey’s concept of value as ‘quantity without
quality’: ‘Bailey identifies the “invariable measure of value” with the search for
an immanent measure of value, that is, the concept of value itself ’. However,
[variability] is precisely the characteristic of value. The term ‘invariable’
expresses the fact that the immanent measure of value must not itself
be a commodity, a value, but rather something which constitutes value
and which is therefore also the immanent measure of its [the commod-
ity’s] value. Bailey demonstrates that commodity values can findA MON-
ETARY EXPRESSION and that, if the value relation of commodities is
given, all commodities can express their value in one commodity, al-
though the value of this commodity may change. But it nevertheless
always remains the same for the other commodities at a given time, since
it changes SIMULTANEOUSLY in relation to all of them. From this he
concludes that no value relation between commodities is necessary nor
is there any need to look for one. Because he finds it reflected in the
MONETARY EXPRESSION, he does not need to ‘understand’ how this
expression becomes possible, how it is determined, and what in fact it
expresses.110
Uno, like Bailey, confounds the determinations of an ‘immanent’ with the
determinations of an ‘invariant’ measure. He subsequently disavows the per-
fectly logical possibility that an ‘immanent measure’ can be variable – and
in the case of abstract labour indeed must be.111 It is in this sense that value-
109 Bailey 1967 [1825], p. 5. Quoted in Marx 1989b [1861–3], p. 331.
110 Marx 1989b, p. 348. See also Brentel 1989, p. 11, who discusses Bailey’s mistake at length. All
capitals in the original.
111 In a striking analogy, Marx quotes Bailey – ‘It is impossible to designate or express the
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producing labour during the working day is variable for Marx, as is the pro-
portion, measured in time, between its paid and unpaid components – ecce
what had to remain a mystery in Ricardo’s lopsided view of the exchange
between capital and labour.112 In other words, for Uno, ‘the exchange value of
a commodity’, as Hyoen-Soo writes, ‘that is, its value form, ought not to be its
exchange relation in a different commodity. Rather, it merely indicates a one-
sided expression of the value of a commodity by its owner in relation to the use
value of the other, desired commodity. The value expression in the simple value
form in Uno is nothing else but the subjective evaluation of the linen owner,
and hence it has nothing to do with the value expression of the coat owner’.113
At this point, Uno’smethodologically individualist and subjectivist view can be
diagnosed with precision. It aligns itself with Bailey’s view that determines the
emergence of value exclusively in the exchange of commodities, so that ‘value
denotes consequently nothing positive or intrinsic, but merely the relation in
which two objects stand to each other as exchangeable commodities’.114 In the
Principles, we read: ‘For the owner, the commodity must be shown to be freely
exchangeable with a specific quantum of another commodity. This is how the
commodity receives its value’.115 But if this were true, the question of how value
could become price without causing the chaos of a myriad of subjective eval-
uations, could never be arrived at.116 But our uneasiness in Uno’s objection to
Marx’s analysis lies deeper: like Bailey, Uno is unable to determine a measure
of value that gives rise to the ‘subjective’ evaluations of the commodity owner
in the first place. It is therefore burdened with unproven presuppositions that
Uno ironically laments as a fault in Marx’s theory of value. Considering this
possibility, Uno claims:
A commodity offered at a certain price is socially confirmed in its value
only when it is recurrently purchased at that price by the money-owners
who demand that commodity. … A once-and-for-all purchase, therefore,
does not confirm the value of a commodity; it is confirmed only when,
value of a commodity, except by a quantity of some other commodity’ – to comment: ‘(As
impossible as it is to “designate” or “express” a thought except by a quantity of syllables.
Hence Bailey concludes that a thought is – syllables.)’ Marx 1989b [1861–3], p. 333.
112 See Chapter 1.
113 Hyeon-Soo 1995, p. 72.
114 Bailey 1967 [1825], pp. 4–5.
115 Uno 1964, p. 21.
116 These ‘subjective evaluations’ of course inform the price formation theory of neoclassical
economics, which Uno’s view ultimately leans on.
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in recurrent transactions at prices fluctuating in response to the forces of
demand and supply, a central price emerges at which normal trade takes
place.117
Without any further mediation, the ‘forces of demand and supply’ fill in for
a missing conceptualisation of the basis for exchange relations in Uno. But far
frombeing presuppositionless, the framework of ‘demand and supply’ abounds
with methodological presuppositions. In this claim, the social conditions that
must be fulfilled so that the individual can appear as a demanding and sup-
plying agent on the market are left unaddressed. Moreover, what social condi-
tions have to be fulfilled, so that the market itself can appear as an adequate
site to social production and distribution? ‘Demand and supply’ already pre-
suppose market relations, which presuppose a mode of production for which
market relations form the adequate form of exchange, which presupposes gen-
eralised commodity production which itself presupposes the relation between
capital and labour as a class relation. In other words, Uno’s framework relies
on an understanding of society based on individual choice and want as an
immediate and direct object of cognition. In Uno’s conception of this object,
individual freedom is an uncontested ‘given’, not a historically specific mani-
festation of society in which commodity exchange mediates class relations.
We have seen that, for Marx, the ‘confrontation between capital and labour’
is hidden in the ‘simplest notion of exchange’, in which the notion of socially
necessary labour time comes to assume the objective determinant of value
‘behind the backs’ of the producers. This framework is not only absent, it is
contested by Uno in favour of a general notion of individual choice and want
that in no way addresses the specificity of exchange relations as they prevail
in a capitalist society. It therefore unsurprising that Uno’s conception should
regress to a purely subjective notion of value in which its social character is
eclipsed.118
117 Uno 1980, p. 9.
118 Uno further betrays his own theoretical roots in neoclassical economics when he argues
that thedecisionsof individuals in a capitalist commodity-societyultimately contribute to
the common best: ‘[The commodity-economic laws] … emerge as a large number of inde-
pendent individuals repeatedly strive to achieve their own self-seeking and myopic goals
by the process of trial and error. For the totality of their acts, plied each independently,
ends by forging stable social relations that suit capitalist society’. Uno 2016 [1971], p. 16.
‘The economic laws are enforced through this corrective process [of the law of value], in
which social imbalances tend to be removed, as individual producers pursue their profits’.
Uno 2016 [1971], p. 17.
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3.2.2 The Four Peculiarities of the Equivalent Form
The mystery of value Uno unwittingly confronts, however, does not lie in the
relative form of value. It lies in the equivalent form. In the subsection on ‘The
equivalent form’, Marx – in the appendix to the first edition of Capital more
prominently than in the subsequent editions – points to the ‘four peculiarities’
(Eigenthümlichkeiten) of the equivalent form. This is the singlemost important
theoretical insight Marx gains from the analysis of the value form. It presents
the explanatory framework for the inherent nexus between abstract labour,
value and money, as the emergence of the fetish-character of the value form, i.e.
the nexus that Uno fails to identify. In other words, it comprises Marx’s ana-
lysis of the fetishism of the value-form as we confront it in bourgeois political
economy.
In the first peculiarity of the equivalent form, we find that the ‘use-value
becomes the form of appearance of its opposite, of value’.119 This has already
been demonstrated in the task of the simple form of value, namely to demon-
strate the possibility of how one particular commodity (the linen) can express
its own value in another commodity ‘outside and alongside it’, and more partic-
ularly in its ‘natural form’ or use value. Yet, the use value of the coat assumes
the appearance of its opposite, value. But this only happens
within the value-relation to it, into which any other commodity A (linen,
etc) enters, and only within this relation. In itself, considered in isolation,
the coat, e.g., is only a useful thing, a use-value, just like the linen, and
hence its coat-form is only the form of use-value (ist nur Form von Geb-
rauchswert) or natural form of a definite type of commodity. But since
no commodity can relate to itself as equivalent and therefore also cannot
make its ownnatural hide an expression of its own value, itmust relate itself
to another commodity as equivalent or make the natural hide of the body
of another commodity its own value-form.120
This is the first inversion that goes unnoticed byUno.Marx provides the reason
for the ‘mysteriousness of the equivalent form, which only impinges on the
crude bourgeois vision of the political economist when it confronts him in its
fully developed shape, that of money’.121 It is precisely that the equivalent form,
119 https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867‑c1/appendix.htm, see alsoMarx 1976,
p. 148.
120 https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867‑c1/appendix.htm, see Marx 1983
[1867], p. 632. Original emphasis.
121 Marx 1976, p. 149.
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the coat (or gold, or money) ‘seems to be endowed’ with the ‘natural’ property
of direct exchangeability. For Uno, however, (and the representatives of the
Uno School, as we will show later) there is nothing mysterious about money.
The ‘want of the commodity owner’ and the ‘offer to sale’ simply sweep the
particular problem of the conditions of possibility of value expression under the
carpet by not addressing it. Also the second peculiarity of the equivalent form,
namely that ‘concrete labour becomes the form of manifestation of its oppos-
ite, abstract human labour’,122 is denied flat out by Uno, as we have shown. Let
us again consider the first edition of Capital:
The coat counts in the expression of the value of the linen as the value-
body, hence its bodily or natural form as value-form, i.e. therefore as
embodiment of undifferentiated human labour, human labour as such
(schlechthin). But the labour by which the useful thing which is the coat
is made and by which it acquires a definite form, is not abstract human
labour, human labour as such, but a definite useful, concrete type of la-
bour – the labour of tailoring. The simple relative value-form requires
(erheischt) that the value of a commodity, linen, for example, is expressed
only in one single other type of commodity. Which the other type of com-
modity is, is however, for the simple value-form, completely irrelevant.
Instead of the commodity-type ‘coat’ the value of the linen could have
been expressed in wheat, or instead of wheat, in iron, etc. But whether in
coat, wheat or iron, in every case the equivalent of linen counts as the body
of valuewith regard to the linen, hence as embodiment of human labour as
such. And in every case the definite bodily form of the equivalent, whether
coat orwheat or iron, remains embodiment not of abstract human labour,
but of a definite concrete useful type of labour, be it the labour of tailor-
ing or of farming or of mining. The definite concrete useful labour, which
produces the body of the commodity which is the equivalent must there-
fore, in the expression of value, always necessarily count as adefinite formof
realisation or form of appearance, i.e. of abstract human labour. The coat,
for example, can only count as the body of value, hence as embodiment of
human labour as such, in so far as the labour of tailoring counts as a defin-
ite form, in which human labour-power is expended or in which abstract
human labour is realised.123
122 Marx 1976, p. 150.
123 https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867‑c1/appendix.htm, see Marx 1983
[1867], p. 634.
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Here is the answer to Uno’s aforementioned criticism that it is ‘impossible
to compare and measure the labour of others producing other products … as
the labour of human beings’. Because only insofar as the coat counts as the
‘body of value’, hence as the embodiment of human labour as such, and not
a specific other kind of labour expended in the process of making the coat,
can the linen measure its own value in it. Inversely, were the coat merely the
result of tailoring, it could not count as the value expression of the linen,
which is the result of an entirely different process (weaving). But only if the
coat counts as the expression of general human labour, labour as such, can
it assume the function of expressing the value of the linen, which answers
Marx initial question about the condition of possibility for exchange. This
inversion, however, escapes Uno, hence he cannot accept that the equivalent
form should present value (and consequently money), because it serves as the
embodiment of human labour in the abstract. For Uno, instead, the want of
the linen owner serves as the value expression of the linen, leaving entirely
open the question of the general condition for commodity exchange. What is
indeed lacking is a common denominator (a ‘third’ or tertium comparationis),
which would allow the commodity owner of the linen to make an evaluation
in the first place. What is lacking is a ‘third of the comparison’, i.e. the quality
that two things compared have in common, or that which prompts the com-
parison at all. This is also why, as we will see soon, an individual can only
exchange her commodity for another if the exchange process of commodit-
ies is already generalised – through money. There is no such thing as ‘indi-
vidual commodity exchange’. But in order to explain money as the ‘enabler’
of generalised exchange, one must first explain how money comes to assume
the position of the general equivalent. This, however, is only possible, because
money is abstract and general human labour, not one kind of labour in particu-
lar.
In the third peculiarity of the equivalent form, ‘private labour takes the form
of its opposite, namely labour in its directly social form’.124 Here we can see
how Marx rests his analysis of the value form on the totality of the relations
of production in a developed capitalist economy in which the expenditure of
private labour can only validate itself socially, as themediation of the aggregate
labour performed in the society as a whole. In a different context, Marx there-
fore states:
124 Marx 1976, p. 151.
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The owners of commodities therefore find out that the same division of
labour which turns them into independent private producers also makes
the social process of production and the relations of the individual pro-
ducers to each other within that process independent of the producers
themselves; they also find out that the independence of the individuals
from each other has as its counterpart and supplement a system of all-
round and material dependence.125
In the appendix to the first edition of Capital, there is a ‘fourth particular-
ity’ of the equivalent form that in the subsequent editions, as is well known,
forms an entire subchapter, ‘The Fetish Character of the Commodity and its
Secret’. It corresponds to the ‘Fourth peculiarity of the equivalent form: the fet-
ishism of the commodity-form is more striking in the equivalent form than in
the relative value-form’.126 Marx shows that it is precisely the identification of
use value (the natural, immediate, sensuous properties of the commodity as
a ‘thing’) with value (the social characteristics of the commodity, grounded in
the specific productive conditions thatmake generalised exchange its adequate
distributive form) that gives rise to fetish-character of the commodity.127What
interests us is precisely the inversion of the essence to its precise opposite in the
appearance of value that Uno fails to see. If one thing manages to appear at
125 Marx 1976, p. 255.
126 https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867‑c1/appendix.htm. See alsoMarx 1983
[1867], p. 637.
127 ‘Now this fetish-character emergesmore strikingly in the equivalent-form than in the relat-
ive value-form. The relative value-form of a commodity is mediated, namely by its relation
to another commodity. Through this value-form the value of the commodity is expressed
as something completely distinct from its own sensible existence. At the same time it is
inherent in this that existence as value (Wertsein) is a relation which is alien to the thing
itself and hence that its value-relation to another thing can only be the form of appear-
ance of a social relation hidden behind it. Conversely with the equivalent-form. It consists
precisely in the fact that the bodily or natural form of a commodity counts immediately as
the social form, as the value-form for another commodity. Therefore, within our practical
interrelations, to possess the equivalent-form appears as the social natural property (gesell-
schaftliche Natureigenschaft) of a thing, as a property pertaining to it by nature, so that
hence it appears to be immediately exchangeablewith other things just as it exists for the
senses (sowie es sinnlichda ist). But becausewithin the value-expressionof commodityA the
equivalent-formpertains by nature to the commodity B it seems also to belong to the latter
by nature outside of this relation. Hence, for example, the riddle (das Rätselhafte) of gold,
that seems to possess, by nature, apart from its other natural properties, its colour, its spe-
cific weight, its non-oxydisability in air, etc., also the equivalent-form, or the social quality
of being immediately exchangeablewith all other commodities’. https://www.marxists.org/​
archive/marx/works/1867‑c1/appendix.htm. See also Marx 1983 [1867], p. 638.
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the same time and with regard to the same aspects as its exact opposite, we are
no longer dealing with an economic theory of value based on rational choice,
methodological individualism, or subjective evaluation of commodity owners.
We are not dealing with a conscious phenomenon at all. Uno fails to grasp this,
and at the same time fails to grasp the origin of the fetishism of both the com-
modity and its more developed form, money.
This is also reflected in the second part of The Political Economy of Capital
(Shihonron no keizaigaku, 1969), ‘Two Particular Terminologies in Marx’s Polit-
ical Economy –On “Fetishism” and “Metamorphosis” ’, one of the few instances
where Uno discusses the three peculiarities of the equivalent form. He argues
that
it is certainly a fact ( jijitsu) that the equivalent commodity of the ‘simple
formof value’ contains the secret of themoney form. But it iswrong to dir-
ectly generalise this.While Marx, in the section on ‘The Equivalent Form’
draws attention to the fact that ‘[the] natural form of the commodity
becomes its value-form’, that ‘this substitution only occurs in the case of
a commodity B … when some other commodity A (linen etc.) enters into
a value-relation with it, and then only within the limits of this relation’,128
he really says that ‘the equivalent form possesses a second peculiarity:
in it, concrete labour becomes the form of manifestation of its opposite,
abstract human labour’129 and that ‘[thus] the equivalent formhas a third
peculiarity: private labour takes the form of its opposite, namely labour
in its direct social form’.130 But I think that the development towards the
money form is already anticipated. That, however, is not all. In fact, the
labour that produces the money commodity of gold is certainly not dir-
ectly the ‘form of appearance of abstract-human labour’, and it is neither
‘labour in directly social form’. Like other commodities, it is nothing but
the product of ‘private labour’.131
Uno rejects the idea that the labour that produces gold is ‘directly’ abstract-
human labour as such. And of course it is not. But this is not Marx’s argument
in the context of the three (resp. four) peculiarities: the argument is not about
the production of gold or any other commodity that serves as money, which is
indeed the product of concrete-useful and ‘private’ labour, but about the pre-
128 Marx 1976, p. 148.
129 Marx 1976, p. 150.
130 Marx 1976, p. 151.
131 Uno 1974 [1969], p. 78.
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condition for exchange, in which the commodity in the equivalent form must
assume a form that renders it equivalent to the other commodity. Marx shows
that this common denominator cannot be the specific concrete labour that
went into the different kinds of production of different commodities. It must
therefore ‘assume the position’ of abstract labour. It is in this sense that ‘gold’
assumes this position. There is no question that gold production is concrete
labour, and so is the tailoring that makes the coat. But as the products of con-
crete labour, they cannot represent the other commodity. They can only do so
as abstract labour, labour representing all and no specific commodity at the
same time. Uno however pays no heed to this inversion taking place in the
peculiarities which are crucial to an understanding of the emergence of the
fetish-character of the commodity – and that of money.
3.2.3 The Role of the Commodity Owner in the Expanded and in the
General Form of Value
As is clear from the previous discussion, Uno centres his interpretation on the
relative importance of use value. In his critique of the expanded form of value
(z commodity A = u commodity B or v commodity C or = w commodity D or x
commodity E or = etc.; 20 yards of linen = 1 coat or = 10lb. Tea or = 40lb. Cof-
fee or = 1 quarter of corn or = 2 ounces of gold or = ½ ton of iron or = etc.),132
Uno claims that the series of commodities that could serve as equivalent forms
of value is not infinite, nor is this form an extension of the simple form. In
already anticipating the money form, Marx’s flaw, according to Uno, consists
in that the ‘citizen’ in the world of commodities as the ‘joint contribution of
the whole world of commodities’133 [gemeinsamesWerk derWarenwelt, rather
‘enterprise’ or ‘deed’ than ‘contribution’] of all the other commodities cannot
be arrived at without the logic of the commodity owner. For Uno, this already
becomes clear in the expanded form of value: ‘I think this schema [20 yards
of linen = 10 pounds of tea] does not follow from 20 yards of linen = 1 coat.
Also in this case, the tea is wanted by the commodity owner, because it rep-
resents a certain amount of what he wants. So, depending on the fact, it might
as well be 10 yards of linen = 5 pounds of tea’.134 In the Principles, Uno repeats
the argument, adding emphasis on the use value andquantitative dimension of
the equivalent. Hemaintains that the value expression 20 yards of linen = 1 coat
expresses the value of the linen pure and simple, without making a claim as to
132 Marx 1976, pp. 154–5.
133 Marx 1976, p. 159.
134 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 299, Footnote. Emphasis added.
204 chapter 3
the value of the 20 yards. Because the value expression hinges on the subjective
evaluation of the commodity owner of A alone,
the linen owner must regulate the quantity of his linen standing in its
position of relative value-form every time adifferent equivalent commodity
enters his value expressionwith a specific quantity. For instance, if he sets
aside twenty yards for a coat, he may set aside 2 yards for half a pound of
tea, etc. Marx’s illustration in which the same ‘twenty yards of linen’ face
some quantities of all the equivalent commodities … fails to bring home
the significance of the equivalent commodities whose ‘use-value’ alone
can reflect the value of the linen.135
From this evaluation, Uno’s misinterpretation of the function and task of
Marx’s analysis of the value form becomes crystal clear. Let us stress two
aspects that strike us as indicative of Uno’s misunderstanding. First, if only
to repeat what is fundamental to the exegesis of the value form, the func-
tion and task of value form analysis in Chapter 1 of Capital Volume i lies in
having ‘to show the origin of this money-form, [such that] we have to trace the
development of the expression of value contained in the value-relation of the
commodities from its simplest, almost imperceptible outline to the dazzling
money-form’. As a starting point, this would require the determination of the
value of the commodity in the relative form of value, e.g. linen. As a matter
of fact this can only be accomplished if we assume a particular amount of
the linen. ‘Linen pure and simple’ can never take the form of a commodity
(unless we think that concepts can be weighed and measured). If we admit
that ‘the concept of linen’ cannot be subject to value expression, we must
attach a particular amount to it. This has nothing to do with the subjective
gusto of the commodity owner: we do not strive to know how much of the
linen the commodity owner would ‘set aside’; we strive to know the value of
the linen. Hence, Uno confuses the task of the analysis of value, i.e. to reveal
the ‘secret’ of the value form of money, with an analysis of the personal wants
of the commodity owner (‘how much can I get for this particular commod-
ity?’) – a hypothesis that, as argued above, is in itself fraught with method-
ological presuppositions that Uno at no point considers. But, since the value
of a commodity can never be expressed in its own ‘natural shape’, it must be
expressed in another commodity. Hence the coat. However, the coat does not
remain the only commodity in which the 20 yards of linen find their value
135 Uno 1980, p. 8.
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expression. The simple form is defective and needs extension. The value of a
commodity A can also express itself in the natural form of another commodity
B, C, D, etc., so that we arrive at an infinite series of commodities that represent
the value of 20 yards of linen. And here is the second significant gap in Uno’s
interpretation of the value form: in the total or expanded form of value, Marx,
whose intention is to demonstrate the social origins of themoney form of value,
demonstrates the gradual exclusion of the use value aspect from the value rela-
tion of commodities – something that Uno ignores.
Because the value of the 20 yards of linen can indeed be expressed in many
different types of commodities, it is of no importancewhich use value these com-
modities serve: they only serve as value expressions of the linen. The answer to
the question ‘How is it possible that the value of a commodity expresses itself
in the use value of another?’ entails the reversal of the question: it is only pos-
sible on the basis that the value of a commodity is not expressed in the use value
of another at all. In the expanded form of value, i.e. the inversion of the value
expression (20 yards of linen = 1 coat or = 10lb. Tea or = 40lb. Coffee or = 1
quarter of corn or = 2 ounces of gold or =½ ton of iron or = etc.), Marx stresses
the ‘indifference’ of the use value in the equivalent form:
… the endless series of expressions of its [the commodity’s] value implies
that, from the point of view of the value of the commodity, the particular
form of use-value in which it appears is a matter of indifference.136
He further argues:
The accidental relation between two individual commodity owners dis-
appears. It becomes plain that it is not the exchange of commodities
which regulates the magnitude of their values, but rather the reverse, the
magnitude of the value of commodities which regulates the proportion
in which they exchange.137
This gradual abstraction from use value is so important for the understanding
of the money form that Marx adds:
The second form, B, distinguishes the value of a commodity from its own
use-value more adequately than the first, for the value of the coat now
136 Marx 1976, p. 155.
137 Marx 1976, p. 156. Quoted in Uno 1973 [1947], p. 298.
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stands in contrast with its natural form in all possible shapes, in the sense
that it is equatedwith linen, iron, tea, in shortwith everythingbut itself.138
In other words, being a ‘coat’ is only a determination among many other pos-
sible placeholders for the value of the linen, e.g. tea, coffee, corn, gold, etc.
Uno however rejects the idea that the coat merely serves as the ‘value body’
(Wertkörper) of the linen etc., for to him the linen still also represents a certain
amount of use value. Therefore, neither can the use value of the commodity in
the relative form be abstracted from, for it is maintained in the value expres-
sion of the use value in the equivalent form, according to Uno. The various use
values should also be expressed in various amounts, according to Uno, so that,
unlike Marx’s presentation of the extended form of value, it should rather be:
1 coat = 20 yards of linen
5lb. of tea = 10 yards of linen
10lb. of coffee = 5 yards of linen
2 quarters of corn = 40 yards of linen
10 ounces of gold = 200 yards of linen
½ ton of iron = 20 yards of linen
x commodity A = Y yards of linen.139
Uno goes on to quote Marx to claim that this equation fulfils both the condi-
tions of the expanded as well as the general form of value: ‘The commodities
now present their values to us, (1) in a simple form, because in a single com-
modity; (2) in a unified form, because in the same commodity each time. Their
form of value is simple and common to all, hence general’.140 Needless to say,
Marx makes this statement about the general value form in which a partic-
ular amount of one commodity acquires the position of value equivalent to
all the other commodities. Form (c), the general value form, is arrived at by
abstracting entirely from the use value of the commodity in the equivalent
form, while ‘[the] two previous forms (let us call them A and B) only amoun-
ted to the expression of the value of a commodity as something distinct from
its own use-value or its physical shape as a commodity’.141 With his reformu-
138 Marx 1976, p. 158.
139 Uno 1973 [1947], pp. 301–2. See also Takatsuka Yoshihirō’s critique of Uno’s reformulation
of the expanded form of value, in Takatsuka 1979, pp. 56–9.
140 Marx 1976, p. 157. Quoted in Uno 1973 [1947], p. 302.
141 Marx 1976, p. 158.
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lation of the schema, Uno collapses the difference between form (b) the expan-
ded form, and (c) the general form. Yet, he agrees with Marx on an important
point: namely that in forms A and B, it is ‘the private task … of the individual
commodity to give itself a form of value, and it accomplishes this task without
the aid of the others, which play towards it the merely passive role of the equi-
valent’.142 The commodity owner is not required to understand how this form
emerges, only how the particular amounts emerge. This however changes dra-
matically, in Uno’s view, when the relative value form in the general form of
value is concerned. Suddenly, a qualitative change occurs that affects not only
the quantities, but the very form in which the equation becomes general. To
understand this, the role of the relative value form in relation to the commodity
owner becomes inevitable.WhenMarx says: ‘The general form of value, on the
other hand, can only arise as the joint contribution of the whole world of com-
modities. A commodity only acquires a general expression of its value if, at the
same time, all other commodities express their values in the same equivalent;
and every newly emergent commoditymust follow suit …’,143 Uno understands
the commodity owner as a prerequisite for this development:
The owner of the coat, like the owners of the tea, coffee, corn, and so
on, express the value of each commodity in a single, identical commod-
ity that is the linen. This is established as the ‘joint contribution of the
whole worlds of commodities’ … when these commodities express their
value opposite the linen, one cannot say that their use value is abstracted
from.144
To prove his point, Uno quotes Marx to show that the use value aspect is not
simply passive and to be abstracted from in the relative value form. Thus, the
labour objectified as the values of all commodities except the linen
is not just presented negatively, as labour in which abstraction is made
from all the concrete forms and useful properties of actual work. Its own
positive nature is explicitly brought out, namely the fact that it is the
reduction of all kinds of actual labour to their common character of being
human labour in general, of being the expenditure of human labour-
power.145
142 Marx 1976, pp. 158–9.
143 Marx 1976, p. 159.
144 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 302–03.
145 Marx 1976, pp. 159–60. Quoted in Uno 1973 [1947], p. 303.
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But this ‘positive character’ cannot help but be expressed as abstract human
labour. Indeed, the reduction to abstract human labour is a ‘positive’ one,
because it unifies the values of the commodities to give them social validation,
it does not merely rely on a negative definition (‘abstraction from’). ‘Positive’
and ‘negative’ are used as logical terms, not as qualifiers denoting value judg-
ments. Uno does not notice that Marx’s statement has nothing to do with ‘pre-
serving’ the use value side of the commodities. To the contrary. The evolution of
the value form that ‘sheds’ use value is constitutive of the universal equivalent
of money.
Uno does not consider the problem of the fetish-characteristic of value. We
have argued that this flawcanbe tracedback tohis disavowal of the ‘threepecu-
liarities’ of the equivalent form and the inversion constitutive for it, especially
that of value and use value.146 But it is precisely the merit of Marx’s theory of
value (which is tantamount to his theory of money) to have ‘rejected theories
which derived value from use value, money from the technical properties of
gold, and capital from the technical productivity of means of production’.147
Instead, Marx’s analysis is an analysis of the social forms value assumes and
their obfuscation in their technological and material forms of appearance. As
Simon Clarke observes,
Marx showed that the individual is only constituted as a private indi-
vidual, and property as private property, on the basis of a mode of social
production in which the co-ordination of social labour is achieved
through the alienated form of the exchange of the products of labour as
values. The apparent form of exchange as the exchange of things between
private individual property owners is accordingly only the fetishised form
of appearance of social relations between people. The exchange relation
is therefore inexplicable in abstraction from the particular social rela-
tions it articulates: the form of exchange cannot be detached from its
social content, a contentwhich political economyonly conceals by attrib-
uting social powers to things. Similarly, the technologistic conception of
production is only the fetishised form of appearance of capitalist social
relations of production, in which the production of things is subordin-
146 There is a striking similarity of Uno’s approach to fetishism with the Russian economist
Pyotr Struve (1870–1944) who sees the problem of fetishism not implied in the concept of
value, but in capital, although capital is only a further developed value form. For a discus-
sion of Struve, see Rubin 1973 [1928], p. 49ff.
147 Rubin 1973 [1928], p. 41.
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ated to the production, appropriation and accumulation of surplus value,
as the alienated form of surplus labour.148
Uno, in his critique of abstract labour as the basis for exchange relations, insist-
ing on its substitution for the individual want of the commodity owner, is little
aware of the inversion of the material and the social relations of production,
expressed in the fact that value appears as a ‘thing’ that exerts its magical
spell over the productive relations between people, so that ‘the process of pro-
duction has mastery over man, and man not yet mastery over the production
process’.149 It is precisely the gradual dissociation from use value that character-
ises the evolution of the money form, andmoney can be meaningfully applied
only in general social, not in individual exchange situations. Marx’s analysis
demonstrates how ‘our actions’ already presuppose complex social structures –
structures of developed commodity production, which presuppose money –
that in turnput the frameworkof ‘our actions’ intoperspective.AsRubinwrites,
… the capitalist glowswith the reflected light of his capital, but this is only
possible because he, in turn, reflects a given type of production relation
among people. As a result, particular individuals are subsumed under the
dominant type of production relations. The social form of things condi-
tions individual production bonds among particular people only because
the social form itself is an expression of social production bonds.150
By no means can the social implications of Marx’s theory of value be under-
stood if the ‘want of the commodity owner of the commodity A’ is taken to
be the motive for exchange. This view truncates the relation between the rela-
tions of production and fetishism to a simplistic methodological framework
of the rationality of individual agents, which itself is embedded in a specific
social context that cannot be reduced to a ‘sum of individuals’.What is at stake
here is the concept of society that radically distinguishes Marx’s from Uno’s
interpretation of value. For Marx, in contrast to Uno, society does not consist
of individuals, but of the relations between them.151 These relations, however,
indicate a social mechanism that is not exhausted in individual actions, but
148 Clarke 1991, p. 163.
149 Marx 2008, p. 95. Own translation. The English translation is incomplete. See Marx 1976,
p. 175.
150 Rubin 1973 [1928], p. 25.
151 For the significance of Marx’s critique of methodological individualism in classical polit-
ical economy, see Heinrich 1999, pp. 154–5.
210 chapter 3
take place in a social context, and in capitalism specifically that of class society.
As Marx time and again emphasises, the exchange relations of the commodit-
ies, that is, their value, ‘is not dependent either of thewill of thewheat producer
or on that of the owners of the other commodities’.152 E.M. Lange, though also
critical of Marx’s analysis of the value form – for altogether different reasons
than Uno – unwittingly expresses precisely what is significant about Marx’s
form of presentation:
The whole process of the differentiation (Ausdifferenzierung) of money
only gains momentum in Marx because the asymmetry of the relative
form of value and the equivalent form is already projected in the simple
value expression, and the commodity is hypothesised as the subject of
action (Handlungssubjekt).153
Yet, the abstraction from ‘individual wants’ in exchange is paramount toMarx’s
analysis of the money form: in fact, the analysis of the value form in the first
chapter of Capital is not an analysis of exchange at all, but of the preconditions
and the economic form determinations for the possibility for exchange. This
has also been noticed by Frank Engster154 and Christian Iber, among others.
In ‘The Significance of the Difference between the Development of the Value
Forms in the First and Second edition of Capital’,155 Iber delivers a powerful
explanation for why Marx discarded the simultaneous presentation of value
form analysis and exchange after the Contribution, to present the analysis of
the value form in separation from the process of exchange in Capital. ‘While
in the Contribution, the solution to the “riddle of money” is embedded within
the presentation of the exchange of commodity and money’,156 in Capital, the
level of the exchange process is clearly demarcated from the level of value form
analysis. ‘If value form analysis is about the derivation of money from the eco-
152 Marx 1976, p. 196.
153 Lange 1978, p. 21.
154 Engster’s rejection of the interpretation of value formanalysis as an analysis of exchange is
motivatedbyhis critique of Sohn-Rethel’s reading of Marx’s ‘systematic-categorial analysis
of the value-form of the commodity as an empirical-historical event (Geschehen)’. Engster
2009, p. 19. Engster’s estimation is unequivocal: ‘By misconceiving the significance of the
non-empirical status of value-form analysis, Sohn-Rethel is unaware that Marx … does in
no way develop a logic of commodity exchange … [nor] an exchange between “commod-
ity owners”, but the necessity of money from the purely logical-categorial analysis of the
value form of the commodity’. Engster 2009, p. 20.
155 Iber 2006, pp. 189–99.
156 Iber 2006, p. 189.
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nomic form determinations of the commodity, the analysis of the exchange
process thematises the presentation of the reality of money that prevails as a
necessity in the exchange process of commodity owners’.157 Hence, in contrast
to the earlier conceptions of value form analysis,
Capital has a double objective: the development [of the value form]
shows, first, that money can be solely explained from the structure of the
commodity, and second, that, precisely for this reason, the exchange pro-
cess as a social relation between subjects mediating commodity determ-
inations is only possible on the basis of money.158
In the following discussion, we will show how Marx conceives of the money
form as a social contradiction manifested in a ‘palpable’ form, and contrast
it with Uno’s interpretation of money as the ‘solution’ to the contradiction
between value and use-value.
3.3 Uno’s Theory of Money: Baileyan Assumptions
3.3.1 Money as the ‘Solution’ to the Contradiction betweenValue and
Use-Value?
Here is howMarx argues the sine qua non of money in ‘The transition from the
general form of value to the money form’:
Only when this exclusion [of a specific commodity to serve as equivalent,
ell] becomes fully restricted to a specific kind of commodity does the
uniform relative form of value of the world of commodities attain object-
ive fixedness and general social validity.159
‘At the same time’, Uno comments, ‘each commodity owner already simply
demands the universal equivalent because of its use value, and because of that,
cannot halt at the relation of the value expression of his own commodity’.160
157 Iber 2006, p. 189.
158 Iber 2006, p. 190. Emphasis added. The first edition of Capital still assumes a middle pos-
ition between the simultaneous presentation of the analysis of money and exchange and
its separation, while already in the 1872 edition, the two presentations belong to different
chapters.
159 Marx 1976, p. 162. Quoted in Uno 1973 [1947], p. 304.
160 Uno 1973 [1947], pp. 304–5. Emphasis added.
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For Uno, the use value of the commodity in the equivalent form at this step of
the development, which already serves as the universal equivalent, still counts
as use value, not as value. But this can only be true insofar as, as Dieter Wolf
argues,
the value of individual commodities can never appear in a medium dif-
ferent from its use value (the commodity is a dead object, which has no
meansof communication, no language, etc.). [Because of that], value can-
not appear in it at all (Wert [kann] an ihr überhaupt nicht erscheinen) … If
the commodity must appear as value, it can do so only in the medium of
use value, but then the commodity can only appear in a use value which
is different from its use value.161
We have seen that both the relative form and the equivalent form count as
use values for Uno: the relative form, because the commodity owner of the
linen always takes the quantity of the linen into account, the equivalent form,
because its use value expresses the value of the quantity or amount of the
commodity in the relative form. The use value of the universal equivalent
must hence be special: it conforms to a ‘social function’. For Uno, in con-
sequence, money must be a ‘universal use value’, a ‘use value for everybody’.
But for Marx, the movement from the simple form of value to the money form
demonstrates the process of total dissociation from use value in the money
form. Uno however sticks to Marx’s initial condition that ‘the value of a com-
modity must be presented in the use value of another’. The crucial point over-
looked by Uno is that Marx, in the course of his presentation of the analysis of
the value form, pervades with this condition to its utmost and consequential
end – only to show that ‘sticking to’ the use value dimension of the equival-
ent is bound to end up in self-contradiction.162 Exchange of something we can
rightfully call ‘commodities’, and which therefore implies general commod-
ity production, is impossible without money, for it already requires that the
‘wholeworld of commodities’ relates to one specific commodity as its universal
equivalent. Crucially, therefore, the universal equivalent, by virtue of its uni-
versality and generality, undergoes an inversion in which its use value ‘body’ is
paradigmatically value. This inversion corresponds to the first peculiarity of the
equivalent form (‘use value becomes the form of appearance of its opposite,
161 Wolf 1985, p. 141.
162 The problem of the self-contradiction in ‘premonetary theories’ of value is similarly
brought up by Backhaus, in Backhaus 2011, pp. 149–50.
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value’). It is important to note however that Marx arrived at this inversion, or
paradox, only by following the initial presupposition through.Hence, in order to
show the decisive paradox of money, in that money’s use value precisely con-
sists in being its opposite, namely value, Marx proceeds from the conventional
notion that the value of a commodity is presented in the ‘use value’ of another.
In the Contribution of 1859, Marx, as against the later version in Capital, still
holds that with this move, the ‘contradiction’ between value and use value is
apparently solved:
The commodity which has been set apart as the universal equivalent is
now an object which satisfies a universal need arising from the exchange
process itself, and has the same use value for everybody – that of being
carrier of exchange value or a universalmeans of exchange. Thus the con-
tradiction inherent in the commodity as such, namely that of being a
particular use value and simultaneously universal equivalent, and hence
a use value for everybody or a universal use value, has been solved in the
case of this one commodity.163
For Uno, the ‘desire’ or ‘want’ (yōkyū) for a commodity A, B (or C, etc.) is decis-
ive not only for the quantities given in exchange, but also the role of money:
‘Money necessarily evolves from such a desire for the commodity’.164 He con-
tinues: ‘[Money] may not fundamentally solve the “opposition-contradiction”
(tairitsu mujun) between value and use value in the commodity, but it is the
method of solving it in reality [through the act of exchange]’,165 and in the Prin-
ciples, he says:
Money, therefore, is the first concrete step towards the settlement of the
so-called contradiction between the value and the use value of a com-
modity, a contradiction that reflects the character of the commodity eco-
163 Marx 1987 [1857–61], p. 288. See, however, the later discussion of money as a means of cir-
culation in which Marx admits to the ‘inherent contradictions’ made possible by money:
‘The separation of sale and purchase makes possible not only commerce proper, but also
numerous pro forma transactions, before the final exchange of commodities betweenpro-
ducer and consumer takes place. It thus enables large numbers of parasites to invade the
process of production and to take advantage of this separation. But this againmeans only
that money, the universal form of labour in bourgeois society, makes the development of
the inherent contradictions possible’. Marx 1987 [1857–61], p. 334.
164 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 309.
165 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 309.
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nomywhich generates a social relationbasedon the individual pursuance
by traders of private interest.166
‘Traders of private interest’ arehowever far removed fromtheanalysis of money
in Marx’s presentation. Before money can be conceived of as something ‘de-
sired’, he non-empirically traces money’s constitutive role for exchange to the
specific function it has as a ‘merely formal existence’, as ‘empty signifier’, as that
which is precisely not desired, because it in itself lacks any useful qualities. In
the same passage from the Contribution, therefore, Marx clarifies that money
does not ‘practically’ solve the contradiction between use value and value, but
preserves it:
Whereas now the exchange value of all other commodities is in the first
place presented in the formof an ideal equationwith the commodity that
has been set apart, an equation which has still to be realised; the use value
of this commodity, though real, seems in the exchange process to have
merely a formal existence which has still to be realised by conversion into
actual use values.167
For Uno, on the other hand, ‘it is not as the fixed amount of the use value of the
equivalent, but through the different amounts of the money commodity that
the value of the single units of each of the commodities is expressed: 1 ton of
iron = 2 ounces of gold, 1 quarter of corn = 1 ounce of gold, 1 centnermocca cof-
fee = 25 ounces of gold etc, 1 single unit of commodity A = X ounces of gold’.168
In money as the ‘universal use value’, the contradiction of being a use value for
its non-owner and a value for its owner, disappears. But Uno here overlooks
the problem implied by money as value. At no point does he ask why this kind
of contradiction emerges in the first place. Already in the Grundrisse, Marx sees
the fundamental contradiction primarily in the notion of (exchange) value169 –
i.e. in money itself:
It is not at all apparent on its face that its character of being money is
merely the result of social processes; it is money. This is all the more dif-
ficult since its immediate use value for the living individual stands in
166 Uno 1980, p. 7.
167 Marx 1987 [1857–61], pp. 288–9.
168 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 306.
169 In the Grundrisse, Marx still uses ‘exchange value’ and ‘value’ synonymously.
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no relation whatever to its role, and because, in general, the memory of
use value, as distinct from exchange value, has becomes entirely extin-
guished in this incarnation of pure exchange value.Thus the fundamental
contradiction contained in exchange value, and in the socialmode of pro-
duction corresponding to it, here emerges in all its purity.170
Money is not use value – it is not food and shelter, clothes and schooling – but
an expression of social relations of production in which food, shelter, clothes
and schooling cannot be obtained, but through it. It indicates the fundamental
contradiction in the capitalist mode of production, which is never directed
at the satisfaction of needs. In different terms, money itself presents the con-
tradiction in the fact that people cannot directly satisfy their needs, but need
money in order todo so. InClarke’swords: ‘…moneydoesnot remove theuncer-
tainty attached to particular exchanges, it merely expresses that uncertainty in
a universal form. Money does not resolve the inconvenience of barter, it gen-
eralises it. Far from expressing the rationality of exchange, money expresses
the irrationality of a system of social production in which provision for human
need is achieved only through the alienated form of commodity exchange’.171
Marx’s unabashed critique of positions hypostasising money as a ‘solution’ to
this contradictionmust therefore also be viewed as a critique of the apologetics
of bourgeois relations of production:
… it is in the character of the money relation … that all inherent contra-
dictions of bourgeois society appear extinguished in money relations as
conceived in its simple form; and bourgeois democracy even more than
the bourgeois economists takes refuge in this aspect … in order to con-
struct apologetics for the existing economic relations.172
In themanuscripts to theTheories of SurplusValue, and finally, in Capital, Marx
is even clearer: money is not at all perceived as the ‘solution’ to a contradic-
tion – money ‘does not abolish these contradictions, but rather provides the
form in which they have room to move’.173 Marx’s attempt is directed at dis-
mantling the ‘apparent’ solution money seemingly provides. In the Theories of
Surplus Value, Marx therefore directly links what he calls the ‘development of
170 Marx 1973, pp. 239–40.
171 Clarke 1991, p. 166.
172 Marx 1973, pp. 240–1.
173 Marx 1976, p. 198.
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the contradiction’ between value and use value to the fetishistic (equivalent)
form in which it appears, and in which that contradiction is embodied:
The fact that the exchange value of the commodity assumes an independ-
ent existence in money is itself the result of the process of exchange,
the development of the contradiction of use value and exchange value
embodied in the commodity, and of another no less important contra-
diction embodied in it, namely, that the definite, particular labour of the
private individualmustmanifest itself as its opposite, as equal, necessary,
general labour and, in this form, social labour.174
Oblivious to the inversion in the equivalent form, this important qualitative
determination is overlooked by Uno. One cannot help but notice that Uno’s
interpretation solely addressing ‘commodity exchange’ as necessitatingmoney
to solve the contradiction between use value and value – discussed in almost
every text published between 1947 and 1969 – bears significant similarities to
Aristotle’s – rather than Marx’s – analysis of money. According to Aristotle,
[w]hen the inhabitants of one country becamemore dependent on those
of another, and they imported what they needed, and exported what
they had too much of, money necessarily came into use … and hence
men agreed to employ in their dealings with each other something which
was intrinsically useful and easily applicable to the purposes of life, for
example, iron, silver and the like.175
But for Marx, the contradiction between use value and value is not at all solved
in money. Because money is the objectification of abstract human labour176,
174 Marx/Engels 1989, p. 317.
175 Aristotle 1966, 1257 a. Quoted in Marx 1987 [1857–61], pp. 351–2, footnote.
176 Throughout his work, Marx uses different formulations to express this ‘objectification’
over and over again: ‘Money is now objectified labour’, Marx 1953 [1857–8], p. 942 (own
translation), ‘Money is not a symbol, just as the existence of a use value in the form of a
commodity is no symbol. A social relation of production appears as something existing
apart from individual human beings, and the distinctive relations into which they enter
in the course of production in society appear as the specific properties of a thing – it is
this perverted appearance, this prosaically real, and by nomeans imaginary, mystification
that is characteristic of all social forms of labour positing exchange value. This perverted
appearance manifests itself merely in a more striking manner in money than it does in
commodities’. Marx 1987 [1857–61], p. 289. ‘This physical object, gold or silver in its crude
state, becomes, immediately on its emergence from the bowels of the earth, the direct
incarnation of all human labour. Hence the magic of money’. Marx 1976, p. 187. ‘Money as
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expressed in thing-like, material form, it becomes the paradigmatic form of
value in which the distinction between use value and value is lost – and the
social relations that give rise to the inverted expression of value obfuscated.
This, of course, is the problem of fetishism Marx’s whole analysis of the value
form points toward. In the following, we shall see how Uno disavows this con-
stellation of the problem, and substitutes it for money as explanans.
3.3.2 The Rejection of the ‘Third Thing’ and the Question of General Social
Exchangeability
Three pages into hismainwork,Marx gives a concrete example of ameaningful
condition of possibility for the category of exchangeability or commensurab-
ility (or generally of comparison, hence tertium comparationis), the so-called
‘third thing’-argument:
Let us now take two commodities, for example corn and iron. Whatever
their exchange relation may be, it can always be presented by an equa-
tion in which a given quantity of corn is equated to some quantity of
iron.What does this equation signify? It signifies that a common element
of identical magnitude exists in two different things, in 1 quarter of corn
and similarly in x cwt of iron. Both are therefore equal to a third thing,
which is in itself neither the one nor the other. Each of them, so far as it
is exchange-value, must therefore be reducible to this third thing.177
This idea is so pivotal for the following analysis (indeed, for the three volumes
of Capital) that Marx – unwittingly anticipating the fierce objections it will
receive in the history of its reception178 – provides an unusually long comment-
ary in lieu of a proof:
This common element cannot be a geometrical, physical, chemical or
other natural property of the commodities. Such properties come into
consideration only to the extent that they make the commodities use-
a measure of value is the necessary form of appearance of the measure of value which is
immanent in commodities, namely labour-time’. Marx 1976, p. 188.
177 Marx 1976, p. 127.
178 Already in 1896, Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk published his famous rejection of the ‘third
thing argument’ in Karl Marx and the Close of his System. See Böhm-Bawerk 1973 [1896],
pp. 81–90. Uno was arguably influenced by Böhm-Bawerk, although he presented a (pre-
carious) critique of the chapter onMarx in Böhm-Bawerk’s ‘Capital and Interest’ (‘Kapital
und Kapitalzins’, 1884) in the introduction to Value Theory.
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ful, i.e. turn them into use-values. But clearly, the exchange relation of
commodities is characterized precisely by its abstraction from use-values
… If then we disregard the use-value of commodities, only one property
remains, that of being products of labour. But even the product of labour
has alreadybeen transformed intoourhands. If wemake abstraction from
its use-value, we abstract also from the material constituents and forms
which make it a use-value … With the disappearance of the useful char-
acter of the products of labour, the useful character of the kinds of labour
embodied in them also disappears; this in turn entails the disappearance
of the different forms of concrete labour. They can no longer be distin-
guished, but are all together reduced to the same kind of labour, human
labour in the abstract.179
As discussed above, Marx operates with the concept of abstract labour as the
fundamental explanans for the money form of value. Abstract labour is there-
fore neither a ‘kind of’ concrete labour (as in deskilled labour, etc.), nor a
‘substance’ in the sense of a transhistorically valid and physical expenditure
of labour, but the historically specific mode in which labour assumes a mon-
etary form. As universal equivalent, abstract labour can buy all the different
kinds of concrete labour, while being restricted to none of them specifically.
By virtue of this ability, it ismoney. In this sense, Marx’s labour theory of value
is indeed ‘substantialist’ – but one must be careful of the specific meaning of
‘substantialism’ as it indicates the form-content (Formgehalt) of value as the
conceptual nexus that explains the value forms.We have already indicated that
this specific level of Marx’s methodological presentation escapes Uno’s inter-
pretation. Before we take a closer look at Uno’s arguments generally dismissive
of Marx’s intervention to show that they even fail to identify it, let us consider
Uno’s objection to the ‘third thing’.
According to Uno, Marx has unjustifiably separated the illustration of ex-
change of different commodities from his presentation of the labour theory
of value: ‘To introduce the labour theory of value, Marx uses corn and iron,
to analyse the value form in the “simple form of value”, he uses linen and a
coat’, Uno laments.180 In ‘The Three Great Laws’,181 Uno complains that Marx
had failed to specify the kind of labour that went into the production of corn
and iron, so that the ‘common denominator’ being labour, or labour time, was
179 Marx 1976, p. 128.
180 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 297.
181 ‘The Three Great Economic Laws that Govern Capitalism’, in Uno 1974 [1969].
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absolutely arbitrary. For Uno, the ‘introduction’ of the labour theory of value
begs the question of abstract human labour as the common denominator or
the ‘third thing’ (daisansha). No such ‘common denominator’, Uno claims, can
be found in the analysis of the value form. Uno is especially deprecatory of the
‘reduction to a third thing’ (daisansha ni kangen182 /daisansha ni yakugen)183
on the basis of which the different labours can be compared and exchanged.
This cardinal point of critique is held by Uno throughout his entire career. For
instance, in the Methodology:
… the theory of the commodity is not just argued as a labour product
that is exchanged as a commodity. With the form-development of the
commodity, money, and capital as basis, the production process itself is
subsumed under capital. This means – and here the substance becomes
clear – that it [capital] provides the form-determination of value. Rather,
by immediately presenting the labour theory of value, the historical view-
point formally established for the first time by Marx regresses to the ‘fail-
ures’ of classical political economy and cannot escape its dangers.184
For Uno, the introduction of the labour theory of value is premature and only
becomes significant when capital’s form-determination and the production
process is analysed.185 This view disregards Marx’s specific method that pre-
supposes the notion of class and the exchange of capital and labour from the
beginning of the analysis, as we have shown in Chapter 1 and the beginning of
this chapter. Yet, Uno continues to doubt the validity of Marx’s labour theory
of value within the theoretical locus of value form analysis. In his critical dis-
cussion of the ‘separation from use value’ in the value expression of the linen,
Uno says:
Here we of course have the labour that made the linen, but the weaving
labour is not simply useful labour. As the equal (hitoshii mono to shite)
to the labour that made the coat, it is reduced to human labour as the
common property of two different kinds of concrete labour. However, it
certainly doesn’t immediately exist as abstract human labour common to
182 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 297.
183 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 313.
184 Uno 1974 [1962], p. 158.
185 Chris Arthur (in Arthur 2004) holds the same view. For a critique of this view in Arthur,
see Lange 2016.
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both. That is an abstraction performed as a ‘detour’ (mawari michi) that
makes the weaving labour equal to the concrete tailoring labour of the
coat.186
Abstract labour forUno, aswehave seen, is an inherent factor of the commodity,
and as such, anathema to the discussion of the exchange process. Itmust there-
fore be relegated to the analysis of production where its relation to concrete
labour can ‘for the first time’ be elucidated. However, because Uno attempts
to discuss exchange in detachment from the notion of abstract labour, he is at
pains to argue the plausibility of general social exchangeability. Instead, Uno
rejects ‘bringing in’ abstract labour as the common aspect of different products
of labour in the exchange process. For Uno, the problem presents itself in the
terms of the status of ‘abstraction’: in order to justify general human labour
as the common factor of the two different concrete useful labours involved
in making the coat and the linen, there is an ‘abstraction’ at work, generated
by the ‘detour’ of making both labours ‘equal’ or ‘the same’ (hitoshii mono ni
suru) – but, Uno argues, we cannot assume that this ‘equalisation’ of two dif-
ferent labours is the same as being ‘abstract labour’.187 To this we can respond
two things: first, as far as abstract labour is merely considered as a ‘property’
of two different things, tacitly identified with their use value, this may make
sense. But it misses the point of the totality of social production relations that
the notion of abstract labour addresses, and not just that of ‘two objects’. This
point has also been raised by Rubin:
Marx says: Let us take, not the chance exchange of two commodities,
iron and wheat, but let us take exchange in the form in which it actually
takes place in a commodity economy. Then we will see that every object
can be equalized with all other objects. In other words, we see an infin-
ity of proportions of exchange of the given product with all others. But
these proportions of exchange are not accidental; they are regular, and
their regularity is determined by causes which lie in the production pro-
cess.188
Abstract labour as value concerns the total process of production. There is no
such thing as the exchange of two single commodities that can be called gen-
186 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 291.
187 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 291.
188 Rubin 1973 [1928], p. 110.
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eral social exchange. In fact, the exchange of two commodities between two
individual commodity owners has no correspondence in social reality at all.
For Marx, it is a hypothesis serving to demonstrate its own impossibility – but
made possible by money. Money however implies general social exchangeabil-
ity: the concept of ‘individual exchange’ contradicts itself. In that sense, the
whole production process of commodities logically precedes the emergence
of the value form – but in this specific instance at the beginning of his study,
Marx’s theoretical interest is the theory of money and fetishism which accord-
ingly assumes the pivotal heuristic to the whole succeeding analysis. For this
reason, the critique of fetishism comprises Marx’s method. But this neither
entails that the production process is ‘irrelevant’ to the analysis of the value
form, nor that production has nothing to do with it. Uno demands a clearer
separationof the two,misrecognising the specific interrelationof the categories
Marx addresses, in which abstract labour, value and money inseparably indic-
ate a common nexus in which money is the explanandum and abstract labour
(‘value’) the explanans.
Second, Uno’s objection that Marx has falsely identified the method by
which he arrives at the notion of abstract labour, namely abstraction, with a
property of that object, is quite bizarre: thought processes necessarily involve
abstraction. This does not mean that ‘abstraction’ becomes automatically
thematic as soon as one starts to think. It also does not mean that someone
who thematises the concept of ‘abstraction’ is bound to confuse it with a prop-
erty of the thought process itself.While the concept of ‘abstraction’ is the result
of abstraction, so is the concept of ‘apple’. More importantly however, as Alfred
Schmidt has emphasised,
Marx’s concept of the relations of production, and moreover, of bour-
geois economy, quintessentially depends on the recognition of the sim-
ultaneously logical and historical objectivity of value. But Marx has by
nomeans assumed that value was merely a concept necessitated by ‘eco-
nomical thinking’ (denkökonomisch) in the sense of the positivist theory
of science. Much rather, we can apply it meaningfully precisely because
it corresponds to an abstraction that is daily performed in the process
of production, which only manifests itself in the individual acts of pur-
chase. It is neither a mere ‘working hypothesis’, nor a practical assump-
tion necessitated by thought (denktechnische Notwendigkeit). Already in
the 1859 manuscripts, Marx had provided evidence that value formation
indicates an abstraction, which is not only methodologically significant,
but which structures the object of the investigation itself. If we misrecog-
nise this point,we get into great difficulties, and canno longer understand
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the nexus between political economy and social totality, which was so
crucial for Marx.189
For Uno, the ‘core problem is that the commodity, to become the common
expression of value, has no other way but to follow this method [of expressing
the different concrete labours of the commodities in general abstract human
labour via money].’190
How is this way characterised?
Uno’s momentous and decisive demarcation against Marx’s theory of value
and money lies in suggesting the replacement of the notion of abstract labour
withmoney itself as the ‘autonomous’ existence of value:
To say thatmoneywas originally a commodity does not amount to under-
standing money. Therefore, it also doesn’t amount to understanding
either the commodity or value. Likewise, to say that the value of a com-
modity is constituted by labour does certainly notmean that one has under-
stood the value of a commodity. The value of a commodity, constituted
by labour, necessarily assumes a specific value form. But when we don’t
make this clear, the fact that value is constituted by labour is not under-
stood. However, so long as it isn’t clear that value assumes an autonomous
(dokuritsu no) form of existence in money, we are no better at formally
understanding its character.191
The ‘autonomous’ existence of value in money, as well as Uno’s rejection of a
‘commodity theory of money’ – i.e. the understanding of money as structurally
implied in the commodity form– is decisive here. No such ‘third thing’, asMarx
allegedly insisted on so as to ‘prove’ the labour theory of value, could be held
accountable for the organisation of the social metabolism:
In contrast to the commodity, that, in its various and different kinds, tem-
porarily appears in the world of commodity circulation, money always
represents andmediates the circulation of all the various kinds of commod-
ities. Rather than value sometimes assuming the shape (sugata) of the
commodity and sometimes that of money, it is a relation in which it
[value] must always assume the shape of money as against the commod-
ity as use value. In other words, instead of conceiving of the ‘reduction’
189 Schmidt 1968b, p. 278.
190 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 308.
191 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 312.
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(yakugen) to value as the ‘third thing’ to be a commodity, we assume the
method that it ismoney that expresses thepossibility of that ‘reduction’.192
But it is not money that expresses the ‘possibility of that ‘reduction’ ’, it is
abstract labour, the kind of labour that is productive of all of the commodities,
and yet not of them specifically. Money is only the form abstract labour assumes
in the process of exchange. To conflate substance and form is fatal to an under-
standing of Marx’s project of the critique of fetishism and bourgeois political
economy.
To summarise: for Uno, commensurability is not generated by a ‘third thing’
that is open to speculation, but generated by money itself. There can be no
doubt:
Money substitutes the ‘third thing’.193
It is not the common denominator (abstract labour) as money, but money as
the common denominator –money as ‘irreducible basic notion’194 – that makes
commodities commensurable for Uno.
As we have already seen in our discussion of Chapter 1 of Volume i of
Capital, proceeding directly from the proof of the so-called labour the-
ory of value to this third thing within the commodities cannot be com-
prehended. It is rather the opposite. With the emergence of money, ‘the
commodity appears as the opposition of use value and exchange value in
money’. The inner opposition of value and use value in the commodity
appears as the outer opposition of the commodity and money.195
Here bothUno’s nominalist aswell as his functionalist understanding of money
becomes clear: it is functionalist, because for Uno, money iswhat money does.
This is contrary to Marx’s non-functional and essence-analytical approach,
which demonstrates that money can only do what it is, i.e., mediate the dif-
ferent kinds of labour embodied in the various commodities, because it is the
general form of abstract labour. Uno’s theory of money is however also nom-
inalist, because money, for Uno, presents the ‘irreducible basic concept’ which
cannot be further deduced, which lacks any sort of ‘substantiality’ with regard
192 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 316. Emphasis added.
193 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 314.
194 Backhaus 2011, p. 181.
195 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 313.
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to the commodities whose values it represents. Marx, in contrast to Uno, rejec-
ted a nominalist understanding of money, as is clear from his critique of Bailey,
to which we will turn in a short while.196 More poignantly, for Uno, money
assumes the position of the common equivalent because it is the autonomous
form of value whichmust appear in specific prices. Hence, for Uno, ‘there is no
other method than that money expresses its own value by the price of such-
and-such monme of gold, or yen of gold, or dollars of gold, and so on’.197 The
danger of categorically conflating value and price is obvious. This is also reflec-
ted in the Principles where Uno maintains that ‘[t]his relation between the
two elements of the commodities, value and use-value, generates value forms
or the peculiar expressions of exchange value by commodities. Their price in
gold is but a highly developed form of value’.198 If the explanatory framework
of explaining value with abstract labour is disavowed, then just what instance
price is a ‘highly developed form’ of, remains completely obscure and can only
be expressed as a tautology: price is expressed in exchange value, which is
expressed inmoney,which is explained in price. This is also confirmedbyUno’s
view of money’s ‘fetish character’ consisting merely in money’s ability to pur-
chase different kinds of use values:
Thatmoneyalwayshasdirect exchangeability in confrontationwithother
commodities, which is to say that it is taking the initiative in the exchange
of purchase and sale, shows nothing but the formal roots of the money
fetish. As a matter of fact, the commodity form itself has a fetish charac-
ter (busshin sūhai teki seikaku), so that in Capital, the ‘Fetish character
of commodities and their secret’ reveals its essential roots, but that is
because rather than the commodity, money as a fetish concretely shows
this character.199
196 Backhaus sets the discussion of the nominalist, i.e. ‘money-prioritising’, theory of money
against a theory of money that develops the concept from the commodity form within
the history of the reception of the ‘logical’ vs. the ‘logico-historical’ presentation of Marx’s
categories, labelling the first a ‘deductive’ and the latter an ‘inductive’ theory of the value
form. He proposes the significance of the nominalist view while he attempts to emphas-
ise the necessity of a ‘inner correlation (inneren Zusammenhang) between Marx’s value
theory and his theory of money’. Backhaus 2011, p. 129. See also Backhaus 2011, p. 179. We
will see in Chapter 5 how the post-Uno School appropriates the views of the Neue Marx-
Lektüre to discard the labour theory of value, ignoring Backhaus’s endeavours to precisely
relate value andmoney theory. This misreading is however owed to Backhaus’s own irres-
oluteness or ‘Herumtappen’ (Backhaus 2011 p. 140) as to howvalue andmoney are precisely
related, ascribing his own indecision to Marx. We will return to this in Chapter 5.2.
197 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 314.
198 Uno 1980, p. 5.
199 Uno 1974 [1969], p. 80.
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The inversion of the problem –money is not to be explained on the basis of
the fetish character of the commodity, but the commodity is to be explained on
the basis of the fetish-character of money – however leaves open the question
howmoney is capable of paradigmatically representing general social exchange-
ability.
As indicated in the previous quote, Uno sees money’s primary function in
denoting the ‘initiative’ of purchase. This is repeatedly confirmed:
… the commodity transfers direct exchangeability to themoney commod-
ity, so that theybecomecommodities for eachother.Thedouble character
of value and use value in the commodity expresses itself in the external
opposition of money and the commodity. Every time, money is given
in the specific position of the possibility of purchase belonging to the
buyer.200
Anticipating the discussion of the convergences between Uno’s and Samuel
Bailey’s respective theories of money, we can preliminarily observe that this
position echoes Bailey’s identification of money with ‘power of pur-
chase’:201 ‘If the value of an object is its power of purchasing, there must
be something to purchase. Value denotes, consequently, nothing positive or
intrinsic, but merely the relation in which two objects stand to each other as
exchangeable commodities’.202 Although we will return to this, Marx’s critique
of the notion of money as ‘power of purchase’ presents a useful summary of the
previous discussion, namely the inability of a formal, functionalist and nomin-
alist theory of money to explain money’s function of general social exchange-
ability, or, which is the same, the measure of value.203 ‘Power of purchasing’
hence does not explain the logical significance of money, but presents a tauto-
logy. It is well worth quoting the passage at length:
200 Uno 1974 [1969], p. 78.
201 A view also held by theUno School’s Costas Lapavitsas in his claimof money as the ‘mono-
poly’ to buy. For a critique of this view, see Lange 2017.
202 Bailey 1967 [1825], pp. 4–5.
203 Suzanne de Brunhoff ’s study Marx on Money, while offering insights to the function of
money as a means of circulation, also insufficiently accounts for the phenomenological
function of money as the measure of value. This is because she begins her comment-
ary with Chapter 3 of Capital (‘Money or the Circulation of Commodities’), and not with
the analysis of the value form, i.e. Marx’s general theory of money, in Chapter 1. We also
disagree with her contention that ‘money is studied in abstraction from capitalism’ (De
Brunhoff 2015 [1973], p. xiii). Like in Uno andmany other commentators onMarx’s theory
of money, Marx’s methodological fetishism-critical approach seems to be of no import-
ance in her analysis, which we believe (and show here to be) is the cause of major faults
in assessing his theory.
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[Bailey’s] entire wisdom is, in fact, contained in this passage. ‘If value
is nothing but power of purchasing’ (a very fine definition since ‘pur-
chasing’ presupposes not only value, but the representation of value as
‘money’), ‘it denotes’, etc. However let us first clear away fromBailey’s pro-
position the absurdities which have been smuggled in. ‘PURCHASING’
means transforming money into commodities. Money already presup-
poses VALUE and the development OF VALUE. Consequently, out with
the expression ‘PURCHASING’ first of all. Otherwise we are explaining
VALUE by VALUE. Accurately expressed it would read as follows: ‘If the
value of an object is the relation in which it exchanges with other objects,
value denotes, consequently’ (viz., in consequence of the ‘if ’) nothing, but
merely the relation inwhich two objects stand to each other as exchange-
able objects’ (I.e., [pp.] 4–5). Nobodywill contest this tautology.What fol-
lows from it, by the way, is that the ‘VALUE’ OF AN OBJECT ‘DENOTES
NOTHING’. For example, 1 lb. of COFFEE = 4 lbs of COTTON. What is
then the value of 1 lb. of COFFEE? 4 lbs of COTTON. And of 4 lbs of COT-
TON? 1 lb. of COFFEE. Since the valueof 1 lb. of coffee is 4 lbs of COTTON,
and, on the other hand, the value of 4 lbs of COTTON = 1 lb. of COFFEE,
then it is clear that the value of 1 lb. of COFFEE= 1 lb. of COFFEE (since
4 lbs of COTTON = 1 lb. of COFFEE), a = b, b = a, HENCE a = a. What
arises from this explanation is, therefore, that the value of a use value = a
[certain] quantity of the same use value.204
In the following, we will address the problem of tautology in Uno’s theory of
money. It will be discussed alongside the emergence of fetishism in theories of
money that denounce the substance of value.
3.3.3 The Emergence of Fetishism
For the discussion of Uno’s objections, we must come back to Marx’s earli-
est conception of the ‘third thing’ or tertium comparationis-argument within
the context of Capital. In the research literature, it has been one of the most
contested theorems of value theory, if not of Marx’s theory as a whole.205 It is
204 Marx 1989b [1861–3], pp. 327–8. Original emphasis.
205 Not only in the context of Analytical Marxism and Uno School theorists, such as Sekine
1975, Albritton 2005 (especially p. 174ff.), and Lapavitsas 2005, but also in recent interpret-
ations within the so-called ‘value-form theory’-branch of Marxian economics, the ‘third
thing’ is disqualified as a premature supposition. See e.g. Chris Arthur 2004, Geert Reu-
ten 2005, David Harvey 2018. For a critique of Arthur’s and Reuten’s position, see Lange
2019. For other critical discussions of the ‘third thing argument’, see Cutler et al. 1977/8,
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especially contested in Uno’s re-formulation and perhaps even more so in the
School that carries Uno’s name. To understand Marx’s labour theory of value,
it is worthwhile looking at his specific intervention against the classical bour-
geois labour theory of value.206We have seen in Chapter 1 that, unlike Uno, and
also e.g. Itoh,207 Reuten,208 and Arthur believe,209 Marx’s concept of abstract
labour in the labour theory of value is not a residue of classical political eco-
nomy, but its precise critique. The ‘monetary theory of value’ and the ‘labour
theory of value’ denote one and the same theory, i.e. not two separate theorems
that can be meaningfully confronted. Moreover, as we will show, it is precisely
the separation of the theory of money and the theory of social labour that gives
rise to fetishistic notions of value. Consequently, as exemplified in Chapter 1,
Marx’s notion of abstract labour, and hence, the ‘third thing’, must be read
against the theory of value in the classics. We do not have to go out of our way
to see that Marx himself considered this distinction pivotal:
As regards value in general, classical political economy in fact nowhere
distinguishes explicitly and with clear awareness between labour as it
appears in the value of a product, and the same labour as it appears in the
product’s use-value. Of course the distinction is made in practice, since
labour is treated sometimes from its quantitative aspect, and at other
times qualitatively. But it does not occur to the economists that a purely
quantitative distinction between the kinds of labour presupposes their
qualitative unity or equality, and therefore their reduction to abstract
human labour.210
It is therefore absurd, as for instanceMakoto Itoh claims, that ‘the direct reduc-
tion from exchange value to the social substance of value in the first section of
Capital contained not only some inconsistency with the analysis of the third
Furner 2004. Furner’s misrecognition of Marx’s central fetishistic-critical implications is
thoroughly discussed by Patrick Murray in Murray 2006. In the debates surrounding the
transformation problem (see Chapter 4.3.), Marx’s labour theory of value has been more
generally attacked. A useful overview of the different accusations against Marx’s core the-
ory is provided in Heinrich 1999, pp. 272–6.
206 Assuming that the classics, predominantly Smith and Ricardo, had a ‘labour theory of
value’ to begin with. Our doubts as to this have been presented in Chapter 1.
207 Itoh 1976, pp. 313–14. Note Heinrich’s critique of Itoh’s conflation of ‘physiological labour’
with ‘abstract labour’. Heinrich 1999, pp. 212–13.
208 Reuten 1993, p. 89.
209 Arthur 2006, p. 10.
210 Marx 1976, 173.
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section, but also insufficiency of logical proof of social inevitability. Unlike the
theory of forms of value, it was not essentiallyMarx’s original logic but rather a
sort of residue of Classical value theory’.211 Arthur’s assessment is equally mis-
taken: ‘Like them (the Uno School) I think that the introduction by Marx of a
posited ground for labour before the form of value is fully theorised represents
a residue of classical political economy’.212 Arthur’s argument, moreover, is a
petitio principii, since he demands that ‘capitalist production must be theor-
ised before the grounding of value in labour is legitimate’213 – to paraphrase:
capitalist production must be theorised before it can be theorised. But Marx’s
Capital thematises capitalist production from the very beginning of the ana-
lysis: there can be no such thing as a ‘commodity’ that has ‘value’ without
capitalist production. The presentation, however, necessitates the move from
the most abstract sphere of simple exchange (as the sphere denoting the ‘only
object’ of bourgeois political economy) to its manifold and intricate social con-
ditions of possibility, that what in hindsight ‘will have made’ simple exchange
appear as the ‘presuppositionless’ condition at the beginning. In other words:
no man (or woman) is born as a ‘commodity owner’. The presentation of the
labour theory of value at the beginning of Capital is however both a logical and
methodological prerequisite: for without such an understanding of the precon-
ditions of general commodity exchange andmoney, the notions of money and
exchange become tautological at best, self-contradictory at worst. In his cri-
tique of Bailey, Marx therefore insists on the presupposition of abstract labour
as value which gives coherence to money, the ‘third commodity’, to begin with:
… for commodities to express their exchange value independently in
money, in a third commodity, the exclusive commodity, the values of
commodities must already be presupposed … in order to be represented in
this way, the commodities must already be identical as values. Otherwise
211 Itoh 1976, pp. 313–14. Also note Itoh’s remarkable attempt to keep the relation between
abstract labour and money at bay: ‘Marx does not regard the common property of com-
modities only as the embodiment of abstract human labor. He emphasizes that “commod-
ities have a value-form common to them all, and presenting a marked contrast with the
varied bodily forms of their use-values” (i, p. 47). He means here the money-form or the
price-form of commodities as the completed form of value, logically developed from the
simple, elementary form of value’. Itoh 1976, p. 310. Not much is said here except for the
truism that the money-form is developed from the simple form of value. The question is
what constitutes the very simple form of value from which the money-form, the ‘dazzling
fetish’, can be developed at all.
212 Arthur 2006, p. 10.
213 Arthur 2006, p. 10.
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it would be impossible to solve the problem of expressing the value of
each commodity in gold, if commodity and gold or any two commod-
ities as values were not representations of the same substance, capable
of being expressed in one another. In other words, this presupposition is
already implicit in the problem itself. Commodities are already presumed
as values, as values distinct from their use values, before the question of
representing this value in a special commodity can arise. In order that
two quantities of different use values can be equated as equivalents, it is
already presumed that they are equal to a third, that they are qualitat-
ively equal and only constitute different quantitative expressions of this
qualitative equality.214
In Capital, Marx emphasises that ‘… their [the commodities’] values can be
communallymeasured in one and the same specific commodity, and this com-
modity can be converted into the commonmeasure of their values, that is into
money’.215 However, Uno doubts this condition of commensurability:
The problem is rather why such a thing as labour itself, the common
foundation of the commodities, is not expressed as such. The common
expression inmoney, too, is performed through nothing but the one com-
modity amidst all the commodities that becomesmoney. In order for such
a commodity to become the common value expression, the centre of the
question is whether there is not another way apart from this method [of
assuming labour as what makes the commodities commensurable].216
Clearly, if it is simply money that makes the commodities commensurable by
solving the contradiction between use value and value, then there is no need to
assumemoney as an already fetishised expression of value. Hence the problem
of fetishism is removed from the question of money in Uno and his theoret-
ical successors in the Uno School. To identify the tautological character of this
claim, we shall move to Uno’s argument for the rejection of the ‘third thing’.
To be sure, ‘value’ as such has no bodily, material existence. It therefore
requires ‘above all an independent form by means of which its identity with
itself may be asserted’.217 Money, as this independent form of value or value
form, has for the first time ‘extinguished’ its own genesis – it leaves ‘no trace
214 Marx 1989b [1861–3], p. 321.
215 Marx 1976, p. 188. Quoted in Uno 1973 [1947], p. 307.
216 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 308.
217 Marx 1976, p. 255.
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behind’218 – of its grounding in abstract labour. Consequently, the separation
of form and substance with the subsequent stress on form demanded by Uno
and Itoh ironically falls victim to the separation of appearance and essence that
is the object of Marx’s critique. Money, appearing as separated from abstract
labour, constitutes value’s ‘identity with itself ’, but precisely by constituting
value’s ‘identity with itself ’, its relation to its essence, abstract labour, is extin-
guished.219 However, because essence ‘must appear’, and cannot exist ‘in itself ’,
we cannot say that value is merely substance. It cannot be separated from its
form of appearance in money, capital, etc. To say that money measures the
values of the commodities is to say that it is the necessary appearance of the
expression of labour time, or, which is the same, the monetary expression of
labour time,220 because the commodities cannot show in and of themselves
what they are worth – they do not have their value ‘branded onto their fore-
head’ (‘auf die Stirn geschrieben’).221 The direct identification of ‘labour’ with
value underestimates the significance of why labour must take on the form of
value under the conditions of capital. The ‘premonetary’ theory of value with
its emphasis on a transhistorically valid ‘labour substance’ therefore ironically
discards the problem of fetishism much in the same way as the Uno School
does.222 Here is also why the alleged theoretical contradiction between a ‘mon-
etary theory of value’ and the labour theory of value is a false one.223 While
218 Marx 1976, p. 187.
219 F. Engster goes even further and demands that Capital should be read by taking money as
the vantage point: ‘… Marx’s Capital must be read by taking money as the vantage point.
That is, already labour, the commodity, and the analyses of their value formsmust be con-
sidered from the “standpoint” of money, as if the economy is the object of determination
for money. Then it is money that gives a double determination to the commodity and it is
also money that makes the three distinctions … with regard to labour, especially by sep-
arating abstract labour from concrete labour and thereby constituting the substance of
value, abstract labour’. Engster 2014, p. 80.
220 Ormelt, originally ‘the value of money’, whichwas theorised concurrently, but independ-
ently, by Gérard Dumenil (1980), Duncan Foley (1982) and Alain Lipietz (1982). It presents
the factor bywhich the value-price divergence can be explained on the basis of the labour
theory of value. We will return to Foley’s conceptualisation in more detail to contrast it
with Thomas Sekine’s view of the ‘law of value’ as the law of general equilibrium. See
Chapter 5.2.
221 Marx 2008, p. 95.
222 ‘… when Marx defines exchange-value as the mode of appearance of value, one should
mobilize here the entire Hegelian weight of the opposition between essence and appear-
ance: essence exists only insofar as it appears, it does not pre-exist appearance’. Zizek 2010,
p. 214.
223 For the discussion of this ‘false opposition’ and critique in the post-Unoist Japanese value
theory, see Chapter 5.
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(surplus) value does not emerge from exchange,224 it cannot exist apart from it.
However, Uno aids and abets the false opposition of the labour theory of value
and a ‘monetary’ theory of value by not acknowledging the necessity of value
to appear in a concrete form. Uno’s determination of money as the ‘mono-
poly to buy’ or as the ‘active leadership of commodity exchange’225 of different
use values remains unhinged from an explanation interested in the social form
of money. By dissociating money theory from the discussion and analysis of
abstract labour, however, Uno skips the analysis of how this objective relation
gains a form of appearance. In sum, Uno proposes a theory of ‘money without
value’, by dismissing the constitutive role and the specific character of abstract
labour. Money is hence tautologically posited as self-explanatory. At this point,
Uno’s presentation of money as simply the ‘mediator’ between different use
values, is reminiscent of Ricardo’s negligence when it comes to examining the
character of the labour that manifests itself in relative values, and accordingly,
in money:
If two commodities are equivalents – or bear a definite proportion to each
other or, which is the same thing, if their magnitude differs according
to the quantity of ‘labour’ which they contain – then it is obvious that
regarded as exchange-values, their substancemust be the same.Their sub-
stance is labour. That is why they are ‘values’. Their magnitude varies,
according to whether they contain more or less of this substance. But
Ricardo does not examine the form – the peculiar characteristic of labour
that creates exchange-value or manifests itself in exchange-values – the
nature of this labour. Hence he does not grasp the connection of this
labour with money or that it must assume the form of money. Hence he
completely fails to grasp the connection between the determination of
the exchange-value of the commodity by labour-time and the fact that
224 Pertinent in this regard is Marx’s critique of Torrens, Malthus and Proudhon. See Marx
1981, pp. 128–31.
225 ‘[i]n contrast to a ruler or a fundō, money does not only function as a measurer, but also
stands in the position of active leadership of commodity exchange itself. Commodities
are not being exchanged because they express their value in money, rather, exchange is
performed as the purchase of commodities through money. Understanding that this pro-
cess takes place through the schema C-M-C’ is, rather, the scientifically investigated result
that, in the back of the real process of purchase, it is something that is socially performed’.
Uno 1973 [1947], p. 314. A fundō is a minted coin of silver or gold, used as a measure and
dating back to theEdoperiod. Between 1665 and 1876, the fundōza, the ‘fundō guild’, intro-
duced it as a weight standard. Since then it was used only as a measure, and as a means of
payment only in cases of emergency. See the Kōjien. Shinmura 1979, p. 1980.
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the development of commodities necessarily leads to the formation of
money. Hence his erroneous theory of money.226
While Ricardo, in Marx’s view, has insufficiently grasped the inner connection
of the specific character of abstract labour andmoney, Uno denies the immedi-
ate connection between abstract labour and money in toto. In this sense, Uno
falls behind Ricardo, assuming a positionmore akin to Bailey, as is shown in the
next section. Uno fails to acknowledge the specific character of labour that is
productive of value andbywhich alone commodities can relate to eachother as
values. Money, the ‘god of commodities’,227 is therefore the objectification (or
‘incarnation’) of abstract human labour in a distinguished sense. By bringing
in the commodity owner, Uno assumes his method is more coherent, and, as
such, does not rely on ‘unproven presuppositions’, as would be the ‘third thing’.
As we have seen, however, abstract labour is not an ‘unproven presupposition’,
but the heuristic to deciphering the emergence of the money fetish. We can
furthermore show that the problemof ‘unprovenpresuppositions’much rather
belongs toUno’s conception of the commodity owner. As pointed to earlier, for
once, there is the circular logic of methodological individualism:money indeed
is advantageous for the individual who uses it – but only if everybody uses it.228
In this respect, money has existed as a social fact ‘before man seeks to give
an account of [its] content andmeaning’.229 Money presupposes general social
relations of production that enable individuals to make use of it, and thereby
express and likewise conceal these relations in the first place. Abstractions that
reduce the social forms of value and money to the function they have in indi-
vidual agents therefore perform a petitio principii.230 Second, as Uno admits,
226 Marx 1989b [1861–3], p. 389.
227 Marx 1987 [1857–61], p. 359. N.I. Stone translates ‘Lord of commodities’ (Marx 1904, p. 166).
The original is ‘Gott derWaren’. Marx 2015, p. 103.
228 See Frank H. Hahn 1987, p. 26. Quoted in Stützle 2015, p. 184.
229 Marx 1976, p. 168.
230 We can also note Lapavitsas’s (who belongs to the Uno School) adherence to the individu-
alistic model, reminiscent of new classical macroeconomics or New Keynesianism (with
their emphasis on micro strcutures), which is best reflected in this passage: ‘Commodity
owners purposely seek others in order to engage in exchange, but it is assumed for simpli-
city that there are no search costs. Commodity owners are also assumed to be unrelated
andprobably unknown to eachother, lacking social or other ties (of rank, kinship, religion,
custom, or through the production process) (sic). The social background against which
they interact is compatible with their essential foreign-ness from each other, as well as
with being motivated by economic gain. Their interactions have an overwhelmingly eco-
nomic (more strictly, commercial) content, which is fundamental for the emergence of
money’. Lapavitsas 2005, p. 554.
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‘free and unhindered exchange’ presents another precondition for the com-
modity economy, as do the private ownership of the means of production, a
large-scale division of labour, competition, etc. Only when thesemanifold con-
ditions are fulfilled can the products of labour acquire a ‘social form’ as com-
modities. Uno’s understanding of ‘social form’ is truncated, because he only
refers it to forms of circulation, while the social form of production is declared
anathematic to the analysis of the commodity:
Marx’s Capital, Volume One, though entitled ‘the Production Process of
Capital’, begins in fact with the discussion of such circulation-forms as
commodities, money, and capital; only after the development of the form
of capital does it turn to the analysis of the labour-process which is com-
mon to all societies (sic), finally opening the real treatment of the pro-
duction process of capital. It cannot be doubted that Marx had an accur-
ate grasp of the true nature of the commodity-economy, although there
remain some methodological ambiguities in Capital [for instance: the
misleading title of the first volume de-emphasises the primacy of the
circulation-forms; the premature and unnecessary (sic) reference to the
labour theory of value in the early part of Capital frequently beclouds the
discussion of commodity circulation (sic)]. The pure theory of capital-
ismmust, in any case, begin with the doctrine of circulation in which the
forms of circulation alone are to be examined.231
But in Marx’s architecture of Capital, the ‘circulation forms’ of the commod-
ity, money, and capital are precisely analysed within the ‘Production Process
of Capital’ to declare their intrinsic relation – to precisely not succumb to the
‘vulgar’ illusion that money should be treated independently of production.
231 Uno 1980, p. xxiv. The quote in square brackets is Sekine’s own insertion, but reflects
Uno’s own later remark: ‘Marx begins the first chapter of Capital, vol. 1, by pointing out
the importance of the commodity-form that products assume. But after stating that use-
value and value are the two elements of the commodity, he immediately attributes the
substance of value to labour that is required to produce the commodity. But the produc-
tion process of a commodity is not yet analysed at this stage. Neither can it be because
production itself does not assume the form of the commodity even if products do. Com-
modity production must assume the form of capital rather than that of the commodity.
Thismeans that commodity production or the production process of capital can be intro-
duced only after the conceptual development of the form of the commodity into that of
capital. Marx’s treatment of the labour-process in Part iii (‘The Production of Absolute
Surplus Value’) of Capital Volume i, is handicapped by his prior discussion of commodity
production at the beginning of the book and fails to be fully developed as the labour-and-
production process common to all societies’. Uno 1980, pp. xxvii–xxviii.
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By merely maintaining that money is a ‘social relation’, authors of the Uno
School, like Costas Lapavitsas,232 do not go further than Marx’s proclamation
in The Poverty of Philosophy that ‘money is not a thing, but a social relation’.
This is also reflected in the view of political economist Ferdinando Galiani
(1728–87)whomMarx criticises in the Fetish chapter for contending that ‘Value
is a relation between persons’ (or more accurately ‘Wealth is a relationship
between two persons’).233 Authors of theUno School altogether underestimate
the role of money as the first appearance of the fetishistic character of value,
precisely in its relation to abstract labour.The finenuance ismissed thatmoney
is not simply a ‘social relation’, but a ‘relation concealed beneath a material
shell’, as Marx formulates his criticism of Galiani.234 But the misconception
of abstract labour goes further. If money alone constitutes the ‘objectivity’ of
value, what are we to make of the commodity owner whose subjective eval-
uation was the motivation for value expression? Needless to say, the whole
complex of real abstraction or Realabstraktion, first theorised by Alfred Sohn-
Rethel, and subsequently gaining momentum in the theoretical framework of
Kritische Theorie,235 goes unnoticed in Uno. Therefore, not only the relation
between abstract labour and money, but also the relation between the sub-
jective and objective aspects of value is left unaddressed. The epistemological
coherence inUno’s approachmust therefore be questioned. It is Reichelt’s eval-
uation of Adorno’s contribution to the problem of money and exchange that
may illuminate Uno’s missing epistemological reflection:
AlthoughAdorno repeatedly spoke about the exchange society, he should
not be described – as he so often wrongly is – as a theorist of an exchange
society in the economic sense. The essence of Adorno’s critical theory lies
in the very fact that he understands the capitalist economy as an inver-
ted reality in which individuals no longer ‘interact with one another’ on
the market as rationally acting subjects, as the idea of the exchange eco-
nomy suggests. Adorno criticised such a concept as ‘social nominalism’.
Rather, they act as executors of constraints generated and reproduced
by themselves, which are implemented in and through their conscious
actions without, however, these being consciously accessible to them.
232 Ingo Stützle emphasises this aspect in Lapavitsas in Stützle 2015, p. 179, footnote.
233 ‘Ricchezza è una ragione tra due persone’, in Galiani, Ferdinando, Della moneta, p. 221,
in Volume 3 of Scrittori classici italiani di economia politica, Parte moderna, Milan 1803,
quoted in Marx 1976, p. 167. Thanks to Riccardo Bellofiore for the precise translation.
234 Marx 1976, p. 167.
235 For an overview of Sohn-Rethel’s concept of real abstraction throughout his writings from
the 1930s to the 1970s, see Lange 2021 (forthcoming).
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This is what the strong concept of totality means, which should not be
confused with the mechanistic idea in which ‘everything is linked with
everything else’ (Albert), or with the hermeneutic one that operates by
‘anticipating the interpretation of a connection of meaning’ (Habermas).
Totality is not amethodological postulate, but rather the concept of a real
‘becoming autonomous [Verselbständigung]’.236
For Adorno, ‘Totality … is pre-established for all individual subjects since they
obey its “constraints” even in themselves and even in their monadological con-
stitution and here in particular, conceptualise totality. To this extent, totality
is what is most real’.237 Marx described the same predicament with his sar-
castic diagnosis that the determination of value as socially necessary labour
time asserts itself in the same way as ‘the law of gravity asserts itself when a
person’s house collapses on top of him’.238 To be sure, there are different ways
to perform an analysis. We do not hold that Marx’s analysis of the value form
is the ‘only’ and ‘exclusive’ way to proceed from the forms of appearance to the
essence of value that determines the exchange relations between commodit-
ies. Much rather, we hold that conducting an analysis by separating the two
issues – money (the explanandum) and abstract labour (the explanans) – and
declaring them as belonging to different levels of analysis – exchange (circula-
tion) and production – is not an analysis at all, for the object in question (the
value formof money) is simply never questioned. Uno’s exemplifications read as
though the reality of money – the fact that money ‘always’ assumes the place
of the universal equivalent – is the one answer we should be content with. But
the ‘how, why and through what’ of this ‘reality’, which allows for the veritably
deep insight into the fetishistic structure that the value formexhibits, simultan-
eously disclosing Marx’s method in Capital, is discarded from Uno’s approach
and substituted for the poor theoretical framework of methodological indi-
vidualism associatedwith commodity owners. It therefore also reintroduces the
money fetish. This one-sided stress on the ‘form’ and the dismissal of the qual-
itative dimension of value is precisely the hallmark of bourgeois and vulgar
political economy, which Marx has predominantly criticised in Samuel Bailey.
Bailey gives the present study a welcome argumentative template with
which to consider Uno’s objections to Marx’s value theory in more detail.
236 Reichelt 2007, p. 5.
237 Adorno 1976, p. 12. Quoted in Reichelt 2007, p. 5.
238 Marx 1976, p. 168. A footnote also refers to Engels’s similar formulation: ‘What are we to
think of a law which can only assert itself through periodic crises [Revolutionen (sic)]? It
is just a natural law which depends on the lack of awareness of the people who undergo
it’. Marx and Engels 1975 [May 1843 – June 1844], p. 433.
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Indeed, Uno’s reservations against the ‘substance of value’ clearly echoes
Bailey’s critique of DavidRicardo’s theory of value. Because these parallels have
not sufficiently come to the fore in Uno research, in the following we will elab-
orate on the basic theoretical similarities between Bailey and Uno which we
previously only hinted at. The following discussion also serves to highlight the
essential differences between Ricardo’s and Marx’s theory of value. It is safe to
say that Marx has been able to refine his value theory through Bailey’s critique
of Ricardo. The question is whether there is still reasonable ground to attack
Marx’s mature value theory by assuming a Baileyist position.
3.3.4 Form vs. Substance: Uno Kōzō’s Baileyism
So far, we have analysed two aspects in Uno’s defective interpretation of the
value form: 1. the emergence of value through the want of the commodity
owner of the equivalent’s use value, and 2., the dissociation of abstract labour
from the theory of money. Both views are to be commonly grounded in themis-
recognition of Marx’s crucial theorem, the threefold inversion taking place in
the ‘particularities of the equivalent form’. To complete the analysis of Uno’s
theory of value without fetish in the context of Capital Volume i, we must take
a closer look at Uno’s emphasis on ‘form’.
As a general preliminary to the problem of ‘form’ in Marx, we strongly hold
that the stress on ‘form’, pivotal to Marx’s analysis of value, is not to be con-
flated (or, indeed, identified) with a ‘formal’ or even ‘formalist’ approach to
value that ‘brackets’ (Arthur) the mode of production. In Marx’s mature work,
the semantics of ‘form’ primarily denotes two aspects: a) a synonym with ‘cat-
egory’, used in the same way as Hegel’s concept or Begriff, and b), as in ‘social’
form, a strictly non-generalisable, historically specificmodeof production such
as we find in capitalism. In this sense, Marx speaks of the form of value as ‘the
particular formwhich labour assumes as the substanceof value’.239 In reference
to his taxonomyof ‘social form i’ and ‘social form ii’, a helpful distinction denot-
ing the specific form of labour assumed in capitalist production (social form
i) and the value forms, i.e. the commodity, money, capital, wage, profit, rent,
etc. (social form ii), Brentel argues that abstract-general labour as substance of
value is specifically social form (form i), which assumes its form of existence in
the value-forms, the categories of bourgeois political economy (form ii).240
Concerning the latter, as Backhaus contends, ‘Marx’s central demand from
“the” economic science (“die” Ökonomie) consisted in “genetically developing”
239 Marx 1989b [1861–3], p. 399.
240 Brentel 1989, p. 14.
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the “categories” or “forms”, instead of “presupposing” them’.241 Hence Marx’s
coinage of the term ‘objective forms of thought’ (‘objektive Gedankenformen’),
uniting both a description of the ossified nature of conventional economic cat-
egories (or forms), and their critique. As for the second, more eminent and
likewise controversial usageof ‘form’,Marxwas intent onconceptually differen-
tiating ‘value’ from ‘value form’. Marx insisted that the conflation of value with
value form in the phenomenon of commodity exchange was the hallmark of a
deficient grasp of value. For it is precisely the analysis of the form of value –
and not, as many interpreters, including Uno, believe, the positive hypostasis
of form – that serves to disclose the content hidden by the form, i.e. abstract
social labour. Here, themeaning of form-content (Formgehalt), whichwepoin-
ted to earlier, can be elucidated.With regard to the ‘Urtext’ (RoughDraft) of the
Grundrisse and its elaborate comments on form,Helmut Brentel states that, for
Marx,
… a mere formal view counts as ‘merely abstract’ (Gr 935); it is fixated
on a merely external form, or the external of the form (das Äusserliche
der Form) respectively, and treats it as though it presented the whole. The
economic form determinations are referred to as ‘superficial forms’ (Gr
934ff.) which themselves seem to emerge from the surface of the social-
isation process ‘(Vergesellschaftungsprozess)’. In this sense, the formal
(das Formelle) forms the antonym to an essential, content-related, ‘qual-
itatively’ (Gr 185) understood form which is reassured with regard to its
constitutive form-content and hence even refers to ‘form’ as one of its
content-determinations.242
Social form becomes indicative of content when it is able to address the
‘grounding nexus’ (Begründungszusammenhang) that gives rise to this form.
This is what is meant by the form-content Marx demands from the analysis
of the value form. It does not suffice to identify value as appearing in specific
forms; in fact, the theorist must be able to account for the common ground of
all the value forms, which cannot directly appear as such. Marx’s critique of
Ricardo, who, like Bailey, only considers specific quantities, but never the qual-
ity grounding particular amounts, directly reflects this demand: ‘[Ricardo] does
not even examine the formof value – theparticular formwhich labour assumes
as the substanceof value.Heonly examines themagnitudes of value, thequant-
ities of this abstract, general, and in this form social labour which engender
241 Backhaus 2011, p. 410.
242 Brentel 1989, p. 244.
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differences in themagnitudes of values in the commodities’.243 Bailey’s conclu-
sion that there is simply no such thing as a common substance or ‘denominator’
in the relativemagnitudes of value, is consequently – within his own logic – not
too far-fetched. However, and this is crucial,
the relativity of the concept of value is by no means negated by the fact
that all commodities, insofar as they are exchange values, are only relative
expressions of social labour time and their relativity consists by nomeans
solely of the ratio inwhich they exchange for one another, but of the ratio
of all of them to this social labour which is their substance.244
Marx’s critique of ‘mere form’, i.e. of the economic form-determinations as they
appear in his predecessors, is the most poignant when it focuses on the fetish-
isations of conventional form-constitution, as e.g. in the hypostasis of simple
circulation and the commodity and money, supposedly presenting the ‘total’
relations of production. Hypostatisations of C-M-C or M-C-M as the ‘real’ or
‘actual’ social process – conducted byUno in the Principleswithout problemat-
ising them245 – fail to see that these ‘formal’ determinations of value primarily
deliver a distorted view of the really existing, fully yet-to-be-analysed relations
of production which are precisely not exhausted in these circulation forms. As
Brentel argues,
The ideological semblance of simple circulation is constituted precisely
in that its economic determinations appear to the immediately acting
subjects as well as their theoretical interpreters as exclusively formal
determinations. The production of this semblance of the merely formal
of so-called simple circulation results from the given form of its mediat-
ingmovement itself. Because in theirmediating formsC-M-CandM-C-M,
simple circulation, viewed as such, only presents the ‘formal process’ (Gr
919) of mediating or realising both determinations of the commodity as
use value and value in the process of exchange in such amanner that they
are divided in polar form to the extremes of the exchange process, as com-
modity and money.246
243 Marx 1989a [1861–3], p. 399.
244 Marx 1989a [1861–3], p. 399.
245 Uno 1980, p. 10; also see Uno 1964, pp. 31–2.
246 Brentel 1989, p. 244.
uno’s theory of value – value without fetish (1947–69) 239
To further indicate the importance of the distinction between value and
value form, Marx made the following crucial remark:
The process of exchange gives to the commodity which it has converted
into money not its value but its specific value-form. Confusion between
the twoattributes hasmisled somewriters intomaintaining that the value
of gold and silver is imaginary.247
That value and the value form are to be strictly differentiated is key to under-
standing the first chapter of Capital and the critique of fetishism that follows
from it, constitutingMarx’smethod.With this remark,Marx has also killed two
birds with one stone: he both discourages the view that value is something that
‘emerges’ from exchange (the view that Uno holds) and the view that value
is to be identified with the form in which it appears. But the emphasis on
value form should not lead us astray: as Rubin has shown, it is precisely the
‘inner dialogue’ with his contemporary Bailey, and especially Bailey’s critique
of Ricardo, that has led Marx to refine his theory of value in terms of differen-
tiating it from ‘exchange value’, the term he used in large parts synonymously
with the concept of value, e.g. in theGrundrisse and the Contribution.248 At the
same time, this ‘dialogue’ can also be read as a direct rebuttal of Uno’s formalist
approach to value. Like Bailey, Uno holds the assumption that 1) the quantity
offered by commodity owner A in exchange for a quantity of commodity B’s
use value determines commodity A’s value, so that 2) value is determined by
exchange alone, and that 3), it is redundant to assume a ‘third thing’ or ‘com-
mon substance’ to arrive at a commodity’s exchange value or price. Accord-
ingly, exchange value or price alone regulates the socialmetabolism: there is no
content, only form. In his discussion in the EconomicManuscripts 1861–3,Marx
first introduces Samuel Bailey249 as deserving the merit to have discarded the
notion that theremust be an ‘invariablemeasure’ of value, as Ricardo believed:
In order to measure the value of commodities – to establish an external
measure of value – it is not necessary that the value of the commodity
in terms of which the other commodities aremeasured, should be invari-
247 Marx 1976, pp. 184–5. One of those ‘writers’, according toMarx, was John Locke: ‘Locke had
already said that gold and silver have a purely imaginary or conventional value; this was
the first blunt opposition to the contention of the monetary system that only gold and
silver have genuine value’. Marx 1987 [1857–61], p. 395.
248 See Rubin 1973 [1928], pp. 109–10.
249 For a debate on Marx’s critique of Samuel Bailey, see Furner 2004 and Murray 2006.
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able. (It must on the contrary be variable … because themeasure of value
is, andmust be, a commodity since otherwise it would have no immanent
measure in common with other commodities.) If, for example, the value
of money changes, it changes to an equal degree in relation to all other
commodities. Their relative values are therefore expressed in it just as cor-
rectly as if the value of money had remained unchanged. The problem of
finding an ‘invariable measure of value’ is thereby eliminated.250
As already highlighted in the previous chapter (Chapter 3.2.), it would bewrong
to infer that because the common measure of value need not be ‘invariable’,
there is no need for a common ground (a ‘third’) on the basis of which value
can be measured at all. This is Bailey’s main thesis, held in the Critical Disser-
tation on Value (1825) and other works directed against Ricardo. According to
Bailey, Ricardo was wrong to transform ‘value’ from being a relative property
of the commodity into being something absolute.251 Long before Uno, Bailey
assumes that there is no other way to determine the value of a commodity
than todetermine thequantitative proportion inwhich commodities exchange
as use values: ‘If the value of an object is its power of purchasing, there must
be something to purchase. Value denotes consequently nothing positive or
intrinsic, but merely the relation in which two objects stand to each other as
exchangeable commodities’.252 In their understanding, both Bailey and Uno
however conflate the value expression of a particular use valuewith value itself,
ignoring the difference between the superficial-phenomenal form of value in
its appearance, and the condition of possibility of the one commodity being
an ‘expression of value’ of the other in the first place. In other words, both
for Bailey and for Uno, ‘value is fundamentally to be understood as nothing
but what presents itself at the level of prices of production, i.e. relative price, a
merely quantitative expression of one commodity in units of another commod-
ity. Any relation to an ‘immanent’ or ‘absolute’ value in the sense of a common
labour value determination is rejected as a relic of a substance-metaphysical
kind of thought’.253
250 Marx 1989b [1861-63], p. 320.
251 ‘The contradiction involved in affirming the stationary or invariable value of any object
amidst the variations of other things, is so direct and palpable, that it may be instructive
to point out theway inwhich awriter of such powers of reasoning, asMr. Ricardo unques-
tionably possessed, has been led into so strange andmanifest an error’. Bailey 1967 [1825],
p. 16.
252 Bailey 1967 [1825], pp. 4–5.
253 Brentel paraphrases Bailey’s position. Brentel 1989, p. 108.
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Bailey:
When … we regard two objects as subjects of choice or exchange, we
appear to acquire the power of expressing our feelings with precision, we
say, for instance, that oneA is, in our estimation, equal to two B. But this is
not the expression of positive, but of relative esteem; or, more correctly,
of the relation in which A and B stand to each other in our estimation.
This relation can be denoted only by quantity. The value of A is expressed
by the quantity of B for which it will exchange, and the value of B is in the
same way expressed by the quantity of A. Hence the value of A may be
termed the power which it possesses or confers of purchasing B, or com-
manding B in exchange.254
To this, Marx responds: ‘To estimate the value of A, a book for instance, in B,
coals, and C, wine, A, B, C must be as value something different from their
existences as books, coals or wine. To estimate a value of A in B, A must have
a value independent of the estimation of that value in B, and both must be
equal to a third thing, expressed in both of them’.255 But Bailey himself is not
entirely consequential in his definition of value. On the one hand, value is rad-
ically contingent and dependent on subjective evaluation by relating different
quantities of different products (not of value, but use value), and on the other
hand, value is a ‘property’ of things: ‘Value is a property of things, riches of
men.Value, in this sense, necessarily implies exchange, riches donot’. Similar to
Uno, the conflation of use value with value also obscures the conceptual rela-
tion to the role of human want. Marx ironically comments: ‘Riches which are
identical with use values are properties of things that are made use of by men
and which express a relation to their wants’.256 However, as Marx has shown in
the fetish-characteristic ‘properties’ of the equivalent (value) form, value does
indeed appear as a ‘property of things’, namely in inverted form:
In the first part of my book, I mentioned that it is characteristic of labour
based on private exchange that the social character of labour ‘manifests
itself ’ in a perverted form – as the ‘property’ of things; that a social rela-
tion appears as a relation between things (between products, values in
use, commodities). This appearance is accepted as something real by our
254 Bailey 1967 [1825], p. 3. Marx does not quote this passage from the Dissertation, but a cor-
responding passage in theObservations on certain verbal disputes in Pol. Ec. that could not
be confirmed.
255 Marx 1989b [1861–3], p. 316. Originally in English.
256 Marx 1989b [1861–3], p. 316.
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fetish-worshipper, and he actually believes that the exchange value of
things is determined by their properties as things, and is altogether a nat-
ural property of things.257
The same goes for both Uno’s and Bailey’s conception of money as merely an
external expression of relative value, reducing the qualitative transformation
of value into money to a quantitative measure. For Bailey, as well as for Uno,
‘ “value” is nothing but the quantitative exchange relation of things that are
exchanged, and everything else is a scholastic illusion’.258 Because for Bailey,
value is already constituted in a ‘monetary expression’, ‘he does not need to
“understand” how this expression becomes possible, how it is determined, and
what in fact it expresses’.259To be sure, Uno, in contrast to Bailey, acknowledged
the problem of fetishism addressed by Marx, manifested in the appearance of
value as money. But he fatally dissociated it from the social character of labour
under capitalist conditions, thereby counterfactually reintroducing the fetish-
istic notion of money as ‘externalmeasure’. In doing so, Uno bizarrely turns the
relation between the value form of money and abstract labour upside down: the
form of value must not be explained by referring it to labour, but labour must be
‘form-determined’ –whether historically or systematically is unclear – by value.
In this sense, form determines content/substance, manifested in ‘commodity
economic development’:
Labour as ‘value forming substance’ abstracted (shashō) from every form
and was, so to speak, nothing more than something passive and abstract
(chūshōteki). As such, we cannot make it the foundation of the value
form. In other words, it is developed by the value form itself. The value
form of the commodity is rather grasped through the forms that this sub-
stance itself passes through,which is nothing but the process of commod-
ity economic development. The formal determination alone clarifies the
assumption of ‘the physical form in the equal objectivity of the products
of labour as values’ (Marx 1976, p. 164). Moreover, in order to take on ‘the
form of themagnitude of the value of the products of labour’ (Marx 1976,
p. 164), the form determination itself is necessary. As the completion of
the value form of the commodity, value as money necessarily appears to
have this independent form (dokuritsu no katachi).260
257 Marx 1989b [1861–3], p. 317.
258 Brentel 1989, p. 112. This comment is directed at Bailey.
259 Marx 1989b [1861–3], p. 341.
260 Uno 1973 [1947], pp. 361–2. Emphasis added.
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However, at no point does Uno discuss ‘how this expression becomes pos-
sible, how it is determined, and what in fact it expresses’.261 His discussion
is strictly limited to giving priority to form over substance, appearance over
essence. Uno’s own ‘inversion’ of the problem therefore does not escape the
pitfalls of a similar kind of question-begging to that which we have noticed in
Bailey: if labour only ‘comes into play’ within the analysis of the production
process of capital, we still have not understood the determination of value that
in turn serves as the analytical template for capital. Uno’s argument becomes
circular.262 His inversion of the problem of the relation of labour to value does
not escape the Baileyist presuppositions, becauseUno, like Bailey, categorically
denies the importance of the ‘third thing’ as the precondition of exchangeab-
ility. Marx’s critique of Bailey therefore also holds for Uno:
Bailey clings to the form263 in which the exchange value of the commod-
ity – as commodity – appears, manifests itself …The individual commod-
ity as such cannot express general labour time, or it can only express it in
its equation with the commodity which constitutes money, in its money
price. But then the value of commodity A is always expressed in a certain
quantity of the use value of M, the commodity which functions asmoney.
This is how matters appear directly. And Bailey clings to this. The most
superficial form of exchange value, that is, the quantitative relationship in
which commodities exchange with one another, constitutes, according to
Bailey, their value. The advance from the surface to the core of the prob-
lem is not permitted. He even forgets the simple consideration that if y
yards of linen = x lbs of straw, this [implies] a parity between two unequal
things – linen and straw –making them equalmagnitudes. This existence
of theirs as things that are equal must surely be different from their exist-
ence as strawand linen. It is not [as] strawand linen that they are equated,
but as equivalents. The one side of the equation must, therefore, express
the same value as the other. The value of straw and linenmust, therefore,
261 See the previous quote, Marx 1989b [1861–3], p. 341.
262 We assume that Uno analyses the value forms as they are specific to capitalist society. If
Uno regarded the basic forms of value as ‘transhistorical’ categories, valid in pre-capitalist
sociation aswell as in the capitalist one, he could no longermaintain that he held a ‘theory
of principles of pure capitalism’. With the methodological reflections of the clear separ-
ation of the three stages of presentation taken as a premise, we must assume that Uno
cannot both hold a transhistorical and a historically specific theory of value. Hence the
question about the possibility of form determination of value in abstraction from the
notion of specifically capitalist character of labour, is justified.
263 Emphasis added.
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be neither straw nor linen, but something common to both and different
fromboth commodities considered as strawand linen.What is it?Hedoes
not answer this question. Instead, he wanders off into all the categories
of political economy in order to repeat the samemonotonous litany over
and over again, [namely,] that value is the exchange relation of commod-
ities and consequently is not anything different from this relation.264
Uno’s tacit agreement with Bailey also pertains to his theory of money. While,
for Uno, money ‘substitutes the “third thing” and guarantees the relational-
ity of the different commodities to itself as the “solution between use value
and value” ’, ‘[a]ccording to Bailey, it is not the determination of the product as
value which leads to the establishment of money and which expresses itself
in money, but it is the existence of money which leads to the fiction of the
concept of value’.265 However, while Uno’s agreement with Bailey strikes us in
the relational-quantitative approach to value and money, Uno simultaneously
stays behind Bailey in the methodological individualism of the significance of
the want of the commodity owner. Bailey’s view does not require ‘subject-
ive’ evaluation – for Bailey, value is objectively manifested in the quantitative
relation between different commodities as use values.266 Yet, both deny the
qualitative aspect of value, a point that, among others, Rubin has emphasised
and criticised in the case of Bailey. At the same time, Rubin contends that the
concept of ‘form’ is not exhausted (or should not be conflated with) a ‘form-
alist’ reading of value. In fact, Rubin directly associates the concept of (social)
formwith the concept of labour: ‘ “[F]orm of value” (Wertform) does not mean
the various forms which value acquired in its development (for example, acci-
dental, expanded, and general forms of value), but of value itself, which is con-
sidered as the social form of the product of labor. In other words, here we do not
have in mind the various “forms of value”, but “value as form” ’.267 Accordingly,
Marx objected to ‘Bailey for limiting his analysis to the quantitative aspect of
exchange value and for ignoring value’,268 and the Classics for ignoring the spe-
cific formof value consisting in its character as specific social labour. It is there-
fore surprising that the Unoist Itoh locates the debate on value as revolving
around the two ‘extremes’ of the Ricardian school and Rubin, and not Ricardo
264 Marx 1989b [1861–3], pp. 326–7. Original emphasis.
265 Marx 1989b [1861–3], p. 326.
266 Which of course leads to other problems, such as ‘price chaos’. See Rubin 1973 [1928], p. 110.
267 Rubin 1973 [1928], p. 112, footnote.
268 Rubin 1973 [1928], p. 113.
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and Bailey.269 The contrast between Ricardo and Rubin is lopsided, since they
do not present opposing extremes: Ricardo’s theory of value relates value to
labour (no matter how precariously), and so does Rubin, by understanding
value as the social form of the product of labour. It is Bailey against which
Ricardo’s and Rubin’s positions must be situated.270 The separation between
substance and form, in order to hypothesise the stress on ‘form’ – understood
as the ‘quantitative exchangeability of commodities in determinate ratios’ in
the theory of ‘pure capitalism’271 – is Bailey’s, and stands diametrically opposed
to Rubin’s stress on abstract labour as the social form of value. The conflation
of form with formalism (and the wrong attribution of Rubin as a ‘formalist’)
is however a symptom in many of Uno’s successors that Uno himself cannot
be accused of. In sum, Uno’s Baileyism consists in holding that the value form
is sufficiently determined by the exchange ratios offered for another commod-
ity, thereby also conflating, like Bailey before him, exchange value (price) and
value. This reduction to a subjectivist formalism radically diverges fromMarx’s
own theorisation in the social form of value, and therefore in the form-content
(Formgehalt) of value:
It is therefore decisive to see that Bailey – and with him, the whole sub-
jectivist approach in economic theory –must ignore the very level of logi-
city (logische Ansprüchlichkeit) which is inherent in the problem of value
expression, the value expression of one kind of commodity in the use
value of another. By doggedly insisting on form, he ignores the immanent
269 See Itoh 1980 and 1988.
270 Simon Clarke directs a trenchant critique at Itoh’s position: ‘For Itoh, the Uno approach
resolves this dilemma [between theRicardians andRubin] by radically separating the the-
ories of the form of value and the substance of value. The pure theory of the forms of
value does not make any reference to the substance of value, but only to the quantitative
exchangeability of commodities in determinate ratios, which ratios are determined by the
social process of reproduction’. Clarke 1988, p. 135. Clarke’s criticism of the Uno approach
is that it remains confined to a ‘dualistic theory’ by positing ‘such a separation in the first
place’ while purporting to retain both. The notion of abstract labour then is reduced to
its ‘technical features of the production process under average conditions’. Clarke 1988,
p. 137. It remains ‘a feature of the labour process as a technical process, independently of
the social form of production’. Clarke 1988, p. 136. In other words, this understanding of
abstract labour is yet another crucial difference to Rubin who emphasised that the iden-
tification of abstract labour with the material and technical aspect of production is the
precise expression of fetishism. See Rubin 1973 [1928], p. 28.
271 ‘The pure theory of the forms of value does not make any reference to the substance of
value, but only to the quantitative exchangeability of commodities in determinate ratios,
which ratios are determined by the social process of reproduction of commodities lying
behind their regular exchange against money’. Clarke 1988, p. 135.
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content of that form (Formgehalt). In order for the commodity to be able to
express its own exchange value as well as its quantitative value relations
autonomously in money – as the third, excluded commodity – the values
of the commodities as the common unit of reference must logically be
presupposed.272
In other words, without an inherent quality that relates commodities of differ-
ent use values in different proportions (quantities) to one another, the very
possibility of a relation is set at nought. Without a tertium comparationis, there
can be no comparatio at all.
To summarise, we can detect three distinct features of Bailey’s theory of
value shared byUno: a) the definition of value as a claimof accidental exchange
relations in the sense of a subjectivist theory of price formation,273 b) the claimof
the constitution of value inacts of exchangebetween two commodity owners, not
as the social form that labour assumes under the conditions of capitalist valor-
isation imperative, and c) the claim of the foundation of value in the natural
properties and the use value of ‘things’, as well as in the consciousness (personal
‘want’) of the agents involved in exchange.
These claims are diametrically opposed to Marx’s understanding of the
problem of value constitution which precisely is not accounted for in the
dimensions of subjective theories of price, dualistic exchange relations, use
value functions, or the ‘personal want’ of commodity owners. To the contrary,
value constitution is inherently embedded in the question of fetishistic appear-
ances that the features identified by Bailey andUno as constitutive of value are
mere expressions of. Again, neither value, nor its fetishistic appearance in the
value forms, can be explained by discarding the specific social form of labour
that, as a relation of totality, makes commodities relate to each other as values
in the first place.
In the followingwewant to examinewhetherUno’s discussion of capital can
tell usmore about the social character of value, and thereforemove beyond the
theories that Marx already found to be logically flawed.
272 Brentel 1989, p. 120.
273 We will return to discussing Uno’s marginalist theoretical assumptions in Chapter 4.2.
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3.4 Uno’s Theory of Capital: M-C-M’ as Pure Form
Value Theory is mainly comprised of a commentary on the first chapters of
Capital Volume i. While Chapters 1 and 2 have been shown to already contain
Marx’s general theory of money, Uno views Chapter 3 of Capital as the locus
classicus of Marx’s money theory. In Chapter 3, Marx discusses ‘Money or the
Circulation of Commodities’ in the sections on money as 1. Measure of Values,
2. Means of Circulation, and money as 3. ‘Money’, namely in (a) Hoarding, (b)
Means of Payment, and (c) World Money. However, Uno omits the discussion
of money as measure of value that represents Marx’s important corrective to
(neo)classical theories of money.274 Uno’s omission is logical, and also telling,
given his rejection of money as ‘the necessary form of appearance of themeas-
ure of value which is imminent in commodities, namely labour-time’.275 For
Uno, money is confined to the functions of the means of circulation, means
(and aim) of hoarding, means of payment, and ‘world money’. His approach
therefore imitates conventional theories of moneywithout adding new incent-
ives. This is also why Uno’s theory of hoarding etc., despite its many prob-
lems,276 will not be discussed here. Instead, we shall directly move on to Uno’s
understanding of capital.
In the section of ValueTheory called ‘Value as Capital’ (Chapter 2, Section 3),
Uno presents his thesis that the development from C-M-C to M-C-M, roughly
referring to Chapter 4 of Capital, was motivated by international trade and
merchant capital. Like in the Methodology, where Uno discusses the historical
beginnings of capitalism, he again recurs toMarx’s assumption fromChapter 2
of Capital Volume i that ‘[t]he exchange of commodities begins where com-
munities have their boundaries …’ We have already seen in Chapter 2.1. of
this volume that Uno delegates the problem of the emergence of a capitalist
mode of production away from the issue of production towards the focus on
exchange between communities in pre-medieval societies, and thereby away from
Marx’s own understanding of primitive accumulation. It makes sense to briefly
return to the discussion on method in Chapter 2. According to Michael Hein-
rich’s important insight, it was the separation of the producers from themeans
of production that initiated capitalist sociation historically, not ‘the hoarding
in the hands of few’. This insight followed from the structural analysis of the
274 Engster 2014, p. 89.
275 Marx 1976, p. 188.
276 One of them being the identification of wealth with use value: ‘In commodity economy,
wealth is nothing but simply use value. But it can also not stop at commodities’. Uno 1973
[1947], p. 325.
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concept of capital in the chapters preceding the one on ‘Primitive Accumula-
tion’. Chapter 24 of Capital Volume i was written as the presentation of the his-
torical instance that gave rise to the subjugation of labour under capital: ‘Only
on the basis of the analysis of the capitalist mode of production it becomes
therefore clear that the separation of direct producers from theirmeans of pro-
duction (and not, as could be assumed, the hoarding of money treasures in
the hands of few) is the central historical precondition for the capitalist mode
of production … only after the analysis of the basic structure of the capital
relation, it becomes clear which historical processes have to be presented with
regard to the generation of the capital relation’.277 Uno, though aware of the
theoretical importance of the ‘free worker in the double sense’, here seems to
attribute a stronger emphasis to the role of the ‘hoarding of money treasures
in the hands of few’ in his discussion of merchant capital and the general for-
mula for capital in M-C-M’.278 He does not clearly delineate the meaning of
the historical emergence of the ‘free worker’ from his emphasis on the exist-
ence of merchant capital for the constitution of capitalism.279 In fact, within
Uno’s historical systematisation of the emergence of the capital relation, this
remains a pervading contradiction. While Uno draws on the unique import-
ance of the ‘commodification of labour power’ for his theoretical elaboration
on the reproduction process of capital, the commodification of labour power
itself – and this ‘relation encloses a world history’ – remains external to Uno’s
understanding of the history of the capital relation. Yet, at the same time, as is
also admitted by Uno, industrial capital ‘is no longer merely a form of circula-
tion’280 and therefore presupposes the labour power commodity.With regard to
this contradiction, Hyeon-Soo remarks that if capital can only be understood
on the social basis of the commodification of labour power, then it is a matter
of fact that the concept of ‘capital’ cannot solely contain the forms of commer-
cial or interest-bearing capital. It follows that the theory of the transformation
of money into capital (as explained by Uno) is insufficient for the understand-
277 Heinrich 1999, p. 178.
278 See also Marx 1989b [1861–3], p. 405: ‘It is not the ownership of money which makes the
capitalist a capitalist. For money to be transformed into capital, the prerequisites for cap-
italist production must exist, whose first historical presupposition is that separation. The
separation, and therefore the existence of the conditions of labour as capital, is given in
capitalist production; this separation which constantly reproduces itself and expands, is
the foundation of production’.
279 Brenner delineates the two clearly and shows why the latter is not a sufficient condition
for the emergence of capitalist relations of production. See Brenner 1977, p. 45. Also see
Chapter 2.1.
280 Uno 1980, p. 16.
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ing of commodity economy in general, and that it neither implies nor mirrors
the emergence of capitalism in a world market dominated by the mercantilist
system, even though particular pre-capitalist forms of capital can emerge from
the forms of the commodity and money.281
To solve this contradiction, Uno suggests limiting the transformation of
money into capital to the pre-capitalist forms of merchant/commercial capital,
explained in the framework of the self-augmentation of capital in the general
formula M-C-M’. Only after this general formula has been explained can we
move to understanding the emergence of surplus value in industrial capital.282
Of course, this leaves us again – as in the discussion of the value form – with
the problem of the status of ‘the theory of principles’ of ‘pure capitalism’. We
must concede that Uno’s theory of capital is undecided between represent-
ing a transhistorical or a historically specific, a logical or a historical account,
undermining his own claim to the clear separation between the ‘three levels’
of method. To follow Uno’s emphasis on merchant capital as the not only his-
torically, but also logically primary form of capital, let us take a look at Uno’s
unfolding of the argument. The following discussion will not only show Uno’s
departure from Marx, but – more pertinently – Uno’s relentless attempt to
appropriate Marx’s theory for his own ends.
3.4.1 Buying Cheap and Selling Dear
Before the analysis of M-C-M’, Uno discusses the circulation form C-M-C’
(which Marx used only in the Contribution) to give further evidence to the
importance of use value in simple commodity exchange. According to Uno,
this development, to which he attributes C-C’ as the fundamental circulation
form of pre-capitalist societies, was gradually and historically overcome by the
development of money as means of circulation, hoardedmoney, andmeans of
payment.What emerged inmerchant or commercial capitalismwas a new ori-
entation towardsmoney as a goal in itself.283 In close connection to the context
of the historical emergence of merchant capital, Uno discusses the new formof
circulation M-C-M, directed at acquiring and accumulating money as a means
in itself:
Moneyas ameansof circulation stoppedcirculationwhen itwashoarded,
while at the same time, the selling of commodities preceded their acquis-
ition and was coercively organised for the sake of the acquisition of means
281 Hyeon-Soo 1995, p. 94.
282 See Uno 1980, pp. 14–18.
283 See Uno 1973 [1947], p. 329.
250 chapter 3
of payment through sale. This substantially assumed the basis of such a
circulation form and was its necessary development. In other words, the
increase of the circulation of gold as money on the one hand assumed
these conditions, while on the other hand, it brought forward the ‘com-
modity-economisation’ (shōhin keizaika) on the basis of the domination
of such a circulation form. The development of foreign commerce com-
mercialised inner trade.284
Marx however does not discuss any particular historical social formation, but
presents the form determinations of circulation (C-M-C, M-C-M) to introduce
his notion of surplus value which, as probably his single most important term,
he directs first and foremost against the fetishised concept of surplus in the
mercantilist notion of ‘buying cheap and selling dear’. Uno, on the other hand,
utilises Marx’s concept of surplus value to do quite the opposite: M-C-M is
introduced emphatically as the very form on which capital is based, namely
the mercantilist self-understanding of ‘buying cheap and selling dear’, or the
price margin. It comes as no surprise then that not only the most schematistic
formula for the basis for capital, M-C-M, is perceived through the lens of mer-
chant capital by Uno – also his understanding of surplus value and the general
formula of capital, M-C-M’, is paradigmatically informed by capital’s commer-
cial form:
As money, value realises itself through the buying and selling of com-
modities in evenmore value. This is because it increases so-called surplus
value. It is only this value increase, which really makes value capital.285
For Uno it is ‘not simply the domination of money’ in the change of M-C to C-
M, but the fact that ‘even more money’ is acquired in M-M’. Here, Uno moves
the discussion to the difference between the interests of the commodity owner
and the merchant. In contrast to the commodity owner who throws money
into circulation to buy and sell his commodities, the merchant invests in order
to obtain more money from circulation. Money that does not take the form of
a commodity cannot become capital. For Uno, this form shows itself predom-
inantly in merchant capital.
What is crucial is the relation of merchant capital in its general formM-C-M’
to the generation of a surplus, or, inUno’s terminology, to the self-augmentation
284 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 329.
285 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 329.
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of value (kachi no jikozōshoku). With his discussion of the ‘failed attempts’
to explain the origin of surplus value by the circulation of commodities and
money in Chapter 5 of Capital, Marx put the theory to the test: capital ‘must
have its origin both in circulation and not in circulation’.286 Marx unfolds his
argument of the production and the validation process as being necessarily
a process of the exploitation of the labour power commodity in the appar-
ent exchange of equivalents (wage against labour) that, in reality, is not an
exchange of equivalents at all, because the labourer does not sell her labour,
but her labour power, the ability to work. The unique disposition of the labour
power commodity – that its use value produces a value that surpasses the
value of its exchange value (wages) – becomes the logical basis for exploita-
tion. It also becomes the basis for the fetishised notion that what occurs is an
exchange of equivalents: after all, wages represent the value of labour power,
and in the sale and purchase of commodities, we pay for its value, not its
use value. Here, Marx reveals the ongoing confusion and self-contradictions
in treating the ‘selling above price’ as the source of surplus. On another level,
more concrete than the merely conceptual introduction of the problematic in
the ‘Contradictions in the General Formula’ in Capital Volume i, Marx treats
these ‘confusions’ in Capital Volume iii (predominantly Chapter 3), and also
in his treatment of commercial capital: ‘… in fact the whole idea that profit
is derived from a nominal increase in commodity prices, or by selling them
above their value, arises from the viewpoint of commercial capital. When we
look at it more closely, however, we soon see that this is just an illusion’.287 For
Marx, in developed industrial capitalism, commercial capital is relevant inso-
far as it contributes to the formation of a general rate of profit, hence, of prices
of production. Commercial capital, along with interest-bearing capital, there-
fore forms a separate factor in the analysis of profit. This does not mean at all
however that in reality commercial capital’s own profit can be accounted for in
separation from theprofit of industrial capital. In reality, there is no such thing as
commercial capital’s ‘pure’ profit, unrelated to the general rate of profit. Com-
mercial capital takes a share in the average profit without contributing to it
via production. The analysis in Chapter 16 and 17 shows just how commercial
capital attracts ‘the part of the surplus-value or profit produced by productive
capital that falls to its share’,288 as well as its role in the formation of the gen-
286 Marx 1976, p. 268.
287 Marx 1981, p. 397. For the discussion of the role of commercial capital in the systematic
context of Capital Volume iii, in contrast to Uno’s understanding, see Chapter 4.1.
288 Marx 1981, p. 395.
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eral rate of profit according to the proportion it forms in the total capital.289
Marx goes on to explain the ‘illusion’ that commercial profit seems to spring
from ‘buying cheap, selling dear’: the merchant makes a surplus by buying the
commodities below the production price resulting from total capital if com-
mercial capital did not contribute to total capital, and hence, to industrial cap-
ital. Ironically, commercial capital can only make a profit by taking part in the
share of industrial capital and therefore initially diminishing the original aver-
age profit rate. This difference of profit rates sans or avec commercial capital
gives rise to the illusion of ‘buying cheap and selling dear’ without relation to
capital’s production process:
Just as industrial capital only realizes profit that is already contained in
the value of the commodity as surplus-value, so commercial capital does
so only because the whole of the surplus-value or profit is not yet real-
ized in the price of the commodity as realized by industrial capital. The
merchant’s sale price is higher than its purchase price not because it is
above the total value, but rather because his purchase price is below its
total value.290
To be sure, this is as true as the math goes for commercial capital in developed
industrial capitalism.
For Uno however, commercial capital is historically, and therefore also logic-
ally prior to general industrial capital.While it is obvious that commercial cap-
ital was historically prior to industrial capital, we should not commit the error
to give it logical priority as a condition for the existence of industrial capital. In
fact, with industrial capital becoming the main mode of production, commer-
289 See Marx 1981, p. 398. If we follow Marx’s example and assume that the total industrial
capital advanced during the year is 720c + 180v = 900, and the rate of s (s’) is 100%, then
we have a product of 720c + 180v + 180s = 1080. p’ is 20% (s/c+v). If we now assume that in
addition to the productive capital of 900, there is a commercial capital of 100, so that the
total capital size increases to 1000, then commercial capital’s share is 1/10. ‘It thus takes
a one-tenth share in the total surplus-value of 180 and gets a profit rate of 18 per cent.
The profit to be divided among the remaining nine-tenths of the total capital is now only
162, or similarly 18 per cent on the capital of 900. Thus the price at which C is sold to the
merchants by the holders of this industrial capital of 900 is 720c+180v+162s = 1062. If the
merchant adds to his capital of 100 the average profit of 18 per cent, he sells the com-
modities at 1062+18 = 1080, i.e. at their price of production … If he still does not sell the
commodities above their value or price of production, this is precisely because he bought
them from the industrial capitalists below their value or price of production’.
290 Marx 1981, pp. 399–400.
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cial capital becomes a secondary aspect to the generation and constitution of
total social aggregate, even if it directly influences the average rate of profit. In
the chapter of commercial capital,Marx’s criticises treating commercial capital
as the logical (‘purely theoretical’) precondition of industrial capital as such:
In the course of scientific analysis, the formation of the general rate of
profit appears to proceed from industrial capitals and the competition
between them, being only later rectified, supplemented and modified by
the intervention of commercial capital. In the course of historical devel-
opment, the situation is exactly the reverse. It is commercial capitalwhich
first fixes the prices of commoditiesmore or less according to their values,
and it is the sphere of circulation that mediates the reproduction process
in which a general rate of profit is first formed. Commercial capital ori-
ginally determines industrial profit. It is only when the capitalist mode of
production has come to prevail, and the producer himself has become a
merchant, that commercial profit is reduced to the aliquot share of the
total surplus-value that accrues to commercial capital as an aliquot part
of the total capital concerned in the process of social reproduction.291
These considerations however are removed from Uno’s discussion of the ‘self-
augmentation’ of value. Quite to the contrary, with the conceptualisation of
merchant capital as the paradigmatic form of capital, Uno maintains that for
the ‘self-augmentation of value’, ‘there is no other method than “buying cheap,
selling dear” ’.292 In other words, because a surplus cannot emerge from an
exchange of equivalents, it must emerge from an exchange of non-equivalents,
from ‘buying cheap and selling dear’. The evidence Uno allegedly draws from
Marx’s critique of Condillac, however, is owed to a substantial distortion of
Marx’s own argument. In the following, let us see how. Marx’s critique of Con-
dillac293 is directed against the latter’s confusion of use value and exchange
value. Condillac (and other vulgar economists) assume an exchange of equi-
valents (‘value for value’) ‘whenever they wish to consider the phenomenon in
its purity’.294 In order to explain the origin of profit, however, Condillac must
assume an exchange of unequal values in which ‘[w]hat is more to the one is
291 Marx 1981, pp. 400–1.
292 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 332.
293 Le Commerce et le gouvernement, considérés relativement l’un à l’autre (1776) remains
Etienne Bonnot de Condillac’s (1714–80) only economic work. He was originally a philo-
sopher, supporter of John Locke’s empiricism, and published widely on epistemology.
294 Marx 1976, p. 260.
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less to the other, and vice versa …Wewish to part with a useless thing, in order
to get one that we need; we want to give less for more …’295 Marx objects:
Hence we see that behind all attempts to represent the circulation of
commodities as a source of surplus-value, there lurks an inadvertent sub-
stitution [German: Quidpropro; the Japanese translation is missing], a
confusion of use-value and exchange-value.296
Uno however omits the following strong argument against Condillac in his
Marx quote: ‘We see … how Condillac not only confuses use-value with ex-
change-value, but in a really childish manner assumes that, in a society in
which the production of commodities is well developed, each producer pro-
duces his own means of subsistence, and throws into circulation only what is
superfluous, the excess over his own requirements’.297 Uno goes on to quote
the following: ‘Still, Condillac’s argument is frequently repeated by modern
economists, especially when the point is to show that the exchange of com-
modities in its developed form, commerce, is productive of surplus value. For
instance, “Commerce … adds value to products, for the same products in the
hands of consumers areworthmore than in the hands of producers, and itmay
strictly be considered an act of production” ’.298 To this, Uno replies: ‘Even if the
argument today no longer exists in this simple form, similar theories have still
not been cleared away.’299Marxdeclares an extremely harsh verdict against this
view, quoted by Uno:
But commodities are not paid for twice over, one on account of their use-
value, and a second time on account of their value. And though the use-
valueof a commodity ismore serviceable to thebuyer than to the seller, its
money-form ismore so to the seller.Would he sell it otherwise?Wemight
therefore just as well say that the buyer performs what is ‘strictly’ an ‘act
of production’ by converting stockings, for example, into money.300
295 Condillac, Le Commerce et le gouvernement (1776), Paris 1847, quoted in Marx 1976, p. 261.
296 Marx 1976, p. 261. Quoted in Uno 1973 [1947], p. 333.
297 Marx 1976, pp. 261–2.
298 Marx 1976, p. 262. Marx quotes from S.P. Newman, Elements of Political Economy, Andover
and New York 1835, p. 175.
299 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 333.
300 Marx 1976, p. 262. Quoted in Uno 1973 [1947], p. 333.
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Marx rejects Condillac’s view that equal exchange can be a source of profit:
we do not pay twice for a commodity. Equal exchange of commodities does
not add value and cannot be considered an act of production – note that the
last sentence has a strong ironic note. So much for Marx’s refutation of the
exchange of equivalents constituting (surplus) value.
However,Uno’s commenton this quote isworthyof consideration. It justifies
not only the role he ascribes tomerchant capital and the logic of ‘buying cheap
and selling dear’ as constitutive to the basic formof capital. It also explainswhy,
for Uno, the production process could be disregarded.Moreover, it claims to be
based onMarx’s ownargument. Let us consider Uno’s comment onMarx’s view
of Condillac.
First, Uno contends that merchant capital ‘concretely shows the form’ of
Marx’s claim that without assuming commodity form, money cannot become
capital:
Of course, by this schema (M-C-M’), we cannot understand how value as
capital obtains self-augmentation. Simply put, there is no other method
than ‘buying cheap, selling dear’. However, as said before, even if there is
an inner circulation as capital, the commodity and money have no func-
tion outside of being the commodity and money. The money owner in
the purchase M-C formally appears as the buyer in contrast to the com-
modity owner. He does not confront him as a capitalist (shihonka to shite
kore ni tairitsu suru wake dewanai). The same goes for the process C-M,
the process of sale …
Finally, whether in the process M-C the commodity is bought below its
value, or in the process C-M, it is sold above its value, there is no otherway
for the value augmentation of capital than to be performed in thismutual
process.301
Uno performs a twofold trick: he acknowledges Marx’s objection to Condillac
in order to use Marx’s argument to maintain that ‘the original rule of self-
augmentation’ was to be found the logic of unequal exchange – for if equal
exchange cannot yield profit, then unequal exchange must. Uno:
Even if the buyer, as well as the seller, perform an ‘act of production’
(seisan no kōi), commerce does not particularly do so. Here is no space for
301 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 332.
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rebuttal in this clear form, but any claim that denies the so-called labor
value theory must first be settled from this point.302
Uno not only uses Marx as a buttress for a view that Marx never holds, namely
that the generation of surplus value in M-C-M’ takes place through the ex-
change of non-equivalents. He also ignores the whole succeeding discussion
in which Marx precisely shows that this, for reasons of logic, cannot be the
case.303 More drastically, Uno concludes that the labour theory of value fails
to hold in the formation of merchant capital: ‘buying cheap and selling dear’,
or the sale of a commodity above its value, is the basic form of capital for Uno.
To be sure, Unomerely considers the ‘purely’ formal criteria for the surplus. But
this is probably also his lacuna. For, if ‘the root of surplus value is completely
irrational’,304 thenwe cannot simply take the formof the logic of self-validation
into account. In otherwords, ‘buying cheap, selling dear’ –mechanisms of mer-
chant capital as an insular and historically overcome phenomenon – do not
suffice to explain, indeed distort, the general concept of capital. The general
concept of capital cannot be arrived at by relations of exchange, asMarx shows
in the ‘Contradictions to the General Formula’. Without repeating Marx’s his-
toriographic arguments for the general concept of capital (see Chapter 2.1. and
5.3.), we must concede that Uno underestimates the historical significance of
merchant capital’s disintegration, and not its continuity, for the emergence of
the new mode of production in productive capital. In this sense, as Brentel
comments, ‘Marx clearly differentiates between, on the one hand, the dissolv-
ing effectof trade andmerchant capital on the oldermodeof production,which
it simultaneously strives to keep intact, and on the other, the implementation
of a new mode of production by industrial capital which is contrary to and
ultimately abolishing merchant capital as an autonomous form’.305 This is also
reflected in the inability of readjustments to the duties and responsibilities of
merchants in the seventeenth century to account for a new production mode:
302 Uno 1973 (1947), p. 333.
303 In Capital Volume iii, Marx is very outspoken about this: ‘… in the process of circulation,
no value is produced, and thus also no surplus-value. The same value simply undergoes
changes of form.Nothing at all happens except themetamorphosis of commoditieswhich
by its very nature has nothing to do with the creation or alteration of value. If a surplus-
value is realized on the sale of the commodity produced, this is because it already existed
in the commodity … Commercial capital thus creates neither value nor surplus-value, at
least not directly’. Marx 1981, p. 392. In this context and section, we can also find a repeti-
tion of Marx’s objection to Condillac from Capital Volume i.
304 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 334.
305 Brentel 1989, p. 182.
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Right up to the middle of this century [the 17th century], for example,
themanufacturer in the French silk industry, and the English hosiery and
lace industries, too, was a manufacturer only in name. In reality he was
simply a merchant, who kept the weavers working in their old fragmen-
ted manner and exercised only control as a merchant; it was a merchant
they were really working for. This method always stands in the way of the
genuine capitalist mode of production and disappears with its develop-
ment.Without revolutionizing themode of production, it simplyworsens
the conditions of the direct producers, transforms them into mere wage-
labourers and proletarians under worse conditions than those directly
subsumed by capital, appropriating their surplus labour on the basis of
the old mode of production.306
Hence, forMarx, ‘this development, taken by itself, is insufficient to explain the
transition from onemode of production to the other’.307 The ‘independent and
preponderant development of capital in the form of commercial capital is syn-
onymous with the non-subjection of production to capital; i.e. with the devel-
opment of capital on the basis of a social form of production that is foreign to
it and independent of it’.308 Merchant capital cannot serve as the explanatory
basis for the general concept of capital as a social relation. The appropriation
of alien and unpaid labour, i.e., unequal exchange in this sense alonemeaning-
fully explains the origin of surplus value. Uno’s insistence on the formal criteria
of commodity exchange as explanandum for the creation of surplus value and
the general concept of capital indicates not only his disavowal of Marx’s spe-
cific cognitive interest in the problem of the fetishistic approach to surplus
value – i.e. in theories of equal exchange or ‘buying cheap and selling dear’ –
but also wittingly undermines the social dimension that the allegedly ‘formal’
relationbetweencommodities entails: namely that betweencapital and labour.
It may be useful at this point to sum up the preceding analysis. The following
points outlinewhereUno’s reading of value differs toMarx’s value theory in the
sequence that they were discussed in Chapter 3, which follows the argument
of Value Theory. Uno differs fromMarx’s conception
306 Marx 1981, pp. 452–3. Competitionbetween industrial andmerchant cities further contrib-
uted to the divide, and explain the politically reactionary character of merchant against
industrial capital: ‘In modern English history, the actual merchant estate and the trading
cities also appear to be politically reactionary and in league with the landed and financial
aristocracies against industrial capital. Compare for example thepolitical role of Liverpool
as against Manchester and Birmingham’. Marx 1981, p. 445 (footnote 46).
307 Marx 1981, p. 444.
308 Marx 1981, p. 445.
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1) in the rejection of the concept of abstract labour for the analysis of
exchange relations anddistribution, advocating its deferral to the analysis
of production,
2) in the understanding of abstract labour emerging historically with sim-
plification, deskilling and homogenisation in large-scale industry, hence
as a form of concrete labour,
3) in the attribution of abstract labour to dead, and concrete-useful labour
to living labour in his reading of ‘The Production Process’ in Chapter 7 of
Capital,
4) in the claim that the subjective evaluation by the owner of the commodity
in the relative form of value (linen) about the commodity in the equival-
ent form (the coat) determines its value, against value determination in
socially necessary labour time,
5) in the theory of money as the ‘solution’ to the contradiction between use
value and value and the Baileyan view of money as ‘power of purchase’,
6) in the conflation of ‘form’ with ‘formalism’, and the prevalence of form
over the substance of value, and
7) in thedeterminationof merchant capital as theparadigmatic formof cap-
ital in the formula M-C-M’, disavowing the transformation of money into
capital by the process of production and the exploitation of labour power.
In the following, we will see howUno conceives of the theory of value as a the-
ory of social reproduction within the context of Principles of Political Economy.
In this context, we will discuss how Uno grounds his theory of social repro-
duction in an equilibrium theory of price. In doing so, we will show that Uno
conflatesMarx’s presentationof the reproduction schemas inCapitalVolume ii
with his price theory of Capital Volume iii. The transformation of value into
prices of production, and with it, the formation of the general rate of profit,
will be presented by taking the results from Uno’s value theory as basis. We
will see that Uno radically departs from Marx’s critical framework to present
us with an apologetic view of the capitalist system.
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chapter 4
The Principles of Political Economy (Keizai Genron,
1952/1964) in Light of Marx’s Critique of Political
Economy
The Critique of Political Economy, for Marx, does … not consist in
grasping the capital relation as a fact, but as a problem.
claudio napoleoni (1974)1
∵
The Principles of Political Economy (Keizai Genron) are without doubt Uno’s
most widely read work and has often been considered his main publication.
It has been translated by Thomas (Tomohiko) Sekine and published in English
translation in 1980. The original Japanese edition was first published as a two-
volume work in 1950 and 1952 with the academic publisher Iwanami Shoten.
In 1964, it was republished in an abridged version that has also been the basic
text for the Sekine translation in 1964, also with Iwanami. The following argu-
ment relies on the 1964 version, the editorial changes to which Uno supervised
himself.
Uno’s intention in the Principleswas topresenthis ‘pure theory of capitalism’
in themost concise way. The work consists of threemajor parts – The Doctrine
of Circulation (ryūtsūron), The Doctrine of Production (seisanron), and The
Doctrine of Distribution (bunpairon) – and discusses the respective economic
categories prevalent in each of them. Remarkably, the footnotes accompany-
ing the main text are not only equally important as the main text, focussing on
an explanatory content, but they also primarily contain Uno’s discussions of
Marx’s own theorems, often supplemented by practical examples.
As is obvious, the structure of the themes and chapters generally leans on
the three volumes of Marx’s Capital – with important distinctions that also
inform Uno’s basic deviation from and sometimes even rejection of some
of Marx’s central methodological claims. To be sure, the central difference
1 Napoleoni 1974, p. 59. Our translation.
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betweenMarx’s Capital as a Critique of Political Economy and Uno’s Principles
is themode of presentation in the former: a critique of the central assumptions
of classical and vulgar political economy and their ‘fetishistic’ and apologetic
perception of capitalist society and its categories. This critique is completely
abandoned in Uno’s text. The Principles solely focuses on the presentation of
‘the laws peculiar to capitalism’, presupposing only ‘the abstract context of a
purely capitalist societymade up of the threemajor classes of capitalists, work-
ers, and landowners’.2 Yet, in another contrast to Marx, Uno claims that
[by] deliberately restricting its scope to the commodity-economy…polit-
ical economy reveals the general norms of economic life common to all
societies, including pre-capitalist societies … as well as a socialist society
in which the commodity-economic relation will have been superseded.
Political economy … reveals the economic base of all societies whether
ancient, medieval, ormodern as the substructure…by exhibiting the self-
containedness of the capitalist economic system … What political eco-
nomy exposes bymeans of the laws of a commodity-economy are, in fact,
nothingother than thebehavioural normsof economic life (keizaiseikatsu
ni okeru kōdō no gensoku) shared by, and forming the ‘substance’ so to
speak, of all human societies, but appearing with transparent clarity only
in a capitalist society, i.e. a society totally governed by the commodity-
economic forms.3
This understanding of capitalist society as a ‘sub-form’ of ‘general economic
life’ is counter-factual to Marx’s understanding of the capitalist mode of pro-
duction as a historically specific formof production inwhich the confrontation
of capital and labour is the basic constellation. The assignment of (a critique
of) political economy therefore consists in precisely clarifying its specificities,
showing how and in what way capital is radically different from previous his-
torical societies – one of the defining differences being the shift to the social
production of value instead of use value. Accordingly, Uno’s understanding of
political economy to ‘reveal the general norms of economic life common to all
societies’ ahistorically and counterfactually ascribes a universal pattern to the
historical specificity of the capitalist relations of production, much akin to the
classical political economists Marx has precisely criticised for this view. Uno’s
definition, that the ‘economic base of all societies, whether ancient, medieval
2 Uno 1980, p. Xxii.
3 Uno 1980, p. xx. See Uno 1964, pp. 3–4.
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or modern’ is ‘revealed’ by political economy, also implies that the modes of
general social reproduction are common to all societies. It is precisely this view
thatMarx contests. Capitalism’smode of social reproduction follows laws quite
distinct from that of pre-capitalist societies and therefore cannot be subsumed
under an ‘economic base’ allegedly ‘common to all societies’. We will see in the
following that this central view of Uno’s is owed to a strong emphasis on a func-
tioning reproduction in the economy in general, while disregarding the specific
conditions of capitalist reproduction, especially the circulation of values based
on unpaid labour. Uno’s model, as we will see, is contrary to Marx’s in that it is
concerned with successful and unhindered reproduction, and not with prob-
lems associated with the hampering of reproduction, i.e. crisis. Following from
this, our discussion of Uno’s theory of reproduction will question the equilib-
rium view that systematically excludes the possibility of reproductive crisis. In
this context, wewill show thatUnodoes not hold any viable theory of the capit-
alist valorisation crisis, but a theory of business cycles, in which equilibrium is
always restored. ForUno therefore, the capitalist economy as object of research
is much rather a fact than a problem.
As for a more detailed presentation of Uno’s deviations from Marx with
regard to the conceptual and structural approach to theorising the capitalist
economy, these will be critically discussed in the following chapter.
4.1 The Reconstruction of Capital
In the previous chapter, we could see that for Uno, the specificity of com-
modity economy consists not in its production mode, but in its forms of cir-
culation.4 The preference for form over substance – which we have critically
revealed as a preference for formalism over an analysis of the social condi-
tions of production that necessitates the very forms in which they appear in the
first place – motivates Uno’s intervention. The understanding of social sub-
stance as being entirely subsumed by the circulation forms of capital forms
the guiding principle for Uno’s reconstruction of the methodological struc-
ture of Capital undertaken in his main work that shall be discussed in this
chapter. Uno’s insistence that ‘the production process is subsumed under cap-
4 ‘It deserves a great deal of attention that the labour-and-production process that is common to
all societies can be subjected to a theoretical analysis only at this juncture of the Doctrine of
Production in the pure theory of capitalism’. Uno 1980, p. 22. See also our discussion of the
transhistorical character of abstract labour in Chapter 3.1. of this volume.
262 chapter 4
ital which … provides the form-determination of value’5 sets forth his motiv-
ation to rewrite the structure of Capital in the Principles of Political Economy.
The following table6 presents Uno’s structuring in direct comparison with the
chapters and sections in Capital that roughly correspond to the Principles of
the 1964 edition:7
Principles of Political Economy Capital
part i: The Doctrine of Circulation Volume i: The Production Process of Cap-
ital
Introduction Part One: Commodities and Money
Principles of Political Economy Capital
1. Commodities Ch. 1: The Commodity
Ch. 2: The Process of Exchange
2. Money Ch. 3: Money, or the Circulation Commod-
ities
3. Capital Ch. 4: The General Formula for Capital
part ii: The Doctrine of Production Part Three: The Production of Absolute
Surplus-Value
Introduction
1. The Production-Process of Capital Ch. 7: The Labour Process and the Valorisa-
tion Process:
The Labour-and-Production-Process The Labour Process
The Process of Value Formation and
Augmentation
The Valorisation Process
The Development of the Capitalist
Mode of Production
Part Four: The Production of Relative
Surplus-Value
5 Uno 1973 [1962], p. 158.
6 See also Hoff 2008 andHyeon-Soo 1995. Hoff however only compares the structure of Part iii
with the one of Volume iii, andHyeon-Soo does not directly juxtaposeUno’s structure to that
of Marx. Hoff 2008, p. 108; Hyeon-Soo 1995, pp. 64–5.
7 Themain text of the original 1952 version is twice the length of the 1964 version. Uno himself
supervised and made the editorial changes to the abridged version.
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2. The Circulation-Process of Capital Volume ii: The Circulation Process of
Capital, Part One: The Metamorphoses
of Capital and their Circuit – Part Two: The
Turnover of Capital
3. The Reproduction-Process of Capital Volume i: Part Seven: The Process of Accu-
mulation of Capital
Simple Reproduction: The Repro-
duction of Capital and Labour-
Power
Ch. 23: Simple Reproduction
Expanded Reproduction: The Actual
Process of Capitalist Accumulation
Ch. 25: The General Law of Capitalist
Accumulation
The Reproduction-Process of the
Aggregate Social Capital: The Abso-
lute Foundation of the Law of Value
Volume ii: Part Three, Ch. 20–21: Accumu-
lation and Reproduction on an Expanded
Scale, Section 1: Accumulation in Depart-
ment i, and Section 2: Accumulation in
Department ii
part iii: The Doctrine of Distribution Volume iii: The Process of Capitalist Pro-
duction as aWhole
Introduction
1. Profit Part Two: The Transformation of Profit
into Average Profit
The Formation of the General Profit
Rate: Transformation of Values into
Production Prices
Ch. 9: Formation of a General Rate of Profit
(Average Prate of Profit), and Transform-
ation of Commodity Values into Prices of
Production
Market Prices and Market Values (or
Market Production-Prices): Demand-
and-Supply-Relation and the Forma-
tion of Surplus Profit
Ch. 10: The Equalisation of the General
Rate of Profit through Competition. Market
Prices and Market Values. Surplus Profit.
The Falling Tendency of the General
Rate of Profit: The Advancement
of Productive Powers and Business
Cycles
Part Three: The Law of the Tendential Fall
in the Rate of Profit
2. Rent Part Six (Ch. 37–47): The Transformation
of Surplus Profit into Ground Rent
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3. Interest Part Five (Ch. 29–36): The Division of
Profit into Interest and Profit of Enter-
prise
Loan-Capital and Bank Capital Ch. 21–23, 25–27, 29–32 (Banking Capital,
etc.)
Commercial Capital and its Profit Part Four (Ch. 16–20): The Transformation
of Commodity Capital andMoney Capital
into Commercial Capital andMoney-
Dealing Capital (Merchant’s Capital)
Capital as an Automatically Interest-
Bearing Force
Ch. 24: Interest-Bearing Capital as the
Superficial Form of the Capital Relation
As we can see from this direct comparison, Uno’s Principles, being a work of no
more than 126 pages in the Sekine translation,8 can in no way correspond to
all the chapters and issues of the three volumes of Marx’s Capital. Neither can
it hope to address all of its issues, let alone analyse them. Especially the bulk
of what Marx has conceptualised and developed as the direct critique of the
main contentions of classical economic thinkers goes unmentioned in Uno’s
work. But thedecision toundertakeCapital’s reconstruction, and the omissions
undertaken by Uno to establish his own version of the ‘pure theory of capital-
ism’, are, as I will argue, themselves symptomatic for his formalistic reading of
the critique of political economy. Regarding the reconstruction of the rough
structure, what we can notice at first sight is the following:
a) Uno starts his Principleswith ‘The Doctrine of Circulation’, in the context
of which he analyses the categories of the commodity, money, and capital, in
contrast to Marx who develops the same categories in the context of The Pro-
duction Process of Capital, beginning with the commodity and money.
b) In Part iii, corresponding to Volume iii of Capital, Uno undertakes a
complete reversal of parts four, five and six, which now appear in inverted
sequence: instead of commercial capital, interest, and rent, Uno first discusses
rent, then interest, and, lastly, commercial capital. The discussion of Part Seven
of Volume iii, ‘The Revenues and Their Sources’, is quickly treated in the last
section of ‘Interest’, ‘Capital as an Automatically Interest-Bearing Force’, where
Uno also references Chapter 24 of Volume iii, ‘Interest-Bearing Capital as the
Superficial Formof theCapital Relation’. By also subsuming commercial capital
under ‘interest’, Uno stresses the pre-eminent function of interest and credit for
8 The original of 1964, published with Iwanami Zensho, is 220 pages long.
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the reproduction of capital. LikeMarx, however, Uno insists that interest is ‘the
form in which the fetishistic character of capitalist production reaches perfec-
tion’.9
c) Having discussed the circulation process of capital in Chapter 2, Uno then
returns to Capital Volume i in Chapter 3 of the Principles, giving it the title
‘The Reproduction-Process of Capital’. Here, Uno intends to show that the gen-
eral reproduction process must be situated within the context of Volume ii,
not in the context of Volume i where it is discussed in Part Seven, ‘The Pro-
cess of Accumulation of Capital’. Uno relocates this part within the context of
Volume ii. Hence, the accumulation process of capital is described within the
context of the reproduction schemes of Volume ii. One of the reasons for this,
as we will see, is to de-emphasise the significance of accumulation. The clos-
ing section of ‘The Reproduction-Process’, subtitled ‘The Absolute Foundation
of the Law of Value’ therefore roughly corresponds to the ‘Accumulation and
Reproduction on an Expanded Scale’ of Volume ii.Wewill discuss Uno’smotiv-
ation to relocate ‘The Process of Accumulation’ within the context of Volume ii
and especially the reproduction schemes at the end of the present chapter
(4.1). With it, we will be able to better understand why and how ‘The Abso-
lute Foundation of the Law of Value’ is central to Uno’s theory of general social
reproduction, based on his understanding of the ‘law of value’ to be discussed
in Chapter 4.2.
It is crucial in this context to point out that in the Principles, the differ-
ent levels of conceptual analysis undertaken with the structure of the three
volumes of Capital, are anathematic. In contrast, in Capital, the different levels
of analysis define the object of research: the manuscripts to Volumes i and ii,
and even the first seven chapters of Volume iii, present the essential concep-
tual analysis that informs the sine qua non of the capitalist mode of production
as the relation between capital and the exploitation of alien, unpaid labour.
Of the two big innovations Marx prided himself on, one was the discovery
of profit in its ‘pure form’, namely surplus value – unlike Ricardo who only
knew surplus value in its already falsified or fetishised form of appearance, as
profit and rent.10 Here, Marx’s critique directly engages theories of equivalent
9 Uno 1980, p. 74.
10 ‘The best points in my book are: 1. (this is fundamental to all understanding of the facts)
the two-fold character of labour according to whether it is expressed in use-value or
exchange-value,which is brought out in the very First Chapter; 2. the treatment of surplus-
value regardless of its particular forms as profit, interest, ground rent, etc. This will be
made clear in the second volume especially. The treatment of the particular forms in clas-
sical political economy,where they are for ever being jumbledup togetherwith the general
form, is an olla potrida!’ Marx to Engels, 24 August 1867. Marx and Engels 1987, p. 407. See
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exchange and surplus value. From here, he conceptually develops the process
of valorisation, accumulation, reproduction, and crisis as form determinations
defining the capital relation as a historically specific economic social relation.
Volume iii, starting with the ‘Transformation of Profit in Average Profit’ is
restricted to the level of appearance, based on the form determinations ana-
lysed in the two previous volumes. By having previously analysed the essential
conceptual nexus of the capitalist mode of production in vols. i and ii, Marx
could now move on to its forms of appearance in the manuscripts comprising
Volume iii. Value here appears as price of production, surplus value as profit,
and capitalist accumulation as the generation of a general profit rate. This is
important for Marx’s fetish-critical method: the fetish-characteristic forms of
value– as different formsof price (productionprice, cost price, sales price,mar-
ket price), industrial and commercial profit, interest and rent – receive their
‘final ossification’ in Volume iii, for which the analysis of the first book holds
the key, andwhich can nowbe revealed in their inverted self-presentation. This
is demonstrated for example inMarx’s discussion of cost price and commodity
value in the first chapter of Volume iii: the difference in price (and the ori-
gin of profit) results not from the commodity value and sales price, but from
the difference between cost price and the commodity value – in short, the dif-
ference between the cost for the capitalist and the profit earned by the same
capitalist in applying unpaid labour in the production process. The concept
of cost price that treats variable capital as constant capital ‘under the heading
of circulating capital’ obscures this, however.11 This also shows the importance
of Volume ii and its conceptual clarifications of fixed and circulating (fluid)
capital as a subspecies of constant capital, conceptually distinct from vari-
able capital. There is a second reason for this specific structure of the three
volumes: in the context of Volume iii, commodities are ‘in fact’ products of
capital. This is not the case in the presentation of Volume i where the gen-
eral systematic conditions of the commodity as a product of capital are ana-
lysed. These conditions lie within the systematic foundation of the capitalist
mode of production, the production and the circulation process of capital.
also Marx’s letter to Engels from 8 January 1868 as quoted in Chapter 1.2. of this volume.
Marx and Engels 1987, p. 551.
11 ‘As far as value formation is concerned … the variable portion of capital, that laid out on
labour-power, is expressly identified here with constant capital (the portion of capital
consisting of production materials), under the heading of circulating capital, and thus
the valorization process of capital is completely mystified’. Marx 1981, p. 124. ‘Profit, as we
are originally faced with it, is thus the same thing as surplus-value, save in a mystified
form, though one that necessarily arises from the capitalist mode of production’. Marx
1981, p. 127.
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In Volume iii, the pivotal concept of competition that as yet has been disreg-
arded in the previous analysis now becomes a defining concept. But because
‘[i]ncompetition…everythingappearsupsidedown’,12 it affects also our epistem-
ological access to the phenomenon of profit. Profit must therefore be analysed
separately, namely as the appropriation of surplus value, in accordance with
Marx’s labour theory of value. However important the distinction, Uno’s prin-
ciples of reconstruction do not reflect the ‘leap’ from the essential and basic to
the superficial and ‘fetishistic’ determinations of value.Here, too,we candetect
Uno’s negligence to see Capital first and foremost as a critical examination of
the fetish character of conventional economic categories.
Concerning the omissions of the reconstruction, aswehave indicated before
in the discussion of Uno’s treatment of merchant capital, Uno (a) altogether
omits Chapter 5, ‘Contradictions of the General Formula’ of Capital (M-C-M’),
and, in direct relation, Chapter 6, ‘The Sale and Purchase of Labour-Power’.
He thereby excludes the central theoretical intervention Marx undertakes in
his critique of ‘circulation theories’ of surplus value, and the fetishistic illusion
appearing from it, so that (b) Uno does not develop a concept of surplus value
from the critique of circulation theories of surplus value, and hence, a theory
of exploitation that stands at the heart of Marx’s critique of the classics and
the ‘vulgar’ economists. Instead, Uno’s conception of surplus value is relocated
within the context of ‘value augmentation’, i.e., ‘The Valorisation Process’ of
capital, without a preceding analysis of what Marx calls ‘the conditions of the
problem’ – namely how the exchange of equivalents can generate a part of the
total produce as surplus value, appropriated as profit. Uno is oblivious to this
central self-posed research framework that marks Marx’s central difference to
conventional economic theory. Even more, Uno accuses Marx of not having
strictly concluded the form determination of capital from the commodity and
money – disregarding the critical analysisMarx’s analysis is embedded in: ‘Cap-
ital has not sufficiently developed “The Transformation of Money into Capital”
clearly as the form determination proceeding from the commodity andmoney.
Besides, as in the case of the commodity andmoney,with respect to their emer-
gence in history, it also shows the historical development theoretically’.13
(c) Uno omits the first two parts of Volume iii – ‘The Transformation of
Surplus-Value into Profit, and of the Rate of Surplus-Value into the Rate of
Profit’ and ‘The Transformation of Profit into Average Profit’. Especially the
exclusion of Part One (Chapters 1 to 7) renders Uno’s understanding of the
12 Marx 1981, p. 311. Emphasis in the original.
13 Uno 1962 [1974], p. 297, footnote.
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so-called transformation problem incomplete. In this part, Marx shows how
surplus labour related to variable capital, i.e. the part of capital used to keep
labour power in the valorisation process, is distorted: with the origin of surplus
value appearing to lie in both variable and constant capital, value appears to be
the outcome of both labour and the means of production in equal ratio. Uno
however does not recur to this problem in the Principles. Quite to the contrary:
for Uno, the question of the transformation of values to prices of production
becomes a question of general equilibrium, hence equilibrium prices. Supply
and demand regulate the production price and socially necessary labour time
in the last instance, so that the validity of ‘the lawof value’ can be shownonly in
the phenomenon of equilibrium prices that serve to satisfy general demand.14
In this sense, the distribution of surplus value as profit serves the aim of sat-
isfying general social demand. This happens, as Uno insists, in contrast to the
rate of surplus value (s/v), which indicates ‘the social relation of workers vis-
à-vis capitalists’.15 The rate of profit (s/c+v), in contrast, indicates the relation
among capitalists alone:
The latter relation [s/c+v] places capitalists, so to speak, outside of the
production process allowing them to observe the efficiency of its value
augmentation per given period of time. Thus the rate of profit offers a
standard, according to which capital selects various spheres of investment
so as to produce and supply the diversity of the use-values that are socially
demanded, though capital itself is not directly interested in these use-
values. This is the manner in which capital satisfies the social demand,
making a commodity-economic detour, so to speak, and developing in
concrete terms a peculiarly commodity-economic principle of capitalist
distribution.16
We will return to Uno’s idiosyncratic view of an alleged compatibility of capit-
alist accumulation with ‘social equilibrium’ in the next chapter (Chapter 4.2.).
In sum however, rather than for his omissions, in the Principles and other
writings, Uno gives reasons for his reconstruction of Capital. In the following,
14 Although it must be noted that Uno’s view does not quite correspond to Sekine’s inter-
pretation of him: ‘… the third doctrine of distribution shows how the capitalist mode of
production develops and regulates its ownmarket so as to produce all use-values that are
socially needed in a manner that is most satisfactory to the self-adopted aim of capital’.
Thomas Sekine, ‘An Essay of Uno’s Dialectic of Capital’, in Uno 1980, p. 148.
15 Uno 1980, p. 73.
16 Uno 1980, p. 73. Original emphasis. See Uno 1964, pp. 137–8.
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let us consider howUno justifies the relocation to place i) the circulation forms
before and in separation from the process of production and ii) rent before
interest, and accordingly, before bank and commercial capital. Here, Section 4
of his 1962 writing The Methodology of Political Economy (Keizaigaku hōhōron)
is telling. In this section, titled ‘About the Structure of the Sections (in Cap-
ital)’, Uno for the first time discusses his critique of Marx’s general architecture
of Capitalwhich formed the basis for Uno’s reconstruction in the Principles.
4.1.1 Circulation before Production
That Marx had allegedly introduced the labour theory of value ‘prematurely’
into his discussion of the commodity form had already been a prevalent cri-
ticism in Value Theory, as we have seen in the previous chapter. In ‘About the
Structure’, Uno reiterates the argument, while stressing the place of the ‘form
determinations’ of the commodity, money, and capital within the complete
structure. For Uno, especially Volume ii is of great importance, less in its ‘medi-
ating’ function, but rather because the form determinations show their actual
impact on the logic of the reproduction of capital. Here, we are also presented
with Uno’s argument for placing reproduction theory not within the ‘Produc-
tion Process’, but solely within the context of Volume ii and the reproduction
schemas:
In Section 3 of vol. 2,17 Marx says that ‘[t]he total process presents itself
as the unity of the process of production and the process of circulation’.
But the relation between the theory of reproduction in volume 1, espe-
ciallywith its theory of population, to the so-called reproduction schemes
in vol. 2, is unclear. As against the consideration of the form determin-
ation of the commodity, money, and capital within the context of ‘The
Production Process of Capital’ in volume 1, ‘The Circulation Process of
Capital’ is considered after the reproduction process of vol. 1, in the sep-
arate volume ii.18
Because forUno, the formdeterminations of the beginning ‘encroach’ upon the
production process, the relation between reproduction and especially the law
of populationmust be elucidated within the theory of circulation. But why are
the forms necessarily ‘external to the production process’19 for Uno? There is
17 The passage quoted by Uno is in Chapter 4 of Volume 2, not in Section 3.
18 Uno 1962 [1974], pp. 287–8.
19 Uno 1962 [1974], p. 289.
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both a historical and a logical reason for this. As we have seen in Chapter 2,
Uno relies heavily on a remark by Marx in the analysis of The Exchange Pro-
cess of Volume ii, namely that ‘The exchange of commodities begins where
communities have their boundaries, at their points of contact with other com-
munities, or with members of the latter’.20 This remark is used ad nauseam by
Uno to stress the historical emergence of production on the basis of a partic-
ular type of exchange, here, communal exchange.21 At the same time, as seen
previously, the labour and production process is conceived as a transhistorical
one, i.e. a process that is shared between such disparate economic forms as
Robinson Crusoe’s island and highly developed industrial capitalism. Hence,
for Uno
[the] unfolding of the circulation forms of the commodity, money, and
capital, when clarified to grasp the production process at the basis of
the capital form, must explain the labour-and-production process as the
social substance that is common toall social formations…The labourpro-
cess common to all societies is subsumedunder its specific social forms,22
that is, the commodity form, money, and capital.
This is also why
the form determinations of the commodity, money, and capital must be
developed in pure form. Furthermore, it makes the determinations of
the abstract labour-and-production process its basis, and hence the sub-
stance of value can be clearly shown. Theremay be people who think this
view is against the materialist view of history in which the production
process is thought to be the foundation. However, this only mechanistic-
ally applies to the materialist view of history. Commodity economy itself
hasn’t evolved from the inner [structure] of the production process, it
did not develop from the production process. The production process
has both a beginning and an ending within commodity economy. This
is why Marx began Capital with the commodity and money, not with
the labour-and-production process. Rather, the development from the
20 Marx 1976, p. 182.
21 As we have seen in the previous chapter, Uno rejects the hypothesis of ‘primitive accumu-
lation’ in the case of Japan.
22 Uno 1962 [1974], p. 290.
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commodity makes the direct explanation of the substance of value in
labour (sic) impossible.23
In the foregoing – see especially the introduction to our Chapter 2 – we have
already discussed why Marx begins with the commodity: not because it is sep-
arate from the process of production, but because generalised commodity pro-
duction is one of the conditions on which the emergence of the commodity
form can take place at all. The separation of the direct producers from the
means of production, the origin of generalised commodity productionwith the
commodification of labour power, is a relation ‘inherent in production itself ’.24
In the introduction to the Principles, Uno is even more outspoken: the com-
modity and the money form derive their specificity not from the specific form
of production, but to the contrary, from the form determinations of circulation.
The latter therefore determineswhich transhistorical laws of production (keizai
gensoku) are to be assumed in the case of specific economies. The ‘pure theory’
of capitalism therefore primarily thematises the forms peculiar to capitalism,
in which these forms present particular general forms of circulation, i.e. the
commodity, money, and capital:
… the commodity-economy, the forms of which are required to disclose
the general economic norms, does not evolve from within the produc-
tion process of a society, i.e., from the root of its economic life (keizai
seikatsu no kiso). It arises, as already pointed out, from the exchange rela-
tion between one production-process and another. The forms of human
relationpeculiar to commodity exchanges then influence theproduction-
processes by reaction, sink slowly into them (shintō shi), and finally take
possession of them; the commodity economy thus secures the substant-
ive base of its operation in a production-process by gradually encroaching
upon it from the outside. It is for this reason that the pure theory of capit-
alism cannot beginwith a doctrine of production, despite thewidely held
view to the contrary that political economy should first examine the pro-
cess of production which forms the real base of any economic process.
Marx’s Capital, Volume One, though entitled ‘The Production-Process of
Capital’, begins in fact with the discussion of such circulation-forms; only
after the development of the form of capital does it turn to the analysis
of the labour-process which is common to all societies, finally opening
23 Uno 1962 [1974], pp. 290–1.
24 Marx 1978, p. 196.
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the real treatment of the production process of capital …The pure theory
of capitalism must, in any case, begin with the doctrine of circulation in
which the forms of circulation alone are to be examined. The doctrine of
production can then treat the production-process that conforms to these
circulation forms.25
First, as discussed in Chapter 3, this enterprise is not only diametrically op-
posed to Marx’s understanding of social form which pertains to the specific
form of labour peculiar to capitalism, namely value-producing abstract labour
where ‘in fact, the whole secret of the critical conception [is]’.26 Uno’s view
is opposed to Marx’s method in which precisely the so-called ‘forms of cir-
culation’ are embedded within the volume of the Process of Production to
dismantle the fetishistic illusion that the commodity, money and capital are
merely ‘forms of circulation’. Second, it is not exactly clear how, if the pro-
duction process is common to all societies, the presentation of the production
process from Chapter 7 of Capital Volume i onward should be able to address
the ‘peculiarity’ of the capitalist production process without a precedingmedi-
ation through the categories that supposedly render the production process
specific. It rather seems that the claim of a ‘premature discussion of the labour
theory of value’ is a petitio principii. The petitio, in fact, consists in maintain-
ing that we must postpone the discussion of the labour and production pro-
cess until the alleged form of circulation has been ‘explained’: because at what
point, andwithwhatmethodological justification, could the defining concepts
of the capitalist mode of production suddenly become a part of the analysis?
Each category is set into the method of the mediation, towards more concrete
and more precisely defined terms, which serve to grasp the capital relation as
a whole. The commodity presented at the beginning of Capital is the capital-
ist commodity, but what it means to be ‘capitalist’ can only be fully elucidated
with further mediation. This does not mean however that capitalist produc-
tion can be abstracted from the concept of the commodity: without capitalist
production, there would not be a commodity, much less a commodity form.
According to Uno’s understanding of the correct method, however, production
would have to be suddenly inserted, externally, and without mediation, after
the circulation forms. But to grasp the forms of circulation requires a grasp of
the complete process of production, and the specific ways the real subsump-
tion of labour under capital or the class relation is enacted. Uno misrecognises
25 Uno 1980, p. xxiv.
26 Marx and Engels 1987, p. 514.
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that, for Marx, the forms of circulation – especially money as the predominant
value form– is necessitated by a specific formof production, whichmakes gen-
eral commodity exchange its only mode of social metabolism. By prioritising
circulation over production, Uno fails to address the peculiarity of this produc-
tion mode. With it, he misrecognises the role of abstract human labour, made
palpable bymoney, as the general socialmediator.We seem tohave come to the
point already addressed in Chapter 1 with regard to Chris Arthur who, unlike
Uno, does not suppose a transhistorical understanding of the production pro-
cess, but, like Uno, believes that production in Capital is discussed ‘too early’.
Here, I argue, is where the source of the confusion lies: precisely by thematising
production right from the start of the exposition, Marx cannot only circum-
vent the problem of justifying an unmediated thematisation of ‘production’ at
some random point, but by explicitly thematising production from the begin-
ning,Marx delivers the key to unravelling precisely the illusion that production
is peripheral to the discussion of the value forms.
4.1.2 Rent before Interest, Banking before Commercial Profit
The next question concerns how Uno justifies the re-shifting of the chapters
in Capital Volume iii, corresponding to his ‘Doctrine of Distribution’ in the
Principles. The Doctrine of Distribution, forming Part Three of the Principles,
addresses the distribution of surplus value among the different branches of
industrial capital, landed property, and bank capital (interest and credit). At
first sight,we cannotice thatUno relocates the concept of rent from the relative
end of Marx’s exposition in Capital Volume iii (Chapter 37 to 47 of 52 chapters
in total) to the relative beginning, right after the discussion of profit. Uno
defines rent as ‘a concession of capital to the proprietors of limited andmono-
polisable natural powers, generically represented by land, which are needed as
means of production in the production-process of capital, but which also set
an external restriction in the activity of capital’.27 Interest, ‘on the other hand,
is the transfer of incremental surplus value produced in consequence of the
utilisation of idle money-capital … as investible funds by other capitals’.28 As to
their basic conceptual difference, which also justifies the order in which they
appear in the structure of the Principles, Uno claims that ‘rent is earned from a
direct participation in the production-process of capital, unlike interest which
derives from a supplementary and additional contribution to the motion of
capital. Hence, after profit, the Doctrine of Distribution must first treat rent
27 Uno 1980, p. 73.
28 Uno 1980, p. 73.
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and next discuss interest’.29 The re-shifting of bank capital before commercial
capital follows the same logic: while bank capital can still be said to emerge
in indirect form from the production process of capital, commercial profit ‘is
no longer directly tied to surplus value obtained in the production-process of
capital; it seemingly springs from the entrepreneurial activity of the capital-
ists’.30 For Uno, the saving of circulation costs by the mediation of commercial
capital forms the condition of possibility for the emergence of idle money
funds that can serve as loan capital, and therefore the condition of possibil-
ity of interest-bearing capital.31 Interest therefore must be referred to a place
in the structure further removed from the actual process of the generation of
an average profit rate. Accordingly, we have two results in the Principles in con-
trast to the structure of Capital Volume iii: with regard to the rough structure
(profit-interest-rent), according to Uno, interest is less directly involved in the
production process of capital than rent and must therefore be treated at the
endof the analysis, so that ‘capital-rent-interest’ becomes the correct sequence.
In the same vein, concerning the more filigree structure within the analysis
of Interest (loan and bank capital – commercial capital and its profit – Cap-
ital as an Automatically Interest-Bearing Force), commercial capital must be
treated after bank capital, as it conceptually presupposes themediating activity
of credit or loan capital in order to serve as the mediator of the saving of circu-
lation costs in the production process. Rather than counterpose the different
semantics of the concepts of rent, interest (bank and commercial profit) and
the accumulation process of capital discussed within the framework of repro-
duction in Uno’s interpretation as against that of Marx, let us take a closer look
at the different systematic locus of these conceptswithin their respective works.
As a matter of fact, the reflection on the systematic position of the respective
categories will also provide valuable insights as to their semantics in Uno and
Marx. But the following shall not be read as an exhaustively performed com-
parative conceptual analysis. Rather, limiting the comparison to the respective
order in which the concepts appear will not only help us understand Uno’s
structural deviation from Marx’s, but also the relocation as a shift of emphasis
29 Uno 1980, pp. 73–4. To emphasise the importance of this point, Uno remarks that ‘I believe
that the formation of rent can and must be logically explained prior to the emergence of
interest motivated by the saving of circulation costs’. Uno 1980, p. 75.
30 Uno 1980, p. 74: ‘The financing of idle money-capital generated from themotion of indus-
trial capital, i.e. the conversion of suchmoney-capital into investible funds, is arranged by
the special institution known as a bank, which develops into bank-capitalwith a share in
the general profit’. Original emphasis.
31 See Uno 1980, p. 74.
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on the taxonomic order in order to stress the respective relevance of these con-
cepts in their structural nexus for understanding capitalist totality.
In Uno’s theory, the concept of rent is arguably developed in closest accord-
ance withMarx’s, despite the difference of locus in the structure of Volume iii.
However, two conceptual deviations exist. They do not in themselves explain
the shift of rent before interest, which for Uno is exhaustively explained by rent
participating directly in the production process and the formation of a general
profit rate as the direct mode of distribution among the different capitals –
while interest does not directly participate in it. But they can help to highlight
a methodological inconsistency in Uno’s alternative conceptualisation, as well
as Uno’s and Marx’s difference in emphasis as to the purpose of the theory of
rent. Let us first review the changed locus of Uno’s concept of rent.
4.1.2.1 Rent
First, Uno stresses that rent presupposes landed property, which in itself can-
not be explained as a result of the capitalist law of appropriation. In other
words, the capital relation does not create landed property as its principle.
Rather, the emergence of ‘modern’ private ownership of land – which is not
equivocal with the ‘capitalist’ ownership of land – is the necessary historical
precondition for the generation and the development of capitalist production,
but it does not create it: ‘Although the conversion of surplus profit into rent
characterises the capitalistic form of land-ownership, this conversion does not
generate land-ownership itself ’.32 In an attempt to defend Hegel’s notion of
private landed property against Marx’s critique,33 Uno claims that
the ownership of land constitutes the foundation of all other forms of
private property, including what Marx calls ‘private property based on
the labour of its owner’. The fact that capitalism presupposes the sever-
ance of the direct producers from land does not simply give rise to the
so-called capitalist law of appropriation; that fact also brings all the forms
of private ownership that a commodity-economy involves into a well-
32 Uno 1980, p. 106, footnote 8. This argument is directed primarily against both Ōuchi
Tsutomu’s and Hidaka Hiroshi’s critique of Uno that pure theory presupposes a historical
precondition while the theory of capitalist ground rent can explain the logical necessity
of landed propertywithout reference to history. The debate betweenUno on the one hand
and Ōuchi and Hidaka on the other also included questions of the exact determination
of absolute rent, the rule of the ‘descending order’ in differential rent i that ‘presupposes
freedom on the part of capital to invest on superior rent first’, a view that Uno rejects. See
Uno 1980, p. 106. See Ōuchi 1958 and Hidaka 1962.
33 See Marx 1981, p. 752, footnote 26.
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defined social institution. Since any form of labour is a human activity
applied directly or indirectly to land, capitalism requires the institution
of private property securely rooted in the private ownership of land in
order to appropriate surplus labour at all.34
Therefore, landed property already owns ‘natural powers’, such as land, ‘and
must confront capital as an alien property, so that the capitalist should be
obliged to rent from their owners such natural powers whenever he wants
to use them as means of production’.35 This argument is not entirely alien to
Marx’s. However, inMarx’s structure, the emergence of private landed property
as a necessary precondition for the capital relation had already been explained
on the basis level of the theory of Capital, concluding Volume i and its dis-
cussion of primitive accumulation. In introducing rent in Part 6 of Capital
Volume iii, Marx can refer to rent’s historical conditions as they have previ-
ously been explained:
Landed property presupposes that certain persons enjoy themonopoly of
disposing of particular portions of the globe as exclusive spheres of their
privatewill to the exclusion of all others. Once this is given, it is a question
of developing the economic value of this monopoly, i.e. valorizing it, on
the basis of capitalist production. In the section on ‘Primitive Accumula-
tion’ (Volume 1, Part 8) we saw how this mode of production presupposes
on the one hand that the direct producers are freed from the position of
amere appendage of the soil (in the form of bondsmen, serfs, slaves, etc.)
and on the other hand the expropriation of the mass of the people from
the land. To that extent, the monopoly of landed property is a historical
precondition for the capitalist mode of production and remains its per-
manent foundation, as with all previous modes of production based on
the exploitation of the masses in one form or the other.36
34 Uno 1980, pp. 103–4, footnote 1.
35 Uno 1980, p. 97.
36 Marx 1981, pp. 753–4. In addition, Marx dedicates a chapter on the historical ‘Genesis of
Capitalist Ground-Rent’ (Chapter 47) after its systematic analysis, in accordance with the
‘Historical Material on Merchant’s Capital’ (Chapter 20) supplementing its logical ana-
lysis in Chapters 16–19, and the presentation of ‘So-Called Primitive Accumulation’, that
also forms the conclusion to the previous analysis of the production process inVolume i of
Capital. The reasons for this particular systematic sequence in Capital – the presentation
of the historical only after the logical presentation – have been discussed in Chapter 2.1.
of this volume.
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Since Uno rejects the grounding function of primitive accumulation for the
emergence of the capital relation, in order to substitute it with a theory of
original exchange (as shown in Chapter 2.1.), he is now at pains to argue the
necessary historical precondition of privately owned landed property for the
emergence of rent under capitalist conditions. At the same time, he stresses
the importance of the historical precondition to conceptually develop rent.
In other words, because pure theory nowhere accounts for the ‘severance of
the direct producers from land’, it cannot account for the conceptual devel-
opment of rent by its own method. However, the difficulty of integrating the
concept of rent into the pure theory itself is beyond Uno’s consideration. For
Uno, rent simply requires an already existing landed property, but as to how
this historical precondition can be explained on the basis of his pure theory of
capitalism remains obscure. Additionally, not only rent, but the ‘institution of
private property’ as such is required for capitalism in order to develop its own
faculties, as Uno asserts. But this cannot be elucidated on the basis of his own
theory. Instead, for Uno, the explanation offered in the Methodology and else-
where, namely that the capitalist mode of production originated in exchange
‘outside of the boundaries of communities’, i.e. merchant capital, rather than
in expropriation, serves as the theoretical foundation of his study of capital
as ‘pure theory’.37 This is a grave lacuna in Uno’s pure theory, and evenmore so
sinceUnonowhere inhis discussionof rent reflects on this obviousmethodolo-
gical flaw. Yet, Uno agrees with Marx that the compatibility of landed property
with the form of capitalist production has yet to be established by capital.38 In
this sense, the theory of rent must – for both Uno and Marx – explain how a
specifically capitalist ground rent is made compatible with the capitalist mode
of production. The question at hand is how rent enters into the formation of a
general profit rate. Uno:
All this [the discussion of the function of differential rent i and ii] boils
down to the fundamental issue concerning the method of theorising
in the context of pure capitalism: the process in which landed prop-
erty develops its particularly capitalistic form … It is therefore neces-
37 See e.g. Uno 1974 [1962], p. 213.
38 ‘But the form inwhich the capitalistmodeof production finds landedproperty at its begin-
ning does not correspond to its mode. The form that does correspond to it is only created
by it itself, with the subjection of agriculture to capital; and in thisway feudal landedprop-
erty, clan property or small peasant property with the mark community is transformed
into the economic form corresponding to this mode of production, however diverse the
legal forms of this may be’. Marx 1981, p. 754.
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sary to show that the first form of differential rent, which arises from
the need of capital to convert its surplus profit into rent, constitutes the
first step towards the capitalistic characterisations of landedproperty; the
second form of differential rent constitutes the second step imposing,
so to speak, a passive constraint upon the process of capital accumula-
tion by the landed property, which again conforms to the commodity-
economic principle of capital … Capital, let me repeat, does not cre-
ate land-ownership as such, but requires the particular form of land-
ownership suitable to its production process. The discussion of rent in
the pure theory of capitalism accordingly exhibits the theoretical com-
patibility of the form of landed property with the production process of
capitalist society.39
Consequently, Uno claims that ‘[r]ent is formed because capital cannot by
itself absorb surplus profit arising from the use of limited land without viol-
ating its own principle of equality’.40 By this he refers to the contribution of
rent to the formation of a general rate of profit. However, in the Principles,
we also find reference to his stages theory that must explain ‘deviations’ from
the ‘rule-of-thumb’, i.e. that capitalist rent presupposes private ownership of
land. This deviation can e.g. be found in the case of Japan: ‘In a country like
Japan, however, in which capitalism evolved relatively late, it was not neces-
sary for capitalism to “subordinate agriculture to capital” in order to achieve a
high level of development…This fact suggests that the purely theoretical study,
though indispensable, cannot be immediately applied to the concrete analysis
of the Japanese experience’.41 The ‘theory of pure capitalism and empirical
analysis must always be mediated by a stage-theoretic characterisation’.42 In
Chapter 2, we have seen how thismediation itself becomes external to a coher-
ent theory of capital, encompassing all ‘levels’. In his more methodological
reflections, Uno fails to address what understanding of capitalism justifies the
systematic coherence and therefore the unity of the three levels of pure the-
ory, stages theory, and analysis of the empirical facts. The ‘Three Level-Method’
(sandankairon) therefore invites an infinite regress to the method of political
39 Uno 1980, p. 107, footnote 9.
40 Uno 1980, p. 100.
41 In same passage quoted above, Marx contends that the subjugation of agriculture to cap-
ital has not been smoothly conducted everywhere. Interestingly, he also chooses Asia as
an example: ‘In Asia, it [capitalist production] has simply been imported here and there
by the Europeans’. Marx 1981, p. 753.
42 Uno 1980, p. 104, footnote 2.
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economy, since the three stages cannot – by means of their own conceptual
definition – account for their own unity. Furthermore, in the context of the the-
ory of rent, the tacit presupposition of the theory of primitive accumulation,
i.e. of a historical precondition not answered for in pure theory, is ominous.
The presupposition of landed property in general, feudal terms, for both the
formation of a specifically capitalist landed property and the entering of sur-
plus profit into the general rate of profit, is methodologically undermined by
Uno’s failure to include primitive accumulation, i.e. the expropriation of land
from the small peasantry, into the pure theory he draws on in order to explain
its own terms in a ‘self-contained’ way.
Second, for Uno, the theory of rent supplements the theory of profit, while
nomore consequences can be drawn for the systematic position of rent within
the general structure. For Marx, the emphasis on rent – discussed after inter-
est – is different. It is more closely connected to the theory of the so-called
‘three sources of revenue’ – the ‘Trinity Formula’ in Marx’s parlance – than
Uno recognises. As argued throughout the present volume, the refutation of
the Trinity Formula is the pivotal motivation for Marx’s criticism of fetish-
ism as method. In the structure of the manuscripts for what would become
Capital, Marx primarily targets the theory’s classic form, as it has been first for-
mulated by Adam Smith, namely in its sequence labour/wages, capital/profit
(interest plus profit of enterprise), land/rent.43 Marx quite obviously adheres
to this form of presentation in his overall analysis and critique over the three
volumes, which demonstrates the centrality of the Trinity Formula’s classic
form as an object of critique. By targeting the theory’s classic form as we find it
in Smith, Marx is also able to discuss it in the conventional sequence in which
it has come to dominate the economic discourse since the 1770s. The first sup-
position, namely that labour ‘yields’ wages, has not only been criticised and
analysed byMarx inVolume i, it forms the heuristic basis or the interpretational
key to demystify the fetishistic illusion that it is only one among other forms of
social wealth. Because abstract human labour, and especially living labour in
the context of production, is the only source of wealth in its particularly capit-
alist social and historical form, it must by logical necessity be analysed first –
at the level of the analysis of essence. Only afterwards, in accordance with the
sequence of the Trinity Formula, is Marx able to show how the notion of cap-
ital yielding profit, respectively interest and profit of enterprise, and the notion
of land yielding rent, is a fetishism based on the naturalisation of the social
43 ‘Wages, profit, and rent, are the three original sources of all revenue as well as of all
exchangeable value. All other revenue is ultimately derived from some one or other of
these’. Smith 1846 [1776], p. 24.
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form specific to capital, in which social production is stripped of its particu-
lar character in the form of wage labour and exploitation. This explains why
the illusion that labour yields wages is dispersed at the basic level of Marx’s
analysis. In this sense, at first sight, Marx seems to deviate from his own intent
of critically revealing the increasing mystification accompanying the categor-
ies of profit, interest, and rent. For is not the category of interest, rather than
the theory of rent, where the ‘capital relationship reaches its most superficial
and fetishized form’?44 For Uno, the discussion of interest as the last category
is at least in part explained by thismotive. Indeed, the relation of M-C-M’ (as in
commercial capital) is extinguished to M-M’ in the theory of interest, with its
original dependency on the exploitation of alien labour completely removed
from sight. To emphasise the importance of interest-bearing capital as ‘fetish-
istic’, Uno maintains that the problem of fetishism with regard to the Trinity
Formula is less comprehended by the category of rent than by interest. Hence,
the theory of rent must precede the theory of interest:
… the so-called ideal (rinen) of capitalist society in the last section on
the ‘Sources of Revenue’ cannot be comprehended in its inner relation
from the category of rent. That the character of class relation in capital-
ist society is obscured (inpei sarete) at the roots of formal commodity-
economic equality and liberty showsmost clearly where landed property
itself becomes interest-bearing capital. The establishment of capital is
completed where land, like capital, becomes commodified and produces
interest by itself.45
But Uno misses the second feature of Marx’s separation of the theory of rent
from the theory of interest: Marx’s desire to criticise their confusion, which has
often overwhelmed classical political economists. This confusion lay either in
their attempt to apologetically ‘transform the capitalist system of production
into a system of “harmonies” (such as Carey)’, or to directly ‘present interest
on capital as a form analogous to ground rent’ (Dudley North, Locke) in a
time when interest received general social contempt. Uno, like some political
economists in Marx’s time, therefore also forgets that ‘ground-rent can and
does exist without the addition of any interest on the capital incorporated in
the soil’.46 Like them, he simply identifies rent with interest-bearing capital.
44 Marx 1981, p. 515.
45 Uno 1974 [1962], p. 288.
46 Marx 1981, pp. 759–60.
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More generally, Marx’s treatment of the theory of the ‘three sources of rev-
enue’ precisely endeavours to show its heteronomity. Hence, Marx comments
that ‘the ostensible sources of the wealth annually available belong to com-
pletely disparate spheres and have not the slightest analogy with one another.
Their mutual relationship is like that of lawyer’s fees, beetroot and music’.47
With regard to rent’s position in the Trinity Formula that Uno claims ‘cannot
be comprehended … from the category of rent’, it is noteworthy that, by the
same token, the notion that ‘nature’ creates surplus value or profit, is no less
fetishistic or illusory than the notion that interest is unhinged from the produc-
tion process of capital.48 And, like the latter, it belongs to the canon of firmly
established beliefs of classical economic theories – including that of Smith and
Ricardo – which can all be traced back to the notion that labour is not the only
source of profit. Hence,Marx’s emphasis on the theory of rent is a different one
than Uno’s. While for Uno, the themes of the ‘Doctrine of Distribution’ revolve
around the distribution of the total social profit between different capitals, in
order to elucidate the relationship among capitalists alone, Marx, in his con-
cluding critique of theTrinity Formula, relegates it back to the relationbetween
capital and labour – keeping in mind the prevalence of the labour theory of
value as a theory of social form. To show this in every instance of the classic
formulation of the theory of the ‘three sources of revenue’ informs the greater
division of Capital Volume iii into profit–interest–rent.
47 Marx 1981, p. 953.
48 Marx lists five conditions of the analysis of surplus profit in the chapter on ‘Differential
Rent in General’. These can be summarised as follows: first, rent is always differential rent,
arising from the difference between the individual production price and the general pro-
duction price for capital in the same sphere of production, 2. ground-rent ‘arises from the
greater relative returns from certain particular capitals invested in a sphere of production’,
as comparedwith capital investments that are excluded from these favourable conditions,
3. ‘the natural force is not the source of the surplus profit, but simply a natural basis for it,
because it is the natural basis of the exceptionally increased productivity of labour’. The
use of natural forces ormechanics, e.g. water power, is directly linked to the appropriation
of a greater share of profit contained in the commodities produced with the help of nat-
ural powers, but this onlymakes sense as a characteristic of andwithin the logic of capital,
not as a characteristic of the natural powers, 4. ‘landed property in thewaterfall has in and
of itself nothing to do with the creation of the portion of surplus-value (profit) and hence
of the price of the commodity that is produced with the aid of the waterfall’. 5. ‘Landed
property enables the proprietor to lay hold of the difference between the individual profit
and the average profit; the profit captured in this way, which is renewed every year, can be
capitalized and then appears as the price of the natural force itself ’. Marx 1981, pp. 785–7.
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4.1.2.2 Interest (Bank Capital and Commercial Capital/Profit)
That Uno discusses bank and commercial capital merely as sub-forms of
interest – though specifically demarcated ones – highlights one of the formal
differences to Marx’s conceptualisation. In Marx, the formation of commer-
cial capital is clearly separated and prior to the theory of interest, the latter of
which subsumes the analysis of bank and loan capital, in short, the credit sys-
tem. The clear separation of commercial capital from interest is motivated by
Marx’s claim that
[i]n interest-bearing capital, the capital relationship reaches its most
superficial and fetishized form. Here we haveM-M’, money that produces
more money, self-valorizing value, without the process that mediates the
two extremes. In commercial capital, M-C-M’, at least the general form of
the capitalist movement is present, even though this takes place only in
the circulation sphere, so that profit appears asmerely profit upon aliena-
tion; but for all that, it presents itself as the product of a social relation, not
the product of a mere thing. The form of commercial capital still exhib-
its a process, the unity of opposing phases, amovement that breaks down
into two opposite procedures, the purchase and sale of commodities. This
is obliterated in M-M’, the form of interest-bearing capital.49
Two results can be drawn from this observation: first, with regard to the com-
plete conceptual structure, the general emphasis on the fetishistic character
of the categories under view in an ‘ascending order’ – from commercial cap-
ital/profit to interest – and second, with regard to the notion of commercial
profit alone, commercial profit’s appearance as ‘merely profit upon alienation’.
It is especially the last aspect that gets lost in Uno’s conceptualisation of com-
mercial profit. Accordingly, Unomisses the point of Marx’s analysis of commer-
cial profit within the structure of Volume iii. To begin with, critically engaging
Uno’s own interpretation against Marx, we must look at Uno’s specific under-
standing of commercial profit within the theory of interest, succeeding the
category of bank capital.
On a more general level, for Uno, commercial profit is obtained from the
saving of circulation costs of productive capital andmust be analysed after the
theory of profit and rent, because it does not contribute to the production of
surplus value. Bank capital however has a special role in themediation of com-
49 Marx 1981, p. 515.
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mercial capital – this is what allows it to become an economic factor in the
question of circulation costs:
… the influence of the circulation period and the circulation costs on the
profit rate, as I have already explained before, does notwait forwhatMarx
calls ‘the intervention of commercial capital’ via the theory of interest in
money capital. It must be clarified through the mediation of commer-
cial capital as bank capital. In other words, ‘industrial capitals and the
competition between them’ itself shortens the circulation period by the
advance (yūzū) of money funds as idlemoney capital which becomes the
first problem (mondai). Besides the fact that commercial capital is a pre-
condition for the saving of circulation costs, it also solves the problem of
the saving of original circulation costs.50
Bank capital advances or accommodates idle money capital to commercial
capitalists in order to serve their (only) function as the savers or ‘econom-
isers’ of circulation costs. They both work hand in hand in the cost-saving
and circulation-facilitating process of capitalist valorisation: while bank cap-
ital converts idle money-capital necessarily generated by the movement of
industrial capital into socially utilisable funds and re-allocates them, commer-
cial capital replaces industrial capitals in the conversion of commodity-capital
into money-capital by selling the commodities and therefore ‘expediting the
hazardous process C’-M”.51 Bank capital therefore participates directly in the
facilitation of the appropriation of profit while commercial capital indirectly
participates in it. To justify this interpretation, Uno refers to Marx: ‘Marx him-
self says that “commercial capital first of all abbreviates the phase C-M for
productive capital. Secondly, given themodern credit system, it has a large part
of the society’s total money capital at its disposal, so that it can repeat its pur-
chases before it has definitively sold what it has already bought …” ’52 The role
of commercial capital is to abbreviate and save this substantial part of the faux
frais of production not only in an accidental, but in a general form:
50 Uno 1962 [1974], p. 296.
51 Uno 1980, p. 113.
52 Uno 1962 [1974], p. 296. Uno quotes from Marx 1981, p. 419. Marx’s original locus for the
discussion of the costs of circulation is not in Volume iii, but in Volume ii, Chapter 6, of
Capital. However, in Volume iii, ‘The Role of Credit in Capitalist Production’ is the ‘reduc-
tionof circulation costs’,whichhowever doesnot fall to commercial capital, but is logically
prior in bank capital and credit. Marx 1981, p. 566.
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Commercial capital, in contrast to the social saving of circulation costs
through the credit system, eliminates the individual, accidental differ-
ence in the shortening of the circulation period by making the direct
saving of so-called pure costs of circulation its object. It therefore addi-
tionally supports the formation of an average profit rate – by capitalising
the costs of circulation itself.53
The savings of the circulation costs arising from the function of commercial
capital, Uno contends, enter into the funds of variable capital in the productive
sector. This is how commercial capital indirectly contributes to the formation
of a general rate of profit. In this case, the expenses at the disposal of com-
mercial capital completely reimburse the costs of labour: ‘As expenses, the
costs of circulation are at once even better saved here than with the labour
of the wage workers, and with the part of the savings, it forms the profit of
variable capital’.54 Commercial profit in Uno’s reading also generates the ‘so-
called entrepreneurial profit’ which for Marx, together with interest for bank
capital, forms a division of profit at the level of productive capital. While for
Marx, profit of enterprise can represent either industrial or commercial profit
and is therefore dependent on its mode of investment,55 for Uno, the relation
between commercial capital and profit of enterprise is more closely knit: even
if the commercial capitalist is in possession of his own capital stock ( jiko shi-
hon/Eigenkapital), this part of his own capital, like loan capital, is thought to
generate interest as capital. The remainder after the subtraction of interest-
share fromcommercial profit by the shortening of the circulationperiod is then
idealised (kannen serareru) as ‘profit of enterprise’ by his own [the commercial
capitalist’s] activity.56 As we can see, Uno attributes a somewhat positive role
to commercial capital and profit, stressing its facilitation of the circulation pro-
cess and its indirect role in the formation of a general rate of profit.
The emergence of the general profit rate, as we have seen earlier, is one
of the three ‘laws’ (hōsoku) of pure theory, now treated in the context of the
distribution of profit. Because it supplements the law of value and the law
of population (which, as a law of general social equilibrium, is the ‘Absolute
Foundation of the Law of Value’ that governs the totality of capitalist activ-
ity), the intermediary function of commercial capital serves as a welcome and
important solution to the problem of general social costs that would otherwise
53 Uno 1962 [1974], p. 296.
54 Uno 1962 [1974], p. 298.
55 Marx 1981, p. 496.
56 Uno 1962 [1974], pp. 298–9.
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impede the ‘automatic power of self-regulation’57 inherent in the law of value.
Marx had allegedly de-emphasised the structurally hampering character of the
circulation period and its costs as an impediment to the smooth functioning
of capital, so that ‘when Capital develops the theory of profit, the treatment
of the circulation period is left unclear, so that this point is for the first time
considered in commercial capital. But the theory of commercial capital is not
clearly solved’.58 ForMarx, what is at stake in the analysis of commercial capital
is veritably different from Uno’s functionalist reading of ‘the saving of circu-
lation costs’. Marx, stressing the ‘characteristic peculiarities’59 of commercial
profit, targets the conventional understanding of commercial profit in his pre-
decessors who have not sufficiently understood its role in the formation of a
general profit rate and hence succumb to the illusory notion that commercial
capital and profit emerge from the mercantilist notion of ‘buying cheap and
selling dear’. Solely in order to disperse this illusion, or rather answer the ques-
tion of how commercial capital ‘attract[s] the part of the surplus value or profit
produced by productive capital that falls to its share’, Marx has written the
chapter on commercial capital and commercial profit. Answering this question
forMarx also serves as an explanans of the formation of profit at the superficial
level of the presentation. Marx’s intervention, in contrast to Uno’s, is therefore
decisively un- if not anti-formalistic: it primarily considers the divergence of
appearance (commercial profit as profit upon alienation) and essence (com-
mercial profit’s ‘parasitic’ behaviour in relation to the general rate of profit in
production) within the limits of the capitalist mode of production that char-
acterises his critique of fetishism as method. It is therefore also situated at a
level of abstraction different from Uno’s. While Uno time and again emphas-
ises the relevance of an unhampered circle of production and circulation in
which commercial capital serves as an auxiliary means for industrial capital to
obtain surplus value (profit) as a whole in order to fulfil the ‘absolute’ law of
value, Marx’s emphasis in contrast lies precisely on a critique of the social rela-
tion that is value. In otherwords, the critiqueof fetishism, in contrast toMarx, is
anathema to Uno within the discussion of commercial profit. At this point, we
do not intend to repeat the presentation of commercial capital’s specific char-
acteristics in fully developed industrial capitalism. Let it however be noted that
Marx rejects the notion that ‘commercial profit is just a supplement, a nominal
increase in the price of the commodities above their value’ by showing how it
57 Uno 1980, p. 69.
58 Uno 1962 [1974], p. 297.
59 Marx 1981, p. 379.
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contributes to the formation of the general rate of profit according to the pro-
portion it forms in the total capital.60 More tellingly, this presumption follows
a remarkable parallel feature to the role of industrial capital: ‘Just as industrial
capital only realizes profit that is already contained in the value of the com-
modity as surplus-value, so commercial capital does so only because the whole
of the surplus-value or profit is not yet realized in the price of the commodity as
realized by industrial capital’.61Without commercial capital, production prices
would be differently adjusted, but commercial capital in turn hinges upon the
lowering of the total value of the commodities in order to make profit: ‘The
merchant’s sale price is higher than his purchase price not because it is above
the total value, but rather because his purchase price is below this total value’,62
i.e. the production price in this segment of production. In otherwords, because
the general profit rate already accounts for commercial capital as an interme-
diary, pushing down the rate of industrial profit in this segment to obtain its
own profit, commerce emerges as profitable at all. But from precisely mistak-
ing the lowering of the purchase price below the total value for a surcharge on
total value arises the fetishistic idea of ‘profit upon alienation’ in the conven-
tional theories of commercial profit. For Uno however, Marx’s critique of the
mercantilist notion is beyond consideration. Marx’s motivation for discussing
commercial profit at all remains unconsidered in Uno’s reading. Quite to the
contrary, like in his general theory of capital discussed in Chapter 2.1, he histor-
ically exemplifies industrial capital on the basis of merchant capital, instead
of comprehending the former as a complete deferral of the analytical frame of
reference with regard to the generation of surplus value:
… I have already mentioned in Part i, Chapter 3, that merchant capital
was the first form of capital to develop in history and is the most gen-
eral form of capital in theory. Thus industrial capital, too, is based on the
form of merchant capital. That is why… industrial capitals are capable of
distributing surplus value among themselves as profit, making use of the
mechanismof circulation. Yet industrial capitals cannot by themselves go
as far as to equalise the burden of circulation costs … commercial capital
… must relieve industrial capitals of these inequalities by taking over the
business of trading commodities.63
60 See Marx 1981, p. 398, for the detailed calculation.
61 Marx 1981, pp. 399–400.
62 Marx 1981, p. 400.
63 Uno 1980, p. 91.
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And yet, Uno considers his reconstruction of Capital as pure theory in the
Principles as superior toMarx’s. This is shown in another critique of Marx. Uno
maintains that ‘the unfolding of commercial profit, interest, and rent inCapital
is rather conducted inmerely external fashion’.64 This objection against Marx’s
method grows more acute in the latter’s distinction between money capital-
ists and functioning capitalists in the theory of interest. Here is what Marx says
about the pivotal distinction between the two kinds of capitalists:
Interest … originally appears, originally is, and remains in reality nothing
but a part of the profit, i.e. surplus-value, which the functioning capital-
ist, whether industrialist or merchant, must pay to the owner and lender
of capital in so far as the capital he uses is not his own but borrowed. If
he simply uses his own capital, there is no such division of the profit; it
belongs to him completely. In fact, in so far as the owners of capital use it
themselves in the reproduction process, they do not compete together to
determine the interest rate, and it is clear here already how the category
of interest – which is impossible without the establishment of a rate of
interest – lies outside the movement of industrial capital itself … It is in
fact only the division of capitalists into money capitalists and industrial
capitalists that transforms a part of the profit into interest and creates the
category of interest at all; and it is only the competition between these
two kinds of capitalists that creates the rate of interest.65
In introducing the notion of interest-bearing capital in Chapter 21 of Vol-
ume iii, Marx gives an example to demonstrate how the money advanced by
the money capitalist to the functioning or the industrial capitalist ‘receives,
besides the use-value which it possesses as money, an additional use-value,
namely the ability to function as capital’, so thatmoney, in its function of being
capital, becomes a commodity:66
Let us take the average annual rate of profit as 20 per cent. Under average
conditions, then, and with the average level of intelligence and activity
appropriate to the intended purpose, amachine with a value of £100 that
is applied as capital yields a profit of £20. Thus a man who has 100 at his
disposal holds in his hands the power of making this £100 into £120, and
thus producing a profit of £20.What he possesses is a potential capital of
64 Uno 1962 [1974], p. 298.
65 Marx 1981, p. 493.
66 Marx 1981, pp. 459–60.
288 chapter 4
£100. If thismanmakesoverhis £100 for a year to someoneelse,whoactu-
ally does use it as capital, he gives him the power to produce £20 profit,
a surplus-value that costs him nothing and for which he does not pay any
equivalent. If the second man pays the proprietor of the £100 a sum of
£5, say, at the end of the year, i.e. a portion of the profit produced, what
he pays for with this is the use value of the £100, the use value of its cap-
ital function, the function of producing a £20 profit. The part of the profit
paid in this way is called interest, which is thus nothing but a particular
name, a special title, for a part of the profit, which the actually function-
ing capitalist has to pay to the capital’s proprietor, instead of pocketing it
himself.67
For Uno, the distinction Marx makes between the money and the function-
ing capitalist is a merely ‘pragmatic’ and ‘arbitrary’ one. Pure theory does not
imply any relation such that a ‘functioning capitalist’ should pay £5 to a ‘money
capitalist’. Pure theory, according to Uno, merely supposes capitalists as the
‘personification’ of capital – which Marx calls ‘character masks’ – so that the
division of capitalists between money capitalists (bankers) and functioning or
industrial capitalists is unacceptablewithin pure theory. Capitalists as personi-
fications of capital only serve the function to producewith their ownparticular
capital a particular surplus value, and, as Uno emphasises, none of this implies
the existence of a ‘money capitalist’.68 Besides,
why should the latter [themoney capitalist] lend his capital to the former
‘for one year’ only instead of permanently? Even if money does acquire
‘the additional use-value, namely that of serving as capital’, in order for
thatmoney to become a commodity, itmust first become a non-use-value
to the ‘money capitalist’. This important point is completely forgotten
in the claim that the presence of the additional use-value by itself con-
verts capital into a commodity. An argument such as this is beyond my
comprehension, unless the prior specifications of the nature of commod-
ities, money, and capital in Capital are to be summarily abandoned at this
point. In the pure theory of capitalism the concept of a ‘functioning cap-
67 Marx 1981, p. 460. The whole passage is quoted in Uno 1980, p. 120, footnote 2. Sekine uses
theCapital edition publishedwith Progress Publishers,Moscow 1965. SeeMarx 1965. (Sek-
ine wrongly cites 1966 as the publication date).
68 For an elaboration of Uno’s critique of Marx’s distinction between ‘money capitalists’ and
‘functioning capitalists’, see Simoulidis, iii Conferencia International La obra de Carlos
Marx y los desafios del Siglo xxi, 2006.
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italist’ who does not possess a capital of his own is surely unreasonable,
even if the concept is proposed to pair off with that of a ‘money capital-
ist.’69
There are several claims in Uno’s rejection of Marx’s distinction that we must
briefly elucidate in order to understand the misapprehension they express
of the form determination of interest-bearing capital.70 First, why should the
money capitalist indeed lend his capital ‘for one year’ only instead perman-
ently? Obviously, because the money capitalist, just like the industrial capit-
alist, is primarily interested in revenue. Revenue however must somehow or
other materialise in time. Since interest is nothing but the payment for per-
mission to use a specific amount of capital in order to valorise it in a certain
period of time, the money capitalist is right to demand his money back after
the exhaustion of this time, based on the law of equivalent change (which,
needless to say, must be supplemented by a theory of the rate of interest which
however precisely presupposes the existence of competingmoney capitalists).
Of course, money-as-capitalmay also be lent over and over again by themoney
capitalist, but even in this case, the very concept of interest demands that it
must materialise in reality after the revenue has been obtained by the indus-
trial capitalist. Otherwise, there would be no reason to lend money capital at
all.
Second, within pure theory, the assumption that functioning capitalists do
not possess their own capital is ‘unreasonable’. If we again bring to mind that,
in Volume iii of Capital, Marx studies the ‘The Process of Capitalist Produc-
tion as a Whole’ in the different forms of capital (profit, interest, rent) as they
appear at the surface of capitalist (self-)presentation in relation to the increas-
ing obfuscation of the exploitation of living human labour it receives in this
order, then interest as a category existing in the reality of the capital relation
cannot be abandoned in this systematic intent of Volume iii. In really existing
capitalist relations, interest, and bank credit deriving from it, precedes indus-
trial profit as a fact. Trivially, that is because – if we exclude inheritance as an
epiphenomenon which cannot explain overall new capital investments in the
69 Uno 1980, pp. 120–1, footnote 2.
70 Ehara Kei agrees with Uno’s claim that the creation of idle money funds in the industrial
cycle give sufficient stimulus for the credit system,without a need to refer to ‘money capit-
alists’ (Ehara 2017/18. pp. 104–5). But if ‘money capitalists’, that is, capitalists solelymaking
profit in the sphere of money circulation, exist – and even Eharawould not deny the exist-
ence of bankers – wemay be well advised to explain their existence. This is, in fact, Marx’s
motivation, which both Uno and Ehara seem to not find necessary.
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complete national and international social context – industrial ‘entrepreneurs’
do not have their own money to start a business. Hence the credit system. Of
course, for Uno, this matter looks different, because he disregards the object
of Marx’s study in Volume iii which is the presentation of the real process of
capitalist valorisation at the surface of its self-presentation. In Uno’s presenta-
tion, in contrast, interest ismerely reduced to the formulaM-M’which relies on
pre-capitalist relations, together with merchant capital, and which both ‘now
obtain their capitalist-economic explanation, in the light of which their ori-
ginal activities in pre-capitalist societies as well as their surviving operations
in capitalist society can be better appreciated’.71 However, the presentation of
their ‘operations’ would precisely have to include the existence of the money
capitalist on the one hand and capitalists on the other. Uno therefore can
neither explain the category of interest nor the category of the rate of interest,
because ‘only the division of capitalists into money capitalists and industrial
capitalists … transforms a part of the profit into interest and creates the cat-
egory of interest at all; and it is only the competition between these two kinds
of capitalists that creates the rate of interest’. At the same time, in Uno’s dis-
cussion of ‘Loan-Capital and Bank-Capital’, banking activities are presupposed.
Uno’s rejection is therefore doubly lopsided: not only does he dismiss Marx’s
discussion of interest by misconceiving of the mode of presentation in Capital
Volume iii that implies really existing relations, but he rejects the distinction
between money and functioning capitalists and yet presupposes them him-
self – if, however, only by sleight of hand.
Yet, Uno admits that ‘functioning’ as well as ‘money capitalists’ in fact do
exist in reality – but pure theorymust exclude their existence from its reflection
and limit itself to the existence of the capitalist par excellence, i.e. the capit-
alist as the personification of capital.72 This argument shows that Uno has not
comprehended the significance of the level of abstraction of CapitalVolume iii
which treats really existing capitalist relations – and therefore matter-of-factly
must also include the analysis of the separation of a part of the capitalist class
in ‘money’, i.e. bank capitalists, commercial capitalists, land owners, and so on.
As Uno says clearly enough, the ‘relation between capitalists’ forms the object
of the Doctrine of Distribution. It therefore seems curious not to include the
relation between industrial and bank capitalists. Third, for Uno, ‘the prior spe-
cifications of the nature of commodities,money, and capital inCapital are to be
summarily abandoned’ if we say that in order for money to become a loanable
71 Uno 1980, p. 109.
72 Uno 1980, p. 121, footnote 2.
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commodity as capital, ‘it must first become a non-use-value to the “money cap-
italist” ’.73 But why should the contention that money functions as a use value
contradict any of the suppositions developed in the first chapter of Capital
Volume i?Money, as the direct incarnation of abstract human labour, even if its
use value and value collapse in its fetishistic semblance of being directly value,
can – under certain conditions – be transformed into capital. This is nothing
new even on the level of Volumes i and ii, in which money capital is conver-
ted into productive capital. It is, however, odd to maintain that money ‘must
become a non-use-value’: since the twofold character of the labour presented
in the commodity (der Doppelcharakter der in denWaren dargestellten Arbeit)
is reflected in use value and value, and the exchange of commodities is motiv-
ated by value as the social form of labour under capitalist conditions, then
Marx’s earliest conception also holds for money loaned as capital: it has value
for its seller and a use value for its buyer. That it has a value at all for the seller
is decisive here. The only modification lies in the fact that the commodity is
not entirely sold once and for all, but lent over a certain period of time. But
that does nothing to change the initial analysis of value and use value and of
the commodity and money in Chapter 1 of Capital Volume i. Uno’s formalistic
theory of commodity and money as discussed in Chapter 3 comes back with
a vengeance in his elaboration within pure theory. Indeed, it is not that the
‘prior specifications … in Capital’ must be abandoned, but Uno’s interpretation
of them. It is remarkable how Uno here indirectly points to the deficiencies of
his own interpretation.
4.1.2.3 Accumulation as the Reproduction-Process of Capital
For Uno, the theory of value, the theory of population (discussed within the
framework of accumulation and crisis), and the theory of the formation of a
general rate of profit form the ‘three great economic laws regulating capital-
ism’ (shihonshugi wo kisei suru sandai keizai hōsoku) of capitalism. All of these,
as will be discussed in the next chapter, regulate capitalist production insofar
as they guarantee the satisfaction of general social demand by the appropriate
allocation of labour to different spheres of production. This process serves to
secure the reproduction of labour power, understood by Uno as the sine qua
non of capitalist sociation. Capitalist accumulation must therefore be primar-
ily understood as the process of the reproduction of labour power. This system
of reproduction accordingly presupposes that labour power is always readily
available. It therefore simultaneously presupposes a relative surplus popula-
73 Uno 1980, p. 121 footnote 2.
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tion created by a period of ‘extensive accumulation’. To generally grasp the
relation between business cycles and population theory, let us provide a pre-
liminary summary on Uno’s theory of crisis within business cycles (which will
be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.4.):
According to Uno, crisis only emerges in periods in which it cannot absorb
the existent supply of labour power. Capital reacts by adopting the measures
and techniques to newly accommodate labour. The adoption of these meth-
ods take place in the phase of depression in which a successive recovery can
be noticed. Because of the employment of new production techniques in this
transition fromdepression to prosperity, cycles of so-called ‘extensive accumu-
lation’, relative surplus populations can be absorbed. This is generally a phase
of prosperity. In effect however, with the increase of the organic composition
of capital, a relative surplus population may be formed, introducing another
phase of crisis. Accordingly, capital must renew its production techniques to
absorb these surplus populations in the next business cycle, so that the succes-
sion of business cycles of prosperity, depression, and crisis can newly occur.74
The law of population for Uno manifests itself in capital’s ability to both pro-
duce, but also absorb the relative surplus population: ‘This is the manner in
which the law of population peculiar to capitalism asserts itself, securing for
capital the supply of labour-power required for its accumulation evenwhen the
existing stock and thenatural growth rate of the labouring population are given
and fixed’.75 For Uno, this law specific to capitalism therefore supplements the
theory of the formation of the general rate of profit, as well as the law of value,
so that ‘everything is to the best in the best of all possible worlds’. These three
laws, in other words, characterise the ‘self-containment’ of capitalist society. In
this conception,Uno invites associationswith Leibniz’s idea of ‘pre-established
harmony’, applied to the capitalist economy. For Uno, accordingly, Marx had
put too much stress on the formation of a relative surplus population and too
little on its repetitive absorption. Uno therefore certainly has a theory of busi-
ness cycles, but he lacks a theory of crisis.76 Needless to say, this perception
of the ‘capitalist laws’ is opposed to Marx’s understanding in which the ‘law’ of
value as a historically specific social form is founded on the basic contradiction
of the domination of value over use value to systematically create poverty and
social oppression. The constant formation of a ‘relative surplus population’, the
74 Uno 1980, pp. 88–9. In this section of the Principles, Uno provides a basic overview of his
crisis theory.
75 Uno 1980, p. 53.
76 We will return to a more detailed discussion of Uno’s theory of the business cycle in
Chapter 4.4.
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so-called industrial reserve army, or ‘surplus population’, on the one hand, with
the simultaneous accumulation and concentration of wealth in the hands of
a few, is one form where this contradiction is demonstrated in really existing
capitalist society.
In order to discuss Uno’s contention that Marx’s theory of the accumulation
process of capital should be subsumed under the theory of reproduction, we
must take a preliminary look at Marx’s conceptual relation of accumulation
and reproduction betweenVolumes i and ii of Capital. Both accumulation and
reproduction are discussed in the two volumes, albeit on different levels of
abstraction. Before we consider the theory of reproduction, as exemplified in
the ‘reproduction schemas’ of Volume ii, let us hearwhatMarx has to say about
the relation of accumulation and reproduction at the beginning of Part Seven,
‘The Process of Accumulation of Capital’, in Volume i:
On the one hand…weassumehere that the capitalist sells the commodit-
ies hehasproducedat their value, andwe shall not concernourselveswith
their later return to the market, or the new forms that capital assumes
while in the sphere of circulation, or the concrete conditions of reproduc-
tion hiddenwithin those forms. On the other hand, we treat the capitalist
producer as the owner of the entire surplus-value, or, perhaps better, as
the representative of all thosewhowill share the bootywith him.We shall
therefore begin by considering accumulation from an abstract point of
view, i.e. simply as one aspect of the immediate process of production.77
In his methodological distinction between the discussion of accumulation
within the basic theory of Capital inVolume i and themore detailed discussion
in Volumes ii and iii, Marx notes that ‘[t]he detailed analysis of the process [of
the reconversionof commodities into capital]will be found inVolume2’, so that
‘in the following pages, we shall assume that capital passes through its process
of circulation in the normal way’.78 Furthermore, the splitting-up of surplus
value into ‘various mutually independent forms, such as profit, interest, gains
made through trade, ground rent, etc.’ will be dealt with ‘only in Volume 3’.79
Uno is dissatisfied with this order of the exposition:
77 Marx 1976, p. 710. The full passage is quoted by Uno in Uno 1962 (1974), p. 292.
78 Marx 1981, p. 709.
79 Marx 1976, p. 709.
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I accept that it [the ‘detailed analysis of the process’ of reproduction in
vol. 2] is different from the ‘distribution of surplus value’. However, the
question is whether ‘the detailed analysis of the process’ must come later
[than the ‘abstract point of view’]. The analysis of ‘The Circulation Pro-
cess of Capital’ in Capital vol. ii is also performed ‘in the normal way’.
What is called the ‘detailed analysis’ is not a process developed in any
unusual way.80
For Uno, this understanding suffices to declare the presentation of the accu-
mulation process in Capital Volume i redundant. The reproduction process,
and especially the schemas in the third part of Volume ii, therefore substi-
tute the demonstration of the basic and abstract process of accumulation
presented in Part Seven of Volume i. As a consequence, accumulation is ‘sub-
lated’ in reproduction, in Uno’s overall systematic order. Uno substantiates this
claim by lamenting the missing relation between the process of accumulation
and the ‘law of population’ in Marx. However, even the reproduction schemas
only insufficiently consider the theory of population which cannot be merely
reduced to reproduction guaranteed by the consumption of the means of sub-
sistence. Accumulation, for Uno, is therefore embedded within the circulation
process of capital and must be theorised from its vantage point in the ‘pure
circulation forms’ of the commodity, money, and capital:
In the schemas, the reproduction of labour power as a commodity is
simply the reproduction of labour depending on the consumption of the
means of livelihood by the workers. This does not explain the specific
law (hōsoku) in the reproduction of labour power as a commodity … as
the commodity realising sale and purchase through value, being able to
assume the form of something that is sold and purchased in separation
from its value [i.e. price], and developing the normal ‘Reproduction and
Circulation of Total Social Capital’, including a circulation that is not nor-
mal [circulation mediated by price], the ‘Accumulation Process of Cap-
ital’ must be developed first and foremost as something that in its inner
structure (sono naibu ni), includes the business cycle that, together with
its specific law of population, adheres to crisis. ThatMarx, beginningCap-
ital with the commodity, did not develop the various forms of the com-
modity, money, and capital as pure circulation forms, is by far the biggest
problem.81
80 Uno 1962 [1974], p. 294.
81 Uno 1962 [1973], pp. 294–5.
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A crucial point for Uno in ‘The Process of Accumulation of Capital’ (Capital
Volume i, Part Seven, Chapters 23–5), corresponding to ‘Expanded Reproduc-
tion: The Actual Process of Capitalist Accumulation’ in the Principles, which
includes the business cycles and the law of population specific to it, is the
availability of additional labour power. This is because, in reproduction on an
expanded scale (= accumulation),
additional means of production and livelihood must … be made socially
available by the overall production of capital. Even if they are available
in themarket, however, capital cannot integrate them into the expanding
scale of its reproduction without the simultaneous procurement of addi-
tional labour-power. It is, therefore, perfectly clear that the accumulation
of capital is crucially dependent on the availability of additional labour-
power which capital by itself cannot directly produce.82
Marx’s presentation of accumulation in Part Seven of CapitalVolume i demon-
strates an entirely different phenomenon, namely how the ‘treadmill-pattern’
of accumulation to the contrary necessitates the redundancy of labour.This fun-
damental contradiction, capital’s self-inflicted compulsion to exploit as much
labour as possible in the shortest period of time, and the simultaneous repul-
sionof living labour from theprocess of production, characterises the inherently
crisis-ridden character of capitalist accumulation and production as a whole.
Therefore Part Seven of CapitalVolume i arguably forms the singlemost import-
ant chapter of all three volumesof Marx’s opusmagnum. In this Part,Marx shows
how and why the theoretical relation of accumulation, reproduction and crisis
must be intrinsically subsumed to the problem of the production of surplus
value.83 The ‘law of population’ (i.e. the constant formation of a relative sur-
plus population or the repulsion of labour) is therefore the consequence of the
‘dictate of capital’, the production of surplus value, but not its regulating prin-
ciple.84 In other words, even though the conversion of labour power into a
commodity is the sine qua non of capitalist production, it is not its primary
motivation, butmerely themeans to an end – an endwhich, strictly speaking, is
never just ‘an end’. The dynamic of surplus value implies only its own augment-
ation as principle, ‘to approach, by quantitative increase, as near as possible
82 Uno 1980, p. 52.
83 We will return to this in more detail in Chapter 4.4.
84 For an extensive discussion of Uno’s vs. Marx’s concept of population and accumulation,
see Chapter 2.2.
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to absolute wealth’.85 While reproduction of the total social capital exhibits
exploitation as the basis to this kind of ‘wealth’,86 accumulation demonstrates
how both the exploitation of a part of the working class and the ‘setting free’ of
the other part condition one another as the basis of capitalist real subsump-
tion.87 Accumulation therefore cannot be subsumed under reproduction or
circulation, as Uno would have it. To the contrary, it first of all presents repro-
duction’s condition of possibility in its capitalist form, so that Uno’s concept
would have to be inverted: accumulation dictates the laws of reproduction, not
vice versa. It is therefore treated in its basic mechanism in Volume i of Cap-
ital, while the analysis of reproduction on a total social scale is postponed to
Volume ii. Because Uno fails to see that Marx’s theory of value is inherently
a theory of crisis, and not a theory of ‘business cycles’, he also misrepresents
the critical intent of bothMarx’s theory of accumulation and the reproduction
schemas. Far fromdemonstrating a linear, harmonious systemof sales and pur-
chases between workers and capitalists, in which the former simply reproduce
their labour power by the consumption of ‘means of livelihood’, the schemas
programmatically demonstrate exploitationof surplus labouras the social basis
on which reproduction under capitalist conditions takes place. In that sense,
the quotes by Uno on the previous pagemay bemisleading: the problem is not
that Uno was not aware of Marx’s treatment of the inherent relation between
accumulation and the ‘law of population’ as the law of the relative surplus pop-
85 Marx 1976, p. 252.
86 The significance of the reproduction schemas in Part Three of Capital Volume iii will be
discussed in the next chapter.
87 For accumulation as extreme exploitation and repulsion of the labour force at the same
time, see Chapter 25 of Capital Volume i. The following passage clearly recapitulates the
inner mechanism necessary for accumulation: ‘The production of a relative surplus pop-
ulation, or the setting free of workers, therefore proceeds still more rapidly than the tech-
nical transformation of the process of production that accompanies the advance of accu-
mulation and is accelerated by it, and more rapidly than the corresponding diminution
of the variable part of capital as compared with the constant. If the means of produc-
tion, as they increase in extent and effective power, become to a lesser extent means for
employing workers, this relation is itself in turn modified by the fact that in proportion
as the productivity of labour increases, capital increases its supply of labourmore quickly
than its demand for workers. The over-work of the employed part of the working class
swells the ranks of its reserve, while, conversely, the greater pressure that the reserve by
its competition exerts on the employed workers forces them to submit to over-work and
subjects them to the dictates of capital. The condemnation of one part of the working
class to enforced idleness by the over-work of the other part, and vice versa, becomes a
means of enriching the individual capitalists, and accelerates at the same time the pro-
duction of the industrial reserve army on a scale correspondingwith the progress of social
accumulation’. Marx 1976, pp. 798–90.
the principles of political economy 297
ulation: he simply did not agree with Marx’s pessimism that capitalismmust by
principle lead to an ever growing tendency to crisis.88 In the next chapter, wewill
see how, in Uno’s understanding, the necessity of crisis can be circumvented in
a strange attempt to reconcile the law of value with a theory of general social
equilibrium.
4.2 The Law of Value as the Law of General Social Equilibrium (Uno)
As we have seen in Chapter 3, Uno’s value theory relies on the assumption that
the use value of the commodity in the equivalent form motivates exchange
relations, even in capitalistically organised ‘commodity economies’. In this
instancewe have argued that Uno neglects the threefold inversion taking place
in the equivalent commodity form, namely that a) use value assumes the
form of appearance as value, b) concrete labour assumes the form of abstract
labour, and c) immediate private labour assumes the inverted form of general
social labour. The fetish-characteristic forms that evolve from this inversion of
appearance and essence are altogether neglected in Uno’s view, especially in
his presentation of the use value of a commodity as the incentive for exchange
relations between individual commodity owners.
In this section, we will show how this focus on the use value characterist-
ics of social production is further applied to Uno’s understanding of capitalist
reproduction in general. Social reproduction for Uno must demonstrate the
‘Absolute Foundation of the Law of Value’, presented in the last section of the
‘Doctrine of Production’ in Part ii. We will further show how the view of value
as ‘expressing’ a balanced relation between production and consumption –
an ‘equilibrium’ of the law of value89 – delivers a problematic understanding
of the creation of surplus value as the necessary basis on which reproduc-
tion takes place. It will be argued that although Uno sees ‘the sole purpose’
of capital as seeking as much surplus value as possible,90 he believes this view
is compatible with an equilibrium theory of value where supply and demand
are necessarily balanced.91 In other words: Uno believes in the compatibil-
88 Which is not only implied in the ‘Tendency of the Lawof the Rate of Profit to Fall’ (ltrpf),
but already by the analysis of the ‘Progressive Production of a Relative Surplus Population
or Industrial Reserve Army’ (Marx 1976, pp. 781–94).
89 Uno 1980, p. 59.
90 Uno 1980, p. 77.
91 This viewhas already beenpertinently rejected by PaulMattick. In the capitalist economy,
according to Mattick, ‘supply and demand never balance’. Mattick 1969, p. 51. The semb-
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ity of a Marxian framework of the self-valorising purpose of capital based on
the extraction of surplus with the premise of a ‘general equilibrium’, serving
social need.92 Here we cannot only detect a misrepresentation of capitalism as
a principally demand-satisfying economic system as in neoclassical econom-
ics and especially marginalism, but also a fatal misunderstanding of the law
of value that is not exhausted in its forms of circulation.93 At their surface,
Marx’s reproduction schemas in Part Three of Volume ii of Capital, based on
Quesnay’s Tableau Economique, seem to invite an argument for what Megh-
nad Desai calls the ‘long-term survival of capitalism’,94 or, in Uno’s words, the
‘self-containedness of the capitalist economic system’. However, if we follow
Marx’s method to differentiate between the fetishistic appearance of equival-
ent change between capital and labour, and its contradictory essence – the
exchange of non-equivalents, i.e. the exploitation of unpaid alien labour –
this argument will prove to be misinformed. Part 2, Chapter 3 of the Prin-
ciples, ‘The Reproduction-Process of Capital’, presents Uno’s own summary of
the reproduction schemas we find in Part Three of Capital Volume ii. Uno’s
chapter is further divided into the following sections: ‘Simple Reproduction:
The Reproduction of Capital and Labour Power’, ‘Expanded Reproduction: The
Actual Process of Capitalist Accumulation’, and ‘The Reproduction Process of
the Aggregate Social Capital: The Absolute Foundation of the Law of Value’.
While the first two sections offer little that is controversial within the Marxian
framework, the same cannot be said about the last section. After all, here the
‘Absolute Foundation of the Law of Value’ can finally be proven. Uno’s absolute
condition for the self-sustainment of capitalist production, that ‘labour-power
is made available to it’,95 is again asserted as the ‘driving force of the motion
of capital’.96 Social reproduction in general is also bound to be ‘anarchistic’ in
the sense that ‘[c]apital … does not produce with a direct knowledge of the
lance of equilibrium is given in the view of ‘maximizaton of private interest’. Mattick 1969,
p. 52.
92 Lebowitz even describes the ‘general equilibrium’ premise as one of vulgar economy –
a premise ‘contained in its results’. As a construction of ‘an apparent totality proceeding
from appearance’, general equilibrium is ‘the highest form of vulgar economy’. Lebowitz
2005, p. 11.
93 As Ebitsuka Akira approvingly comments: ‘In short, the central assignment of Uno’s the-
ory of circulation forms is the ability to explain the mechanism of the equilibration of
supply and demand in a commodity economy’. Ebitsuka 1982, p. 268.
94 Desai 2002, p. 83.
95 Uno 1980, p. 54.
96 Uno 1980, p. 51.
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structure of social demand’.97 AsUnohowever argues, this does not infringe the
fact that social reproduction, notwithstanding its ‘anarchistic’, i.e. blind form,
satisfies social need. In fact, the satisfaction of social demand is the necessary
logical process by which the circular motion of production and reproduction
in the two different departments of production (Department i as the produc-
tion of means of production and Department ii as the production of means of
consumption) are guaranteed:
In all societies, the continuation of annual reproduction depends on the
distribution of both labour power and the means of production in the
two departments (of social production), in accordance with the degree
of social demand. This presents nothing but the implementation of the
norms (gensoku) existing as a matter-of-fact in the rational process of
economic life, and equally pertaining to all societies that assume the
commodity form. A capitalist commodity-economy realises this norm
through the law of value, which is regulated by and asserts itself in the
movement of price. Capital, in other words, provides every sector of pro-
duction with labour power andmeans of production in order to, with the
given labour time necessary for the production of individual products,
satisfy social demand.98
For Uno, the accumulation of value and the satisfaction of social demand do
not form a contradiction.99 However, Uno’s view of social reproduction, under-
stood as a transhistorical law, cannot explain the specificities it has in a par-
ticularly capitalist society, namely the irreconcilable confrontation of capital
and labour and the specifically social form that labour assumes in capitalism –
namely, as the various value forms. On thebasis of this confrontation, reproduc-
tion is only possible if exploited,materialised labour inmoney terms is over and
over again thrown back into the circulation process, so that the appropriation
of this kind of labour can be repeatedly performed without an equivalent. For
Uno, to the contrary, exploitation, or rather, the ‘augmentation’ of value, is a
necessary condition to safely guarantee general social reproduction. A problem
97 Uno 1980, p. 55.
98 Uno 1964, p. 116.
99 For ‘balanced growth’ theories, see themostly neo-Ricardian theorisations of Sraffa’s tech-
nology matrices (see Sraffa 1960), Leontief ’s input-output tables (Leontief 1986) and the
assumptions in neoclassical growth theory, as in Lange 1969,Morishima 1973, Howard and
King 1985, Gehrke and Kurz 1995. For a critique on the neo-Ricardian interpretations of
Marx’s reproductions schemas assuming ‘physical quantities of inputs and outputs for
the various sectors in the economy’, see Moseley 1998a, p. 159.
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as to capital’s need of accumulation-through-exploitation of human labour is
anathema in Uno’s presentation of the reproduction schemas. Marx’s specific
incentive to present the reproduction schemas only in Chapter 20 and 21 of
CapitalVolume ii is also absent fromUno’s considerations.Marx’s presentation
follows the close criticism of Adam Smith’s negligence to discuss the reproduc-
tion of constant capital in his theory of the three sources of revenue.100 To be
sure, in pure theory, theCritique of Political Economy is eclipsed fromview. But
precisely by declaring it ‘outside’ of the presentation of pure capitalism’s ‘laws’,
Uno fails to see what specifically motivated Marx to conceptualise his cent-
ral theorems, such as the reproduction schemas. He thereby misses the critical
intervention Marx provided and instead substitutes it for a social equilibrium-
model in which production necessarily satisfies demand, regulated by the law
of value. Yet, nothing could be further fromMarx’s own intervention. Method-
ologically, Uno’s conceptualisation of social reproduction becomes even more
ominous when he discusses it in close proximity to Marx’s, using the same fig-
ures as him to illustrate his example. To explain, we shall therefore take a closer
view at Uno’s (mis-)appropriation of Marx’s reproduction schemas. Mainly,
Uno’s contention that accumulation must be subsumed under the theory of
social reproduction to demonstrate the law of value as a law of social equilib-
rium will be critically evaluated. In direct connection, this evaluation will be
complemented by a critical analysis of the role of use value in reproduction.
Lastly, this chapter concludes by showing how Ricardo has already conceived
of the reproduction of labour power merely in terms of use value – thereby
attempting to highlight yet another convergence of Uno’s thought with non-
Marxian political economy, as has previously been indicated with the compar-
ison to Bailey’s functionalist understanding of value.
100 Fred Moseley has persuasively argued that Marx’s presentation of the reproduction
schemas was basically motivated by his critique of Adam Smith’s view that ‘the price of
the total social product is entirely resolved into revenue, that is, into wages plus profit
and rent’, thereby forgetting the recovery of constant capital (means of production) as
money capital in annual reproduction. See Moseley 1998a, p. 160. The context in which
the schemas appear is Marx’s critique of the Trinity Formula discussed in the previous
chapter (Chapter 19 of Volume ii of Capital) that centrally informs Marx’s critique of fet-
ishism. While this motive escapes Uno’s view, it can at least be said that Uno, unlike the
theorists of ‘physical inputs and outputs’ that Moseley targets in this essay, conceives of
the inputs and outputs in monetary terms, using the same figures as Marx. As a matter of
fact, however, Uno still misconceives of Marx’s schemas as presenting a theory of general
equilibrium.
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4.2.1 Uno’s Appropriation of Marx’s Reproduction Schemas:
The Compatibility of Accumulation with ‘Social Equilibrium’
Because Uno insists that ‘[t]he law of value becomes an economic law because
it has the power to realise a general economic norm on a society-wide scale’,101
he can also argue that ‘[e]ach individual capital satisfies part of the social
need while merely aiming at the augmentation of value guided as it is by the
motion of prices’.102 Here, Uno’s view as to the compatibility of the law of
value, directed at the exploitation of surplus labour, with an equilibrium of
supply and demand becomes clear. He goes on to provide, in accordance with
Marx’s schema of Simple and Extended Reproduction in Chapter 20 and 21 of
Volume ii, schematic examples of reproduction to show that a) for the case
of simple reproduction, ‘the sum of the variable-capital component (and) of
the surplus-value component of the outputs of the first sector should be equal
to the constant capital component of the output of the second sector’, so that i
(v+s) = iic,while b), for expanded reproduction, i (v+s) > iic.103Here, in the case
of extended reproduction, where the surplus product of both departments is
not entirely consumed by the capitalists, but accumulated for the next cycle of
production, he again gives nearly the same figures as Marx.104What is decisive
is that these schemas are entirely in terms of money circulation, and that par-
ticular sums of money are on the one hand required to circulate the capital of
c+v, and another sum is required to circulate s.105 To argue for a), Uno uses the
same figures as Marx.106 Accordingly, Uno supposes the following value com-
positionof c (constant capital component), v (variable capital component) and
s (surplus value component), at an exploitation rate of 100%: Department of
Production i (Means of Production): i. 6000 = 4000 c + 1000 v+ 1000 s, Depart-
ment of Production ii (Means of Consumption): ii. 3000 = 2000 c + 500 v +
500 s.
101 Uno 1980, p. 69, footnote 12.
102 Uno 1980, p. 55.
103 Uno 1980, p. 56. It must be noted that Marx’s schemas operate at the level of labour val-
ues, not price. This important distinction for the level of presentation is eclipsed in Uno’s
presentation.
104 Marx 1978, p. 581 ff.
105 For a detailed summary of the rule of i (v+m) = ii c to guarantee simple reproduction, see
Marx 1978, pp. 473–4. Moseley strongly argues this point: ‘Marx’s analysis … has nothing
essential to do with the physical quantities of inputs and outputs, but instead has to do
with the advance, recovery and reproduction of different components of money capital
throughout the capitalist economy through the purchase and sale of commodities’. Mose-
ley 1998, p. 160.
106 Uno 1980, p. Marx 1978, p. 473.
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If, by the condition of simple reproduction that capital in the next produc-
tion cycle must only be able to produce with the same capital value as before,
the surplus value components are entirely consumed by the capitalists of both
departments, then the value 2000 (= 1000 v + 1000 s) of both i and ii must be
consumed by those workers and capitalists in the form of consumption com-
modities of ii. In consequence, the capitalist of ii has substituted the value of
his (ii’s) constant capital through the consumption of the capitalists andwork-
ers of i. Hence, production can start anew with the same value composition
of capital: for i: 4000 c + 1000 v; for ii: 2000 c + 500 v. Therefore, the formula
for simple reproduction must be i (v + s) = ii c. At the same time, the money
value of the v in department i is substituted with the money value the cap-
italists of ii spend on means of production. Uno disregards this latter point
and with it the fact that the money value advanced by the capitalists of both
sectors to circulate their value product flows back to them.107 If however we
assume expanded reproduction in which the surplus is not entirely consumed
by the capitalists, we get the following value composition as the initial schema
for extended reproduction in b):
i. 6000 = 4000 c + 1000 v + 1000 s,
ii. 2250 = 1500 c + 375 v + 375 v,
the sum being 8250, less than the 9000 in schema a) of simple reproduction.
Uno’s figures here only slightly deviate from Marx’s.108 In his presentation
of extended reproduction, Marx has deliberately chosen a smaller sum than
in the initial schema to show that ‘reproduction on an expanded scale … has
nothing to do with the absolute size of the product, that for a given volume of
commodities it simply assumes a different arrangement of a different determ-
ination of the function of the various elements of the given product … It is
not the quantity, but the qualitative character of the given elements of simple
reproduction that is changed, and this change is the material precondition for
the ensuing reproduction on an expanded scale’.109 Accordingly, if extended
reproduction requires a greater value product of v + s in department I than that
of c in department ii, then the formula for extended reproduction must be i (v
+s) > ii c. To prove this, Uno gives the following argument: first, for extended
reproduction to take place, the capitalists of i do not spend all of i s on products
107 See Marx 1978, p. 477.
108 In Marx, the v and s of ii are 376, respectively, so that the total value product = 8252. See
Marx 1978, p. 581.
109 Marx 1978, p. 582.
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of consumption, but withdraw a part of it from the surplus. For example, they
keep or accumulate half of it (= 500 s) for the next production cycle with the
value composition of 4:1.With the relation of 4:1 transferred to the newly added
capital of 500 from the surplus of i, in this department 400 c are added to the
original 4000 c, and 100 v are added to the original 1000 v. In this case, as in
the schema of simple reproduction, since i (1000 v + 500 s + 100 (s)v) = ii 1600,
department ii must transform not only 1500, but 1600 into its c. If the same
capital composition 4:1 is to be maintained in department ii as well, then its
c must increase by 100, and the v component must increase by 25, so that the
accumulation required from surplus value in this sector will be 125 s. To sum-
marise:
i. 4000 c + 400 (s)c + 1000 v + 100 (s)v + 500 s,
1500 c + 100 (s)c + 375 v + 25 (s)v + 250 s.110
Accordingly, the composition of productive capital in the two departments
newly consists in:
i. 4400 c + 1100 v,
ii. 1600 c + 400 v,111
and the value composition of the new productive capital is:
i. 4400 c + 1100 v + 1100 s = 6600
ii. 1600 c + 400 v + 400 s = 2400
In this case, the scale of a newly commencing production cycle is extended,
compared to the first cycle, even though the value sum of productive capital
of both departments is the same as with simple reproduction (= 9000). In the
present cycle therefore, half of the surplus product being accumulated, the
capital value is already reimbursed, so that the resulting production, all other
conditions being equal, can start anew with a capital of 9000 (i. 4400C + 1100
v + 1100 s = 6600 and ii. 1600 c + 400 v + 400 s = 2400; 6600+2400 = 9000). For
extended reproduction to take place, therefore, the conditionmust be satisfied
that the valueproduct of the first sector i (v + s) is greater than the constant cap-
ital of the second sector or department, so that i (v +s) > ii c. With the above
110 Uno 1980, p. 56. The figures in italics indicate that these are exchanged, according to i
(v+m) = ii c.
111 Uno 1980, p. 57. Uno uses the same figures as Marx.
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schema, and on the condition that real accumulation now proceeds on this
basis, and produces with the accumulated capital, in the following year we get:
i. 6600 = 4400 + 1100 v + 550 s + 440 (s)c + 110 (s)v
ii. 2400 = 1600 c + 400 v + 200 s + 160 (s)c + 40 (s)v,
so that the composition of capital becomes, for i. 4840 c + 1210 v, for ii. 1760 c
+ 440 v, in which case the resulting total value of this production cycle will be
9900, in the following composition:
i. 4840 c + 1210 v + 1210 s = 7260
ii. 1760 c + 440 v + 440 s = 9900.
And this is as true as far as the maths goes – for both Uno and Marx. For Uno
though, the expanded reproduction schemas show a perfect, if hypothetical,
balance of the inter- and intrasectoral exchanges, so that the schemas ‘aim at
nothingmore than to show that capitalist society too satisfies, albeit in the par-
ticularly commodity-economic form, the fundamental condition of simple and
expanded reproduction which all societies must satisfy’.112 Under unchanging
conditions therefore, this balance invites the hypothesis that the law of value
regulates, and indeed, guarantees a stable equilibrium of supply (expressed
in the act of sale of one part of the value product) and demand (expressed
in the act of purchase in one part of the value product), or as C-M-C’-M’-C”-
M”, etc. Indeed, the equilibrium of supply and demand is nothing short of the
‘basic requirement for a commodity economy’.113 For Uno, extended reproduc-
tion only requires an ‘incremental production of the means of production’114
as a precondition. In contrast toMarx, therefore, Uno believes that the circula-
tion of a surplus product is not based on the extraction of surplus labour – or
rather, only insofar as capital must satisfy the needs of the consuming workers
by their own product, namely as use value.While it is not the case that Uno dis-
regards exploitation – thoughhe rarelymakes use of the term–he clearly sees a
structural compatibilityof the extractionof surplus labourwith the commodity-
economic general laws of aggregate social reproduction, in order to guarantee
social equilibrium:
112 Uno 1980, p. 58.
113 Uno 1963, p. 76, quoted in Ebitsuka 1982.
114 Uno 1980, p. 57.
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The consumption of labour-power is labour itself which produces a new
value-product v + s in excess of v. In a capitalist commodity-economy,
however, even this human relation involving labour-power conforms to
the peculiar rules of that economy by the ‘commoditisation’ and reific-
ation of labour-power; it is this conformity that endows the aggregate
reproduction-process of a capitalist society with its characteristically
commodity-economic regularity.115
What we find here is an interpretation of the reproduction schemas that sets
themwithin the idea of the pre-established harmony also conceived in Smith’s
‘invisible hand’: while individual capitals seek to maximise their profits, they
do so only for the benefit of the social reproduction of all. Or, in Uno’s words:
Each individual capital satisfies part of the social need while merely aim-
ing at the augmentation of value guided as it is by themotion of prices.116
And:
… capital possesses the faculty of allocating itself to the various spheres
of production so as to supply all the products that society demands.117
Again, this view of the reproduction schemas sets them within the idea of
pre-established harmony in which precisely those use values are supplied that
are needed for consumption while those values are reproduced that are again
needed for reproduction. This can only be guaranteed by the governance of
the law of value, understood as Say’s Law, according to which ‘a product is no
sooner created than it, from that instant, affords a market for other products
to the full extent of its own value’.118 In this sense, production ‘supplies’ its own
demand in equal quantities, and demand ‘provides’ productionwith its incent-
ive. Consequently, forUno (as for Say), ‘no general over-productionof commod-
ities is theoretically possible’.119 In general, rather, the activities of ‘individual
capitalists’ and ‘individual labourers’ are ‘merely compelled by the law of value
which, asserting itself in the motion of prices, regulates the individual pursuit
115 Uno 1980, p. 61.
116 Uno 1980, p. 55.
117 Uno 1980, p. 76.
118 Say 1834 [1803], p. 138.
119 Uno 1980, p. 121.
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of private interests’.120 Uno strangely seems to believe that individual labour-
ers kill two birds with one stone: while they produce the material basis for
reproduction – that is, for profit – they pursue their ‘private interests’ in the
simultaneous production of their ownmeans of subsistence. Indeed, to explain
capitalism as a self-sustaining system with this strange amalgamation of clas-
sical (Smith’s invisible hand, Ricardo’s focus on the reproduction of labour
power in terms of use value) and neoclassical (marginalist) assumptions, in
combination with Leibnizian metaphysics, is to obscure precisely the social
form that labour takes in its direct confrontation to capital – which Marx’s
reproduction schemas demonstrate. The view of social reproduction consist-
ing in equilibrium has already been pertinently rejected by Paul Mattick. In
the capitalist economy, according to Mattick, ‘supply and demand never bal-
ance’.121 However, the semblance of equilibrium is given in bourgeois economic
theory’s viewof ‘maximisation of private interest’: ‘…market relations assure to
each and all the equivalent of their particular contributions to the production
process, and that is precisely the maximization of private interest which leads
to the optimum of social well-being’.122 As we have seen, Uno implicitly shares
this axiomwith bourgeois economists. However, asMarx notes, thiswould only
work if ‘private interests were not already socially-determined private interests,
whose realization depended on social conditions and on the means provided
by these conditions, as well as on their reproduction requirements’.123 That is,
not the ‘regulatory power’ of supply and demand indicates the regulatory oper-
ation of the law of value, but the conditions and limits of production ‘regulate’
general social supply and demand (which is not tantamount to ‘equilibrium’).
Mattick:
… market relations are essentially derivative, circumscribed as they are
by the capacities and limitations of the production process. Because it is
impossible in practice to separate the production process from the cir-
culation process, the effects of the increasing productivity of labor upon
the basic production relations as value relations appear only in the mod-
ified form of price and profit relations determined by the competitive
supply and demand mechanism. But the fact that market relations can
only be price relations in no way alters the primary fact that the supply
120 Uno 1980, p. 59.
121 Mattick 1969, p. 51.
122 Mattick 1969, pp. 51–2.
123 Marx 1953 [1857–8], p. 74. Emphasis added and quoted in Mattick 1969, p. 52, who also
provides his own translation. See Marx 1973, p. 156.
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and demand relations are circumscribed by social production relations
and the character of social production as the accumulation of capital.124
The semblance of equilibrium in terms of supply (in Uno’s terms: what ‘soci-
ety’ produces) and demand (in Uno’s terms: the means of subsistence for the
reproduction of labour power) is a consequence of its social constituents in
terms of the relation between capital and labour: because only when ‘mar-
ket demand is one that will assure the realization of surplus-value by way of
capital expansion’,125 can we rightfully speak of demand.126 There is indeed
nothing natural about it, as the ahistorical and unspecific notion of ‘supply
and demand’ suggests. Accordingly, crisis occurs, not because the law of value
‘breaks down’ in regulating supply and demand, but precisely because supply
and ‘demand’ depend on the rate of accumulation, i.e. conditions inherent in
production, as the independent variable. The breakdown of equilibrium is one
of valorisation’s most eminent features. However, there are restrictions to the
perfect equilibrium that the law of value regulates, even for Uno: ‘… if a com-
modity is over-produced, a fall in its price compels a contraction of the scale
of its production; if a commodity is underproduced, a rise in its price induces
an expansion of the scale of its production. Hence the labour-time required for
the production of each commodity cannot diverge very far from that which is
socially normal’.127 What is ‘socially normal’ however is tautologically defined
by the law of value: general social reproduction expressed in an equilibrium of
inputs and outputs forUno obeys the lawof valuewhile the equilibrium, simul-
taneously, ‘demonstrates’ the law.With this circular assumption, Uno’s thesis of
an equilibrium theory of value is completed: ‘In other words, the law of value
must apply to the whole of society in enforcing the general economic norm
of reproduction. The relation between the two sectors expresses an “equilib-
rium” of the law of value in this sense’.128 This view is wrong in two aspects:
first, as previously stated, it ignores the impetus of capitalist (re-)production
whose goal is not the satisfaction of needs by use values, but the accumulation
of surplus value (profit). This also delegitimises Uno’s appeal to equilibrium,
since
124 Mattick 1969, p. 53.
125 Mattick 1969, p. 56.
126 Mattick however forgets to mention the bogus concept of ‘supply and demand’ in terms
of its naturalisation. It is never demand that assures the realisation of surplus-value, but
moneyed demand.
127 Uno 1980, p. 59.
128 Ibid.
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[the] very necessity of evening-up presupposes the imbalance, the dis-
harmony and hence the contradiction … if it is the tendency of capital
to distribute itself in the correct proportions, it is just as much its neces-
sary tendency to drive beyond the correct proportion because it strives
boundlessly for surplus labour, surplus productivity, surplus consump-
tion, etc.129
Second, Uno’s use value-based view of social reproduction leads to a circular
view of the concept of value, according to whose ‘law’ supply and demand reg-
ulate the market value in the last instance, while the law of value depends on
its expression in a market value directly regulated by the dynamics of supply
and demand. The first view permeates Uno’s theory of value as a whole, while
the second is a specific symptom of Uno’s developed value theory that oscil-
lates between explaining an objective law that governs exchange relations, or
a merely regulative force, ultimately suspended in the notion of market values
explaining price fluctuations of commodities as the products of capital in the
market:
… the social regulation of the activity of individual capitals by means
of the conversion of values into production-prices results in a definitive
quantitative relationship between the means of production and materi-
als for consumption such as is exhibited in the schemes, and confirms the
law of value by ensuring the feasibility of social reproduction.130
The determination of values presupposes the adjustment of supply ac-
cording to social demand, and themechanismof this adjustment actually
develops only when commodities are supplied as products of capital …
Only after the establishment of the notion of market value as the centre of
gravity of the market price of a commodity in general, can this notion be
applied to the case in which the commodity is a product of capital.131
Both aspects, however, are part of a wider symptomatic problem in Uno’s ver-
sion of the pure theory of capitalism: they both ignore Marx’s crucial aspect,
namely that thedistributionof the aggregate surplus over the twodepartments,
andhence, the ‘perfect balance’ of reproduction, is defrayed by the exploitation
of labour power so that the repository of surplus value ‘does not cost anything
129 Marx 1986 [1857–61], p. 340.
130 Uno 1980, p. 93, footnote 6. Emphasis added.
131 Uno 1980, p. 93, footnote 7. Emphasis added.
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to its appropriators’.132 The law of value is therefore not a theory of equilibrium,
quite to the contrary: it shows that reproduction under the conditions of capital-
ist production133 necessarily implies the creation of a surplus via exploitation, a
surplus that ‘costs the capitalist class nothing’.134 Therefore, forMarx, the ques-
tion is not: howdoes the aggregate annual reproduction process, the inputs and
outputs between the two departments, continuously reconstitutes a balance?
The question at stake for Marx rather is: ‘How is it possible for each capitalist
to withdraw a surplus-product from the annual product in money, i.e. to with-
draw more money from the circulation sphere than he cast into it’135 – and all
of that ‘without an equivalent’?136 In order to answer this question – probably
themost crucial question in the context of the basic theory of capitalist circula-
tion at all – Marx organises his analysis in the following way: first, he considers
the exchange between the two departments i (v + s) against ii c, second he
analyses the exchange within department ii (‘Necessary Means of Subsistence
and Luxury Items’), and third, he considers the mediation of the exchanges by
monetary circulation. The still unresolved reproduction of the constant capital
of Department i is discussed in the next section, the reproduction of variable
capital and surplus value in the successive one, and in the last chapter, where
the exchange of constant capital in both departments is discussed.
As to how simple reproduction already guarantees that the capitalist with-
drawsmoremoney from circulation than he initially cast into it, the section on
‘The Mediation of Exchanges by Monetary Circulation’137 is especially inform-
ative. To these, Marx applies the schema i. 6000 = 4000 c + 1000 v + 1000 s
and ii. 3000 = 2000 c + 500 v + 500 s. In the following, Marx shows how all the
single constituents of value are replaced and a surplus value is still obtained
from this process, whether in commodities or in money. To give an example,
Marx assumes the capitalist of Department i as a case in point:
132 Marx 1978, p. 572.
133 As shown in Chapter 2 of this volume, Uno treats the law of value as a transhistorical law,
and capitalism just as an instance of it.
134 Marx 1978, p. 550. Notice the emphasis Marx puts on this fact in Marx 1978, pp. 550–1. See
also Clarke: ‘It is not simply [the distinctive feature] that the motive of the capitalist is to
produce values in order to appropriate a profit. The decisive point is that of the means by
which the capitalist is able to appropriate a profit’. Clarke 1994, p. 281. Emphasis added.
135 Marx 1978, p. 549.
136 Marx 1978, p. 550. ‘It is important … to realise, contrary to a long interpretative tradition,
that inMarx the schemes of reproduction have nothing to dowith a picture of a “balanced
economic growth” ’. Bellofiore 2018, p. 382.
137 Marx 1978, pp. 487–97.
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As far as the department i capitalists are concerned, with respect to the
component v+s of their commodity product they withdraw more money
from the circulation sphere than they cast into it. Firstly, their £1,000 of
variable capital returns to them; secondly, they sell means of production
for £500 [(Department ii buys means of production from department i
for £500, i.e. commoditiesworth £500)], and this enables them to convert
half their surplus-value into cash; then they again sell a further £500 of
means of production ([Department ii uses £500 to buymeans of produc-
tion from department i; i.e. commodities worth £500]), the second half
of their surplus value, and as a result their entire surplus-value has been
withdrawn fromcirculation in themoney form.Wehave therefore, in suc-
cession, (1) variable capital transformed back intomoney, £1,000; (2) half
of the surplus-value realized, £500; the other half of the surplus value,
£500; a total realized of £1,000v + £1,000s = £2,000. Even if department
i cast only £1,000 into circulation (we leave aside here the circumstances
that mediate the reproduction of i c, which will be considered later)138
it has withdrawn twice the amount. Of course, the s that has been real-
ized (transformed intomoney) immediately vanishes again into someone
else’s hands (department ii), because money is exchanged for means of
consumption. The capitalists of department i have withdrawn only as
much in money as they cast in commodities. The fact that this value is
surplus-value, and costs the capitalists nothing, in no way alters the value
of the commodities themselves; it is therefore completely immaterial, as
far as the exchange of values in commodity circulation is concerned.139
What we notably find here is the phenomenon that ‘it is themoney that depart-
ment i itself cast into circulation that realizes its own surplus value’.140 It is not
difficult to see how the apparent exchange of equivalents is compatible with
themore essential nexus of exploitation, so that the exploitation and appropri-
ation of surplus labour becomes the basis onwhich general social reproduction
can take place in a capitalist economy. Uno is disinterested in this historic-
ally specific feature of capitalist reproduction, instead declaring reproduction
‘the basic economic norm that is common to all societies’. More eminently, for
Marx, it is the question of appearance vs. essence that guides his critique as
a critique of fetishism. Uno’s research question not only differs in this regard
138 See Marx 1978, pp. 498–501.
139 Marx 1978, pp. 493–4.
140 Marx 1978, p. 495.
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from that of Marx, but falls behind its critical impetus. But it is precisely the ‘fal-
lacy of everyday notions’ – more concretely, how the general social reproduc-
tion process, based on the extraction of surplus value, can appear as a process
of equivalent exchange, that interestsMarx. Uno’s research programme, disreg-
arding the nexus between the essence of the capital relation and its necessary
forms of appearance, is explicit in his presentation of ‘The Absolute Founda-
tion of the Law of Value’ in the reproduction schemes that in Uno’s view enacts
the ‘automatic power of self-regulation’.141 How important indeed forMarx the
contrast between the appearance and the essence of these schemes is, is not
addressed only inMarx’s critique of Smith’s and Tooke’s reproduction theories.
Let us consider the following, more general point discussed towards the end of
the chapter on Simple Reproduction:
… if the capitalist class casts a certain sum of money into circulation in
the shape of revenue, it appears as if it paid an equivalent for this part
of the total annual product, and that this has thereby ceased to repres-
ent surplus value. But the surplus product in which the surplus-value is
represented costs the capitalist class nothing. As a class, it possesses it
and enjoys it free of charge, and the monetary circulation cannot alter
this in any way. The change that this brings about simply consists in the
fact that each capitalist, instead of consuming his own surplus product
in kind, for which in most cases it would not be suitable, withdraws com-
modities of all kinds from the total stock to the amount of the surplus
value that he appropriated, and appropriates these … If the capitalist not
only withdraws surplus value from the commodity market in the form of
commodities for his consumption fund, but at the same time the money
with which he buys these commodities flows back to him, he has evid-
ently withdrawn the commodities without an equivalent. They cost him
nothing, even though he pays for them with money.142
It is the dialectic of the last sentence – that the surplus with which the capital-
ist obtains more money ‘cost(s) him nothing, even though he pays for (it) with
money’ – and its far-reaching consequences that are eclipsed from Uno’s view
of a theory of a purely capitalist society.
This also resonates with Brentel’s trenchant critique of the ‘proportionality’-
view of Proudhonism entering into Uno’s conception. In Proudhon, as Bren-
141 Uno 1980, p. 69.
142 Marx 1978, p. 550.
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tel points out, the ‘harmonist semblance of circulation becomes the ground/
reason (Grund) for value constitution. Labour values, which are already consti-
tuted (in the process of production) are legitimised by the fiction of harmoni-
ous exchange’.143 He comments:
In fact, what happens is the exact opposite: what, for Marx, is revealed
by the analysis of the capitalist relations of production is that the Proud-
honist ‘constitution’ of value objectivity in reality does not refer to any
kind of proportional relation of exchange. Quite the opposite: only the
constantly disproportional relations of production and consumption, the
disproportional distributionof total social labour across the different pro-
ductive sectors and their equilibrating movement by the competition of
capitals [demonstrate how] the fluctuating relations between supply and
demand constitute an objective, viz. objectifying labour value as the aver-
age determination of themovements of price. The lawof value is real only
insofar as it is a law of disproportionality, not of proportionality.144
In the following, wewill focus on the ‘automatic power of self-regulation’ (Uno)
of capitalist production – a form of its proportionality – that Uno sees guaran-
teed precisely by the limitations set upon value production by the use value
aspect of commodities – and how he takes Marx as a buttress for this view.
4.2.2 Use Value as ‘Passive Constraint’ to Equilibrium
In an important explanatory note145 to support his thesis of the inter-sectoral
equilibrium being regulated by the law of value, Uno admits to a ‘passive con-
straint’ in the power of the law of value ‘to realise a general economic norm on
a society-wide scale’.146 This constraint is represented by use value:
… it would be completely incorrect to assert that the reproduction of a
capitalist society follows the numerical relation of the schemes exactly
or that the schemes can possibly represent an unbalanced development
of the relation of reproduction in a capitalist society. Such misappre-
hensions would deny the automatic power of self-regulation inherent
in a capitalist commodity-economy, and would neglect the fundamental
rationale that makes the theoretical treatment of capitalism possible
143 Brentel 1989, p. 221.
144 Brentel 1989, p. 221.
145 Uno 1980, pp. 68–9. Note 12.
146 Uno 1980, p. 69.
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(sic). The wrong interpretations and the misuses of the reproduction
schemes based upon such misapprehensions are still prevalent among
manyMarxist economists. It appears that theymisunderstand the nature
of the lawof value: its peculiar formof application to a capitalist economy,
and the restriction imposed on the working of the law by the use-value
aspect of the commodities.147
We are yet again confronted with Uno’s fundamental (mis-)understanding of
the value relation, namely that capitalist production, viewed as a whole, pro-
duces for, and according to, ‘consumer needs’ or use value. His reasoning is
based on the immediate translation of forms of appearance – that workers in
general reproduce themselves as consumers – into a conceptual scheme, that
of use value, which is hypostasised as a structural impediment to capital’s full
self-realisation. To quote the Uno School follower John Bell, ‘there was always
some use-value and human resistance that capital’s impersonal market could
not overcome simplyby applying its “dull composition” on capitalists andwork-
ers alike’.148 In our context, Uno takesMarx’s considerations of the proportions
between necessary and surplus labour and its ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ con-
ditions in agricultural reproduction as buttress to confirm his view. In Capital
Volume iii, in his discussion of ground-rent being ‘surplus-value, the product
of surplus-labour’, Marx says the following (quoted by Uno):
But, if the use-value of individual commodities depends on whether they
satisfy a particular need, then the use-value of the mass of the social
147 Uno 1980, p. 69. Italics in the original.
148 Along with Sekine, John R. Bell is arguably the most outspoken supporter of the idea of
‘use value resistance’ (Bell 2009, p. 9). Sekine uses this theorem to explain the impossibil-
ity of real historical capitalism to operate ‘purely’, i.e. as the capitalist class ‘would have it’
(Sekine 2001, pp. 37–9). According to Bell, in theorising capitalism, ‘wemust fully contrive
an “idealized use-value space” in theory, wherein capital can perform its own abstrac-
tions without being impeded by external contingencies (such as intractable collective
human, use-value or natural resistance) which would be sufficiently powerful that cap-
ital could not overcome them by its autonomous and impersonal operation’. Bell 2009,
p. 8. The idealisation of an ideal use value space which obstructs the pure workings or
‘self-realisation’ of capital is problematic in its own ideological implications which will be
discussed in Chapter 5.3. It is difficult to see how this ‘infringement’ of pure capitalism
by use value resistance pares with the equally important premise of capitalist economy
as a ‘self-defining’, ‘self-regulating’ and ‘self-expanding’ system. Even if it only applies to
‘pure capitalism’, one would have to define the methodological means by which we can
differentiate the one from the other (which theUno School abstains fromdoing). ‘Method
copying’, as suggested by Sekine, is begging the question.
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product depends on whether it satisfies the quantitatively definite social
need for each particular kind of product in an adequate manner, and
whether the labour is therefore proportionately distributed among the
different spheres in keeping with these social needs, which are quantit-
atively circumscribed … The social need, that is, the use-value on a social
scale, appears here as a determining factor for the amount of total social
labour-time which is expended in various specific spheres of production.
But it is merely the same lawwhich is already applied in the case of single
commodities, namely, that the use-value of a commodity is the basis of
its exchange-value and thus of its value. This point has a bearing upon
the relationship between necessary and surplus labour only in so far as a
violation of this proportionmakes it impossible to realise the value of the
commodity and thus the surplus-value contained in it.149
This quote deals especiallywith the proportion of necessary and surplus labour
as condition for the realisation of value: that the direct producers must not
only perform surplus labour, i.e. more time than is required to reproduce their
labour power – which Marx calls a ‘subjective condition’ of the existence of
surplus-value and profit – but must also fulfil its ‘objective condition’, namely
that ‘they also can perform surplus labour: that natural conditions are such
that a part of their available labour-time is sufficient to produce and maintain
themas producers; that the production of their necessarymeans of subsistence
does not consume their entire labour-time’.150 Other restrictions to this ‘nat-
ural condition’ would e.g. be the natural fertility of the cultivated land (though
chemical manipulation has already in Marx’s times undermined such ‘natural
restriction’). Seen this way, it is self-evident that capital can only guarantee its
reproduction if the ‘objective condition’ is fulfilled. However, Uno hyperbolic-
ally comments:
The limitation which Marx mentions here due to the use-value of com-
modities imposes, however, a passive constraint upon the unfolding of
the law of value. This limitation does not, as the marginal utility theory
might assert, actively form any value. Yet a simple-minded approach to
the labour theory of value has often neglected the significance of this
passive constraint on the law of value, and over-emphasised the active
determination of commodity values by the socially necessary input of
149 Uno 1980, p. 69. Sekine quotes from Marx 1965, pp. 635–6. The corresponding passage in
Marx 1981, p. 774. Emphasis added.
150 Marx 1981, p. 773.
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labour-time alone. Such a one-sided view tends to obstruct a full under-
standing of the law of value, the peculiarity of which is that it enforces
itself only through the motion of prices.151
What Uno presents as a use value-based ‘constraint’ to capitalist self-valo-
risation is nothing short of a truism: in order to survive, the workers must be
able to also work for themselves, and not entirely for the capitalist. If they
didn’t, there would hardly exist an expenditure of human living labour at all.
It is in this context that Marx discusses the relevance of use value. The relev-
ance of use value however in no way infringes the fact that with their wage, the
producers buy a part of the total social value product represented in terms of
value, not in terms of use value. In his emphasis on labour reproduction, Uno
disregards this point. The reproduction of labour-power ‘in the private lives’ of
the workers (eating, drinking, dressing, occupying a habitat and reproductive
labour) can only take place on the condition of themonetary form of themeans
of reproduction, wage as a form of value.152 This is all the more strange since
Unohas emphasised that social reproduction requires circulationof inputs and
outputs in monetary terms, and that the total social surplus results from the
exchanges of the products of unpaid labour among the capitalists of the two
departments. Therefore, the reproduction of labour power is first and foremost
mediated in terms of value, according to which general social reproduction
is mediated under capitalist conditions. We will return to this in more detail
in discussing Uno’s ‘Ricardian assumptions’ in the next section. For now, let
us return to Uno’s quote above. In the given quote, Marx argues that ‘[t]he
social need, i.e. its use value on the social scale, here appears decisive for the
quota of total social labour-time that falls to the share of the various particu-
lar spheres of production’.153 As in every other instance where Marx uses the
verb ‘to appear’ or its grammatical correlates, one should be alert. It describes
a factual appearance which is often promptly refuted by the succeeding sen-
tence: ‘But this is simply the same law that is already exhibited by the individual
commodity … it is a point that bears on the relation between necessary and
surplus labour only in as much as an imbalance in this proportion means that
151 Uno 1980, p. 69.
152 We have already pointed to Ricardo’s failure to articulate the reproduction of labour in
terms of themonetary expression of the value of labour power, and its sole articulation in
terms of use value – see his presentation in the section ‘OnWages’, in which the essential
part of the labourer’s necessities are expressed in ‘corn wages’. Ricardo 1969 [1817], pp. 58–
9.
153 Marx 1981, p. 774. Emphasis added.
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the commodity value, and therefore also the surplus-value contained in it, can-
not be realized’.154 In other words: if a part of the working day was not spent
on the reproduction of labour-power, the value of the commodity could not
be realised – private reproduction forms the precondition for the realisation of
surplus value. Clearly, the realisation of the commodity value is decisive. The
realisation of the total value of the commodities however implies that a part of
this value is produced to furnishworkers’ consumption. But before it enters the
sphere of private consumption, it exists as value – as being a value product on
themarket. But this neither serves to undermine the law of value, nor presents
a ‘modification’ of Marx’s labour theory of value. In other words, it is difficult
to see how the ‘use-value aspect of the commodities’ limits or ‘restricts’ the
workings of the law.WhenMarx says: ‘Only such-and-such a quantity of this is
required in order to satisfy the social need’,155 this is a truism in no way imped-
ing the fact that, first and foremost, themeansof consumptionenter themarket
in the formof commodities. However, Uno quotesMarx to support his view that
use value restricts (or broadens) social demand, and therefore also the law of
value itself : ‘Only such-and-such a quantity of this is required in order to sat-
isfy the social need. The limit in this case emerges through the use-value. Under
the given conditions of production, society can spend only so much of its total
labour-time on one particular kind of product’.156 This is quite obvious, and
relates to Marx’s previous discussion of the eminent role of agricultural pro-
duction which ‘must be sufficient to produce the necessary foodstuffs for the
entire society, i.e. also for the non-agricultural workers’.157 Uno’s understanding
however is led astray, blinded by his insistence on the relevance of use value:
the use value aspect of the commodity – which is here understood as supply
and demand regulating capitalist production in the last instance – does not
only not infringe the law of value, it lacks any bearing on it: if supply does
not meet social demand, as e.g. in the case of the overproduction of cotton
goods, and the sales price necessarily falls, then obviously too much labour-
time (necessary and surplus) had been spent on its production. But this can
only be measured quantitatively, i.e. in terms of value. Accordingly, if the sales
price falls below the value of a commodity, production in the next cycle will
have to take a new form, e.g. lead to the lowering of wages, so that the com-
modity value can be readjusted. In short, if supply fails to meet demand, the
154 Marx 1981, p. 774. Emphasis added.
155 Marx 1981, pp. 774–5.
156 Marx 1981, p. 775. Emphasis added. Sekine quotes fromMarx 1965, pp. 635–6.
157 Marx 1981, p. 773.
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market price will change and most probably fall. In other words, the ‘use value
aspect’ of the commodity has absolutely no bearing on the working on the law
of value, which is always and exclusively determined by quantitative propor-
tions (as e.g. reflected in the new value composition of productive capital).
This is why Marx, rather laconically, remarks that ‘[this] quantitative barrier
to the quotas of social labour-time devoted to the various particular spheres
of production is simply a further developed expression of the law of value in
general; even though necessary labour-time takes on a new meaning here’.158
The demand aspect of themarket economy, therefore, does not impose ‘a pass-
ive constraint on the law of value’.159 But Uno insists that ‘a simple-minded
approach to the labour theory of value has often neglected the significance
of this passive constraint … and over-emphasised the active determination of
commodity values by the socially necessary input of labour-time alone’.160 This
view is the result of a confusion of the quantitative expressions of the law of
value (in prices, e.g.) with the law of value itself, i.e. the fact that the value
of commodities is quantitatively determined by the average socially necessary
labour time required for their production.161 To be sure, towards the end of the
presentation of the simple reproduction schemas and the transition to expan-
ded reproduction, in order to confirm the consistency of his own analysis,Marx
emphasises that accumulation does not take place at the expense of consump-
tion – simply because, more generally, capital does not produce for demand to
begin with:
… we simply note that it was presupposed in our presentation of simple
reproduction that the entire surplus-value in departments i and ii was
spent as revenue. In point of fact, however, one portion of surplus-value is
spent as revenue, andanother portion transformed into capital. Onlywith
158 Marx 1981, p. 774.
159 Uno 1980, p. 69.
160 Uno 1980, p. 69.
161 There are obvious similarities of Uno’s view with Paul Sweezy’s interpretation of the law
of value as a ‘theory of general equilibrium’. Sweezy: ‘What Marx called the “law of value”
summarizes those forces at work in a commodity-producing society which regulate a)
the exchange ratios among commodities, b) the quantity of each produced, and c) the
allocation of the labor force to the various branches of production’. Sweezy 1942, pp. 52–
3. The law of value, as in Uno, is ‘essentially a theory of general equilibrium’. Sweezy 1942,
p. 53. Notwithstanding the strange assertion of a ‘law’ as a ‘theory’, Sweezy, again like Uno,
emphasises the ‘self-regulation’ or, in Uno’s term, the ‘self-sustenance’ (sore jishin ni son-
ritsu suru mono) of the capitalist market: ‘… in a commodity-producing society, in spite
of the absence of centralized and coordinated decision-making, there is order and not
simply chaos’. Sweezy 1942, p. 53. For a critique of Sweezy, see Postone 1993, pp. 44–6.
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this precondition does real accumulation take place. But the idea that
accumulation is achieved at the expense of consumption – considered
in this general way – is an illusion that contradicts the essence of capit-
alist production, in as much as it assumes that the purpose and driving
motive of this is consumption, and not the grabbing of surplus-value and
its capitalization, i.e. accumulation.162
In a theory of value that relinquishes its fetish-characteristic appearances –
be it production for use value or equivalent exchange – Marx’s intervention
is bound to go unnoticed.
In an admittedly polemical intervention against the equilibirium model of
the Uno School more broadly, and Sekine in particular,163 Michael Lebowitz
argues that:
… of course there is no place for class struggle in this Stepford edition of
Capital…Everything has already beendeterminedby supply anddemand
in a perfectly competitive model. Simply assume a natural rate of popu-
lation growth and a desired rate of accumulation out of the surplus, and
the atomised workers who compete against each other (but do not com-
bine) receive as wages what is necessary to keep everyone more or less
happy and the system running. Nothing in ‘this liberal utopia, in which
the existing resources are optimally allocated for the production of all use
values’ and where workers ‘enjoy a historically feasible standard of living
in a state close to full employment’ would make a neoclassical econom-
ist uneasy – as long as the term ‘positive non-wage income’ were to be
substituted for ‘exploitation.’164
4.2.3 Ricardian Assumptions
As we have seen before, the reproduction of labour-power as the sine qua non
of capitalist reproduction and accumulation, is regarded by Uno solely in terms
of use value. In this aspect, he shares a basic assumption with Ricardo and his
school (e.g. Ramsay), which can be even traced back to Smith’s conceptualisa-
tionof capital. Let us take a look atMarx’s discussionof the ‘misunderstandings
162 Marx 1978, 579.
163 We will return to our discussion of the Uno School and in particular Sekine’s equilibrium
model in Chapter 5.2.
164 Lebowitz 2005, pp. 321–2. Lebowitz quotes fromSekine’s ‘Dialectic of Capital’. Sekine 1986,
p. 98.
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onRicardo’s part’165with regard to the reproductionof labour-power in an early
conception of the part on the ‘Theories of Surplus Value’ in the Grundrisse and
briefly also in the 1861–63EconomicManuscripts inwhichRicardo’s repetitionof
Smith’s error is more obvious.166 From here we shall see how Uno relies on the
same presuppositions as Ricardo – while Uno’s view even more fatally misrep-
resents Marx’s critical emphasis of the creation of value as the basis of surplus
value. According to Marx, Ricardo still adhered to Smith’s notion on the gen-
eral character of capital, namely that capital is ‘command over alien labour’,
instead of comprehending the nature of capital’s exploitative character, not ‘in
the sense that … it gives its possessor buying power, but that it is the power
to appropriate alien labour without exchange, without equivalent, but with the
semblance of exchange’.167 Therefore Ricardo’s understanding of the determin-
ation of value by labour with regard to wages (‘revenue from labour’) is limited
to the view that a particular quantity of labour can set ‘sometimes more and
sometimes less living labour into motion’. Here, we find no determination of
thematerialised labour that can set living labour ‘inmotion’ in value terms, but
merely in terms of direct use value:
… [Ricardo] regards the product of labour in respect of theworker only as
use value–only as the part of the productwhichheneeds to be able to live
as aworker. But how it comes about that theworker suddenly only repres-
ents use value in exchange, or only draws use value from the exchange, is
bynomeans clear to him…Butwhy is it, then, that the share of theworker
in the value of the product is determined not by the value, but rather by
the use value of the product, thus not by the labour time employed in it,
but by its quality of maintaining living labour capacity?168
How close indeed Uno’s understanding of the ‘value of labour’ in terms of use
value is to Ricardo’s assumptions shall be illustrated by this passage from the
1861–3 Economic Manuscripts:
TheVALUE or LABOUR is therefore determined by themeans of subsist-
ence which, in a given society, are traditionally necessary for the main-
tenance and reproduction of the labourers. But why? By what law is the
165 Marx 1973, p. 551.
166 The subdivision ‘Theories of Surplus Value’ has been added to the Grundrisse in the ‘Ana-
lytical Contents List’.
167 Marx 1973, p. 551.
168 Marx 1973, pp. 551–2.
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VALUE OF LABOUR determined in this way? Ricardo has in fact no
answer, other than that the law OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND reduced
the average price of labour to themeans of subsistence that are necessary
(physically or socially necessary in a given society) for themaintenance of
the labourer. He determines value here, in one of the basic propositions
of the whole system, by demand and supply – as Say notes withmalicious
pleasure.169
Here, ‘in oneof thebasic propositionsof thewhole system’, Ricardo suddenly devi-
ates from the determination of the ‘value of labour’ as the (relative) quantity of
labour time contained in it. He exempts the determination of wages from the
law of value to delegate it to the law of supply and demand (causing much of
the schadenfreude of his contemporary Jean-Baptiste Say).170 This is compoun-
ded by the fact that he repeats Smith’s original error with regard to use value
being represented in different exchange values:
Adam Smith errs when he concludes from the fact that a definite quant-
ity of labour is EXCHANGEABLE for a definite quantity of use value,
that this definite quantity of labour is the measure of value and that it
always has the same value, whereas the same quantity of use value can
represent very different exchange values. But Ricardo errs twice over;
firstly because he does not understand the problem which causes Adam
169 Marx 1989b, p. 36.Marx refers to the followingpassages: ‘Labour, like all other thingswhich
are purchased and sold, and which may be increased or diminished [in quantity] has its
natural and its market price. The natural price of labour is that price which is necessary
to enable the labourers, one with another, to subsist and perpetuate their race, without
either increase or diminution. The power of the labourer to support himself, and the fam-
ily which may be necessary to keep up the number of labourers, does not depend on the
quantity of money which he may receive for wages, but on the quantity of food, necessar-
ies, and conveniences required for the support of the labourer and his family. With a rise
in the price of food and necessaries, the natural price of labour will rise; with the fall in
their price, the natural price of labour will fall’. Ricardo 1969 [1817], p. 52. ‘It is not to be
understood that the natural price of labour, estimated even in food and necessaries, is
absolutely fixed and constant. It varies at different times in the same country, and very
materially differs in different countries. It essentially depends on the habits and customs
of the people’. Ricardo 1969 [1817], p. 54.
170 The supply-and-demand interpretation of capitalist reproduction is by necessity con-
ceived of in terms of use value, such that consumer demand structures the production
of value. Accordingly, Uno remarks that ‘[the] theory of market value emphasises the
impossibility of neglecting the effect of use-value in the determination of the value of
the commodity, although the part played by the demand side in this determination must
always be considered passive’. Uno 1980, p. 93, footnote 9.
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Smith’s errors; secondly because disregarding the law of value of com-
modities and taking refuge in the LAW OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND,
he himself determines the value of labour, not by the quantity of labour
BESTOWED UPON T H E FORCE OF LABOUR, BUT UPON T H E
WAGES ALLOTTED T O T H E LABOURER. Thus IN FACT he says:
The value of labour is determined by the value of the money which is
paid for it! And what determines this? What determines the amount of
money that is paid for it? The quantity of use value that a given amount
of labour commands or the quantity of labour that a definite quantity of
use value commands. And thereby he falls literally into the very inconsist-
ency which he himself condemned in Smith.171
In the relation of the product of labour in respect to the worker, the value
expression is extinguished and substituted for use value. But this is begging the
question, for when the value of labour is determined by the ‘necessaries’ for
workers’ consumption, it would be equally necessary to determine the value of
the necessaries. In this sense, Brentel remarks:
The determination of wages, a quantity determined by price, by the price
of the necessaries is categorially tautological. The concept of ‘natural
price’ in a certain sense is used as a bulwark against this predicament,
by attempting to explain the value of labour by a non-value category,
i.e. a certain amount of use values necessary for the maintenance of the
labourer. With this reference to a certain quantity of use values neces-
sary for the reproduction of the labour capacity however, the problem of
the value determination of the labour power commodity is by no means
solved, but merely transferred to the value determination of the neces-
saries. Ricardo however does not relate the value of the necessaries to the
socially necessary labour time contained in them, but to [the argument-
ative level of] relative prices. In this case however, again [as in Smith], the
‘value of labour’ is determined by the quantity of commodities which it
can buy or command.172
In other words, the theory of the reproduction of labour power in terms of
use value is socially undetermined and hence altogether unspecific to cap-
italist relations of production.173 Ricardo’s predicament also holds for Uno:
171 Marx 1989b. p. 39.
172 Brentel 1989, p. 77.
173 This model of reproduction is also adopted recently by ‘feminist’ social reproduction the-
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the relation of labour-power to capital is comprehended as being structur-
ally mediated by use value ‘in the private life of the workers themselves’,174 in
the ‘individual consumption of wage-earners’.175 Therefore, the labour-power
commodity is the only commodity which ‘capital by itself cannot directly
produce’,176 suspending the law of value in the cycle of private consump-
tion. Hence, like Ricardo, Uno distinguishes the determination of the value of
labour-power from the determination of ‘commodity values in general’. In the
same vein, he insists that the ‘reproduction of labour-power forms the indi-
vidual consumption-process of the workers parallel to, but not integrated in,
the production-process of capital …’177 Marx’s critique targets Ricardo’s neg-
lect to consistently apply the labour theory of value to the category of wages.
Because, if he had applied his value theory to what seems to be an exchange
of equivalents between capital and labour, Ricardo would have realised that
the exchange between capital and labour is essentially based on the exchange
of non-equivalents – though, ‘as a bourgeois’, he could not have been clear
about this process. Marx: ‘Now, how one gets from value as equivalent determ-
ined by labour to the non-equivalent, i.e. which posits surplus-labour through
exchange, i.e. how one gets from value to capital, from one aspect to its appar-
ent opposite, this does not interest Ricardo’.178 It was left to Marx to provide
an explanation of the exchange between capital and labour as essentially an
exchange of non-equivalents appearing in the form of equivalent exchange.
The determination of the wage by the labour-time necessary to reproduce the
labouring faculties of the labourer in terms of value, i.e. in strict accordance
ories (see e.g. Gonzalez and Neton 2014, Bhattaracharya (ed.) 2017, Mezzadri 2019). In
the theoretical framework of this approach, social reproduction is treated solely in terms
of use value. It is thus altogether unspecific to capitalism whose defining characteristic
is monetary mediation of social reproduction. See our critique of the framework of use-
value-mediated reproduction in Chs. 2 and 5.3. See also Heinrich’s critique, which rejects
the contention that capital hinges on unpaid reproductive labour: ‘[With the increasing
development of productive powers in the rise of capitalism], the “setting free” of women
from household labour and their direct exploitation by capital, makes it possible for cap-
ital not only to appropriate a greater mass of surplus value, but a rising rate of surplus
value: because the costs of reproduction for one family must be covered by two instead of
one labour power, the value of individual labour power decreases’. Heinrich 1999, p. 262.
Own translation. Already for Marx, the treatment of the wage form as ‘an external and
irrelevant formality in capitalist production’ allows us to ‘readily deducewhat an F. Bastiat
understands about the nature of capitalist production’ (Marx 1976, p. 1006).
174 Uno 1980, p. 52.
175 Uno 1980, p. 51.
176 Uno 1980, p. 52.
177 Uno 1980, pp. 62–3.
178 Marx 1973, p. 560.
the principles of political economy 323
with the labour theory of value, was of ‘decisive importance’ to Marx. In the
chapter on ‘Wages’, we therefore find one of his fiercest polemical remarks
against the determination of wages as the ‘value of labour’ in conventional
political economy:
We may therefore understand the decisive importance of the transform-
ation of the value or price of labour-power into the form of wages, or into
the value and price of labour itself. All the notions of justice held by both
the worker and the capitalist, all the mystification of the capitalist mode
of production, all capitalism’s illusions about freedom, all the apologetic
tricks of vulgar economics, have as their basis the form of appearance
discussed above, which makes the actual relation invisible, and indeed
presents to the eye the precise opposite of that relation. World history
has taken a long time to get to the bottom of the mystery of wages; but,
despite this, nothing is easier to understand than the necessity, the raison
d’être, to this form of appearance.179
However, whereas Ricardo, were he consistent, would have had to recognise
the factual reality of the exploitation of surplus labour by capital in its con-
frontation with the living labour of the workers – capital as a ‘definite social
relationship’180 – Uno is already well aware of this fact. But, again like Ricardo,
‘this does not interest’ him. Uno’s pure theory dispels the problem of appear-
ance and essence in the central category of ‘value of labour’, and with it, the
problem of fetishism. Pure theory is therefore disinterested in enabling a cri-
tique of capitalism by bringing the complex of appearance (or capital’s self-
179 Marx 1976, pp. 680–1.
180 Marx 1989, p. 37. Ricardowas altogether unaware of the concept of the production of abso-
lute surplus value, and only had an (no less confused) understanding of the concept of
relative surplus value. Hence, he ‘does not comprehend capital as a relation of domination
which coerces the workers to work beyond the point that would correspond to the repro-
duction of their wages’. Brentel 1989, p. 74. While Marx takes the varying length of the
working day as the assumption to conceptualise the production of relative surplus value,
Ricardo, who only considers the different distribution of the surplus product without its
original production, assumes the working day as fixed. ‘For him it is a fact, that the value
of the product > the value of theWAGES. HOWthis fact arises, remains unclear. The total
working day is greater than that part of the working day which is required for the pro-
duction of theWAGES.Why? That does not emerge. The magnitude of the total working
day is therefore wrongly assumed to be fixed, and directly entails wrong conclusions. The
increase or decrease in surplus value can therefore be explained only from the growing or
diminishing productivity of social labour which produces the NECESSARIES. That is to
say, only relative surplus value is understood’. Marx 1989, pp. 41–2.
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representation) and essence (the way capital really operates) to the fore. It
merely reiterates its mode of ‘operation’ in a positivistic form, addressing cap-
ital’s appearance alone. The ‘law of value’ thus degenerates into a theory of
general social reproduction in which the conversion of value into production
prices (i.e. the allocation of labour to the different spheres of production to
result in a general rate of profit) ‘confirms the law of value by ensuring the
feasibility of social reproduction’.181 For Uno, the reproduction of labour power,
solely based on use value, can only be viewed from the level of real circulation
in which commodities are sold and purchased as products of capital. While
in Uno’s discussion of general social reproduction in the abstract, wages are
expressed inmonetary (value) terms, in considering the realmovement of cap-
italist production where production and market price fluctuations take place,
use value determines value by imposing a ‘passive constraint’ upon the law of
value in the reproduction of labour power. In the real process therefore, active
demand (and supply) determine the lawof value in the last instance. Use value,
expressed in demand-and-supply relations, triumphs over value:
In Capital, vol. iii, part ii, chapter 10, Marx tries to develop a theory of
market value. His explanation, however, remains unsatisfactory because
he does not articulate the significance of price fluctuations in the market
in adjusting demand and supply. This point, I believe, is of somemethod-
ological importance. Marx’s general neglect of the demand-and-supply
analysis impairs his theory of value-forms at the outset of Capital already,
placing the rest of his economic doctrine on rather precarious ground.182
He therefore shares another of Ricardo’s strategical moves, namely ‘taking
refuge in the law of supply and demand’.183 Here is why Uno introduces the
‘passive constraint’ of use value – the fact that capital ‘cannot directly produce’
the labour power faculty of the workers – into his study of pure capitalism to
begin with. Precisely by being located in the sphere of the use values of com-
modities, the law of value can finally be proven: namely by the governance
of society’s total annual reproductive powers, guaranteeing an equilibrium of
supply and demand. The law of value, so to speak, takes a detour through the
mode of individual consumption expressed in use value in order to finally
prove the ‘automatic power of self-regulation’ of capitalist social production.
This is the bearing the reproduction of labour power ‘in the private lives’ of
181 Uno 1980, p. 93, footnote 6.
182 Uno 1980, p. 93, footnote 8.
183 Marx 1989, p. 39.
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the workers has on establishing the ‘law’. Hence, Uno remarks that ‘[t]he the-
ory of market value emphasises the impossibility of neglecting the effect of
use-value in the determination of the value of the commodity, although the
part played by the demand side in this determination must always be con-
sidered passive’.184 In other words, ‘because of the inherent incompleteness
that inevitably-recurrently emerges whenever capital’s logic attempts to dis-
play itself as a perfect circle, this logic should not work, yet it works perfectly
well in capitalist society’.185
Neither Ricardo nor Uno take theoretical account of the fact that it is the
transformation of a law of exchange into a law of appropriation, the appropri-
ation of surplus without an equivalent, that characterises capitalist production
as a whole. In both conceptualisations, the character of capital that constantly
confronts and contradicts living labour as a material force is neglected. But
while in Ricardo, this misrecognition is explained by the disconcertedness to
clarify the exchange of non-equivalents on the basis of equivalent commodity
exchange (because of the ‘bourgeois’ impediments of his own enterprise), Uno
is well aware of Marx’s own solution to the riddle. Still, the strategic import-
ance of theMarxian insight is disavowed in Uno’s conceptualisation of general
capitalist reproduction, and the lawof accumulation declared compatiblewith
the law of general equilibrium. This result necessitates a brief examination of
Uno’s basic marginalist assumptions.
4.2.4 Marginalist Assumptions
Let us recall Uno’s conceptualisation of use value, putting a restraint or ‘lim-
itation’ to the operations of the law of value when applied to actually existing
market relations. i.e. market values and market prices:
This limitation does not, as the marginal utility theory might assert, act-
ively form any value. Yet a simple-minded approach to the labour theory
of value has often neglected the significance of this passive constraint on
the law of value, and over-emphasised the active determination of com-
modity values by the socially necessary input of labour-time alone. Such a
one-sided view tends to obstruct a full understanding of the law of value,
the peculiarity of which is that it enforces itself only through the motion
of prices.186
184 Uno 1980, p. 93, footnote 9.
185 Walker 2016, p. 170. For a discussion of Walker’s intervention, see Chapter 5.3.
186 Uno 1980, p. 69.
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Aswecould see fromthe abovediscussion,Unoattempts to reconcile theuse
value-based demand and supply determination of prices with the law of value
that ‘rests on the workers-versus-capitalists relation in the production-process
of capital; for without this relation the law of value cannot operate on a social
and global basis’.187 In other words, by systematically diverging from market
values ‘is a commodity-economy enabled objectively and efficiently to alloc-
ate the social labour to all the branches of industry as social need requires’.188
Market value guarantees the equilibrium between supply and demand, so that
supply can naturally adjust to demand. Themarket value of the commodity, as
will be explained in the next chapter, suspends the lawof value in the sense that
it adjusts to the commodities produced in the branch of production in which
the average conditions of production prevail. Yet, if the real process of adjust-
ment between demand and supply via market values systematically diverges
from the real value of a commodity, i.e. the form constantly digresses from its
content, then how can we say that the ‘law of value’ enforces itself upon capit-
alist production ‘as if it were a natural law’?189
Indeed, in order to prove the ‘general norm of economic life common to
all societies’, as which Uno, at odds with Marx, understands the law of value,
Uno subsumes the theory of value to an understanding in which marginalist
assumptions dominate. We have demonstrated this in Chapter 3. Here, Uno’s
rejection of the ‘Third Thing’, abstract human labour as the objective basis for
the value form of money, i.e., Uno’s rejection of an objective theory of value,
is eminent. As seen before, in simple exchange, Uno draws on the economic
rationality of the commodity owners and their ‘want’ (yokubō) of the use value
of the commodity in the equivalent form to explain the generation of money as
a means to facilitate exchange on a general social scale. Only now, however, at
the level of the discussion of total social reproduction, can we see how intrins-
ically this fundamentally marginalist view of society also informs Uno’s theory
of general social distribution.
The ‘marginalist revolution’ primarily consisted in shifting the problematic
in classical political economy–namely the question of the rational distribution
of socialwealth, as reflected in the ‘Trinity Formula’ – to thequestionof how the
rationality of the capitalist system can be established on the basis of allocative
efficiency. Consequently, marginalism restricted economics to a field of tech-
nology, purified classical political economy of the ‘political’, and discarded all
187 Uno 1980, p. 84.
188 Uno 1980, pp. 84–5.
189 Uno 1980, p. 84.This question, giving rise to the ‘transformationproblem’,will be discussed
in the next chapter.
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assumptions of the specifically social, historical andparticularly class character
of the capitalist mode of production. By its primary claim to present a ‘rigorous
theory of price determination’,190 in which the scientific character of its theory
would prove itself, untouched by ‘imperfect conditions’ in the real world, mar-
ginalism even endeavoured to radically separate the realm of economics from
the study of society or ‘sociology’. Needless to say, this claim does not imply
that the marginalist view of price, of resources, of technical innovation and
its hypothesis of ‘perfect competition’ is free from implicit assumptions about
society, and especially about its individuals. The most immediate expression
of marginalism’s understanding of the individual is expressed in the rational-
ity of exchange, which becomes the foundation for the basic theory of price
in marginalist economics. In marginalism, the view of economics as a science
is based on the presuppositions of a radical methodological individualism in
which the agents of exchange act according to the optimisation of their own
position expressed in the maximisation of utility, which in this framework is
tantamount to the principle of rationality.While being different in the detailed
elaborations of their respective works, the main thinkers of the marginalist
school, William Stanley Jevons (1835–82) in England, Léon Walras (1834–1910)
in Switzerland (Lausanne), and Carl Menger in Vienna (1840–1921)191 – inde-
pendently of one another, but almost simultaneously – developed the theory
that prices emerge on the basis of individual exchanges between owners of
goods. Insofar, they reject the views of Ricardo and Smith that an ‘independent
measure of value’ must exist on whose basis a theory of price can be estab-
lished. As the classical economists insist, a utility theory of price would involve
the paradox that the ‘highest prices are paid for themost worthless goods, such
as diamonds, while the most useful goods, such as air, are free.’192 The margin-
alist school tries to solve this paradox by saying that the price does not corres-
pond to the ‘total utility’ of the good, but to the utility of the last unit of the
good that was acquired. If an individual is in possession of a great quantity of
190 Clarke 1991, p. 143.
191 Other important marginalists include Alfred Marshall (1842–1924), Johann G.K. Wicksell
(1851–1926), Friedrich von Wieser (1851–1926), and Philip Henry Wicksteed (1844–1927),
who also has written a critical review of Capital (see Wicksteed 1884). Their main works
included Marshall’s Principles of Economics (1890), Wicksell’s Interest and Prices (1898),
Wieser’s Der natürliche Werth (1889) (the English translation, Natural Value, appeared in
1893), andWicksteed’s Common Sense of Political Economy including a Study of the Human
Basis of Economic Law (1910).We are followingClarke’s andHeinrich’s careful presentation
of the main contentions of marginalist theory. See Clarke 1991 and Heinrich 1999.
192 Clarke 1991, p. 147.
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a particular good, then the ‘utility of the marginal good tended to diminish’.193
The price level and the value of goods therefore depend on the condition of
scarcity, so that the value rises in proportion to its increasing scarcity: the price
of diamonds is high not because of the relatively high amount of labour input,
but because the marginal utility194 is high as a consequence of the diamonds’
scarcity. However, scarcity is not an ‘objective’ qualifier for the exchange rela-
tion: in the marginalist view, all goods are subject to relative scarcity in the
face of total demand, in smaller or greater intensity. For the individual, then,
the rational optimisation of its position in exchange is the main incentive for
exchange. In exchange, the goal for the individual consists in increasing the
sum of utilities at his/her disposal, so that individual behaviour is necessarily
directed at increasing the sum total of his or her use values. From this point of
view, a situation in direct barter, value is subject to individual evaluation: the
‘individual will choose to exchange goods until the relativemarginal utilities of
the goods possessed at the end of the transaction correspond to the exchange
relations in which they stand’.195 In marginalism therefore, it is assumed that
in the process of exchange the individuals compensate for the ‘loss of utility’
in the alienated good with the ‘gain of utility’ in the good received. The indi-
viduals only accept kinds of exchange pairs in which they have a prospect of
gain or, at the least, no prospect of loss. This is only the case if the marginal
utility of the quantity of alienated goods is smaller or equal to the marginal
utility of the goods received. Exchange, finally, only takes place for precisely
those goods in which, for all the agents of exchange, the marginal utility of
the quantities of goods is the same.196 Characteristically however, marginalism
applies this view to a more general conception of economic input and output:
it is at the root of its understanding of economy that ‘its essential results can
be extended from the case of the isolated individual making subjective private
decisions … to the case of an exchange economy considered as a whole’.197
Therefore, the process of price determination on the market with many more
agents of exchange results from the aggregation of the functions of supply
and demand based on individual utility estimations. If ‘individual demand and
193 Clarke 1991, p. 147.
194 The term of ‘marginal utility’ (Grenznutzen) was originally coined by Wieser (Wieser
1884), but converges with Jevons’s term ‘final degree of utility’, Menger’s ‘Value of the least
important partial quantity’, as well asWalras’s ‘rareté’. See Heinrich 1999, p. 66 footnote 10.
For a detailed discussion of the theories of the three founding fathers of marginalism, see
Lehmann 1977 and Blaug 1985.
195 Clarke 1991, p. 147.
196 See Heinrich 1999, p. 67.
197 Clarke 1991, p. 151.
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supply functions are aggregated, total demand and supply functions can be
specified. It can be shown that under appropriate assumptions … the interac-
tion of demand and supply will give rise to a unique set of stable equilibrium
prices that clear all markets by equalising supply and demand. These prices
are those that correspond to the free and rational choices of all the individual
members of society seeking to achieve their own optimal solution in condi-
tions of scarcity’.198 This view is further supplemented by the emphasis on the
unique role of households in a national economy and private consumption. In
the national circulation of goods, households supply the services of productive
factors to firms andpurchase from firms the goods that are producedwith those
productive services. Not production, but consumption stands at the heart of
economic circulation. Economic rationality however requires the existenceof a
freemarket ‘as ameans bywhich individual evaluations of utility can be related
to one another, and the freedom and security of property as the basis of free
exchange … The marginalist analysis therefore also purports to establish the
social rationality of a society based on competitive exchange by establishing
that theprices reached, and the consequent allocationof resources, are in some
sense optimal’.199 This converges with Uno’s view discussed above that market
values always guarantee a stable equilibrium between supply and consumer
demand in accordance with the ‘law of value’ as the commodity-economic
form of the ‘behavioural norms of economic life shared by … all human societ-
ies’.200 In particular, a closer look at the basic approach of Carl Menger’s theory
in relation to Uno’s seems to be rewarding, though, for reasons of space, the
following will only allow us to discuss a few fundamental traits in Menger’s
approach that suggests its compatibility or similarity with Uno’s views on the
methodology of economic science. Like Uno, Menger in his main work Prin-
ciples of Economics (Die Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaft, 1871) proposes a ‘pure
economic theory’ as amethodological template for economic science in which
the real processes of economic activity are suspended. That means that rather
than viewing the actual economy as object, the object of that theory is theory
itself. It takes ‘idealised basic assumptions’ as the template to review whether
they conform or contradict mathematically sound operations.201 For Menger,
as for other marginalists, pure theory is able to prove its superiority over other
economic theories in the determination of prices. However, the object of pure
198 Clarke 1991, p. 148.
199 Clarke 1991, p. 150.
200 Uno 1980, p. 20.
201 For a critique of themicro-foundational economic assumptions of marginalism, and espe-
cially the circular character of its model building, see Kade 1962 and Ritsert 1988.
330 chapter 4
theory is not concerned with the determination of real prices, but with ‘their
determination in an idealworld of perfect knowledge, perfect foresight, perfect
competition and pure rationality’.202 Similarly to Uno, pure theory abstracts
from the real world as a methodological strategy, so that ‘it is against this ideal
world that the real world, and proposed reforms in the real world, are to be
measured’.203 In the narrower sense, the theory of value which he formulated
in exact contradistinction to Marx’s, was central to Menger’s intervention.204
Menger saw in the marginalist approach a fundamental explanation of the
precise mechanism by which money and price – ‘organically created’ social
institutions205 – ‘emerge from the pursuit of individual self-interest and come
to express the collective wisdom of society’.206 Menger therefore, like Uno, and
unlike Marx, insisted on the need to relate social institutions such as money
and exchange back to their ‘origins in individual action in order to establish
their foundations in the natural and spontaneously evolved needs and aspira-
tions of individuals’.207 Pure theory forMenger depends on the extent to which
general economic processes of exchange can be derived from individual ‘util-
ity maximising’ behaviour.208 Especially the founding concept of value is here
understood as a neutral, and hence, natural and aboriginal relation between
the individual and the object/good/commodity of his/her want, expressed in
a subjective judgment, and therefore nothing that has objective existence – an
assuption laying bare its Baileyan roots. For Menger, value is hence defined as
nothing inherent in goods, no property of them, nor an independent
thing existing by itself. It is a judgment economizingmenmake about the
importance of the goods at their disposal for the maintenance of their
lives and well-being. Hence value does not exist outside the conscious-
ness of men. It is, therefore, also quite erroneous to call a good that has
202 Clarke 1991, p. 145. See also Shaikh 2016, pp. 340–46.
203 Clarke 1991, p. 145.
204 It is precisely the ‘refutation’ of Marxism that motivates Menger’s publisher, the Lud-
wig van Mises-Institute, to write about The Principles of Economics: ‘It was this book that
kicked-off the Marginalist Revolution, which corrected theoretical errors of the old clas-
sical school. These errors concerned value theory, and they had sown enough confusion to
make the dangerous ideology of Marxism seemmore plausible than it really was’. https://​
mises.org/library/principles‑economics (last consulted September 30th, 2019).
205 Menger 1963, p. 177.
206 Clarke 1991, p. 146.
207 Clarke 1991, p. 152.
208 For Uno, this is expressed in the task of the pure theory of political economy to study
‘a historical process made up of the purposive activities of men (ningen no kōdō ni yoru
rekishiteki katei wo kagakuteki ni kaimei shiyō to suru mono)’. Uno 1980, p. xxiii.
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value to economizing individuals a ‘value’, or for economists to speak of
‘values’ as of independent real things, and to objectify value in this way.
For the entities that exist objectively are always only particular things or
quantities of things, and their value is something fundamentally different
from the things themselves; it is a judgment made by economizing indi-
viduals about the importance their command of the things has for the
maintenance of their lives and well-being. Objectification of the value of
goods,which is entirely subjective innature, has nevertheless contributed
very greatly to confusion about the basic principles of our science.209
This view is entirely consistentwithUno’s emphasis on the role of the commod-
ity owner in the simple value expression, namely that the judgment of thewant
for the coat, i.e. the subjective and unilateral initiative of linen owner, makes
the coat a value expression of the linen. Money, therefore, arises ‘spontan-
eously’ from themediationof the interest of thedifferent commodity owners in
direct barter, as a result of themediation of different kinds of wants. This is sub-
stantially the marginalist view of money.210 Furthermore, especially Menger’s
view on value is profoundly informed by the methodological individualism of
‘need’ or ‘want’: ‘Our previous explanation … demonstrates that man, with his
needs and his command of the means to satisfy them, is himself the point at
which human economic life both begins and ends’.211 The inductive method of
going back to the ‘satisfaction of needs and desires’ as the founding principle of
economic science’s categories also informs Uno’s focus on use value to explain
the productive and reproductive faculties of capitalism’s ‘self-sustenance’. As
is clear from the previous, Uno does neither assume the general condition of
scarcity, nor does he share the marginalist view of the ‘factors of production’
theory of the three sources of revenue.212 However, at the most general level
209 Menger 1950, p. 120 1.
210 ‘The inconveniences of direct barter originally led someenterprising individual to attempt
to achieve exchange through themediation of a third good that was highly exchangeable.
As others imitated the innovator that good came to take on the character of money. Thus
money too had a rational origin as a technical instrument invented by individuals in order
to perfect the process of utility-maximisation’. Clarke 1991, p. 153.
211 Menger 1950, p. 108.
212 According tomarginalist theory, classical political economywas toooccupiedwith labour-
time or costs of production in resolving the annual national income (wages, rent and
profit) which should instead be seen as accruing to factors of production labour, land
and means of production. See Clarke 1991, p. 149. Seen this way, marginalism has only re-
formulated Smith’s and Ricardo’s problem, while being inflicted with the same vicious
circle.
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of marginalist theory, Uno shares the basic assumptions of 1. the constitutive
role of exchange in determining value, 2. the importance of the evaluation of
the individuals engaged in the process of exchange, based on subjective want
and the rejection of a concept of objectively constituted value (i.e. socially
necessary labour time), 3. money as ‘purchasing power’, 4. the reproduction of
individual ‘utilitymaximising’ behaviour at the level of general social exchange
(methodological individualism), fromwhich follows, 4. that the aggregate func-
tions of supply and demand give rise to equilibrium (market) prices directed at
‘satisfying social demand’ (Uno), 5. the shift from the producer and production
(as in classical theories) to the consumer and consumption (households/the
‘private consumption of workers’), and last but not least, 5. the ignorance
of the specific property relations giving rise to the appearance of equivalent
exchangewhile being essentially a law of appropriation of alien unpaid labour,
in short: the ignorance of the socially and historically specific laws of capitalist
appropriation, expressed in Uno’s view of reproduction being ‘common to all
societies’, including the specifically commodity-economic forms.213 In the next
chapter we will see how Uno’s understanding of the transformation of values
into prices of production (the ‘Transformation Problem’) further severs social
production’s ties to labour values. On the theoretical level, we will therefore
witness how Uno further severs his ties to Marx’s intervention – and with it,
discards capitalist society as a problem.
4.3 Surplus Value and Profit: The ‘Transformation Problem’ in Uno’s
Perspective
As mentioned above, Uno’s developed equilibrium theory of value contains
a self-contradictory moment – his claim of the indispensability of the ‘law of
value’ as the regulatory force of total social reproduction214 and his simultan-
eous substitution of the law of value for an emphasis on the principle of supply
and demand that he sees insufficiently developed in Marx.215 To reconcile the
contradiction, Uno adjusts the ‘law’ of value to his marginalist notion of price,
so that in the last instance, the reproduction of labour power in terms of use
213 Uno 1980, p. 84. For a good overview of the circular motives of the ‘theory of general equi-
librium’, see Heinrich 1999, pp. 68–78.
214 Though even this claim is tautological, as shown above.
215 ‘Marx’s general neglect of the demand-and-supply analysis impairs his theory of value-
forms at the outset of Capital already, placing the rest of his economic doctrine on a rather
precarious ground’. Uno 1980, p. 93.
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value – the muri or ‘nihil of reason’ of capital – regulates the total social value
product by demand, so that the aggregate values do not determine prices, but
prices, to the contrary, determine values. In his discussion of the equalisation
of profit rates, Uno accordingly parts with his idea discussed above, namely
that ‘[each individual capital] must obey the regulation of the law of value,
the global consequence of which is to realise the norm of reproduction com-
mon to all societies’ leading to the ‘automatic power of self-regulation inherent
in capitalist commodity economy’, as presented in Uno’s view of the repro-
duction schemes. In the equalisation of profit rates, it is no longer the law
of value that ‘governs’ exchange, and therefore, the prices of production, but
vice versa: ‘The determination of values presupposes the adjustment of supply
according to the social demand, and the mechanism of this adjustment actu-
ally develops onlywhencommodities are supplied as theproducts of capital’.216
The heuristic value of the ‘law of value’ for Uno’s interpretation of a ‘capital-
ist commodity-economy’ in the total social reproduction process consequently
becomes as dubious as Uno’s appropriation of the concept of abstract labour
for his theory of value and money: it is Uno’s own interpretation that renders
the concepts – both of ‘abstract labour’, as well as the ‘law of value’ – redundant
asheuristically rich conceptswith significant explanatorypower. In anultimate
argumentative move, his interpretation of the ‘transformation’ of commod-
ity values to prices of production severs the ties to the significance of socially
necessary labour time once and for all. In the following, we will demonstrate
the devastating consequences of this move for a coherent theorisation of the
‘law of value’ as a methodological and theoretical object. To do so, we find it
useful to contrast Uno’s view with Marx’s incentive to thematise the inherent
relationship between values andprices (of production, etc.) to point to a funda-
mental problemof classical political economy, especially Ricardo.The following
presentation however merely serves to introduce the matter, in order to make
sense of Uno’s perspective. Itwill be shown that the problemof the value-price-
transformation, in accordance with the pervasive method of Marx’s critique in
Capital, must be seen against the background of the problem of fetishism. Only
an understanding that sees the transformation problem as a qualitative prob-
lem of the fetish-characteristics of the bourgeois relations of production can
fully grasp the extent to which Marx’s own theorisation surpasses the quantit-
ative solutions to the problem Marx himself (and some of his successors) has
offered – even beyondMarx’s own objective. ThoughMarx, by his own fetishism-
criticalmethod, first and foremost opened up the terrain of potentially viewing
216 Uno 1980, p. 93.
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the equalisation of profit rates this way, he fatally failed to recognise this qualit-
ative dimension of the problem posed by his ownmethod of inquiry. Instead, he
chose to solve the problem quantitatively, underestimating the heuristic power
of this own approach. This will form a part of the following discussion, though
bynomeans canwe, in the context of this volume, hope to exhaustively address
the methodological and theoretical problems associated with this lacuna. The
full analysis would have to be conducted in a theoretical forum or publication
solely engagedwithMarx’s solution to the transformation problem. In this con-
text, we can only hope to give hints at what we think are promising insights
emphasising the coherence of the fetish-critical method throughout the cat-
egorial development of all three volumes of Capital.
It will therefore be necessary, first, to present the value-price relation and
Marx’s solution to it, as he himself saw it in the context of the Critique of
Political Economy, namely as a critique of Ricardo’s solution. However, the
quantitative solution Marx offers in Chapters 9 and 10 of Capital Volume iii,
as a whole bulk of research literature since Eugen Böhm-Bawerk’s first critique
(1896) attempted to demonstrate, has proven to be veritably problematic, if not
faulty. Therefore, when we speak of the ‘transformation problem’ in the con-
text of economic theory today, we usually address a problem within Marx’s,
and not Ricardo’s, theory. In this context, it will be necessary to address, if –
for reasons of space – impossible to exhaustively comment on, Fred Moseley’s
‘macro-monetary’ intervention that more ‘radically’ applies the quantitative
solution to ‘Marx’s dilemma’ offered by the so-calledNew Interpretation (ni) in
the early 1980s. BothMoseley and the ni offer a valuable quantitative heuristic,
the ‘value of money’ or, in a later dictum, the ‘monetary expression of labour
time’ (melt) to demonstrate the ‘retainment’ of ‘the proportionality of profit
and unpaid labor time in the face of any deviations of prices from labour val-
ues’,217 that is, the validity of the labour theory of value in the face of prices
diverging from labour values. While we strongly agree with the offered solu-
tions, we also believe that both Moseley and the proponents of the ni218 offer
an interpretation to a problem whose significance Marx himself was clearly
not aware of. Our objective will therefore be to elucidate what conditions of
the problem Marx was not aware of, and locate it in a lack of insight into the
scope and explanatory power of his own method. Our investigation therefore
differs from the ‘macro-monetary’ quantitative solution in stressing the qual-
217 Foley 1982, p. 37.
218 To which we will return in the context of non-equilibrium theory and Sekine’s critique in
Chapter 5.2.
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itative significance of the transformation procedure for understanding the prob-
lem of fetishism. The succeeding discussion of Uno’s view will point us to the
basicmisrecognition in the perception of the relation between value and price.
By disregarding Marx’s fetish-critical method, Uno wilfully ignores the wider
problem-setting of the ‘transformation’, namely as being coherently embedded
in the method of criticising the increasingly fetish-characteristic value form
of price. In the concluding section, we will formulate an attempt to shift the
view of the formation of a general profit rate and of prices of production away
from the technical-mathematical field to the, as we believe, more fundamental
epistemological problematisation of the cleft between our cognition of ‘social
processes’ in their own presentation (Darstellung) and in their real, essential
movement.
4.3.1 Marx’s ‘Solution’ to Ricardo’s Transformation Problem
Marx’s attempt to explain the transformation of aggregate values to prices of
production was motivated by (as Marx saw it) Ricardo’s inability to explain
prices on the basis of his own theory of value. For Marx, the contradiction in
Ricardo regarding labour values and prices of production arose from themeth-
odological conflation of surplus value and profit in Ricardo’s notion of profit.
Thus, for Marx, the ‘contradiction’ between the two must be solved by trans-
forming it into an ‘illusion which arises from the development of the thing
itself ’.219 In other words, as discussed above, because Ricardo was inconsequen-
tial in applying his own theory of value to the exchange between capital and
labour, he could not develop a theory of surplus value, and hence, a theory of
exploitation. Only after the concept of surplus value has been developed purely
(‘rein entwickelt’) could the equalisation of profit rates and the theory of prices
of production be demonstrated in order to investigate their relationship.220
219 Marx 1989a, p. 266. This is the concise way in which ‘Hegel Helped Marx To Overturn
Ricardo’s Theory of Profit’. See Murray 2014.
220 As to how Ricardo’s conflation of surplus value and profit informs the basis of Ricardo’s
inability to distinguish value from cost price, Marx comments: ‘It has already been shown
in some detail, that the laws of surplus value – or rather of the rate of surplus value –
(assuming the working day as given) do not so directly and simply coincide with, nor
are they applicable to, the laws of profit, as Ricardo supposes. It has been shown that he
wrongly identifies surplus value with profit and that these are only identical in so far as
the total capital consists of variable capital or is laid out directly in wages; and that there-
fore what Ricardo deals with under the name of ‘profit’ is in fact surplus value. Only in
this case can the total product simply be resolved into wages and surplus value. Ricardo
evidently shares Smith’s view, that the total value of the annual product resolves itself into
revenues. Hence also his confusion of value with cost price’. Marx 1989b, p. 60.
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Ricardo however presupposed a general rate of profit throughout the Prin-
ciples (1817), although the concept of wages is systematically developed only
in Chapter 5 and that of profit in Chapter 6. Yet, he wasn’t clear on how the
concept of surplus value, profit and a general rate of profit – or, indeed, cost
price – could emerge from his own concept of value at all. It was precisely this
problem–how to get from the determination of value by relative labour quant-
ities to prices which precisely do not reflect labour values – that constituted
Ricardo’s contradiction and the specifically Ricardian transformation problem.
Marx comments:
IN FACT the only thing which he proves … is that the prices of the com-
modities, in so far as they are determined by the general rate of profit, are
entirely different from their values. And he arrives at this difference by
postulating the rate of profit to be LAW. One can see that though Ricardo
is accused of being too abstract, one would be justified in accusing him
of the opposite: lack of the power of abstraction, inability, when dealing
with the values of commodities, to forget profits, a FACTwhich confronts
him as a result of competition.
BecauseRicardo, instead of deriving the difference between cost prices
and values from the determination of value itself, admits that ‘values’
themselves (here it would have been appropriate to define the concept of
‘ABSOLUTE’ OR ‘REAL VALUE’ OR ‘VALUE’ as such) are determined by
influences that are independent of labour time and that the lawof value is
sporadically invalidated by these influences, this was used by his oppon-
ents, such as Malthus, in order to attack his whole theory of values.221
Of course, for Marx, the relationship between values and prices was one of
structural dependency: the empirical, apparent fact of the equalisation of rates
of profit is directly based on the non-empirical, essentially constitutive nexus
of value production. Marx was therefore determined to show that the former
must and can be explained on the basis of the latter.
Ricardo’s inconsequential application of the labour theory of value played a
significant role for Marx’s own motivation to quantitatively deduce the value
form of price from the value they contain. First of all, Marx saw a transforma-
tion problem in Ricardo and tried to solve it by showing that the equalisation
of profit rates and the formation of prices of production fundamentally rested
on the value quantities produced in the different branches of production.222
221 Marx 1989a, p. 416.
222 Here is not the place to discuss Ricardo’s own version of the solution in detail. Suffice it
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Here is where the stakes of his critique of Ricardo lay – namely in criticising
Ricardo’s inability to conceptually differentiate constant and variable capital,
which forms the basis to understanding how production prices systematically
diverging from labour values could emerge at all. Instead, Ricardo relies on the
difference between the proportions of fixed and circulating capital invested,
and hence, the difference between circulation and production time. Ricardo’s
modifications to his own ‘embodied labour’ theory of value can be found in
Section iv of Chapter 1 of the Principles:
It appears, then, that the division of capital into different proportions
of fixed and circulating capital, employed in different trades, introduces
a considerable modification to the rule, which is of universal applica-
tion when labour is almost exclusively employed in production; namely,
that commodities never vary in value unless a greater or less quantity of
labour be bestowed on their production, it being shown in this section
that, without any variation in the quantity of labour, the rise of its value
merely will occasion a fall in the exchangeable value of those goods in the
production of which fixed capital is employed; the larger the amount of
fixed capital, the greater will be the fall.223
For Marx however, only the conceptual differentiation between variable cap-
ital as living and value-creating labour, and constant capital as dead labour –
and not Ricardo’s ‘secondary’ determination of value in the difference between
proportions of fixed and circulating capital – can clarify how the ‘modifica-
tion’ from values to production prices arises at all. Helmut Brentel summarises
Marx’s rejection of Ricardo’s understanding of the problem in terms of fixed
and circulating capital in the following way:
to say that Ricardo tried to ‘modify’ his value theory by assuming that a change in wages
influences the cost prices (not the values), and hence the rate of profit of the respective
capitals, so that e.g. wage rises have a different effect on the rates of profit of commodit-
ies produced with different relations between direct and indirect labour. If the exchange
relation between two commodities does not change after a rise in wages (in both lines of
production), then both commodities are no longer produced with the same rate of profit,
i.e. yield different cost prices. From this, Ricardo followed that the relative values of the
commodities are subject to change even if the labour quantities do not change, namely
in the case of different amounts of direct/indirect labour, or in the case of wage changes.
See Marx 1989a, pp. 417–20. Also see Heinrich 1988.
223 Ricardo 1969 [1817], pp. 23–4.
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… the relation between constant and variable capital was originally
responsible for the production of sectorally different surplus values, which
are redistributed with the emergence of a general rate of profit. By virtue
of the addition of a uniform rate of profit onto the sum of the total cap-
ital advanced, they [the surplus values] are differently realised than they
are produced [werden sie anders realisiert als produziert.] The differenti-
ation between constant and variable capital shows the production and
the distribution of surplus value and therefore clarifies the category of
profit. Ricardo on the other hand was exclusively concerned with what
has to be conceived as the subordinate ‘different forms arising out of the
process of the circulation of capital, that is, fixed and circulating capital,
capitalwhich is fixed to a greater or lesser degree (i.e., fixed capital of vary-
ing durability) and unequal velocity of circulation, or rates of turnover of
capital’.224
Marx’s incentive to find a solution to the transformation problem was motiv-
ated by demonstrating the fundamental dependency of prices of production
on labour values. At the same time, it would hinge on this demonstration
whether the labour theory of value had any validity with regard to the ‘Pro-
cess of Capitalist Production as a Whole’, as presented in the manuscripts for
Volume iii of Capital – after all, the level of analysis in which capital’s perfec-
ted self-mystification and fetishisation ‘at the surface’ would be revealed and
rationally countered. Marx’s allegedly ‘failed’ attempt to successfully demon-
strate the equivalence of prices of production to labour values, i.e.Marx’s failed
transformation procedure, caused the fierce rejection of Marx’s labour theory
of value received in the history of its reception. This is, however, also what
motivates us to defend, not the quantitative solution with regard to Marx’s
transformation procedure (which we believe Moseley has sufficiently shown),
but the methodological quality of Marx’s investigation into capital’s mystifica-
tion process, a quality that, as we will show, was not always appreciated by its
own author.
To first explain the problems in Marx’s solution, it is therefore useful to
present Marx’s answer to Ricardo’s problem in more detail, which we will do
in the following.
224 Brentel 1989, p. 93. The quote is fromVolume ii of theTheories of SurplusValuewhereMarx
discusses Ricardo’s theory of cost price. Marx 1989a, p. 401.
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As mentioned above, in Volumes i and ii, and also at the beginning of Vol-
ume iii, of Capital – i.e. at the level of the essential conceptual and non-
empirical analysis of the capitalist production and circulation process – Marx
assumes that commodities are exchanged at their values, i.e. at ‘prices’ that
directly correspond to the socially necessary labour time for their production
(‘value-prices’). In accordance with the method of the presentation, this was
hypothetical. Only after developing the concept of profit and cost price in
Chapters 1–3 of the manuscripts to Volume iii – an already fetishised, trans-
formed concept of surplus value and value – could he show that, at the sur-
face of capitalist production under the condition of different branches of pro-
duction and competition, real prices necessarily diverge from values. On the
assumption that the rate of surplus value is the same for all individual branches,
and the organic composition of capital (the rate between c and v) is different,
the exchange of commodities over the different productive sectors would res-
ult in completely different profit rates. Evidently however, profit rates tend to
equalise – trivially because capital ‘seeks for asmuch surplus value as possible’,
so that, were it not the case, capital would collectively assemble in the sphere
of production with the highest rate of profit. Competition therefore manages
to equalise the rate of profit. Since the equalisation of profit rates in a national
economy is an empirical fact, the prices that guarantee this equalisation must
necessarily diverge from the values of the commodities. Marx calls these prices
production prices: they are neither market prices (which are constantly subject
to change), nor merely ‘sales prices’. Prices of production, rather, denote a new
value form in the course of the methodological presentation. They result from
the competition between the sum of all branches of production to guarantee
an average rate of profit to be gained fromevery individual capital in social pro-
duction as a whole. In contrast, the market production price, or ‘market value’
inMarx’s terminology, expresses competitionwithin individual branches inone
line of production. In other words, prices of production ‘arisewhen the average
of the different rates of profit is drawn from the different spheres of production,
and this average is added to the cost prices of the different spheres of produc-
tion …’225 The price of production p, for Marx, consists of the cost price k (the
costs of the productive capital for the capitalist) plus the average profit (a sur-
charge to the cost price in proportion to the capital employed), so that p = k
+ kp’, or p = k (1+p’).226 On the basis of this formula, Marx attempts to prove
225 Marx 1981, p. 257.
226 Marx 1981, p. 265: ‘The formula that the price of production of a commodity = k +p, cost
price plus profit, can now be statedmore exactly; since p = kp’ (where p’ is the general rate
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how the level of the average rate of profit and accordingly, the prices of pro-
duction, can be established on the basis of the value quantities produced in all
spheres of production. In the style of an axiom, i.e. without further deducing
this claim, Marx hypothesises that the average rate of profit derived from the
system of production prices is identical to the average rate of profit in each pro-
duction sphere in terms of value. In other words, the average rate of profit must
be identical with the ratio of surplus value to the complete social capital inves-
ted in the totality of social production (‘value rate of profit’), during a particular
time span. If we consider five different types of capital with different value

















i. 80c+20v 100% 20 20% 50 90 70
ii. 70c+30v 100% 30 30% 51 111 81
iii. 60c+40v 100% 40 40% 51 131 91
iv. 85c+15v 100% 15 15% 40 70 55
v. 95c+5v 100% 5 5% 10 20 15
390c + 110v 110 110% Total
78c + 22v 22 22% Average
a See Marx 1981, p. 256. Heinrich formalises this schema as r = Σ si/Σ (ci + vi), if si, ci and vi denote surplus
value, constant and variable capital for the i-th sphere of production, and Σ the sum of all i, and r the
average rate of profit. See Heinrich 1999, p. 269.
If we now treat the different single capitals i–v as a single total capital and dis-
tribute the surplus value of 22 or the rate of profit of 22% evenly among the
capitals i–v, we would arrive at the following prices of production of the com-
modities:
of profit), the price of production = k + kp’. If k = 300 and p’ = 15%, the price of production
k + kp’ = 300+300 15/100 = 345.’

















i. 80c+20v 20 90 70 92 22% + 2
ii. 70c+30v 30 111 81 103 22% - 8
iii. 60c+40v 40 131 91 113 22% - 18
iv. 85c+15v 15 70 55 77 22% + 7
v. 95c + 5v 5 20 15 37 22% + 17
a See Marx 1981, p. 256. Heinrich accordingly formalises this schema for the price of production of the i-th
commodity (i.e. the product of the i-th sphere) as pi = (ci + vi) (1 + Σ si/Σ (ci + vi)). See Heinrich 1999, p. 269.
b This shouldmore correctly read as ‘Prices of production of commodities’. However, at this pointMarx has
not yet introduced the concept of the price of production.
As we can see from the last column in the latter table, the divergence of price
from value in the individual capitals, when considered as one single total cap-
ital, balances itself out. Therefore, a divergence of price from value, taken in
production as a whole, does not take place:
Taken together, commodities are sold at 2+7 + 17 = 26 above their value,
and 8+18 = 26 below their value, so that the divergences of price from
value indicated above cancel each other out when surplus-value is dis-
tributed evenly, i.e. through adding the average rate of profit of 22 on the
capital advance of 100 to the respective cost prices of commodities i–v
… And it is only because they are sold at these prices that the rates of
profit for capitals i–v are equal at 22 per cent, irrespective of their differ-
ent organic compositions …227
With this table and method of transformation, Marx thinks he has finally
proven his initial claim, namely that the production price systemmust rest on
the basis of the value system by necessity, keeping his theory of value intact.
He has thus provided a solution to the value-price-transformation on the basis
of his own labour theory of value, fulfilling the two axioms following from this
claim, namely that i. the sum of profits must be equal to the sum of surplus
value ‘which this capital produces in a givenperiodof circulation’,228 and ii. ‘the
sumof prices of production for the commodities produced in society as awhole
227 Marx 1981, p. 257.
228 Marx 1981, p. 141.
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… is equal to the sum of their values’.229 Marx therefore believes he has shown
that these particular rates of profit in each sphere of production are s/C and
‘to be developed from the value of the commodity as shown in the first Part of
this volume’, inwhich he demonstrates the notion of profit as being a derived, a
‘mystified’ form of the real and fundamental relation between abstract labour
and capital in the notion of surplus value.230 The congruity between prices of
production and values in the production of commodities in society as a whole
is of decisive importance for Marx, since
[i]n the absence of such a development, the general rate of profit (and
hence also the production prices of the commodity) remains a meaning-
less and irrational conception. Thus the production price of a commodity
equals its cost price plus the percentage profit added to it in accordance
with the general rate of profit, its cost price plus the average profit.231
Two important consequences must be drawn from this: one is unproblematic
andmerely serves to specifyMarx’s understanding of surplus value production
on the surface of totally developed, competitive capitalism: profit accrues to
the individual capitals only in proportion to the total social capital advanced.
The allocation of surplus value or profit in the perspective of total capital con-
sequently rests on a redistribution of surplus value to the individual branches
of production. In other words, as soon as competition is considered, even a
favourable (low) organic composition of capital can only realise a portion of
theprofit it would realise under different conditions. Single capitalists therefore
never realise the ‘full’ surplus value produced in their own branch of produc-
tion, but only a fragment of the surplus product generated in social production
as a whole, by the whole working class. This also means that the notion of
‘individual value’ is, strictly speaking, self-contradictory, even if Marx uses this
229 Marx 1981, p. 259.
230 ‘In surplus-value, the relationship between capital and labour is laid bare. In the relation-
ship between capital and profit, i.e. between capital and surplus-value as it appears on
the one hand as an excess over the cost price of the commodity realised in the circulation
process and on the other hand as an excess determined more precisely by its relation-
ship to total capital, capital appears as a relationship to itself, a relationship in which it
is distinguished, as an original sum of value, from another new value that it posits. It
appears to consciousness as if capital creates this new value in the course of itsmovement
through the production and circulation processes. But how this happens is nowmystified,
and appears to derive from hidden qualities that are inherent in capital itself ’. Marx 1981,
p. 139.Wewill return to this quote below to analyse its importance for the fetishism-critical
approach to the ‘transformation problem’.
231 Marx 1981, p. 257.
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term to differentiate it from the market value of a commodity (more on this in
the next section).
The other consequence is of a more technical nature, and also more devast-
ating for Marx’s own quantitative solution to the value-price-transformation:
while the first axiom is merely a hypothesis which is impossible to prove
empirically (which must not mean it is wrong), the second axiom contains
a logical flaw and is, therefore, untenable: it assumes that the capitalists can
buy their productive capital and, likewise, the workers their means of sub-
sumption, at their respective values. However, in fully developed capitalism
in conditions of competition, this is impossible: productive capital as well as
means of consumption are traded at definitive prices. Therefore, the standard
reproach against Marx’s calculation method is that he had allegedly ‘forgot-
ten’ or ‘failed to transform the inputs’232 in his calculation of cost prices (see
table 2, column 5). This is of course a problematic formulation, because the
transformation of the inputs already requires the existence of prices of produc-
tion on whose basis cost prices could afterwards be accounted for. In other
words, the problem is not one of Marx’s ‘forgetfulness’. The standard reproach
alsomisses that Marx was well aware of the problem;233 but he fatally underes-
timated its significance for the quantitative solution, asHeinrich emphasises.234
The problem rather consists in the circular logic of Marx’s quantitative solution
to the value-price calculus: cost prices cannot be accounted for in separation
andbefore theprices of production, because cost prices themselvesmust be cal-
culated on the basis of productionprices. Seen thisway, cost prices (and prices of
production) must be accounted for simultaneously. But, as Heinrich has poin-
232 We use Moseley’s formulation. See Moseley 2016, p. xii.
233 Adivergenceof prices of production fromvalues can ‘arise out of the following reasons’ for
Marx: ‘(2) because the price of production of a commodity that diverges in this way from
its value enters as an element into the cost price of other commodities, whichmeans that
a divergence from the value of the means of production consumed in a commodity may
already be contained in the cost price, quite apart from the divergence thatmay arise from
the difference between average profit and surplus-value’. Marx 2015 [1864–5], p. 318.
234 ‘While Marx himself pointed to this “mistake”, he completely underestimated its signific-
ance’. Heinrich 1999, p. 270. Instead, Marx casually comments: ‘As the price of production
of a commodity can diverge from its value, so the cost price of a commodity, in which the
price of production of other commodities is involved, can also stand above or below the
portion of its total value that is formed by the value of themeans of production going into
it. It is necessary to bear in mind this modified significance of the cost price, and there-
fore to bear in mind too that if the cost price of a commodity is equated with the value
of the means of production used up in producing it, it is always possible to go wrong. Our
present investigation does not require us to go into further detail on this point’. Marx 1981,
p. 265. Emphasis added.
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ted out, thenwe cannot assume that ‘the general rate of profit of the production
price system coincides with the average rate of profit of the value system’,235
hence, not only the second, but also the first axiom becomes untenable. This
predicament however seems to concern the tenability of the labour theory of
value as a whole.
4.3.2 Uno’s Perspective
It is unnecessary at this point to refer to the vast amount of both Marxist and
non-Marxist literature either discussing solutions to the transformation prob-
lem, or taking it to present fundamental objections to Marx’s conception of
value and sometimes even to declare the theoretical ‘bankruptcy’ of Marx’s
teaching as such (e.g. Samuelson, Steedman, Morishima, analytical Marxists
such as Elster, Roemer, Cohen).236 The general reproach concerning the so-
called ‘transformation problem’ is that Marx made an error in hypothesising
the two axioms of ‘aggregate equalities’ simultaneously, namely i. That the total
profit is equal to the total surplus value (rate of profit = ‘value rate of profit’)
and ii, that the total price of production is equal to the total value (that the
divergence of price from value in the total economy = 0).237 Since both cannot
coincide to form a coherent theory of values and price in the real capitalist
economy, the theory of production in Volume i (and Volume ii) of Capital
is declared redundant. We are therefore stuck with a theory of the apparent
movements of price without being able to coherently, i.e. logically ground the
235 Heinrich 1999, p. 270.
236 For Steedman,Marx’s labour theory of value is redundant, because inputs/outputs can be
specified according to physical quantities: ‘… value magnitudes are, at best, redundant in
the determination of the rate of profit (and prices of production)… [because] the physical
quantities of commodities and of labour specifying the methods of production, together
with the physical quantities of commodities specifying the given real wage rate, suffice
to determine the rate of profit’. Steedman 1978, p. 202. For similar critiques from a neo-
Ricardian standpoint, see Seton 1957, Samuelson 1971,Morishima 1973, Elster 1985, Roemer
1981, Cohen 1981, though Sweezy was arguably the first to revive the Bortkiewicz model
(see Sweezy 1942, pp. 115–25). See also, from a different viewpoint, Napoleoni’s (Napoleoni
1974) and A. Brewer’s (Brewer 1995) similar argument. For a nearly exhaustive overview
of the debates on the ‘transformation problem’ until 1988 and a critique of these views,
see Heinrich 1988. For a recent survey and critical discussion on different solutions to the
problem since 1988, starting with the tssi interpretation (Kliman andMcGlone 1988), see
Moseley 2016, pp. 286–360. Moseley especially targets the understanding of inputs/out-
puts as ‘physical quantities’, emphasising the role of money capital, i.e. the fact that a given
sum of money, not a given sum of physical inputs, stands at the beginning of the valorisa-
tion process. For further critiques of the ‘physical’ view, see Foley 1997.
237 This view was held by Bortkiewicz (Bortkiewicz 1906–7), and later reformulated by the
neo-Ricardians. See Moseley 2016, p. xii.
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prices of commodities in labour values. Or so it seems.238 What is more inter-
esting is the claim that no such thing as a transformation ‘problem’ exists
in Marx’s presentation, because the prices of production have always-already
been ‘transformed’ from the beginning of the presentation. It is Fred Mose-
ley who came forward with this view in recent years, especially in his seminal
Money and Totality (2016). In the book, he presents a strong argument based
on both algebraic calculus and textual evidence to show that there ‘is’ no trans-
formation problem inMarx, if only we takeMarx’smethod seriously. Moseley’s
work, based on research over more than two decades, is therefore arguably the
most well-crafted argument in ‘defence’ of the coherence of Marx’s presenta-
tion throughout the three volumes of Capital, and hence, on the labour theory
of value. Unfortunately, his ‘macro-monetary’ approach cannot be discussed in
detail in the context of this study. Suffice it to say that Moseley shows through
a careful philological analysis of Marx’s text that the three volumes of Capital
are commonly based on the form of a monetary expression of labour time – a
monetary expression of value in ‘value-price’ – so that Marx assumes a given
M as the value form of prices of production from the beginning of the analysis.
Moseley therefore rejects the ‘standard interpretations’ (Bortkiewicz, Sweezy,
the Sraffian interpretations of Morishima and Steedman) on the basis of their
interpretation of physical (non-monetary) input-output schemas. The givenM
at the start of the circuit of money capital M-C … P … C’-M’ is the only known
variable here, so that, unlike a simultaneous determination of the ‘inputs’ and
‘outputs’, a sequential determination of the variables is required. Therefore,
what is at stake at the level of Volume iii of Capital is not the ‘proof’ that labour
values must be ‘transformed’ into prices of production, but, rather, that on the
level of the theory of distribution of Capital Volume iii, profit, interest and rent
as concrete monetary forms of value are based on the appropriation of surplus
labour by the capitalist class as a whole, which is based on the theory of produc-
tion of Volume i. In other words, for Moseley, there are no two versions of cost
price, one based on values (i.e. the sum of the actual constant capital and vari-
238 The debates surrounding Böhm-Bawerk’s ‘refutation’ – arguably one of the earliest and
most influential attempts to refute the Marx’s value theory on the basis of the ‘contra-
diction’ between Volume i and iii of Capital (Böhm-Bawerk 1949 [1896], p. 30) were
also known to Uno. Especially Hilferding’s reply, but also Tugan-Baranowski’s interven-
tion of 1905, Theoretical Foundations of Marxism (Leipzig: Duncker & Humboldt) was
known to Uno, while he did not comment on the more recent debates (Sraffa and the
neo-Ricardians). Uno was arguably influenced by Böhm-Bawerk, although he presented
a (precarious) critique of the chapter on Marx in Böhm-Bawerk’s ‘Capital and Interest’
(‘Kapital und Kapitalzins’, 1884) in the introduction to Value Theory. To our knowledge,
Uno also did not further engage with Bortkiewicz’s ‘new method’ of calculation.
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able capital advanced), and one based on prices of production. There is only
one cost price, based on values. Therefore, as Moseley states, ‘according to this
interpretation and contrary to the traditional interpretation, Marx did not fail
to transform the inputs because the inputs (the cost prices) are not supposed to
be transformed…but are instead supposed to be the samemagnitude (K) in the
determination of both values and the prices of production’.239 Moseley argues
this by a close comparison betweenMarx’s originalmanuscript andEngels’ edi-
tion of Volume iii.240 But the contention that ‘the inputs are not supposed to be
transformed’, so that there is ‘nothing to transform’ is odd in the face of Marx’s
own elaborated efforts at a transformation procedure from labour values to prices
of production in Chapter 9 of Capital Volume iii. The ni and Moseley’s ‘macro-
monetary’ approach therefore much rather provided solutions to a problem
thatMarxwas clearly not aware of. Similarly to recent – sometimesmore, some-
times less justified – attempts to declare a ‘non-existence’ of a transformation
problem inMarx,241 Uno does not acknowledge the existence of a problem. Of
course, this view is also the result of a particular kind of interpretation. In the
following, I will first provide an account of Uno’s understanding (in the Prin-
ciples) of both the relation between labour values and prices of production,
and second, the concept of market values – a prominent term for Uno – in its
relation to supply and demand. While in the Principles, however, Uno merely
stresses the regulatory influence of the supply-and-demand factor to generate
an equilibrium of the profit rate, without directly referring to Marx (except
accusingMarx of underestimating this factor, as shown above), in Part iv of his
earlierMethodology of 1962, we find amore fundamental critique of Marx. Uno
239 Marx 2015 [1864–5], pp. 15–16.
240 It is therefore possible to viewMoseley’s intervention as amore ‘thoroughgoing’ variant of
the quantitative solution offeredby the so-calledNew Interpretation,whichwehavepoin-
ted to earlier (see Dumenil 1980, Foley 1982, and Lipietz 1982), and which wewill return to
in detail in Chapter 5.3. As Foley says, the money wage multiplied by the value of money
implies ‘that the valueof labourpower is equal inmagnitude to thewage share inaggregate
value added’. Foley 1982, p. 42. In other words, the value of labour power is already trans-
formed in terms of price expressing its exact value, i.e. the ‘fraction of the working day that
is paid labour’. Moseley 2016, p. 256. Moseley’s interpretation is more radical, because, in
contrast to e.g. Foley’s explanation, not only the value of labour, i.e. thewage (v), is ‘already
transformed’, but also constant capital (c). For criticisms of Moseley’s interpretation, see
Kliman’s 13-part series (as of 17 January 2017), ‘All Value-Form, no Labour Substance’ in
Marxist-Humanist Initiative (https://www.marxisthumanistinitiative.org/uncategorized/​
all‑value‑form‑no‑value‑substance‑comm
ents‑on‑moseleys‑new‑book‑part‑1.html, last access 15 Aug. 2019), and Freeman 2019.
241 ‘… the “transformation problem” … simply does not exist’. Milios 2009, p. 269. If it does not
‘exist’ however, what is it that Milios addresses?
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here criticises Marx’s conceptualisation of market values and market prices
that Uno regards as the result of a more fundamental flaw in Marx’s basic the-
ory of the form and substance of value.
Part iii of the Principles, the ‘Doctrine of Distribution’ (bunpairon), imme-
diately begins with Uno’s theorisation of the formation of the general profit
rate and, accordingly, the transformation of values into productionprices. First,
he presents the view that ‘in a purely capitalist society in which unrestricted
competition prevails among capitals’,242 all commoditiesmust be traded at def-
inite prices. Capital must use labour-power and the means of production in
the most efficient way, so that a ‘normal standard’ can be reached, in which all
capitals tend to equalise their profits. Uno concludes that ‘[o]nly with these
general presuppositions can it be made apparent that capital possesses the
faculty of allocating itself to the various spheres of production so as to sup-
ply all the products that society demands’,243 again propagating his dominant
view of capitalism as a basic demand-satisfying and use value-oriented eco-
nomic formation. Yet, on what factors in Uno’s view does the formation of a
general rate of profit, on the condition of competition between all industries
or branches of production, depend? For him, it depends on the three factors of
(1) the rate of surplus value, (2) the (organic) composition of capital, and (3)
the turnover-time of capital, consisting of both the production-period and the
circulation-period. The turnover-time of capital, however, is abbreviated by the
intermediary function of commercial capital, so that commercial capital also
indirectly participates in the formation of a general profit rate. To discuss the
problem at hand, we need not go back to the discussion of commercial cap-
ital as it is sufficiently explained in Chapter 4.1. As for (2), understanding the
dependence of the general rate of profit on the rate of surplus value (the ratio
between necessary labour time and surplus labour time) is relatively unprob-
lematic. Unomerely stresses the relevance of the production of relative surplus
value with the technical progress of the means of production and the histor-
ical tendency to equalise the rate of surplus value across all branches of the
industry with technical progress: ‘Inequalities that in practice remain in the
rate of surplus value over different capitalist activities must be attributed to
certain particular conditions requiring in each case separate explanations’.244
Consequently, it is in (1) that the formation of a general rate of profit confronts
its most fundamental problem against the background of the ‘law of value’. For
242 Uno 1980, p. 76.
243 Uno 1980, p. 76.
244 Uno 1980, p. 78.
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technical reasons, differences in the composition of capital between the pro-
ductive branches must be allowed for. In contrast to the rate of surplus value,
they do not tend to equalise with technical progress, for some branches of
production, i.e. large-scale operations as e.g. heavy metal industries, require
a higher composition of capital than small-scale industries (e.g. the hospital-
ity industry), yielding a smaller rate of profit, accounted for on the basis of
surplus values. As a consequence, the different industries would yield com-
pletely different profit rates. To therefore guarantee the even distribution of
profits over the different branches of production, it ‘becomes unavoidable that
the price of the products produced with a higher composition of capital rises
above its value and the price of those produced with a lower capital composi-
tion falls below its value’.245 ForUno, hence, ‘the prices that equalise profits that
accrue to all capital investments of the same value are, therefore, equilibrium
prices’.246 Like Marx, Uno terms these prices production-prices (or prices of
production). As a consequence, andby introducing the notion ofmarket price–
that however arises not from inter-sectional, but intra-sectional competition
between commodity suppliers – Uno sees little controversial potential in the
transformation of values into production-prices:
In other words, production-prices which consist of the cost-price plus
the average profit earned by the total of invested or advanced capital
regulate the social supply of capital’s products in place of values (kachi
ni kawatte); for market prices that fluctuate in response to the forces of
demand and supply gravitate towards production-prices rather than to
values. This conversion of values into production-prices, however, does
not imply any change in the labour-time required to produce each com-
modity.This technical requirement is taken forgrantedwhencapital, guided
by production-prices, determines the quantity of each commodity that it
will supply socially. In other words, here again capital makes a commodity-
economic detour. Since it cannot know directly what quantity of each
commodity ought to be socially supplied, the production of which re-
quires a definite quantity of labour-time, capital relies on themarket form
of production-prices to allocate itself and labour with it to the various
spheres of industrial production, thereby ensuring that the socially neces-
sary labour-time is spent for theproductionof each individual product.247
245 Uno 1980, p. 78.
246 Uno 1980, pp. 78–9.
247 Uno 1980, p. 79. A translation closer to the original of the sentences in italic would be:
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According to Uno, ‘in reality’ capital does not produce according to the
labour time socially necessary in terms of value, but orients itself towards
production prices. Production prices guarantee that socially necessary labour
time is automatically readjusted to the quantities ‘needed’ in every branch of
production as soon as they form the centre of gravity around which market
prices, determined by supply and demand, gravitate. But then there is no reason
to believe that labour values form the theoretical basis on which to determine
the ‘price fluctuations’ on the market. With this theory of production price, the
assumption of values becomes redundant.
Additionally, conscious planning of the economy is no longer a problem,
since, by the automatism of the prices of production, capital ‘relies on the
market form of production-prices’ to guarantee the supply of products in pro-
portions of socially necessary labour time. But socially necessary labour time
is then no longer determined by the ‘value rate of profit’, it is determined by
the ‘profit rate of profit’ and thus is altogether detached from the ratio of the
surplus product to paid labour. Moreover, it is based on the ratio of the surplus
product to both constant and variable capital (the cost price for the capitalist),
or the rate of profit. Böhm-Bawerk’s most trivial, however central accusation,
namely that Marx had not moved beyond Smith, Ricardo and the Physiocrats
in his new determination of price, here certainly holds for Uno’s interpreta-
tion.248 It must be noted that Marx even admits that the price of production
is the same of the understanding of price in the classics: the point for Marx
however is that ‘none of these people explained the difference between price
of production and value’.249 As a matter-of-fact, with the elimination of labour
values and the ‘value rate of profit’, Uno eliminates the transformation prob-
lem tout court. He substantiates the argument of an automatic readjustment of
labour values to prices of production which form the centre of gravity for mar-
ket prices in each industrial sector by saying that ‘[s]ince theproducts of capital
are now traded at prices gravitating towards production-priceswhich consist of
the cost-price plus an average profit (on total invested capital), the movement
‘Presupposing this, in order to determine the amount of social production of these com-
modities, it is necessary for capital to make this detour’. Uno 1964, pp. 147–8.
248 ‘That price of a commodity which is equal to its cost price plus its share of the yearly aver-
age profit of the capital employed (not merely that consumed) in its production (regard
being had to the quickness or slowness of turnover) is its price of production. This is in fact
identical withAdamSmith’s natural price, Ricardo’s price of production, andwith the prix
nécessaire of the physiocrats. And the actual exchange relation of the separate commod-
ities is no longer determined by their values but by their prices of production; or asMarx likes
to put it “the values change into prices of production” ’. Böhm-Bawerk 1949 [1896], p. 24.
249 Marx 1981, p. 300.
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of prices can no longer be said to be directly governed by the law of value’.250
For Uno, consequently, prices of production that guarantee an equal share in
the aggregate profit for all branches of production necessarily diverge from val-
ues, and only this divergence establishes the law of value at all. Paradoxically
therefore, for Uno, the law of value only holds when it does not hold. At the same
time, by disavowing the primordial determination of unpaid labour as the part
of the working day in which the labourer produces the surplus, which in turn
becomes the primordial form of profit, for Uno, the characteristic of the ‘law of
value’ consists in a law of social reproduction based on the satisfaction of social
demand in a general equilibrium:
… the law of value that governs a commodity-economy does not secure
the solidmechanism of its operation, nor the full scope of its application,
unless commodities are produced by capital, i.e. unless values are already
transformed into production prices. Only by the formation of the rate of
profit is it possible objectively to determine the equilibrium quantities
of the various use-values that are socially demanded and that technically
require a certain labour-time for their production.251
Here we can return to the inherently Baileyan assumptions in Uno’s value the-
ory: like Uno long after him, Bailey already conceived of money as the sole
‘external’ measure of commodities. According to Bailey,money need not be the
‘absolute’ measure of value, and can hence be variable, and by virtue of being
variable, evenly and uniformlymeasure the values of all other commodities. In
other words, Bailey can ignore Ricardo’s transformation problem and describe
the formation of value as a system of exchange of simple relative values. This
alsomeans that ‘value’, as soon as the real process of the formation of a general
rate of profit is concerned, is nothing but a relative relation of exchange in a
system of quantities.252 Hence, for both Bailey and Uno, the concept of produc-
tion price simply substitutes the concept of value, as soon as the ‘total process’
of capitalist production and the formation of the general rate of profit is con-
cerned. Both become ‘fetish worshippers’ of the value form of price. But how, if
250 Uno 1980, p. 79.
251 Uno 1980, p. 81. Here we can also see how for Uno the reproduction of total social cap-
ital discussed in the previous chapter smoothly adjusts to the value-price-transformation:
‘In fact, capital realises the equilibrium state of reproduction in which it forms and aug-
ments values only when commodities are exchanged at production-prices since the state
of equilibrium implies and depends on a general rate of profit’. Ibid.
252 See Brentel 1989, p. 111.
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everything is to thebest in thebest of all possibleworlds, can this interpretation
not impede Marx’s theory of value as a theory of exploitation of living human
labour that is its central critical insight? How does Marx, with Uno’s interpret-
ation, in fact move beyond the classical understanding? Uno does not seem to
have an answer. Still, he insists that ‘this fact [the systematic divergence of the
cost price (hence, the production price) from values] does not in any way alter
the basic worker-versus-capitalists relation according to which workers devote
the necessary labour-time for the production of their own livelihood and the
surplus labour-time for the formation of the capitalists’ income’.253 The plaus-
ibility of this assertion is however suspended by Uno’s own interpretation in
which the fundamental dependency of the price system on the value system
can no longer be reconstructed. In the following, we will investigate a little fur-
ther the importance of market values for Uno’s ‘solution’ to the transformation
problem. We will show that Uno, in contrast to Marx, ascribes a constitutive
role to supply and demand for the formation of market values, relying on a
basic assumption of neoclassical economic theory.
4.3.3 Supply and Demand,Market Value andMarket Prices
The role of market prices and market values (i.e. ‘market production-prices’)
in Marx’s further elaboration in Chapter 10 of Volume iii of Capital concerns
competition within a branch of production of the same type of commodity.
Marx discusses these terms against the background of the function of supply
and demand, especially its heuristic value in determining prices. Market value
for both Marx and Uno is defined as the average value of all the commodit-
ies produced in the same branch of production, yet it can also be the individual
valueof the commodity producedunder average conditions of production. But,
as Marx points out, the supply of the quantity of a certain type of commodity
does not simply ‘satisfy demand’, it satisfies demand on a particular social scale.
As a rule of thumb, demand and supply regulate the market price or rather,
the deviation of the market price from market value, while on the other hand,
the market value ‘regulates the relationship between demand and supply, or
the centre around which fluctuations of demand and supply make the market
price oscillate’.254 However it is crucial to see that for Marx, in contrast to Uno,
this contention is made on the presupposition that ‘the law of value regulates
the prices of production’.255Hence, forMarx, demand and supply have noheur-
253 Uno 1980, p. 80.
254 Marx 1981, p. 282.
255 Marx 1981, p. 281.
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istic value for the explanation of the relations under which commodities are
exchanged as the products of capital. This point is crucial for Marx:
Here again we can see how absolutely nothing can be explained by the
relationship of demand and supply, before explaining the basis on which
this relationship functions.256
The fluctuations of supply and demand accommodate to market values. Be-
cause of this, we might even imagine the case that the constant divergence
of supply and demand from value forms a new market value (= the average
taken from the different market prices) ‘since the departures from these val-
ues balance each other as pluses and minuses, when their average is taken’.257
But demand and supply merely constitute deviations, accidental fluctuations,
and cannot explain the dynamic of social reproduction. Marx even goes one
step further to prove the tautological character of an explanation that attempts
to establish the value form of market value – we shall not forget that market
value, like price of production, is a value form – on an equilibrium of supply
and demand, i.e. the satisfaction of social needs. In Chapter 10 of Volume iii of
Capital, Marx carefully analyses, first, the role of supply, and second, the role
of demand. Let us first consider supply. The view of supply as a particular sum
of commodities, existing in use value to satisfy human needs, fails to recognise
that these use values are available on the market in a given scale.258 However,
according to Marx, there is no intrinsic relation between the quantity of the
commodities available on the market and the market value of these articles.
The relation merely indicates that on a given basis of labour productivity in
the sphere of production in question, the production of a particular quantity
of this article requires a particular quantity of social labour time, even though
this proportion may be completely different from one sphere of production to
another and has no intrinsic connection with the usefulness of the article or
the particular character of its use value.259
The quantity in which a certain commodity is produced therefore bears no
relation to the social usefulness of the article, i.e. the degree in which it sat-
isfies social demand. Accordingly, to say that products are available on the
market is not to say that they ‘satisfy a demand’. They only satisfy the demand
of the solvent participants on the market, people that pay for the products
with money. Since production in capitalism is based on the social division of
256 Marx 1918, p. 282.
257 Marx 1981, p. 291.
258 Sea Marx 1981, p. 287.
259 Marx 1981, p. 288.
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labour, therefore, the part of ‘society’ (rather, that section of workers) that
expends its labour-time on the production of particular commodities ‘must
receive an equivalent in social labour represented in those articles that satisfy
its needs’.260 From this, it follows by no means that the extent of the supply
of particular quantities of products on the market is directly related to the
extent to which they are socially demanded: it only follows that a part of the
labour time invested in the production of particular articles buys back a part
of the quantity of certain other products available on the market. The relation
between theproportion that the productionof a certain article assumes in total
social labour time and the ‘proportion in which the society demands satisfac-
tion of the need appeased by that particular article’261 is not a necessary, but
merely an accidental one. In other words, themarket value of a particular com-
modity depends on factors completely unrelated to the quantity (supply) in
which this commodity is available on the market. The same goes for demand.
Demand, needless to say, is a social fact without which a part of the repro-
duction of the annual aggregate product would be impossible. This demand
accrues to both capitalists and workers, as we have seen in 4.2., with the cru-
cial difference that the demand of the capitalists is a demand for productive
consumption, the purpose of which is the appropriation of surplus value, value
without an equivalent. Generally, it seems that, on the one hand,
… there is a certain quantitatively defined social need on the demand
side, which requires for its fulfilment a definite quantity of an article on
the market. In fact, however, the quantitative determination of this need
is completely elastic and fluctuating. Its fixed character is mere illusion.
If means of subsistence were cheaper or money wages higher, the work-
ers would buy more of them, and a greater ‘social need’ for these kinds
of commodities would appear, not to mention those paupers etc. whose
‘demand’ is still below the narrowest limits of their physical need. If cot-
ton, on the other hand, became cheaper, the capitalists’ demand for cot-
tonwould grow,more excess capitalwouldbeput into the cotton industry,
and so on.262
But the capitalist’s need for cotton ‘is modified fundamentally by the fact that
all it really clothes is his need to make profit’.263 Of course, this does not mean
that supply anddemandhavenobearing on the real prices, i.e. themarket prices,
260 Marx 1981, p. 288.
261 Marx 1981, p. 288.
262 Marx 1981, p. 290.
263 Marx 1981, p. 29.
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under which commodities are traded. If supply exceeds demand, commod-
ities must be sold for less than the market value, if demand exceeds supply,
commodities are sold above their market value, in this way reflecting devi-
ations from the market value, and with it, the market price.264 But from this
logic it does not follow that an ‘equilibrium’ of supply and demand ‘determ-
ines’ market value. Market value itself – the sum of v and c plus the average
profit, a surcharge to the cost price in proportion to the capital employed – is
altogether independent of the coincidence or the ‘equilibrium’ of supply and
demand. To the contrary: market value determines the relationship of demand
and supply to begin with. Hence, the fundamental problem in the determina-
tion of price by the supply-and-demand-function, argued by marginalism and,
in ‘value-theoretically modified’ fashion also by Uno, is its lack of explanatory
power contained in the tautological character of what it is supposed to prove:
Demand and supply coincide if they stand in such a relationship that the
mass of commodities produced by a certain branch of production can
be sold at its market value, neither above it nor below. This is the first
thing we are told. The second is that when commodities can be sold at
their market value, demand and supply coincide. If demand and sup-
ply coincide, they cease to have any effect, and it is for this very reason
that commodities are sold at their market value … If demand and sup-
ply cancel each other out, they cease to explain anything, have no effect
onmarket value and leave us completely in the dark as towhy thismarket
value is expressed in precisely such a sumof money and no other. The real
inner laws of capitalist production clearly cannot be explained in terms
of the interaction of demand and supply … since these laws are realized
in their pure form only when demand and supply cease to operate, i.e.
when they coincide.265
However, under certain conditions, demand can regulate the market value of
a commodity in relation to the conditions of its production. Here is a point
in which Marx’s argument seems to suggest an alternative to the pure value
264 With the important addition that ‘[m]arket prices that diverge frommarket valuesbalance
out on average to become market values, since the departures from these values balance
each other as pluses or minuses, when their average is taken. And this average figure is
by nomeans of merely theoretical significance. It is, rather, practically important for cap-
ital whose investment is calculated over the fluctuation and compensations of amore less
fixed period of time’.Marx 1981, p. 291. Yet, this does nothing to change the fact thatmarket
values determine market prices. For Marx’s elaboration, see Marx 1981, pp. 291–7.
265 Marx 1981, pp. 290–1.
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determination of market value (i.e. a portion of socially necessary labour time
required to produce a commodity under average conditions, providing a pro-
portional share of the individual capital’s profit). Marx thus seems to end up
with twodeterminations of market value, one regulated by value, one regulated
by demand and supply. At this point, we also find Uno’s more elaborate and
direct criticism of Marx’s explanation of market value in the Methodology. Let
us first turn to Marx’s, seemingly counterfactual explanation of market value.
First, he introduces the term by assuming average market conditions, with the
quantity or the mass of the commodities provided as a given. Here, he invest-
igates the influence of quantities of commodities produced under different
conditions (favourable and unfavourable) on the deviations of market price
frommarket value in three different cases. In the first case (case i), the market
value is equal to the sum of its individual values. Here, the quantity of com-
modities produced under good conditions and those produced under worse
conditions in this same line of production is relatively small, while the greater
bulk of commodities is producedunder average conditions.The relatively small
quantities of extreme conditions of production then correspond to the greater
mass of average conditions of production and balance each other out: capitals
producing at the worst extreme of the spectrum have to sell their commodit-
ies below their individual value, while those producing at the best extreme sell
their commodities above it (‘normal’ case). In this case, themarket value of the
mass of commodities ‘is determinedby the value of the greatmiddlingmass’.266
In case ii, the part of the sumwhich is produced under relatively unfavourable
conditions forms a more significant quantity than in case i, so that the indi-
vidual amounts of commodities produced at the two extremes fail to balance
each other out. Accordingly, it will be the commodities produced under the
worst conditions that regulate themarket price. If, in case iii, the commodities
produced under favourable conditions form the greater part of the mass, then,
accordingly, the market value falls below the average value.267 Uno is therefore
justified in remarking that inMarx’s determination, ‘the qualitative dimension
of market value is dissolved into the quantitative dimension’.268 This impres-
sion is further consolidated by Marx’s modified determination of market value
with regard to supply and demand in relation to the commodities produced at the
margin. Here, the supply of commodities is regarded in relation to demand.
While he insists that the mass of commodities ‘not only satisfies a need, but it
satisfies this need on its social scale’, he proceeds:
266 Marx 1981, p. 284.
267 See Marx 1981, pp. 283–5.
268 Uno 1962, p. 207.
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[i]f … thequantity supplied is less than thedemand, or alternativelymore,
this market price deviates from the market value. In the first case, if the
quantity is too small, it is always the commodities produced under the
worst conditions that govern the market value, while if it is too large, it is
thoseproducedunder thebest conditions; i.e. it is oneof the twoextremes
that determines the market value, despite the fact that the proportions
producedunder the different conditions, takenby themselves,would lead
to a different result.269
This modification with regard to market value seems to indicate that market
value is essentially regulated by the given demand in relation to a given supply
within a particular branch of production. This modified circumstance caused
Uno to fundamentally question the consistency of Marx’s concept of market
value. What market value should explain, according to Uno, is ‘the formation
of a particular surplus value as the special case of the production of relative
surplus value’ – as e.g. how surplus profit is transformed into rent. Instead, ‘in
Marx, this [explanation of market value] is conflated with the fluctuations of
market price arising from demand and supply’.270 The accusation againstMarx
of a ‘conflation’ of market price andmarket value is predominant inUno’s treat-
ment of market value in the Methodology.271 For Uno, this is not to say that
demand and supply bear no relation on market value, but rather, that we can
detect a correspondence in demand and supply if commodities are sold at their
269 Marx 1981, pp. 286–7. Quoted in Uno 1962, p. 207.
270 Uno 1962, p. 206.
271 Uno 1962, p. 207: ‘Here, market value and market price are debated in clearly confoun-
ded fashion’. See also Itoh 1979 and Itoh 1980. For Itoh, Marx ‘seems to leave us with two
contradictory theories [of market value]. One of them defines market value as determ-
ined directly by the technically average conditions of production … In contrast, Marx’s
second theory gives demand an important role in determining the market value’. Itoh
1980, pp. 82–3. For Itoh, unsurprisingly, Uno’s theory of market value forms the solution
to the ‘dilemma’ by defining market value as ‘social value determined through the medi-
ation of the market’. Uno 1973 [1952] p. 90, quoted in Itoh 1980, p. 86. This, however, as we
have reconstructed above, would mean us abandoning the value determination of price.
On the problem of market value in Marx, also see Ehara 2017/18. Ehara, however, alto-
gether disregards themethodological architecture of the three volumes of Capital, i.e. the
assumption of a value-price-congruence in the first two volumes as a structural necessity
for the explanation of their deviation in Volume iii. The value-price deviation, contrary to
what Ehara believes, is not an inconvenient ‘concession’ by Marx. Again, Uno is invoked
as delivering a better explanation for market value in providing the, in fact, tautological
explanation of an equilibrium of supply and demand as regulating market value. We will
show to the contrary thatMarx, read carefully, at no point suggests demand and supply as
an independent factor for price determination, so there is no ‘conflation’ to speak of.
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market value, even if price appears as the regulator of supply and demand,
regardless of the mass of commodities supplied at the margins (i.e. under the
extreme conditions of production). Uno: ‘For the quantity of commodities,
Marx fixed the cases of “being too low” (kashō) or “being too high” (kadai),
but in contrast, he thought he should not consider the reactions of supply and
demand in his determination of market value’.272 For Uno, the determination
of market value by demand and supply becomes clear when ‘in the process of
fluctuation, the supply towards social demandof a commoditymakes the social
labour in the proportion to its production necessary, and this is the waymarket
value is determined’.273 This is the ‘commodities are sold at their market value
if supply and demand are in equilibrium’ – variant that Marx mockingly iden-
tifies in some of his predecessors, with the distinction that Uno brings in the
dimension of value as socially necessary labour. However, Uno’s interjection is
not unfounded: Marx indeed seems to open his conceptualisation of market
value to the motive of supply and demand as an essential presupposition. But
this impression is superficial and, as we argue, unfounded. If we closely regard
Marx’s view, his considerations with regard to a) the quantities of commodities
produced at the margins (under ‘worse’ and ‘favourable’ conditions of produc-
tion, respectively), and b) the quantities with regard to fluctuating supply and
demand, we can see the clear causal relation between value – reflected in vari-
ous prices – and supply and demand. The causality lies in the fact that value
and price determine supply and demand behaviour already at the stage of pro-
duction, and not just after products must be socially distributed. In this sense,
‘commodities produced under favourable conditions’ are simply commodities
produced with e.g. a relatively low organic composition of capital, and the rel-
atively low prices resulting from this kind of capital employment accordingly
determine demand’s behaviour274 – not the other way around. Marx therefore
remarks:
If demand and supply determine the market price, then market price
in turn, and at a further remove market value, also determine demand
and supply. As far as demand is concerned, this is self-evident, since this
272 Uno 1962, p. 208.
273 Uno 1962, p. 210.
274 On the presupposition that competition forces other capitals to try to sell at similarly low
prices – and diminishing their chances for a profitable return. The tendency of capital in
the course of cost saving, i.e. the production of relative surplus value, to acquire smaller
returns as an effect of the lowering of the value of labour power or as an effect of a con-
tinuously higher organic composition, or both, is the symptom of crisis – which lies in the
form of value acquisition itself. We will return to this topic in more detail in Chapter 4.4.
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moves in the opposite direction to price, expanding when it falls and
vice versa. But the same is true of supply. For the prices of means of pro-
duction that go into the commodities supplied determine the demand for
these means of production, and hence also the supply of the commodit-
ies whose supply brings with it a demand for those means of production.
Cotton prices determine the supply of cotton goods… In other words, the
relationship between demand and supply does not explainmarket value,
but it is the latter, rather, that explains fluctuations in demand and sup-
ply.275
As we can see more clearly from this passage, the concept of market value is
in no way inconsistent with Marx’s value theory: demand and supply can only
ever be the executors of the dominant forces of competition for a share in the
rate of profit, not their cause.
Unohowever takesMarx’s alleged confusionwith regard tomarket value and
price as anopportunity tohint at amore fundamentalmisrecognition.Uno sees
Marx’s dissatisfactory solution to the value-price-transformation as a method-
ological failure to have understood clearly the subsumption of the substance
under the form of value in the course of capitalist development. Let us quote
the complete passage:
In his value form theory, as well as in his theory of the measure of value,
Marx determines the value of a commodity by the labour time socially
necessary for its production. And the value form must be explained as
its indicator (hyōji suru mono). We also think the function of money as
the measure of value is the indicator passing through value, and is meas-
ured as such – even if we admit the possibility of a non-correspondence
betweenprice and value. However, in a commodity-economy… the lawof
value is accomplished through the fluctuation of price. The value form of
the commodity, as well as money’s function of the measure of value, are
the forms that adjust the fluctuations of price, making value their cen-
ter. That is [value’s] function. As being the indicator from the beginning,
passing through value in the commodity value, its specific character was
lost out of sight. We cannot help but say that the substance-theoretical
determination of value provided before the formdetermination belies the
method of form theory (keitairon no hōhō wo ayamaru). In the theory of
market value, this becomes clear again in the possibility of social value
275 Marx 1981, pp. 292–3. Emphasis added.
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separated from the average of the individual values. The original prob-
lem becomes conflated with the problem of the divergence of themarket
price frommarket value through the non-correspondence of demand and
supply. In the theory of market value, the content of value determina-
tion that originallywas the substance determination in the general theory
of value, is not directly explained. As said before, while having already
explained value theory, the development of a theory of market value is
necessary, but it shows a peculiar aspect of the theory of commodity
value. It must not simply explain the substance of value as the social sub-
stance common to all societies, but it must explain that this substance,
as the substance of commodity value itself, is subsumed (hōsetsu suru) by
the form determination. However, at the same time, going hand-in-hand
with the subsumption itself (hōsetsu suru shikata jishin ni tomonau) is the
insertion of a gap (zure no ireuru men) which is an aspect that must also
be explained. The explanation does not halt at the temporary deviation
of price from value, which is constantly annulled by the act of themutual
adjustment between demand and supply.We need an explanation for the
deviation from social value to individual value that, too, enters the form –
a deviation that is notmerely temporal and cannot be annulled by the act
of adjusting demandand supply…With regard to theprincipal (genriteki)
determination of commodity value, this ‘grasp’ [of form] over substance
is given in the tendency for individual values to be united in social value.
However, this can for the first time be said of the form into which the
gap is inserted. From the beginning, it was no substance conforming to its
form (saisho kara keitai ni soku shita jittai to shite aru wake dehanai). As
against the previous theory of market value [as being the average of the
individual values], Marx leaves each of these points unclear, but that is
a fundamental problem of the method of proof of the labour theory of
value.276
For Uno, as argued before at the level of value theory, the specificity of capital-
ism does not consist in the appropriation of unpaid and alien human labour,
which the value forms manage to conceal in their thing-like absoluteness.
Hence, it neither consists in the social form of labour that cannot but express
itself in forms of value. Abstract labour, as the substance of value, is a transhis-
torical fact for Uno, slightly modified by its relation to concrete labour in the
capitalist production process, as discussed inChapter 3.What is specific to cap-
276 Uno 1974 [1962], pp. 211–12. Emphases added.
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italism, then, for Uno, is the pure form in which the law of value imposes itself
on theproductionand reproductionprocess. In the real processhowever, prices
determined in the last instance by the demand-and-supply-relation (systemat-
ically deviating from the determination of (market) value by socially neces-
sary labour time as their ‘gravitational’ centre), dominate the real relations
between workers and capitalists, and capitalists and workers alike. The sub-
stance of value becomes subsumed to form, form determines substance. Here,
at the level of the transformation problem, we can retrospectively determine
the reason for Uno’s insistence on the priority of form over substance against
Marx: whether in emphasising reproduction against accumulation, the sale
and purchase of labour power in the circulation sphere against exploitation
in the sphere of production, or the ‘form determination’ of price over the real
labour content in the aggregate values. As argued before, it is Uno’s transhis-
torical understanding of abstract labour, his failure to consider the historically
specific form determination of labour under capitalist relations, that makes
him prioritise the forms over their content – and likewise, the forms of appear-
ance over their essential determinations. The law of value degenerates into a
theory of successful social reproduction, while the central critical insight of
Marx’s theory of (surplus) value, namely that the law of exchange becomes
a law of appropriation of alien unpaid labour, becomes ephemeral. Uno con-
sequently collapses the difference between the actual dynamic of capitalist self-
valorisation and the ‘configurations of capital’ as they appear ‘in the everyday
consciousness of the agents of production themselves’.277 If Marx were alive
to read Uno’s criticisms, he would probably give the following answer to Uno’s
understanding of the problem, as he did to the vulgar economists:
We can also understand why those very economists who oppose the
determination of commodity value by labour-time, by the quantity of
labour contained in the commodity, always speak of the prices of pro-
duction as the centres around which market prices fluctuate. They can
allow themselves this because the price of production is already a com-
pletely externalized and prima facie irrational form of commodity value,
a form that appears in competition and is therefore present in the con-
sciousness of the vulgar capitalist and consequently also in that of the
vulgar economist.278
277 Marx 1981, p. 117.
278 Marx 1981, p. 300.
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According to Uno, however, the structural nexus of capital’s form determ-
inations can only be fractured by highlighting the role of use value and ‘social
need’, what he calls the ‘passive constraint of use-value’. To explain, let us briefly
return to Uno’s concept of market value in the Principles.
For Uno, the proportional allocation of social labour to the different spheres
of industry, according to ‘social need’, implies ‘that the supply of every product
can be varied according to the changing pattern of social demand’.279 Market
value is therefore ‘not determined by the actual content of labour per unit of
the commodity but rather by the individual value of the same kind of commod-
ity supplied at the margin’.280 The market value for Uno is therefore subject to
change of supply in response to changing demand. For him, too, however, it
is the equilibrium of both that is essentially constitutive of market value: ‘The
market value as the gravitating center of market price is determined on the
basis of an equilibrium of supply and demand … Thus, the determination of
the market-value of a commodity depends upon the conditions of production
under which the supply of the commodity is adjusted to demand’.281 For Marx,
to the contrary, the equilibrium of supply and demand ceases to explain any-
thing, to have ‘any effect’. Rather than rely on the equilibrium of supply and
demand to explain market value, then, one would have to explore the inner
dynamics affecting demand (and supply). These affects reflect themselves at
the conceptual level of price, which are based on a social relation completely
unrelated to demand and supply, namely the paid and unpaid components of
abstract human labour in the process of production. Needless to say, for Marx,
total social capital must ‘function’ in order for accumulation to take place on
increasingly expanded scales of production. This also means that a particular
structure of use values must be reproduced to guarantee the material repro-
duction of total social capital, as he shows in Part Three of Volume ii of Capital
(referred to here in Chapter 4.2.). However, only here, in the discussion of the
real process of social reproduction at the surface of capitalist production as
a whole, can Marx prove that demand itself must obey the laws of the repro-
279 Uno 1980, p. 85.
280 Uno 1980, p. 85. Here, ‘margin’ refers to Marx’s statement that ‘[i]f … the quantity sup-
plied is less than the demand, or alternatively more, this market price deviates from the
market value. In the first case, if the quantity is too small, it is always the commodities
produced under the worst conditions that govern themarket value, while if it is too large,
it is those produced under the best conditions [‘margins’]; i.e. it is one of the two extremes
that determines the market value …’ Marx 1981, p. 286.
281 Uno 1964, p. 159. Translation in Itoh 1980, p. 87.
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duction of capital, and not the other way around.282 Demand (and supply) is
subordinate to the fact that all individual capitals must yield an average rate of
profit to belong to total social capital at all. Hence, the emergence of a general
rate of profit and the transformation of values into prices of production, for
Marx, is not simply a technical requirement to understand capital’s inner opera-
tions. The sale and purchase of commodities at prices that guarantee an equal
share in the rate of profit ‘is the form in which capital becomes conscious of
itself as a social power (gesellschaftlicheMacht), in which every capitalist parti-
cipates in proportion tohis share in the total social capital’.283 As a social power,
capital is indifferent to the particular use-values it produces, and in fact
to the specific character of its commodities in general. All that matters
in any sphere of production is to produce surplus-value, to appropriate a
definite quantity of unpaid labour in labour’s product.284
Uno,while trying to grasp capitalism in terms of ‘pure theory’, ignores or at least
gravely underestimates this fact. For him, it is the aspect of use-value in terms
of demand meeting supply in appropriate measures that guarantees succeed-
ing social reproduction. He misrecognises the problematic of Marx’s inquiry,
namely how reproduction subordinates social needs to its own imperative of
growing accumulation and still manages to foster the illusion that capitalist
production is not solely directed at profit, but at demand. In other words, Uno
misrecognises the problem of fetishism generated by the very social form that
consolidates capital’s domination over human needs. This is why the value-
price-transformation is not simply successfully solved by admitting to a sys-
tematic ‘gap’ inserted by the form of price into the substance of value. In fact,
the value-price-transformation has little to do with Marx’s ‘mistake’ of clearly
demarcating the ‘subsumption’ of substance under form at all, as we will see
soon. To the contrary: in order to clarify Marx’s specific consciousness of the
problem that Uno so dramatically misrecognises, we will offer an interpreta-
tion that views the ‘transformationproblem’ precisely as a problemof fetishism
expressing itself in the forms of its appearance. At the same time, we will point
toMarx’s own shortcomings in coherently applying his ownmethod of inquiry
to this crucial theorem.
282 I thank Dr. Ingo Stützle for presenting me with his ideas on the relation between the the-
ories of reproduction in Volumes ii and iii of Capital.
283 Marx 1981, p. 297.
284 Marx 1981, p. 297.
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4.3.4 The Transformation Problem as a Problem of Fetishism
Commodities as products of capital are the results of a specific social form of
labour, namely capitalist wage labour. As such, they are explicitly thematised
by Marx as late as the beginning of Chapter 9 of Volume iii of Capital, ‘Form-
ation of a General Rate of Profit (Average Rate of Profit), and Transformation
of Commodity Values into Prices of Production’. As products of capital, com-
modities are always-already bearers of an average rate of profit as the result
of the unity of the process of production and circulation. However, the cat-
egories of value and of surplus value are logical-conceptual presuppositions to
understand the categories of profit and production price. Therefore, address-
ing the issue of ‘value’ or ‘surplus value’, and addressing the issue of ‘produc-
tion price’ and ‘profit’ means to address two different levels of abstraction. Yet,
the level of abstraction required by the category of value is presupposed in
the category of prices of production. The former is based on the confronta-
tion between capital and labour in ‘purer form’ than the latter, in which the
basic confrontation is already obscured by the ‘apparent’, i.e., fetishised form of
profit. The specificity of the capitalist relations of production hence does not
consist in the production of a surplus product, i.e., surplus labour. Most histor-
ical relations of production presuppose a surplus product. What is decisive for
the specificity of capitalist relations of production is the social form in which
the production of a surplus product, as surplus value, takes place: it does not
rely on personal relations of dependence, but is mediated by the exchange of
formally free and equal persons. The proof of unequal exchange between cap-
italist and labourer on the basis of equivalent exchange is therefore not only the
centrepiece of Marx’s explanation for the social form that the surplus product
assumes as surplus value, it is simultaneously the centrepiece for the explan-
ation of the false illusion of equivalent exchange between capital and labour,
the central fetishism of bourgeois political economy.285 Heinrich explains: ‘For
the analysis of the capitalist form of exploitation, surplus-value is not decis-
ive as a quantitative category, but rather to the extent that it expresses on an
abstract level the form-content (Formgehalt) of the exchange between capital
and labour’.286 In rejecting the quantitative congruency between surplus value
and profit in favour of the qualitative significance of the basic categories for a
scientific understanding of profit, Heinrich further remarks:
285 See Chapter 6 of Capital Volume i, ‘The Sale and Purchase of Labour-Power’; Marx 1976,
pp. 270–80.
286 Heinrich 1999, p. 282.
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What is essential for the category of surplus-value is not the arithmetic
sum of profit, interest, and ground rent, but rather that it is a ‘general
form’, a non-empirical category that underlies the concepts of profit, in-
terest and ground rent, and with which the visible forms on the ‘surface
of society’287 can be grasped.288
Especially the first chapter of Capital Volume iii, in which Marx develops
the categories of cost price and profit, is revealing in this regard. It probably
presents the most concise analytic deconstruction of the fetish-characteristic
value form of profit we can find in his complete oeuvre. The relation between
surplus value and profit here presents the critical relation between the essence
and the appearance of the relation between capital and labour:
In surplus-value, the relationship between capital and labour is laid bare.
In the relationship between capital and profit … capital appears as a rela-
tionship to itself, a relationship in which it is distinguished, as an original
sum of value, from another new value that it posits. It appears to con-
sciousness as if capital creates this new value in the course of its move-
ment through the production and circulation processes. But how this
happens is now mystified, and appears to derive from hidden qualities
that are inherent in capital itself.289
Yet, what does it mean to say that it ‘appears to consciousness as if capital
creates this new value’, which generates the impression that, in profit, ‘capital
appears as a relationship to itself ’?What does itmean to say that ‘surplus-value
must appear as profit, profit is the transformed form of surplus value’?290 In
other words, what does itmean to say that ‘essencemust appear’?291 In order to
grasp the necessary nexus between the non-empirical, conceptual foundation
of profit, and the simultaneous illusion and ‘mystification’ it creates by simply
being itself, we must take a closer look at the determining factor of the rate of
profit, i.e. cost price. As is known, the rate of profit is represented by the ratio of
surplus value to the total capital invested, i.e. both constant and variable cap-
ital, or the cost price of capital (s/c+v or s/C). It is already obvious that this shift
from the rate of surplus value which only sets the ratio between surplus value
287 Marx 1981, p. 33.
288 Heinrich 1999, p. 282.
289 Marx 1981, p. 139.
290 Murray 2014, p. 192.
291 Hegel 2010 [1813], p. 418.
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and the creator of value, i.e. the variable capital employed in the production
process (s/v), to a ratio that also accounts for the components that do not create
new value, results in a lopsided view of valorisation. For Marx,
[p]rofit… is thus the same thing as surplus-value, save in amystified form,
though one that necessarily arises from the capitalist mode of produc-
tion. Because no distinction between constant and variable capital can
be recognized in the apparent formation of cost price, the origin of the
change in value that occurs in the course of the production process is shif-
ted from the variable capital to the capital as a whole.292
The loss of the distinction between constant and variable capital however is
constitutive to how capitalists perceive of their own act of ‘advancement’ of
capital. Here is a first hint at how capital can ‘appear as a relation to itself ’,
namely in the fact that, for the capitalist and his ‘investment’, the ‘capitalist
cost is measured by the expenditure of capital, whereas the actual cost of the
commodity is measured by the expenditure of labour’.293 Here we can detect
the importance of the concept of ‘transformation’ for Marx, which he uses as
chapter and part titles throughout Volume iii:294 ‘transformation’, for Marx, is
not simply an affair of relegating the mode of presentation towards different
relational quantities, co-efficients or variables. The concept of transformation,
carefully chosen byMarx, denotes a reduction or even contraction, not just with
regard to the informative content of our viewof the problem, but of theway that
the problem poses itself to the vulgar perspective. Because the notion of profit
relates the ‘extra’ value to the total capital invested, we will only be inclined
to look for the difference between capital invested and the surplus it yields,
without further questioning which component of the ‘value’ invested is pro-
ductive of new value at all – they all equally seem to yield a ‘profit’. Yet, ‘the
category of cost price has nothing to dowith the formation of commodity value
or the process of capital’s valorization’.295 The result of this shift or, indeed,
transformation of the problematic is twofold: first, it abets the conflation of
variable with circulating constant capital, muddling their respective share in
the value composition of the product, and second, it abets the illusion that
292 Marx 1981, p. 127.
293 Marx 1981, p. 118.
294 As e.g., the titles of Part One and Two of the manuscripts to Volume iii indicate, i.e. ‘The
Transformation of Surplus Value into Profit’ and ‘The Transformation of Profit into Aver-
age Profit’.
295 Marx 1981, p. 119.
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profit is necessarily ‘profit upon alienation’, i.e. resulting from the circulation
process of capital. The latter is a result of the former. For a better grasp of
this crucial theorem related to the fetishism of the bourgeois relations of pro-
duction, the ‘transformation’ from essence to appearance,296 let us consider
separately the two results of viewing all value components of cost price as
equally yielding profit. As for the first problem arising from the concept of the
rate of profit (s/C), this is still quite obvious. For the capitalists, the constant
fixed capital used in production does not completely enter into the commod-
ity’s cost price at once anddirectly, but only partially (e.g. pumppressmachines
require substitution only after several years of use). Both circulating capital and
variable capital, however, appearing to the capitalist merely as costs in general,
completely enter the cost price, because they are thoroughly used up in pro-
duction (circulating capital as e.g. the paint needed for the fabrication of mock
Olympicmedals in pumppressing is physically used up after production comes
to a halt). Hence, ‘[t]his difference between fixed and circulating capital in con-
nection with the calculation of the cost price, thus only confirms the apparent
origin of the cost price in the capital expended, or the price that the expended
elements of production, labour included, cost the capitalist himself ’. But with
regard to value formation,
the variable portion of capital, that laid out on labour-power, is expressly
identified here with constant capital (the portion of capital consisting of
production material), under the heading of circulating capital, and the
valorization process of capital is completely mystified.297
This mystification, however, is not without consequence for the theory of the
source of profit. In Chapter 1 of Capital Volume iii, Marx arguably presents the
clearest and most condensed critique of ‘circulationist’ theories of profit (or
rather, of ‘surplus’) that demonstrate the fetishistic predicament of the the-
orists in question – predominantly Col. Robert Torrens and his Essay on the
Production of Wealth (1821) – as well as pointing to the blind spot of the mech-
anism in which the concept of the profit and the rate of profit obfuscate the
essential relation between capital and labour in the production process.298
Two faulty premises here give rise to the fetishistic illusion that labour is just a
296 This transformation of essence to appearance, needless to say, pertains only to an analyt-
ical distinction. It does not occur anywhere in ‘reality’.
297 Marx 1981, p. 124.
298 For reasons of space, Marx’s critique of Torrens must be limited to sketching out the fet-
ishistic component of circulationist theories of profit.
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value component among others: first, for the capitalist, if a commodity is sold
beneath its cost price, the capital expended cannot be fully replaced. If this pro-
cess continues long enough, ‘the capital value will disappear completely’.299 If
relations present themselves this way, it is very understandable that ‘the capit-
alist is inclined to treat the cost price as the real inner value of the commodity,
as it is the price he needsmerely to preserve his capital’.300 Second, however, as
Marx says nowwith regard toTorrens, ‘is the fact that the cost price of the com-
modity is the purchase pricewhich the capitalist has paid for its production, i.e.
the purchase price determined by the production process itself ’.301 The source
of profit therefore must appear to consist in the excess value over the cost price
of the commodity, realised with the sale of the commodity, in the
excess of its sale price over its value instead of an excess of its value over
its cost price, so that the surplus-value concealed in the commodity is not
simply realized by its sale, but actually derives from the sale itself.302
Because the difference in the costs of production and the surplus gained from
the sale apparently seems to spring from the sale itself – in that the difference
is thought to consist between C and the sales price, not between k and C – the
source of profit is determined to be in the circulation process, in ‘profit upon
alienation’.303This argument has already been presented in the ‘Contradictions
in the General Formula’ in Chapter 5 of Volume i of Capital. But it is not until
at this exact point in the presentation, with the specification of the concept of
cost price, thatwe finally comprehendnot only that a fetishistic illusion occurs,
but also why. In other words, with the analysis of the notion of profit and cost
price, we can determine the mechanism by which the fetishistic view of cap-
ital as a ‘self-valorising force’ takes hold of capitalism’s self-understanding.304
Needless to say, the fetishistic illusion of capital as a ‘relation to itself ’, a relation
of immediacy, will finally consolidate itself in the notion of interest-bearing
capital. But it is already inMarx’s discussion of profit that the inversion of sub-
ject and object, the structural mechanism bywhich capital’s various fetishisms
come into being, becomes central.
299 Marx 1981, p. 128.
300 Marx 1981, p. 128.
301 Marx 1981, p. 128.
302 Marx 1981, p. 129.
303 For this argument, see Torrens’s Essay on the Production of Wealth, London 1821, pp. 51–3
and 349, quoted in Marx 1981, pp. 128–9.
304 For a similar stress on the importance of Chapter 1 of Volume iii of Capital for Marx’s
‘deconstruction’ of the conventional theories of profit, see Murray 2014, pp. 208–9.
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…theway that surplus-value is transformed into the formof profit, byway
of the rate of profit, is only a further extension of that inversion of subject
and object which already occurs in the course of the production process
itself …This inverted relationshipnecessarily gives rise, even in the simple
relation of production itself, to a correspondingly inverted conception of
the situation, a transposed consciousness, which is further developed by
the transformations and modifications of the circulation process.305
Yet, if the problem at hand is one of a ‘transposed consciousness’ (ein trans-
poniertes Bewusstsein), an epistemological problem arising from the capitalist
mode of production itself, then why did Marx feel the need to abandon the
investigation of the qualitative dimension of the relation between surplus value
and profit for a quantitative solution?
First, it must be noted that the emphasis on a qualitative (or ‘conceptual’)
problem that is at stake in the value-price-transformation, as analysed by
Heinrich et al., is justified on the basis of Marx’s method itself. In this sense,
the transformation of values into production-prices is not a temporal-spatial
act, but a conceptual-logical one.306 However, what is at stake at this point
of the investigation of the relation between value and prices of production
(i.e., between the rate of surplus value, indicating exploitation, and the rate
of profit in which any relation to exploitation is extinguished) is precisely
what ‘conceptual transition’ (‘begrifflicher Übergang’, Heinrich) is supposed to
designate. This is because, by saying that the value profit rate and the price-
of-production profit rate denote different ‘conceptual levels’, one has in fact
not said much yet. We are therefore inclined to ask the following: does Marx’s
diagnosis of a ‘transposed consciousness’ involved in the emphatically uncon-
scious transformation from values to prices (of production) deliver significant
epistemological insights for his own method of demystifying the concepts of
conventional political economy? And if yes, does this involve that the rela-
tion between values and prices of production is exhausted in an epistemo-
logical problematic of the qualitative relation between essence and appear-
ance, without further application of this relation? Or did Marx, by reducing
the deep epistemological, i.e. qualitative challenge related to the transforma-
tion problem to a quantitative proof of the two axioms (sum of profit = sum of
305 Marx 1981, p. 136. Note how explicitly Marx identifies the concept of ‘transformation’ with
a fetishistic inversion.
306 Heinrich points to the obvious fact that commodities are never sold at market values,
only to be later ‘transformed’ intomarket production-prices. They aremarket production-
prices to begin with. Heinrich 1999, p. 283.
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surplus value; sum of prices of production = sum of values) at this point aban-
don his own fetishism-critical method and strategy? The centrality of Marx’s
critique of fetishism pivotal to the architecture of his intervention is specific-
ally discussed at three conceptual trajectories: first, as the introduction to the
theme of Capital, the conceptual development of value in Chapter 1 of Cap-
ital Volume i; second, in his introduction to the notion of profit in Chapter 1 of
Capital Volume iii; and third, in his deconstruction of the ‘Trinity Formula’ in
Chapter 48 of the same volume.The interrelation of the three conceptual stages
is crucial at this point, in that how they mediate the previous levels of abstrac-
tionwith the new one is the symptom of the newly reached level of obfuscation
or ‘mystification’. At the same time, the analysis provides the key to unravel the
mystification at hand: in the concept of profit, i.e., the notion of cost price as
it presents itself to the capitalist, as well as in its real determination, we can
explain how the appropriation of alien unpaid labour must disappear from
the surface. The interrelation between this conceptual trajectory (i.e., value to
price) and its analysis, however, is already manifested in the ‘three particular-
ities of the equivalent form’ we were introduced to at the very beginning of
Marx’s analysis. In the equivalent form (money), it should be remembered, use
value becomes the form of appearance of its opposite, value, concrete labour
becomes the form of appearance of its opposite, abstract labour, and private
labour becomes the form of appearance of its opposite, labour in immediately
social form. These inversions are not simply one of the imagination. Money
in reality becomes value, a social relation that mediates all concrete labours to
one another by making them relate to itself as their common denominator, as
abstract labour. In an additional further twist however, we can say that the cat-
egory of valuebecomes the formof appearanceof its opposite in the category of
price (price of production and, at a further remove, market production-price).
This is already obvious from the fact that money is always attached to the
form of price. We can therefore add a fourth peculiarity307 to the ones Marx
lists in the first chapter of the first volume of Capital. With the price form as
a fourth peculiarity, the mystification is completed. The ‘obvious’ dynamic of
capitalism, located in movements of price, altogether erases any epistemolo-
gical residues of unequal exchange between capital and labour. The ‘obvious’
dynamic of the capitalist mode of production, however, embodied in price
307 That is, if we base our argument on the text of the ‘official’, the fourth edition (1890). In
the first edition, the fact that the ‘fetishism of the commodity-form is more striking in the
equivalent form than in the relative value-form’ already forms a fourth peculiarity and
is not yet, as in the subsequent editions, relegated to the separate Section 4 in the first
chapter. In this case, mutatis mutandis, the price form would indicate a fifth peculiarity.
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movements, is competition. Competition is the necessary condition that inad-
vertently leads to the equalisation of profit rates, so that it is also the inner
mechanismor cause (Grund, in theHegelian sense) for the emergence of prices
of production. ‘In competition, therefore, everything appears upside down’,308 as
Marx observes: average profits seem to be independent of the organic compos-
ition of capital, the wage level seems to determine rises and falls in the prices
of production, fluctuations in market prices seem to reduce the average mar-
ket price of a commodity to its production price, not to its value. Hence, at the
level of Capital Volume iii, the real mechanism of competition309 informs the
inversion of appearance and essence in the conventional understanding:
The finished configuration of economic relations, as these are visible on
the surface, in their actual existence, and therefore also in the notions
with which the bearers and agents of these relations seek to gain an
understanding of them, is very different from the configuration of their
inner core, which is essential but concealed, and the concept correspond-
ing to it. It is in fact the very reverse and antithesis of this.310
At this point, we can retroactively determine the fetish-character of value as it
appears to us already at the very beginning of Marx’s exposition in Capital.
At the same time, we can finally comprehend why ‘essence must appear’. Yet,
the attempt to ‘demystify appearance’ is itself not indicative of a particular
strategy. The strategy by which to achieve demystification, so to speak, lies out-
side its objective, is not ‘automatically’ provided by its intended purpose alone.
We therefore confront the epistemological problem of the ‘dialectic’ of precon-
dition (Voraussetzung) and result (Resultat) that Marx was very well aware of
as a problem of the inversion of appearance and essence, hence of fetishism.311
308 Marx 1981, p. 311.
309 This is not to say that competition is the inner cause for capital’s need to obtain a share
in social production’s aggregate surplus value. The contrary is the case: the necessity of
individual capitals to self-valorise, i.e. obtain a share in the social surplus value, consti-
tutes competition in the first place. In a critique of Smith’s notion of competition in the
Grundrisse, this becomes clear: ‘Competition executes the inner laws of capital; makes
them into compulsory laws toward the individual capital, but it does not invent them. To
try to explain them simply as results of competition therefore means to concede that one
does not understand them’. Marx 1973, p. 752.
310 Marx 1981, p. 311.
311 ‘Every precondition of the social production process is at the same time its result, and
every one of its results appears simultaneously as its precondition. All the production rela-
tions within which the process moves are therefore just as much its products as they are
its conditions. Themore one examines its nature as it really is, [themore one sees that] in
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Here, we face it in the context of the value-production price transformation:
while a coherent theory and concept of value is presupposed for the analysis of
cost price, profit, and prices of production, it is prices of production, or rather
market production-prices,not the category of value, thatwe are confrontedwith
in reality, at the surface, as thatwhich is posited as appearance.Yet, even accept-
ing the objective of ‘demystifying’ the obvious as a given – ‘all science would be
superfluous if the form of appearance of things directly coincided with their
essence’312 – the question would be this: how did Marx even know what he was
supposed to look for? How did ‘value’ become a key heuristic to defetishise the
categories of bourgeois political economy– andhowdid it become aprerequis-
ite by which to unravel the mystifications of capital? In the following, we will
attempt to give a sketch, if for reasons of space only a brief one, of what we
believe are answers to questions that Marx himself was not thoroughly aware
of. In his monumental Money asMeasure, Means andMethod. Calculating with
the Identity of Time (2014) (Das Geld als Maß, Mittel undMethode. Das Rechnen
mit der Identität der Zeit), Frank Engster explores the condition of possibil-
ity of uniformly relating the different kinds of labour to one another through
money. This, for him, is the fundamental epistemological question with regard
to the value-price-transformation, revealing the status of Marx’s critique.313
The question here follows up on themethod of inquiry posed above: even if we
assume that ‘essence and appearance never coincide’, how does the inquiry –
the investigation of the nature of price and a uniform rate of profit – point
at ‘its’ inner core, namely the production of value and surplus value? Under
which conditions could we, being confronted with prices only, assume their
determination by value ‘in the last instance (in letzter Instanz)’?314 Engster sug-
gests that the initial question – how do we get from value to price? – should be
reversed: what permits us to go from prices back to value? This important ques-
tion however hints at whereMarx in fact underestimates the impact of his own
the last form it becomes increasingly consolidated, so that independently of the process
these conditions appear to determine it, and their own relations appear to those compet-
ing in the process as objective conditions, objective forces, forms of things, themore so as,
in the capitalist process, every element, even the simplest, the commodity for example, is
already an inversion and causes relations between people to appear as attributes of things
and as relations of people to the social attributes of these things’. Marx 1989b, p. 507.
312 Marx 1981, p. 956.
313 ‘The status of Marx’s critique of value is ultimately revealed only in the transformation
and inversion of price’. Engster 2014, p. 615.
314 ‘… dieWerte, die hinter den Produktionspreisen stehen und sie in letzter Instanz bestim-
men’.Marx 1964 [1894], p. 219. Fernbach translates: ‘… (values) ultimately determine them’.
Marx 1981, p. 311.
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inquiry, namely that it supposes not only a quantitative, but both a quantitative
and qualitative incommensurability of value and price. This is the real signific-
ance of the fetishistic illusion of the superficial presentation of the aggregate
surplus value in profit rates: that they in fact do not and cannot correspond,
neither in quantity, nor quality – and, yet, that they need not. We agree with
Engster’s view that the relation of value and price must be incommensurable,
since the notion of ‘price’ itself is only a fetishised form of appearance of value.
Therefore, we must not only concede a quantitative incommensurability con-
cerning their magnitudes, but also of a qualitative one that points us to the fact
that they address different conditions of valorisation, and, respectively, differ-
ent relations of capital to itself. Engster expresses this in the notion of ‘rupture’
(Bruch): ‘The essenceof capitalist society, the valorisationof value,appears and
must appear. It is not only ruptured by a definite unit (maßgebliche Einheit) [i.e.
money],315 in that this rupture itself 316 makes valorisation appear at all – with
this rupture by a definite unit, all labours and all capitals are put into a total
social proportion (Verhältnis) and transformed into prices. This rupture both
comes to appear in the prices of commodities and in money, and is simultan-
eously obscured in them’.317 Accordingly, the two incommensurables of value
and price cannot be overcome bymoney as themeasure of value (as e.g. in simple
commodity exchange). First, Engster explains why the traditional attempts at
quantitative ‘solutions’ to the transformationproblemwithin theMarxist camp
had to fail:
The problem of transformation seemed to consist in the fact that one
and the same quality – value – appears to be quantitatively determined
in different terms, in so far as the values created by labour and the final
prices (of production) diverged. The transformation was reduced to the
attempt of a mere conversion (Umrechnung) of given quanta (labour
quanta or labour time) into equally quantitative prices of production. If
however, on both sides of the calculus, determinate quantities are already
treated as given, then the transformation can only mean to converse two
quantities of the same quality318 and to determine their relation through
315 In literal translation, a ‘measure-giving’ unit: ‘With money, the relation to a common unit
takes place, in which all labours and commodities are put into proportion to another by
mediation, in such a way that the realisation of commodity-relations also puts all labours
into relation [to one another] by a definite unit of value’. Engster 2014, p. 611.
316 Emphasis added.
317 Engster 2014, p. 614.
318 Emphasis added.
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it. Moreover, the transformation of values into prices is understood as a
spatial-temporal act.On theonehand, the transformation is performedas
mathematical accounting (Verrechnung), which, on the other hand, must
be carried out in space and time in order to put individual labour in rela-
tion to total labour in order to draw their average, and also to put the total
sum of surplus value in relation to individual capitals to form the general
rate of profit. The question however, which forms the basis of this trans-
formation, namely, why the individual labours as well as their results can
be put into one and the same relation andwhy this relation can be realised
as an identical quality (a quality which consists in nothing but its quanti-
fication) – this question is uncritically left aside, above all becausemoney
as the ‘locus’ of the transformation is completely ignored … But while it
is correct that value has no quantitative determination before price, and
accordingly, in price, value quanta are not transformed, it is too hastily
concluded [by Heinrich] that the level of value is merely ‘conceptual-
logical’.319
Second, Engster argues that value can never become the object of empirical
verification:
It is precisely the indeterminacy and ‘vagueness’ (Unschärfe) of value
which … signalises its determinacy as pure relation (a relation in and for
itself) and as the reality of social mediation. … Precisely because money
is accompanied by the realised quality of ‘value’, and value is by all means
(unhintergehbar) mediated by money and transformed into prices, the
question of transformation poses itself at all. But this question must be
asked in a different way than usual: because if value by all means appears
as transformed into prices, and cannever be known in any otherway, then
the transformationof values into pricesmust be reverted: whydoes it have
to seem, by the appearance of prices, as though appearance was based
on a previously vague, but ultimately decided relation? Why, in the cat-
egory of price, does it have to seem that it results from a transformation
of this relation into individual prices – a transformation, which cannot be
reconstructed from determinate, given values, and which, viewed quant-
itatively, must rather remain indeterminate and insofar out of the scope
of empirical verification?320
319 Engster 2014, p. 612. Footnote.
320 Engster 2014, pp. 612–13, footnote 155. Christoph Deutschmann has also pointed to the
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In Marx’s quantitative transformation procedure it seems as though the
non-empirical category of value retroactively acquires an empirical, determin-
ate quality introducedby the concept of productionprice. But thatwouldmean
that values and prices were of the same inherent quality, so that the fetishistic
displacement occurring through the ratio of the surplus to the total capital
invested–Marx’s owncritical insight from the analysis of profit and cost price –
no longer had a heuristic function explaining its necessarily fetishistic charac-
ter.321 Instead of emphasising the significance of the fetishistic illusion of price
and the equalisation of profit rates that accounts for the ‘upside down’ view of
conventional political economy, Marx accepts the premise of profit-rate equal-
isation as a fact to subsequently prove the compatibility of the sum of surplus
value and the sum of profit, and of the sum of values with the sum of prices.
It seems that his insights into the fetishistic character of competition and the
formation of a general rate of profit,322 fostering false assumptions about the
essential dynamic of valorisation, and hence, the qualitative incompatibility of
value and price, ‘goes by the board’323 in Marx’s own quantitative transform-
ation procedure. Against this background, attempts at denying Marx’s clear
claimas to thenumerical equivalenceof surplus value andprofit324 seemunten-
able. Hyeon-Soo, for example, drawing on Paul Mattick’s estimation,325 con-
necessary ‘indeterminacy’ (Unbestimmtheit) and vagueness (Unschärfe) of value as pre-
cisely its quality, in contradistinction to price. See Deutschmann 2001, p. 99, quoted in
Engster 2014, p. 612, footnote.
321 Himmelweit and Mohun seem to point at a similar argument concerning the systematic
specific difference between values and prices of production: ‘… the development of capit-
alist competition does not introduce a deviation of prices frompreviously existing socially
necessary labour-times, but instead gives those socially necessary labour-times an inde-
pendent quantitative aspect they did not previously possess’. Himmelweit and Mohun
1981, p. 240.
322 ‘[With the formation of a general rate of profit], [the] actual difference in magnitude
between profit and surplus-value in the various spheres of production … now completely
conceals the true nature and origin of profit, not only for the capitalist, who has here a
particular interest in deceiving himself, but also for the worker. With the transformation
of values into prices of production, the very basis for determining value is now removed
from view’. Marx 1981, p. 268.
323 Marx 1981, p. 268.
324 ‘… the difference in magnitude … was simply between rate of surplus value and rate of
profit, and not between surplus-value and profit themselves’. Marx 1981, p. 267.
325 ‘There is no direct way of discovering a commodity’s price in its “value”, or, by a reverse
procedure, of discovering its “value” in its price. There is no observable “transformation”
of values into prices; and the value concept has meaning only with regard to total social
capital’. Mattick 1969, p. 25.
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tends: ‘I am convinced that Marx has nothing to do with the attempt to derive
the theory of capitalist economy (sic) and the price of production, among other
things, immediately from the theory of value or, which is the same, Marx never
intended “to descend from the general idea of value … by means of ever closer
determinants to a direct determination of the prices of commodities”.326 …
Value analysis does not deal with concrete capitalist relations of exchange,
but especially with the disregarded and superficially unrecognisable realities,
which form the basis of these exchange relations’.327 This estimation is beside
Marx’s point, i.e. the intent to scientifically prove the equivalence of the aggreg-
ate sums inChapter 9 of CapitalVolume iii. It alsomisrecognisesMarx’s several
dubious attempts to ‘explain away’ the unresolved problem of ‘untransformed’
cost prices byway of calculus. If Marxwere only interested in pointing to ‘unre-
cognisable realities’ (nicht erkennbare Realitäten), he could have saved himself
the whole exposition of both chapters 9 and 10 in Capital Volume iii. Yet, Marx
was explicit in his intention to demonstrate how the process of capital’s valor-
isation is not onlyabstractlybasedon the appropriationof alien labourwithout
an equivalent, but how this can be proven in the actually existing relations of
production, relations in which we are confronted with the fact of the equalisa-
tion of profit rates and the existence of prices. In Engster’s view, Marx himself
has conceived of the fetishism already thematised in the ‘three particularities’
in a ‘new’ way in his thematisation of the value-price-transformation. This, for
Engster, becomes evident in thenotionof ‘rupture’ (Bruch).While at the level of
simple commodity exchange (i.e. commodity exchange considered at themost
abstract level), it is merely commodities that engage in a social relation through
a ‘measure-giving’ (maßgebliche) unit (money), but at the level of prices of pro-
duction, not commodities, but their (previous) production is put into relation
with the measure-giving unity in money-price. The rupture in both cases con-
cerns value itself – first, insofar as it pertains to the rules of value’s process of
valorisation (the production process of capital) and, second, its appearance in
price. The rupture then includes ‘the complete difference between, on the one
hand, the becoming of value through its valorisation and, on the other hand,
its finished appearance as price at the surface of society’.328 In the concept of
price, therefore, ‘the whole essence of valorisation must necessarily appear in
inverted form – if only by the fact that value, while being by all means a total
social relation and a total social process of valorisation, appears in the price of a
326 Korsch 1939, p. 159. Quoted in Mattick 1969, p. 49.
327 Hyeon-Soo 1995, p. 193.
328 Engster 2014, p. 615.
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commodity in an immediate and singular, explicit and final fashion’.329 In other
words, the difference between value and price can only appear as their rup-
ture. This is especially true for the implicit argumentMarxmakeswith regard to
the fetishistic transformation – and yet, he was intent on deriving the obvious,
‘apparent’ form from its fundamental social grounding in value quantitatively.
Interestingly, Engster’s notion of rupture between the rules of valorisation in
the process of production and the appearance of singularly ‘explicit’ prices, is
quite the opposite of Uno’s notion of a ‘gap’. For Uno, the systematic gap in the
form in which the law of value ‘accomplishes’ the production process, namely
the ‘fluctuations of price’, bears no relation to the fetishistic view of the laws
of valorisation itself. Hence, for Uno, Marx was wrong to hypostatise the sub-
stance of value as the guiding principle under which the forms of value assume
different forms of appearance, for, in Uno’s view, form subsumes substance. The
process of reproduction forUno therefore cannotbemeaningfully explainedby
the ‘substance theory of labour value’ alone, but must be supplemented by the
notions supply and demand in its relations to the conditions of production.
The opposite is the case for Engster: because valorisation (a term Uno never
uses in this context) must be reflected in commodities as the products of cap-
ital, valorisation appears as the singular price of a singular commodity – i.e. in
necessarily inverted form – although valorisation always concerns the relation
of the total social labour and the total capital invested in total social produc-
tion.
For Uno, the ‘transformation problem’ does not present itself as a problem
of fetishism at all – to the contrary: at this stage of the presentation, according
to Uno, Marx had unwittingly confronted his own shortcomings in the theory
of value. To ultimately showhow this estimation owes to Uno’s deepmisunder-
standing of the concept of value, let us turn to the law of value as the law, not
of social equilibrium, but of crisis.
4.4 The Law of Value as the Law of Crisis (Marx)
Aswehave indicated above, the capitalist crisis of valorisation forUnopresents
a ‘breakdown’ in the law of value, not a consequence of the ‘law’ of value itself.
In the following chapter, we will counter this view by demonstrating that the
theory of crisis is tantamount to the law of value itself – and vice versa. The ‘law
of crisis’ so fundamental for understanding capitalist relations, therefore coin-
329 Engster 2014, p. 615.
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cides with the ‘law of value’, and more precisely, its inherent contradictions:
‘To understand Marx is to understand in what sense the theory of value is the
theory of crisis’.330 What follows is that Marx’s theory of crisis, is the persist-
ent underlying theme of his value theory, even if it is nowhere coherently and
systematically elaborated in his published and unpublished works. What fol-
lows from this, too, is that Marx had no ‘different crisis theories’,331 but only
one theory of crisis. That is, no separate mechanism often associated with
explaining both the secular and periodic crisis – such as underconsumption,
disproportionality, or the ‘law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall’ –
can sufficiently account for the logic of crisis already at work in the logic of an
economic system solely oriented towards the appropriation of surplus value.
As we will see in short, the potentiality of crisis is already contained in the
contradictory character of the capitalistically determined commodity, consist-
ing both of use value and value. While the dominant interpretative strands of
underconsumption, disproportionality, and the falling rate of profit theories,
can all be found in Marx at various points, none of them taken in isolation can
give a holistic explanation – not of why the capitalist mode of production is
bound to be ‘crisis-ridden’, but of why capitalism itself is the crisis, character-
ised by the fundamentally contradictory conditions of its (re)production and
its valorisation. ForMarx, the capitalist system is constituted through a proces-
sual contradiction between its ‘voracious appetite for surplus labour’ through
constant development of the forces of production without limit, and the inner
limit that capital imposes on itself in terms of profitability – not the market.
The market, for capital, is only another barrier to be overcome by the unlim-
ited development of the forces of production. Hence, the market expands and
contracts according to the level of the forces of production. This phenomenon,
too, is a premise given by the very way in which commodities are produced
under capitalist conditions – directed solely at profit, presupposing overpro-
duction without regard to the ‘purchasing power’ of themarket.We will return
to this crucial property of production in the forthcoming section.332 As shown
330 Bellofiore 2011, p. 95.
331 That Marx had ‘different crisis theories that can be derived from Capital’ is a dominant
view. See e.g. Bellofiore 2011, p. 82.
332 In his critique of Ricardo’s theory of accumulation, Marx stresses that overproduction, as
a result of that tendency, remains unaffected by the presumed limits of themarket: ‘Over-
production is specifically conditioned by the general law of the production of capital: to
produce to the limit set by the productive forces (that is to say, to exploit the maximum
amount of labour with the given amount of capital), without any consideration for the
actual limits of themarket or the needs backed by the ability to pay; and this is carried out
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in Chapter 3, the contradiction of money as the physically palpable expression
of a purely social relation, value, hence, as a value form, finds its exacerbated
mode of expression in capital as the more developed value form, a ‘moving
contradiction’. ForMarx, this contradiction is inherentlymanifested in the very
mode inwhich capital produces value (commodities), namely precisely by con-
stantly depressing the value of the labour power commodity which functions
as the exclusive source of value in the process of production. The production of
relative surplus value, the technical term for the ‘development of the forces of
production without limit’, coincides with real subsumption insofar as its tech-
nical employment shows not only how capital produces (commodities), but
produces itself.333 Therefore, as soon as real subsumption has taken hold of the
production process as a necessary, by no means contingent development of the
forces of production, the inherent contradiction comes to the fore in the fol-
lowing way:
Capital itself is the moving contradiction, [in] that it presses to reduce
labour time to a minimum, while it posits labour time, on the other side,
as sole measure and source of wealth. Hence it diminishes labour time
in the necessary form so as to increase it in the superfluous form; hence
posits the superfluous in growing measure as a condition – question of
life or death – for the necessary. On the one side then, it calls to life all the
powers of science and of nature, as of social combination and of social
intercourse, in order to make the creation of wealth independent (relat-
ively) of the labour time employed in it. On the other side, it wants to
use labour time as the measuring rod for the giant social forces thereby
created, and to confine them within the limits required to maintain the
already created value as value.334
This passage does not appear randomly in the Grundrisse. The manuscripts
of the Grundrisse, as well as those of the Theories of Surplus Value, provide
the fullest account of crisis in Marx’s economic-critical work. It is worthwhile
to mention that the writing of the manuscripts was accompanied by what
counts as one of the first worldwide economic crises in history, the ‘finan-
through continuous expansionof reproduction andaccumulation, and therefore constant
reconversion of REVENUE into capital …’ Marx 1989b, pp. 163–4.
333 ‘… it is necessary to describe the circulation or reproduction process before dealing with
the already existing capital – capital and profit – since we have to explain, not only how
capital produces, but also how capital is produced’. Marx 1989b, p. 143.
334 Marx 1973, p. 706.
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cial panic’ in theUnited States of 1857–61. BothMarx and Engels were intrigued
by this first ‘global’ crisis, andMarx concentrated his theoretical efforts on elab-
orating on its cause.335 The 1857–8 manuscript of the Grundrisse hence takes
its vantage point from the critique of the predominant theories of money,
exemplified in Proudhon and Proudhonians like Darimon. It also provides a
rich source for Marx’s conceptualisation of crisis that he, not too accidentally,
developed alongside his theory of surplus value. The kernel of his theory of
production, circulation and distribution from which he develops the concepts
of his critique of the political economists (necessary labour, surplus labour,
surplus value, the rate of surplus value, etc.) has been first developed in this
unpublished manuscript, and the corresponding passages in the later 1861–3
manuscripts (Theories of Surplus Value). References to the fundamental the-
ory of crisis, in themetamorphosis of the commodity, and in the contradiction
of money as a means of circulation and means of payment, are also delivered
throughoutCapital, but in his laterwork, references to crisis aremore scattered.
In the next section,wewill look at the topic of the inherent contradiction of the
capitalistmode of production, predominantly expressing itself inmoney,more
closely, both in the Grundrisse and in the Theories of Surplus Value, as well as
Capital. After that, the much debated issue of the ‘law of the tendency for the
rate of profit to fall’, of which we have only Engels’ account in the third volume
of Capital, will be elucidated as one expression of the more fundamental con-
tradiction that manifests itself as the result of the rising organic composition
of capital, which however itself results from the ‘development of the forces of
production without limit’ and the production of relative surplus value. In this
context,we arewell advised to lookmore closely at the rejectionof Marx’s proof
of the falling rate of profit, prominently formulated by Michael Heinrich, to
draw attention to not only the unfinished character of the context in which the
law is formulated, but also its questionable foundations as a systematic law of
crisis. We attempt to show that Marx, similarly to his underestimation of his
own fetish-critical methodwith regard to the transformation problem, the ‘law
of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall’ presents much less an insight into
his own analytical framework as the framework that he otherwise confronts
political economy with, namely that the ‘drive’ to valorisation contradicts its
own foundations in the process of circulation: the production for the sake of
surplus value (profit). The discussion of Marx’s view on crisis will conclude
with the expression of the fundamental contradiction of a mode of produc-
335 See Goldberg 1987.
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tion that is solely oriented towards tearing down the barriers to the creation of
abstract wealth, and precisely by tearing down these barriers, reproduces them
at a higher and more conflicted level.
These accounts serve to put Uno’s theory of business cycles and his equilib-
rium theory of social reproduction into the context of Marx’s own conceptu-
alisation. At the end of this chapter, we will therefore revisit aspects of Uno’s
theory of ‘crisis’ in the Principles, insofar as we haven’t discussed them yet.336
Uno’s emphasis of the supply of labour power as the sine qua non of capital-
ist production, so that the expansion of production with the given technical
method is potentially unlimited,337 as well as his rejection of the possibility
of overproduction, will be countered with Marx’s understanding. Again, this
chapter will draw attention to Uno’s theoretical parallels with classical bour-
geois economy, especially Ricardo, in their viewof crisis. Finally, and in contrast
to this, we hope to demarcate the ways in which Marx, much rather than offer
a technical-mechanical ‘theory’ of crisis, as SimonClarke puts it, ‘[offers] a fun-
damentally different foundation for the analysis of the capitalist economy from
that on which bourgeois economics is built’.338 In that sense, it is because of
the contradictory process of the development of the forces of production, due
to the appropriation of surplus value and the conditions of profitability of the
same surplus value – a contradiction not even fathomed by his predecessors –
that, for Marx, the theory of crisis lies ‘at the heart’ of the critique of political
economy.339
4.4.1 The Inherent Contradiction of the Capitalist Mode of Production (1):
Money
What is an economic crisis? Beforewe come toMarx’s ‘deflated’ definition – the
possibility of a crisis is already given in the separation of purchase and sale in
336 Within the theory of the business cycle which we have briefly presented in 4.1., Uno has
more specifically a) a theory of surplus population, b) a theory of cyclical crisis in rela-
tion to the renewal of fixed capital, and c) a theory of a cyclical falling rate of profit based
on ‘profit squeeze’, which are all loosely connected. They will be discussed later in this
chapter.
337 ‘… there is no inherent limit to the accumulation of capital so long as capital is well
supplied with labour-power, which it cannot directly produce, in the form of surplus pop-
ulation. Hence, so long as labour-power is available, there is no theoretical reason why
capital may not continue to expand its production with the given technical method’. Uno
1980, p. 88.
338 Clarke 1994, p. 285.
339 See Clarke 1994, p. 279.
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the capitalistically produced and therefore money-mediated commodity – let
us turn to a more general definition generally in line with the macroeconomic
view:
An economic crisis is a situation in which the reproduction of an eco-
nomic unit is suddenly compromised, typically when it is unable to meet
its contractual obligations. A crisis may be generalised from one unit to
the system as a whole, with the crisis being transmitted through a break-
down of the financial system as one failure provokes others and under-
mines the confidence of investors.340
A good theory of capitalist crisis should not only cover the ground relating to
the specific instances where this inhibited valorisation occurs, or which sec-
tors of the economic system it may expand (i.e. financial system, banking) but
should be able to encompass the conditions of the problem to include the
foundations onwhich the distribution or circulation of total social capital rests,
and that is the process of production. Hence, in the Grundrisse, Marx observes
that
The result at which we arrive is, not that production, distribution, ex-
change and consumption are identical, but that they are all elements of a
totality, differences within a unity. Production is the dominant moment,
both with regard to itself in the contradictory determination of produc-
tion and with regard to the other moments. The process always starts
afresh with production. That exchange and consumption cannot be the
dominant moments is self-evident, and the same applies to distribution
as the distribution of products. As distribution of the agents of produc-
tion, however, it is itself a moment of production. A definite [mode of]
production thus determines a definite [mode of] consumption, distribu-
tion, exchange and definite relations of these different moments to one
another.341
340 Clarke 1994, p. 74. For Joseph Schumpeter, one of the few bourgeois theorists who takes
crisis seriously as a theoretical problem, this ‘inherent’ character of economic crisis is not
a necessity: ‘Of course, there can be no doubt that the phenomenon of crisis essentially
belongs to the sphere of the economy. But it is by no means certain that it belongs to the
essence of the economy, or even to just some economic form in the sense that it necessar-
ily results from the effects of factors in the economy left to themselves’. Schumpeter 1911,
p. 417. Original emphasis. Translation our own.
341 Marx 1986 [1857–61], 36.
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An adequate theory of crisis therefore ‘must be a theory of the dynamics
of the capitalist mode of production which establishes the tendency to crisis
as something inherent in those dynamics’.342 This is precisely Marx’s claim
to his own theory with which he confronts conventional political economy.
Quite an influential theory of bothmoney and crisis inMarx’s time was Proud-
hon’s and his school’s, which forms the starting point of Marx’s criticism in the
Grundrisse. The passage quoted above sets themethodological tone for the cri-
tique of Proudhonist positions and especially their view of crisis.
‘The Chapter on Money’, which forms the first part, begins with a review of
Darimon’s De la Réforme des Banques (1856). By the 1850s, Proudhonian social-
ism has moved away from questions of social distribution and the view of
property as ‘theft’ and shifted its emphasis to circulation, especially of money
and the means of consumption. In sum, the Proudhonian socialists believed
that the ultimate cause for crisis was to be detected in the obstacles to com-
modity circulation (commodities as means of consumption), caused by the
shortage of money. They saw capital andmoney precisely as a hindrance to free
exchange relations, a position already held by Proudhon in his early ‘Qu’est-ce
que la propriété?’ (1840).343 Proudhon’s followers ‘believed that a systemof free
credit, unconstrained by the limits of metallic convertability [hence the idea
of ‘labour certificates’ and the ‘People’s Bank’] would eliminate both the cap-
italistic exploitation of the producers by the bankers, and the periodic crises
to which the system of metallic money gave rise’.344 They equally rejected a
revolution of the conditions of production which would overcome the antag-
onistic social classes in the production process – capitalists and labourers –
since they primarily regarded bankers as the beneficiaries of the economic sys-
tem, not the capitalist class as a whole. By the same token, they did not view
the capitalist system as one in which private property of the means of pro-
duction presented the differentia specifica against other historical formations.
This view of money shortage as the cause of crisis madeMarx formulate a per-
342 Clarke 1994, p. 74.
343 See Proudhon 1994 [1840].
344 Clarke 1994, p. 125. See Darimon, in De la Reforme des Banques (Paris 1856): ‘Donc, dirons-
nous à notre tour en manière de parenthèse, c’est à ce privilège, dont jouissent l’or et
l’argent, d’être les seuls instruments authentiques de circulation et d’échange qu’ il faut
attribuer non-seulement la crise actuelle, mais les crises périodiques qui frappent le com-
merce. C’est à cause de cela que les banques, au lieu de venir en aide à l’ industrie dans
ces moments difficiles, n’ont jamais servi qu’à précipiter sa ruine.’ Darimon 1856, p. 6. See
also: ‘The root of the evil is the predominance which opinion obstinately assigns to the
role of the precious metals in circulation and exchange.’ Original quote in Darimon 1856,
pp. 1–2. Quoted in Marx 1973, p. 115.
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tinent critique of ‘quantitative money theories’ (also conducted against the
currency school in the Contribution and the third volume of Capital). At the
same time however that the Proudhonists demand ‘free credit’ (crédit gratuit)
to circumvent the obstacles to consumption, they reject money and strive to
abolish themoney form as universal equivalent by bestowing ‘all commodities’
with the monopoly of purchase.345 Instead, labour certificates should substi-
tute metallic money, the ‘root of the evil’.346 In his critique, Marx made clear –
often polemically – that Darimon failed to understand the difference between
the need for money as money (unifying the functions of being the measure
of value/measurement of prices and means of circulation) and the need for
money merely as means of circulation. Most of all however, Darimon failed to
comprehend that the character of money as the universal equivalent already
presupposes a particular form of social production:
The real question is: does not the bourgeois system of exchange itself
necessitate a specific instrument of exchange?Does it not necessarily cre-
ate a specific equivalent for all values? One form of this instrument of
exchange of this equivalentmaybehandier,more fitting,may entail fewer
inconveniences than another. But the inconveniences which arise from
the existence of every specific instrument of exchange, of any specific but
general equivalent, must necessarily reproduce themselves in every form,
however differently.347
The misconception of solving the limited means to the access of consump-
tion by either inflating the quantity of money or by wresting the monopoly
position from metallic money to ‘debase’ gold and silver as the ‘gods of com-
modities’, is based on the failure to comprehend the function of money as the
mediator of the different kinds of labour in one specific commodity, and like-
wise on the failure to seemoney as ‘abstract-general, social labour’.348Hence, in
345 ‘Then youno longer have the specific evils of gold and silvermoney, or of notes convertible
into gold and silver. You abolish all evils. Or, better, elevate all commodities to the mono-
poly position now held by gold and silver. Let the Pope remain, butmake everybody Pope’.
Marx 1973, p. 126.
346 Darimon 1856, p. 1. Quoted in Marx 1973, p. 115.
347 Marx 1973, p. 127.
348 Marx 1989b, p. 135. Here is not the place for a general critique of Proudhonism. Suffice it
to say that Proudhon, in Brentel’s words, is the paradigmatic ‘theorist for the necessary
semblance of the bourgeois mode of production, the semblance of simple circulation’
(Brentel 1989, p. 209) in that Proudhon takes simply commodity exchange to represent
the essence of capitalist relations, devoid of the conceptual presuppositions of unequal
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a crisis, commodities (in the form of commodity capital) remain unsold – not
because there is not enoughmoney to effect the exchange, but because there is
nothing ‘against which they can be exchanged’.349 The problem is not the short-
age of money as the means of circulation to facilitate exchange, but a shortage
of money as equivalents for the commodities themselves: precisely because in a
crisis money no longer fulfils the function as ameasure of values, as a measure
of the socially necessary labour time expended in production, the commodity
cannot be sold. In otherwords: in a crisis,money no longermeasures the labour
time of the commodity it is confrontedwith – it is no longer ‘valuable’. Inflation
only abets this problem – while the quantity of money grows, its value dimin-
ishes, and is less and less capable of representing the value of commodities.
In this respect, in a crisis, inflating money as a means of circulation will never
solve themore fundamental problemof money’s incapability to function as the
measure of value. In a situation of crisis, therefore, capitalists cannot realise
the value of their commodities. In money, we already confront the basic con-
tradiction between its function as ameans of circulation and its function as the
measure of value: ‘… none of [the various forms of money] can resolve the con-
tradictions inherent in the money relationship, they can all only express these
contradictions in one form or another’.350 The task then would be to determ-
ine the character of money at its most basic level to see how the germ of crisis
already consists in the concept of money itself.
4.4.2 The Inherent Contradiction of the Capitalist Mode of Production (2):
Say’s Law
The metamorphosis of the commodity is a good indicator for a more general
view of this task. In relation to the metamorphosis, in the Grundrisse, the 1861–
63 Economic Manuscripts, and Capital, Marx makes the most ‘abstract’ obser-
exchange between labour and capital that Marx’s analysis of the money already contains.
Unlike Marx who views the contradiction between use value and value as an object-
ive phenomenon at the heart of the contradiction in the capitalist mode of production,
Proudhon saw the contradiction between value and use value merely as a principally
rectifiable flaw within capitalist relations. This understanding ultimately culminates in a
normative-subjective theory of value, directed towards a harmonic system of exchange
where commodities are always exchanged in ‘just’ proportions of the directly and imman-
entlymeasured labour time they contain. For Proudhon, money is therefore not a specific
social relation necessitated by the objective contradiction between value and use value,
but a corrigible flaw of a principally harmonious system of exchange in capitalism. For a
detailed account of Proudhon’s economic views, see Brentel 1989, pp. 187–242.
349 Clarke 1994, p. 126. Emphasis added.
350 Marx 1986 [1857–61], p. 61.
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vations in relation to crisis. The discussion of the potentiality and actuality of
crisis is here embedded in a critique of the dominant law of classical – and
today, neoclassical – economy: Say’s Law, on the one hand, and Ricardo’s the-
ory of accumulation on the other.351 Let us first deal with Marx’s critiques of
Say’s Lawas a problemof the contradictionmanifested inmoney and exchange
before we move on to Marx’s critique of Ricardo’s theory of accumulation as a
problemof the contradiction in production, the latterwhich can be considered
the culmination of Marx’s critical insights. According to the influential French
economist Jean-Baptiste Say (1767–1832), ‘[a] product is no sooner created, than
it, from that instant, affords a market for other products to the full extent of its
own value’.352 For Say, in sum, crises on themarket cannot occur, because ‘every
seller brings his own buyer to the market with him’.353 Say’s Law therefore pos-
tulates that every sale is a purchase and every purchase a sale, implying a gen-
eral equilibrium.Marx confronts the equilibrium theory of social reproduction
which we have already encountered in Uno on three levels: a) in the formal or
‘abstract’ possibilities of crisis in the simplemetamorphosis of the commodity,
b) in the misrecognition of the relations of capitalist production in which cap-
ital confronts the labourer not as ‘consumer’/‘customer’, but as the living source
of profit, and c) in the substantial reality of overproduction crisis, conditioned
by the tendency of the total growth of capitalist production (unconditioned by
the market). Let us consider these three objections, which appear unsystemat-
ically over the Grundrisse, the 1861–63 Economic Manuscripts, and Capital, in a
more systematic form:
a) Directing his argument against J.B. Say, for Marx, the metamorphosis of
the commodity, C-M-C, already presupposes that the sale of the commodity
potentially does not happen smoothly at all. It is here, in simple circulation,
that the formal possibility of crisis already becomes apparent:354
351 The relation between the two is obvious since, as Brentel observes, ‘Marx criticises Ricardo
because of the adaptation of Say’s harmoniousmodel of reproduction, according towhich
no general overproduction of commodities, or “no general glut of the market” … is pos-
sible, and points to the origins of this view in James Mill who insinuates a “metaphysical
balance of sellers and buyers”, a view that developed into the claim of the identity of sup-
ply and demand being solely determined by production itself ’. Brentel 1989, p. 163.
352 Say 1834 [1803], p. 138. Also, for Say, ‘[as] each of us can only purchase the productions of
others with his own productions – as the value we can buy is equal to the value we can
produce, the more men can produce, the more they will purchase’. ibid., p. 3.
353 Marx 1976, p. 208.
354 Marx here only presents the most formal and abstract exchange (simple circulation) in
which the concepts of credit, profit and fully established capitalist relations are not yet
considered. Economists, however – like J.S. Mill for example –mistake their own present-
ation resting on barter or money-mediated barter for developed capitalist exchange rela-
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The possibility of a crisis, in so far as it shows itself in the simple form
of metamorphosis, thus only arises from the fact that the differences in
form – the phases – which it passes through in the course of its progress,
are in the first place necessarily complimentary and secondly, despite this
intrinsic and necessary correlation, they are distinct parts and forms of
the process, independent of each other, diverging in time and space, sep-
arable and separated from each other. The possibility of crisis therefore
lies solely in the separation of sale from purchase.355
According toMarx, ‘[nothing] canbemore foolish than thedogma that because
every sale is a purchase, and every purchase a sale, the circulation of commod-
ities necessarily implies an equilibrium between sales and purchases’.356 The
commodity is useless if it is not converted into money. However, even when
‘the first difficulty’357 – the metamorphosis C-M – is solved, the new owner
of money does not need to immediately purchase a use value, i.e. throw her
money back into circulation. The immediate identity of the exchange of one’s
own product with the acquisition of someone else’s is split up into two pro-
cesses which are not necessarily reconcilable: hence the possibility of crisis
already at the level of simple circulation. The necessity of an inner unity of the
autonomously existing acts of purchase and sale hence must manifest itself
‘violently’, i.e. in crisis – which gives proof that their ‘internal unity moves for-
ward through external antitheses’.358 It is the inverted presentation of use value
in value, concrete in abstract labour, performed by the universal equivalent,
money, which presents a barrier to the act of exchange. Exchange exacerbates
the fetish character of money at the level of circulation. Marx contends:
There is an antithesis, immanent in the commodity, between use-value
and value, between private labour which must manifest itself simul-
taneously as directly social labour, and a particular concrete kind of
tions and therefore only ‘explain the possibility of crises, by nomeans explain their actual
occurrence. They do not explain why the phases of the process come into such conflict
that their inner unity can only assert itself through a crisis, through a violent process’.
Marx 1989b, p. 133. Marx does not so much criticise the attempt to only present the ‘pos-
sibility’ of crisis – which he does himself – as the fact that economists like Mill take the
presentation of crisis in simple circulation for a presentation of fully developed relations.
See Marx 1976, p. 209, footnote 24 and Marx 1973, p. 198.
355 Marx 1989b, p. 133.
356 Marx 1976, p. 208.
357 Marx 1989b, p. 138.
358 Marx 1976, p. 209.
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labour which simultaneously counts as merely abstract universal labour,
between the conversion of things into persons and the conversion of per-
sons into things; the antithetical phases of the metamorphosis of the
commodity are the developed forms of motion of this immanent contra-
diction.359
Again, aswith theProudhonians, Say andhis followersmisrecognise the deeper
characteristics of the role of money. They fail to see it as themediator of differ-
ent kinds of privately performed concrete labour in a social context, as abstract
labour, and therefore as the materialisation of any, and, at the same time, no
particular kindof labour. In direct ormoney-mediatedbarter, aswhich the clas-
sical economists, including Say, view the exchange of commodities sub specie
aeternitatis, not capitalis,360 this difficulty does not arise.361 Here, exchange
takes place because what is demanded is use value, and money only ‘facilit-
ates’ this process. If the end of the exchange is a particular use value, there
should be no reason why every purchase should not be a sale and vice versa.
Under these ‘eternal laws of human interaction’ or the ‘proclivity to exchange’,
i.e. under the conditions of barter, the equalisation of supply and demand, in
which Say and alsoUno believe, is indeed possible. But these economists forget
that in a capitalistically determinedmoney economy, the difficulty of transform-
ing a commodity – the particular product of individual, concrete labour – into
its opposite, money – abstract-universal, social labour – is that ‘money does not
appear as the particular product of individual labour’,362 so that ‘the person
who has effected a sale, who therefore has commodities in the form of money,
is not compelled to buy again at once, to transform themoney again into a par-
ticular product of individual labour’.363 This is the way of a society in which
use value is not the aim of production. Like Say, Ricardo is unaware about the
specific character of money as the expression of abstract and general human
labour, and reduces money to a simple means of exchange of a more or less
‘balanced’ exchange process, directed towards use value. Marx therefore con-
359 Marx 1976, p. 209.
360 In contrast to Marx who views these relations ‘sub specie capitalis, not sub specie aeterni-
tatis’. Marx 1987, p. 130.
361 See also the corresponding passage in the Grundrisse: ‘After the economists have most
splendidly shown that in barter, in which both acts coincide, does not suffice for a more
developed form of society andmode of production, they then suddenly look at the kind of
barter which ismediated bymoney as if it were not somediated, and overlook the specific
character of this transaction’. Marx 1973, p. 198.
362 Marx 1967 [1861–63], p. 510. Own translation.
363 Marx 1989b, p. 139. See also Clarke 1994, p. 169.
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tends that Ricardo’s insightsmark ‘a returnnot only to the timebefore capitalist
production, but even to the time before there was simple commodity produc-
tion; and the most complicated phenomenon of capitalist production – the
world market crisis – is flatly denied, by denying the first condition of capital-
ist production, namely, that the product must be a commodity and therefore
express itself as money and undergo the process of metamorphosis’.364 What
follows from this is that precisely because production is oriented towards the
production of value and surplus value, not use value, and hence not directed
towards social need, there is no necessary relation established between the sup-
ply of commodities as use values and the demand for them.365 In capitalism,
to use this infamous term for once, use values are only ever produced because
they serve as the bearers of (surplus) value, not to satisfy a need. From this
also follows that the market cannot have the function of limiting or expanding
demand. Demand in fact does not present a decisive criterion for production at
all. It is therefore also in the context of the contradiction inherent inproduction
itself, not only in the contradiction inherent in the exchange of commodities,
that Say’s Law must be confronted. Marx does so by rejecting the impossibil-
ity of overproduction implied by Say’s Law and reiterated by Ricardo. Needless
to say, our context shows that the arguments directed against them must be
repeated against Uno’s claim that ‘generally, overproduction does not occur’.366
Before we move to confronting the problem of general overproduction, let us
confront a further problem in Say’s Law:
b) In the beginning of the section on the ‘Contradictions between Produc-
tion and Consumption under the Conditions of Capitalism. Transformation of
the overproduction of leading articles of consumption into general overpro-
duction’ in Notebook xiii of the Theories of Surplus Value, which addresses
Ricardo, Marx discusses the conditions of reproduction and consumption of
labourers (in both his own and Ricardo’s example, weavers). Ricardo, as a fol-
lower of Say’s Law and like Say himself does not acknowledge the possibility
of general crisis or a crisis of overproduction because the exchange of the total
social aggregate should always happen without obstruction – every commod-
364 Marx 1989b, p. 132. (mecw 32).
365 Clarke 1994, p. 127.
366 Uno 1964, p. 207. Uno: ‘The phenomenon of crisis is not directly caused by an over-
production of commodities. Both the means of production and the articles of consump-
tion that capital requires for its expanding reproduction are produced, as they are socially
regulated by the movements of prices, so that no general over-production of commodit-
ies is theoretically possible [rather: ‘so that, generally, overproduction does not occur’].
Some partial over- and under-production of commodities are indeed unavoidable, but
these must eventually be corrected by the movement of prices’. Also see Uno 1980, p. 121.
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ity will find its buyer. But what about the product that the direct producers, the
labourers, do in fact produce themselves, like machinery, but do not buy? The
labourer herself does not own the conditions of themeans of the realisation of
her own labour. She is not a ‘customer’ or ‘consumer’ of capital in the circula-
tion process – even if she, by expending her labour power, ‘consumes’ capital
in the process of production by producing new value. But she can never repres-
ent demand for any other commodities than those which enter into individual
consumption:367
Hence nothing is more ridiculous than to speak of the identity of pro-
ducers and consumers, since for an extraordinarily large number of
TRADES – all those that do not supply articles for direct consumption –
the mass of those who participate in production are entirely excluded
from the purchase of their own products … This also shows the ambigu-
ity of the word consumer and how wrong it is to identify it with the word
buyer. As regards industrial consumption, it is precisely the workers who
consume machinery and raw material, using them up in the labour pro-
cess. But they do not use them up for themselves and they are therefore
not buyers of them…nothing ismore absurd as ameans of denying crises,
than the assertion that the consumers (buyers) and producers (sellers)
are identical in capitalist production. They are entirely distinct categor-
ies.368
This is already apparent in the fact that the landlord does not produce any-
thing, but consumes – and the same goes for ‘moneyed interest’, i.e. the banking
sector. Say’s Law, to sum up, fails as soon as it is employed upon the actual rela-
tions of the capitalist mode of production. Because the contradictions of this
mode of production,most notably the contradiction between capital andwage
labour, are ‘erased in their imagination’ (wegphantasiert), they cannot develop
an adequate theory of crisis.
c) In the problem of overproduction, the formal contradiction embodied
in money, has hence turned into a substantial one. Marx here confronts Say’s
367 With the presentation of the ‘Reproduction Schemas’ in Chapter 4.2., we have seen that
v can only ever substitute a part of the invested capital, never the total capital invested.
Hence, Marx not only rejects equilibrium theories like that of Destutt de Tracy, which
claim that the consumers buy back what they produce (see Marx 1978, pp. 556–65), but
also rejects theories of crisis that see the failure in social reproduction to ‘find buyers’ for
the aggregate products, i.e. theories of underconsumption.
368 Marx 1989b, pp. 147–8.
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Law to demonstrate the actual tendency, and not just the possibility of over-
production. The tendency of overproduction cannot be circumvented by the
‘regulation of the market’, since the market itself is fundamentally dependent
on the development of the forces of production. It may appear as though a
shortage in money, as the Proudhonians believed, hampers the realisation of
value. But in order to understand that this ‘formal’ barrier to valorisation has
its origin in the ‘substantial’ one in theway that general capitalist production is
organised,wehave to look at the implications of the realisationof surplus value.
Indeed, the first systematic (not temporal) barrier the total social product (con-
sisting of commodities) confronts is the transformation of the products into
money, as we have seen in the contradictory moments within exchange. In a
second step, however, it is not only the value that has to find its money equival-
ent to realise the product, but the product’s surplus value. This surplus value,
again, must meet its monetary equivalent in order to be realised. The problem
of extended reproduction is therefore confronted with the conversion of a sur-
plus value consisting in commodities into even more money, as we have seen
in Chapter 4.2. But the money equivalent of the surplus mass of commodities
cannot be ‘conjured out of thin air (nor created by a banker)’.369 Marx, meth-
odologically presupposing ‘capital in general’, not individual capitals, shows in
Volume ii of Capital that the money for the realisation of the surplus comes
from the other capitalists involved at a different point in the total circulation of
the aggregates. As Clarke observes:
[The money for the realisation of the surplus] can only exist if capital-
ist production has also taken place elsewhere, producing an equivalent
surplus value embodied in commodities against which the first can be
exchanged. Behind the need for a consumer of the increased production,
therefore, lies the need for another capitalist producer whose activity
will have promoted the increase in demand … Behind the growing mar-
ket required to absorb the growing product, therefore, lies the systematic
growth of capitalist production.370
This ‘systematic growth’ can only express itself in a general overproduction.
Consequently, the market constitutes no external barrier to this systematic
growth. It is solely conditioned by the mode of existence of the capitalist form
of production, the production oriented towards surplus value, neither towards
369 Clarke 1994, p. 134.
370 Clarke 1994, p. 134.
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needs, nor towards ‘the consumer’. This is yet another way in which Say’s Law
or the law of a necessary equilibrium is based on dubious foundations when it
is confronted with the organisation of capitalist production.
4.4.3 The Inherent Contradiction of the Capitalist Mode of Production (3):
Overproduction
If, however, the inner barrier to capitalist production is not set by the market
or consumption, but by the organisation of production in terms of profitabil-
ity itself – how does it work? And how does the fundamental contradiction –
the development of the productive forces without limit and the limit simul-
taneously set to the very foundations of the same development, namely the
reduction of the value of labour power – necessarily culminate in general, and
not just a partial, overproduction as the overarching feature of capitalist crisis?
In a passage in the Grundrisse (whereMarx also for the first time introduces
the concept of necessary and surplus labour to describe themethod of increas-
ing productivity), he pertinently characterises how capitalist production must
always tear down the barriers to its valorisation in terms of value.
… since capital represents the general form of wealth – money – it has a
boundless and measureless urge to exceed its own limits. Every bound-
ary is and must be a barrier for it. Otherwise it would cease to be capital,
money reproducing itself. If a particular boundary were not to be a bar-
rier for it, but one towhich it could confine itself without difficulty, capital
would itself havedeclined fromexchange value touse value, from the gen-
eral form of wealth to a particular substance of it.371
The systematic growth of capitalist production confronts itself in the realisa-
tion of value, i.e. the circulation process. It is here that capital must face its
barrier set by its own mode of organising social reproduction oriented towards
value. Paradoxically however, capital, whose raison d’être is the production of
commodities containing value and surplus value, cannot comply with itself
when confronted with its own mode of the realisation of that (surplus) value,
namely in circulation. Overproduction under the conditions of capital is there-
fore not an overproduction ‘bare and simple’, understood as an overproduction
of ‘products’: rather, it is an overproduction of commodities, values and capitals,
hampered by the lack of moneyed demand.372 It is decisive here that money
371 Marx 1986 [1857–61], pp. 259–60.
372 ‘The world OVERPRODUCTION in itself leads to error. So long as themost urgent needs
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steps between supply and demand. In other words, for succeeding reproduc-
tion on an ever extended scale, ‘demand’ bare and simple is not enough:
capitalist reproduction demands moneyed demand, and better even, ‘surplus-
moneyed’ demand, which again depends on the conversion of the surplus
product of other capitalists into surplus money, and so on – a completely fra-
gile process. In more precise terms therefore, overproduction as the cause for
crisis is simultaneously the cause for the crisis of reproduction, but reproduc-
tion not on an even, but a constantly expanding scale. Under the conditions of
the need for reproduction on a higher scale, therefore, supply and demand do
not regulate (re-)production at all. To the contrary: the irrational production
of surplus value for the sake of surplus value, mediated by moneyed demand,
constantly shakes up the equilibrium of supply and demand. An equilibrium
is the exception from the rule, not the rule. In other words: the market can-
not serve as a limit to production, because production is by its own standards
limitless. Hence, it is not demand that gives the incentive to production, but
the production of profit itself. The contradiction of value and use value there-
fore manifests itself on the substantial level: disproportionality does not only
express itself as an ‘imbalance’ of production, but as general overproduction.
Furthermore, on the substantial level of the organisation of production itself,
we can see how the lowering of the value of labour power to extend its use
value is the precise expression of that contradiction. The substantial contra-
diction within production itself is therefore two-fold: capitalist production is
directed at ‘general wealth’, at money, not at any particular wealth, expressed
in any use value. Hence the breakdown of theories that view social reproduc-
tion primarily serving the need of social reproduction by the consumption ‘in
the private lives of workers themselves’.373 Money (capital) as the ‘living con-
of a large part of society are not satisfied, or only the most immediate needs are satisfied,
there can of course be absolutely no talk of an overproduction of products – in the sense
that the amount of products is excessive in relation to the need for them. On the contrary,
it must be said that on the basis of capitalist production, there is constant underproduc-
tion in this sense. The limits to production are set by the profit of the capitalist and in no
way by the needs of the producers’. Marx 1989b, p. 156.
373 Uno 1980, p. 52. And yet Uno seems to be unaware that what he terms the muri (the
‘impossibility’) of labour-power. i.e. that labour-power is the only commodity capital can-
not directly produce which therefore relies on non-capitalist forms of ‘reproduction’ and
is not subsumed to capital’s logic, is the precise condition of capital’s valorisation to take
place – and not, as authors of the Uno tradition such as Bell (Bell 2009) would have it,
forming a potential ‘use value space’ of resistance against capital. That this view is mis-
taken can be shown in Patrick Murray’s spot-on commentary on the role of ‘domestic
labour’: ‘The ordinary point of paying wages is to reap profits. But profits can be reaped
from household labour only on the assumption that it produces commodities with a big
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tradiction’ radicalises the opposition of value and use value in the commodity,
precisely by materialising the crisis of valorisation. We saw this in the above
discussion of money’s failure to represent the measure of value characterising
a crisis on the level of exchange (formal possibility of crisis). Second, andmore
pertinently, the contradictionof value anduse valuehere consists in the contra-
diction between necessary labour and the total labour (necessary plus surplus
labour) expended in the production process. It characterises the crisis in the
structure of production itself: the proportions are constantly shifted towards
diminishing the proportion of necessary against surplus labour. It is here that
the inner barrier to capitalist production results from the internal foundation
of this mode of production itself:
The stages of production which precede capital appear, when looked at
from the standpoint of capital, as just somany fetters upon theproductive
forces. But capital itself, correctly understood, appears as the condition
for the development of the productive forces only so long as they require
an external spur, a spur which at the same time appears as their bridle.
It is a discipline over them, which at a certain level of their development
becomes quite as superfluous and burdensome as [previously] the cor-
porations, etc. These inherent limits must coincide with the nature of
capital, with the essential character of its very concept.374
The inherent limits are those of 1) necessary labour as the limit to the exchange
value (value) of the living labour capacity, 2) surplus value as the limit of sur-
plus labour and the development of the forces of production, 3) money as the
limit to production and 4) the limitation of the production of use values by
value: ‘The limits to production are set by the profit of the capitalist and in
no way by the needs of the producers’.375 Hence overproduction is ‘a sudden
reminder of all these necessary moments of production based on capital’.376 In
order to answer why the tendency to overproduction is not just a partial, but a
general phenomenon, or why partial crises are always generalised, it is useful
to remain a little with Marx’s critique of Ricardo’s theory of accumulation and
surplus-value. But what would those commodities be? Wage-labourers? … In a system of
unfree labour, you cannot exploit workers in the capitalist manner: without wages, there
is no gap between wages and the value produced by workers.Where there is no gap, there
is no surplus-value …Without surplus-value, there is no capital’. Murray 2000, p. 131.
374 Marx 1986 [1857–61], p. 342.
375 Marx 1989b, p. 156.
376 Marx 1986 [1857–61], p. 342. See also Marx 1953 [1857–8], p. 319.
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crisis, in order to highlight the convergences of his approach with that of Uno.
Both Ricardo and Uno, as had been shown before in the case of Uno, generally
deny the possibility of general overproduction.
In general, for Ricardo, as long as there is demand for the products of cap-
ital, capitalist production is limitless.377 The competition of capitals sees to the
conditions of proportionality of production, so that overproduction or a gen-
eral glut of the market is impossible.378 On these grounds, the possibility of
crisis expressed in a lower profit rate can only occur as an effect of rising wages
which themselves are a quasi-natural result of the growth of the national popu-
lace.379 Ricardo develops this as a counterargument against Smith’s conception
of crisis as the result of competition. Against Ricardo, Marx points out that
the ‘disproportionality’ of production countered by competition itself however
presupposes a crisis tendency of this production mode itself – ‘proportionate
production is, however, always only the result of disproportionate production on
the basis of competition’380 – so that Ricardo fails to see that competition itself
imposes a constant tendency to disproportionality. Competition however only
reinstalls proportionality ‘through the pressure to develop the forces of pro-
duction in order to reduce the labour time necessary to production’, in other
words, precisely by driving ‘capitalist production constantly beyond those lim-
its’.381 Competition is therefore capital’s external, and yet self-imposed contra-
diction, a contradiction arising from the ‘rules of the game’ of valorisation itself.
However, it only ‘executes the inner laws of capital. It does not invent them’.382
But precisely by being guided by the principle of competition as its executor,
the dynamic of the law of value (valorisation) coincides with the dynamic of
the law of crisis in the first place. It is true that, next to the drive imposed by
377 ‘It follows then … that there is no limit to demand – no limit to the employment of cap-
ital while it yields any profit, and that however abundant capital may become, there is no
other adequate reason for a fall of profit but a rise of wages …’ Ricardo 1969 [1817], p. 197.
378 ‘That is why Ricardo admits that a GLUT of certain commodities is possible.What is sup-
posed tobe impossible is onlyA SIMULTANEOUS,GENERAL GLUT inTHE MARKET’.
Marx 1989b, p. 158.
379 ‘… and further it may be added, that the only adequate and permanent cause for the rise
of wages is the increasing difficulty of providing food and necessaries for the increasing
number of workmen’. Ricardo 1969 [1817], p. 197. Agricultural production is the decisive
sector here: Because with general social development and a growing population, capital
will increase, and so will the demand for labour. The demand for it may accordingly rise
in greater proportion than the supply for it. See Ricardo 1969 [1817], pp. 55–6.
380 Marx 1989b, p. 150.
381 Clarke 1994, p. 142.
382 Marx 1973, p. 752.
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competition, supply and demand can provide a counter-tendency to dispro-
portionality in production, because in such a case, e.g. in a leading commodity
of consumption, its pricewill fall. However, since the production and the provi-
sion of commodities to themarket are temporally separated, demand can only
have an ex-post effect to counter overproduction of that particular commod-
ity. What happens is devaluation and the destruction of productive capacity
in the overextended branches of production. This however leads to a gener-
alisation of the losses of overproduction, because the capitalists in question
will now save their costs in their purchase fromother capitalists. Consequently,
money influx to these other branches of capital is hampered, so that, theoret-
ically, reproduction cannot continue on the same or even an expanded scale.
The distinctionmade by classical economists between ‘particular’ and ‘general’
overproduction is therefore ‘entirely spurious’, as Clarke points out.383 In sum,
‘themomentumof thedevelopment of production in anybranch is not determ-
ined by the demand for the product, but by the opportunities for acquiring a
surplus profit by advancing the productive forces’.384 However, if Ricardo’s fail-
ure to see the inherent contradiction of capitalist production is conditioned by
his ‘bourgeois standpoint’ alone, how do we classify Uno’s very similar estima-
tion? Before we come to a closer look at Uno’s aspects of periodic crisis in the
Principles, let us sumupwhatwehavealreadypresented in this chapter asUno’s
theory of value as the law of general equilibrium, and in the previous chapter
as Uno’s ‘formal’ theory of money. Recall that Uno hypostatises 1) the role of
money and commodity as ‘circulation forms’ subsuming the capitalist produc-
tion process and 2) the latter as a system of social reproduction, as ‘common to
all social formations’, so that
[the] unfolding of the circulation forms of the commodity, money, and
capital, when clarified to grasp the production process at the basis of
the capital form, must explain the labour-and-production process as the
social substance that is common to all social formations … The labour
process common to all societies is subsumed under its specific social
forms.385
383 Clarke 1994, p. 143. This is less Marx’s than Clarke’s own argument, concluded fromMarx’s
remarks in theGrundrisse: ‘In fact, the departure from the given proportion in one branch
of production drives all the other branches out of that proportion, and at unequal rates’.
Marx 1986 [1857–61], p. 341.
384 Clarke 1994, p. 143.
385 Uno 1974 [1962], p. 290.
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We have also seen that money, for Uno, unlikeMarx, does not conceal a par-
ticular social relation, namely abstract labour, under its palpable shell. Money
is only valuable as it is useful, for Uno, in its exchange for use values, measured
by the subjective evaluation of the commodity owner of the linen (i.e. the com-
modity in the relative form of value). Hence, for Uno, ‘if we say that it is labour
through which the value of a commodity is constituted, we have definitely not
understood the value of a commodity’.386 Furthermore, we have seen that for
Uno, circulation determines production. In lieu of a critical response to Uno,
let us hear instead Marx’s own critical summary of Ricardo:
If Ricardo thinks that the commodity form makes no difference to the
product, and furthermore, that commodity circulation differs only form-
ally from barter, that in this context the exchange value is only a fleeting
form of the exchange of things, and that money is therefore merely a
formal means of circulation – then this in fact is in line with his presup-
position that the bourgeois mode of production is the absolute mode of
production, hence it is amode of productionwithout any definite specific
characteristics, its distinctive traits are merely formal. He cannot there-
fore admit that the bourgeois mode of production contains within itself
a barrier to the free development of the productive forces, a barrier which
comes to the surface in crises and, in particular, in overproduction – the
basic phenomenon in crises.387
Like Ricardo, Uno denies the secular tendency to crisis which is conditioned
by the substantial contradiction of the capitalist productionmode – the devel-
opment of the forces of production without limit and the limits to the same
development set by the law of value – because, like Ricardo, Uno perceives of
the capitalist mode of production in mere formal terms. In other words, pre-
cisely because Uno only considers the forms without the content in his ‘pure
theory of capitalism’, he is blind to the content hidden by these forms. With
regard to the equilibriumof profit rates, furthermore,Unoclaims that ‘…capital
possesses the faculty of allocating itself to the various spheres of production so
as to supply all the products that society demands’388 and, with regard to the
satisfaction of the ‘commodity-economic norms’, Uno says:
386 Uno 1973 [1947], p. 312.
387 Marx 1989b, p. 156.
388 Uno 1980, p. 76.
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In all societies, the continuation of annual reproduction depends on the
distribution of both labour power and the means of production in the
two departments (of social production), in accordance with the degree
of social demand. This presents nothing but the implementation of the
norms (gensoku) existing as a matter-of-fact in the rational process of
economic life, and equally pertaining to all societies that assume the
commodity form. A capitalist commodity-economy realises this norm
through the law of value, which is regulated by and asserts itself in the
movement of price. Capital, in other words, provides every sector of pro-
duction with labour power andmeans of production in order to, with the
given labour time necessary for the production of individual products,
satisfy social demand.389
This view is close to both Say’s and Ricardo’s view of general social reproduc-
tion in which supply always meets its proportional demand. It is only logical
that in such a society, ‘generally, overproduction cannot occur’.390 What does
Marx have to say on this?
All the objectionswhichRicardo and others raise against overproduction,
etc., rest on the fact that they regard bourgeois production either as a
mode of production inwhich no distinction exists between purchase and
sale – direct barter – or as social production, implying that society, as if
according to a plan, distributes its means of production and productive
forces in the degree and measure which is required for the fulfilment of
the various social needs, so that each sphere of production receives the
quota of social capital required to satisfy the corresponding need. This
fiction arises entirely from the inability to grasp the specific form of bour-
geois production and this inability in turn arises from the obsession that
bourgeois production is production as such, just like a man who believes
in a particular religion and sees it as the religion, and everything outside
of it only as false religions.391
Unlike Ricardo, needless to say, Uno perceives bourgeois production as a ‘spe-
cific form’. However, he resorts to an understanding of that form which halts
at being formal. This is implied in his idea of the general equilibrium which
believes that the reproduction of total social capital is exhausted in aiming to
389 Uno 1964, p. 116.
390 Uno 1964, p. 207.
391 Marx 1989b, p. 158.
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show that ‘capitalist society too satisfies… the fundamental conditionof simple
and expanded reproductionwhich all societiesmust satisfy’,392 eliminating not
only the critical impetus of Marx’s analysis, but also naively subsuming cap-
italist reproduction under a quasi-natural law of the need for reproduction
in which society ‘sees to’ providing its own self-sustenance: instead of seeing
that the reproduction of that society is not only a constant administration of
crisis, but takes place in the mode of the subordination of humans to the law
of value. In this sense, Uno’s strangely un-Marxian understanding of capital-
ist society also receives an apologetic moment in its approach to capitalism as
mere formality that has nobearing onMarx’s critique of the bourgeois relations
of production.
4.4.4 The Systematic Crisis Tendency of Capital: The Problem of Marx’s
Law of the Tendency of the Rate of Profit to Fall
For Marx, the tendency of general overproduction was not the only problem
associatedwith the historical tendencies of capital to develop the forces of pro-
ductionwithout limit. The historical tendencies towards unlimited production
manifested themselves in different ways, which, however, all contribute to a
general tendency for crisis.
Just as the transformation of values into prices of production presented the
one big challenge to Marx in his attempt to overcome the contradictions and
insufficiencies of classical political economy, especially in Ricardo, the coher-
ent and ‘law-like’ explanation for the tendency for a falling rate of profit presen-
ted the other big challenge for Marx as he tried to expose the ‘fallacies’ of his
predecessors. Indeed, the discovery of the law, for Marx, as he has written in a
letter to Engels, presented ‘one of the greatest triumphs over the pons asinorum
of all previous economics’.393 Marx considers his own intervention in giving a
law-like explanation of the fall in the rate of profit, which had already been
asserted by Smith and Ricardo, in the following way:
And given the great importance that this law has for capitalist produc-
tion, one might well say that it forms the mystery around whose solution
the whole of political economy since Adam Smith revolves and that the
difference between the various schools since Adam Smith consists in the
different attempts made to solve it. If we consider, on the other hand,
how previous political economy has fumbled aroundwith the distinction
between constant and variable capital, but has never managed to formu-
392 Uno 1980, p. 58.
393 The letter is dated 30 April 1868. See Marx 1983, p. 137.
the principles of political economy 399
late this in any definite way; how it has never presented surplus-value as
something separate from profit, nor profit in general, in its pure form, as
distinct from the various constituents of profit which have attained an
autonomous position towards each other … how it has essentially never
analysed the differences in the organic composition of capital, and hence
has not analysed the formation of the general rate of profit either – then it
ceases to be a puzzle that political economy has never found this puzzle’s
solution.394
We will return to this crucial quote, as it points to the specific character of the
interventionMarx aimed at.
In general, Marx develops the Law of the Tendency of the Rate of Profit to
Fall, ltrpf in short, on the basis of a rising organic composition of capital
(occ) which itself is the result of the general tendency of capital to develop
the forces of production without limit, i.e. the production of relative surplus
value as the economically most pertinent phenomenon of the real subsump-
tion of labour under capital. For Marx therefore, against Smith and Ricardo, a
falling rate of profit is considered as one of the phenomena resulting from the
general historical tendencies of capitalist accumulation, i.e., the production of
relative surplus value and incessant revolutionising of production, itself. It is
therefore not a direct historical, but a systematic explanation of crisis. That
is, even if the secular tendency of the falling rate of profit is not necessarily
inevitable – depending on class struggle or the counteracting tendencies capit-
alists will employ (rising rate of exploitation, cheapening of constant capital,
shortening the turnover time) – any measurement to counter the tendency for
diminished returns is likely to reintroduce precisely the factors by which the
‘fundamental barrier to valorisation’ is reproduced at a higher level.395 In other
words, the massive cost saving procedures capital employs to intensify both
the intensive as well as the extensive expansion of production, undermines
the desired effect of increasing returns, and instead leads to the tendency of
their general decline, which in the long-term could manifest itself in crisis.
Historically, the tendency to crisis may manifest itself more directly through
general overproduction, in that on theonehand, the greater themass of surplus
value,396 the greater will be the mass of commodities to be realised through
394 Marx 1981, p. 320.
395 We will return to this point at the end of this chapter.
396 In fact, themass of surplus value s/v • Vmay also risewhile the rate of profit declines.Marx
discusses a specific case where the surplus value of an individual capital rises, but its rela-
tion to the total capital invested in this branch of production, i.e. the profit-rate, declines
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their sale to other capitalists, and therefore more vulnerable to the crisis of
reproduction. On the other hand, andmore clearly, as a historical tendency, the
rising occ and the growing mass of surplus value is associated with the gen-
eral law of accumulation, i.e. the concentration and centralisation of capital,
a growing relative surplus population, pauperisation, and a growing polarisa-
tion of capitalist society, as we described it in Chapters 2.2. and 4.1. Yet, as
against this historical tendency of capitalist accumulation, the ltrpf is ‘the
most important law of modern political economy’397 for Marx,398 so that it
can hardly be ignored in the context of elucidating Marx’s view of crisis. Since
Uno was well aware of the importance of this law, we shall also briefly discuss
Uno’s view of it within the context of the Principles. As said before, an increase
in the occ is a consequence of the growing productivity of labour in which
each labourer processes a greater quantity of raw material.399 What exactly is
meant by the term ‘organic composition of capital’? Since a cost-intensive con-
stant capital may be processed by either many or few labourers, it is difficult to
relate the value relation directly to the technical relation of capitals. To under-
stand, therefore, how a growing productivity of labour will diminish the value
of labour power and shift the relation between the value composition and the
technical composition of capital, Marx introduces the concept of the organic
composition of capitalwhich is the value composition of capital ‘in so far as it is
determined by its technical composition and mirrors changes in the latter’.400
A rising occ is therefore the direct consequence of productive techniques in
whichmore constant capital is employed and the value of labour power in rela-
tion is diminished, even if the total number of workers rises. In otherwords, it is
accompanied and sustained by the production of relative surplus value. Need-
less to say, the cost saving procedures in terms of wages do allow individual
(see Marx 1986 [1857–61], pp. 306–10). He uses this to counter, on the one hand, Bastiat’s
mistaken notion that profits on machine-intensive capital advanced must necessarily be
smaller than on labour-intensive capitals (for Marx, this depends on the surplus labour
performed, not on the composition of capital). On the other hand, he counters Ricardo’s
‘profit-squeeze’ theory of declining profits through higher wages. Marx 1986 [1857–61],
p. 311.
397 Marx and Engels 1987, p. 133.
398 Clarke doubts the plausibility of this claim. The formulation of the law ‘does not appear
at all in any of the works which Marx published in his own lifetime. In Volume One of
Capital … the organic composition of capital plays a central role, but in relation to the law
of population, not that of the tendency for the rate of profit to fall’. Clarke 1994, p. 166. This
may be, however, because in the only work on the critique of political economy published
in Marx’s lifetime, Volume i of Capital, the concept of profit is not yet developed.
399 Clarke 1994, p. 159.
400 Marx 1976, p. 762.
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capitals to reap an ‘extra profit’ – but only until this procedure has become
generalised in this same branch of production. Average profit always evens out
on the basis of the latest cost saving technological process (commodities pro-
duced under ‘favourable conditions’), so that this ‘tendency’ of a falling rate
of profit becomes a general feature that catches even the most profitable indi-
vidual capitals in its vortex. How does Marx, then, prove the actual ‘law’? First,
he assumes a constant rate of surplus value and a risingocc,which accordingly
shows the decline in the rate of profit (either viewed temporally, as successive
capital compositions of one capital, or simultaneously, different increasingocc
in different capitals):
if c = 50 and v = 100, then p’401 = 100/150 = 66 2/3%
if c = 100 and v = 100, then p’ = 100/200 = 50%
if c = 200 and v = 100, then p’ = 100/300 = 33 1/3%, etc.402
From this, it is clear that if we assume (1) p = s / c+v, the formula for the rate of
profit, and a growing occ while the rate of surplus value remains constant, we
can express the ltrpf in the formula (2) p = (s/v) / (c/v) + 1. TowhichMarx says:
If we further assume now that this gradual change in the composition of
capital does not just characterize certain individual spheres of produc-
tion, but occurs in more or less all spheres, or at least the decisive ones,
and that it therefore involves changes in the average organic composition
of the total capital belonging to a given society, then this gradual growth in
the constant capital, in relation to the variable,must necessarily result in a
gradual fall in the general rate of profit, given that the rate of surplus value,
or the level of exploitation of labour by capital, remains the same.403
Note that this assumption is based exclusively on the hypothesis of the inner
secular tendency of capital to develop the forces of production without limit,
which must always be reflected in a growing occ and increasingly machine-
and technology-intensive investments. As a fundamental assumption, the rate
of surplus value remains the same.
It is preciselyMarx’s basic assumption, namely that the rate of surplus value
remains the same (while the possibility of a rising rate of surplus value has
been deferred to a mere ‘counteracting tendency’ by Marx), which has drawn
401 The rate of profit, expressed in percentage.
402 See Marx 1981, p. 317.
403 Marx 1981, p. 318.
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fierce objections to the law. To explain the ltrpf and the terms of its applic-
ability as a systematic expression of the crisis tendency of the capitalist mode
of production, it seems almost impossible to ignore the critique it has faced,
as well as heated debate that has formed around the concept in Marxian eco-
nomics in the last years. However, for reasons of space, we must abstain from
a detailed evaluation of these debates.404 In short, however, among the many
objections, especially from Heinrich, lurks the assumption that the ltrpf and
the phenomenon of the rising occ obscures a more fundamental claim con-
cerning the crisis of realisation related to the law of value itself. Let us shortly
review two positions related to this claim. In his article on ‘Crisis Theory, The
Lawof theTendencyof theRate of Profit to Fall, andMarx’s Studies in the 1870s’,
Heinrich gives a comprehensive overview of the development of Marx’s drafts
of Capital from the Grundrisse to the final manuscripts in relation to crisis the-
ory, with a particular emphasis on the Law of theTendency of the Rate of Profit
to Fall (ltrpf) as it is now presented in Volume iii of Capital, in Engels’s heav-
ily edited version. Heinrich draws attention to both the editorial problematic of
the ltrpf’s presentation, and also the objective inherent problems of demon-
strating the law to claim that Marx ‘does not succeed’405 in demonstrating the
law as such. As for the relationship between the ltprf and the ‘counteract-
ing factors’, Heinrich points out that Marx assumed the fall in the profit rate
would in the long run outweigh the counteracting factors – without provid-
ing a proof for this. In short, Heinrich’s critique of the law itself consists in
showing that Marx ‘failed’ to prove the law within the framework of its own
conditions, for the condition of rising productivity would entail both a rise in
the rate of surplus value and a rising occ. If, as Heinrich claims, the formu-
lation of the ‘law’ rests on contradictory assumptions, so that Marx ‘failed’ to
prove the ltrpf from within the secular tendencies of capitalist development
404 The evaluation of the ltrpf debate sparked by Heinrich’s essay ‘Crisis Theory, the Law of
theTendencyof theRateof Profit toFall, andMarx’s Studies in the 1870s’ inMonthlyReview
in 2013 (see Heinrich 2013), with subsequent commentaries by Guiglielmo Carchedi/
Michael Roberts, Fred Moseley, and Shane Mage, had originally formed a part of this
chapter. It is however probably better suited for a separate article which we consider for
future publication, especially because Heinrich’s assessment of the law has in the mean-
time drawn further criticism in the German debate. Hans-Peter Büttner, for example,
argues that Heinrich adopts a neo-Ricardian framework he otherwise rejects, by accept-
ing the ‘Okishio theorem’ and hence physical, and not monetary, inputs and outputs. See
Büttner 2017. The ‘round-table on Heinrich’ was conducted online: https://monthlyreview​
.org/commentary/critique‑heinrichs‑crisis‑theory‑law‑tendency‑profit‑rate‑fall‑marxs‑st
udies‑1870s/.
405 Heinrich 2013, p. 22.
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as such, we would have to concede that this ‘most important law of modern
political economy’ is altogether a red herring and might as well be discarded.
Supplementing this with Marx’s own view of crisis, Heinrich argues that there
are reasonable doubts that Marx himself considered the ltrpf as crucial to
understanding the ‘law of value’, as a fundamentally contradictory law inherent
to the appropriation of surplus value: ‘Themost general formulation of capital-
ism’s tendency to crisis is completely independent of the “law of the tendential
fall in the rate of profit”; rather, its starting point is the immediate purpose of
capitalist production, surplus-value or rather profit’.406 Heinrich provides tex-
tual proof fromMarx’s own discussion of the ltrpf in Volume iii of Capital to
show that ‘[here], a fundamental problem becomes apparent’:407
The conditions for immediate exploitation and for the realization of that
exploitation are not identical. Not only are they separate in time and
space, they are separate in theory. The former is restricted only by the
society’s productive forces, the latter by the proportionality between the
different branches of production and by the society’s power of consump-
tion. And this is determined neither by the absolute power of production
nor by the absolute power of consumption, but rather by the power of
consumptionwithin a given framework of antagonistic conditions of dis-
tribution, which reduce the consumption of the vast majority of society
to a minimum level, only capable of varying within more or less narrow
limits. It is further restricted by the drive for accumulation, the drive to
expand capital and produce surplus value on a larger scale …Themarket,
therefore, must be continually extended … the more productivity devel-
ops, the more it comes into conflict with the narrow basis on which the
relations of consumption rest. It is in no way a contradiction, on this
contradictory basis, that excess capital coexists with a growing surplus
population; for although the mass of surplus-value produced would rise
if thesewere brought together, yet thiswould equally heighten the contra-
diction between the conditions inwhich this surplus-valuewas produced
and the conditions in which it was realized.408
It is this contradiction – the contradiction between the conditions for the pro-
duction of surplus value and the conditions for its realisation – that, accord-
ing to Heinrich, provides a more fundamental framework for the systematic
406 Heinrich 2013, p. 26.
407 Heinrich 2013, p. 26.
408 Marx 1981, pp. 352–3.
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tendency to crisis than the ltrpf: ‘Hence, Marx points out a fundamental con-
tradiction between the tendency towards an unlimited production of surplus-
value, and the tendency toward a limited realization for it’.409 The realisation of
surplus value, however, has nothing to do with ‘advocating an underconsump-
tionist theory’ here, because ‘also the investments of businesses … determine
the relationshipbetweenproduction and consumption’.410Yet,Heinrich clearly
conceptualises the ‘crisis of realisation’ in terms of unsuccessful circulation.We
will contest this view in our interpretation of the ltrpf towards the end of
this section. In consequence, no matter how much Marx stresses the import-
ance of the law, we have to consider that he did not invent the ltrpf ‘for its
own sake’. Clarke concurs: ‘The fundamental issue is the historical tendencies
of capitalist accumulation, of which the tendency for the rate of profit to fall
is only one aspect to be considered in the wider framework’.411 Accordingly, in
Clarke’s view, the ltrpfwas only one approach to explaining the inherent con-
tradiction of the capitalist mode of production based on its drive to expand
the forces of production without limit.412 The ltrpf therefore is neither suf-
ficient nor necessary to explain the correlation of the two, Clarke contends.
Despite the objections the ltrpf has faced, it has also been made useful as
a ‘meta-theory’ of crisis. In this sense, Riccardo Bellofiore argues that the ‘law’
must not be understood as a ‘consequence of the rise of the composition of
capital’, but as a ‘meta-theory of the crisis, which includes within it other and
different theories of the crisis’,413 i.e. ‘not only the so-calledunderconsumption-
ist and the so-called disproportionality lines about the realization crisis, but
also the tendency to the capitalist crisis that originates directly in the social
relations of production within the immediate process of valorisation’.414 This
roughly corresponds to the contradiction between the conditions of produc-
tion and that of the realisation (or the successful circulation) of surplus-value.
Bellofiore however deemphasises the role of a rising occ in favour of the crisis
of realisation, which springs from the ‘counteracting tendency’ of increasing
the rate of surplus value. Here, a further motion can be noticed: ‘… precisely
the force repressing the crisis [the increase in the rate of surplus value] pushes
409 Heinrich 2013, p. 26.
410 Heinrich 2013, p. 26.
411 Clarke 1994, p. 223.
412 ‘The progressive tendency for the general rate of profit to fall is thus simply an expression,
peculiar to the capitalist mode of production, of the progressive development of the social
productivity of labour’. Marx 1976, p. 319. The original says ‘ein’ (one) der kapitalistischen
Produktionsweise eigentümlicher Ausdruck, not ‘the’ expression.
413 Bellofiore 2011, pp. 82–3.
414 Bellofiore 2011, p. 92.
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the system toward a third, different kind of crisis; the crisis of realization’.415 But
how does Bellofiore argue for a crisis of realisation without advocating a once-
and-for-all underconsumptionist interpretation of crisis? To be sure, Bellofiore
admits that an ‘effective consumerdemand’ theoryof crisis ‘seems in contradic-
tion to Marx’s reproduction schemes that show how demand to capital comes
from capital itself, directly or indirectly’.416 The predicament lies in the fact
that capital, so to speak, cannot have its cake and eat it too: any counteracting
tendencies to the falling rate of profit, such as the rising rate of surplus value,
while beneficial to productivity, hamper the successful realisation of profit, in
the restitution of the initial v. This intensification of the ‘tendency to the fall of
the relative wage’ also affects extended reproduction, by shaking up the ‘ratios
of exchange, which are necessary for stable-extended reproduction (in equi-
librium)’.417 But neither Heinrich nor Bellofiore can thoroughly circumvent the
problem that both their rejections viz. reformulations of the ltrpf in favour
of ‘realisation crisis’ virtually end up with the problem of underconsumption.
While this may be a partial explanation to crisis – wages can only ever substi-
tute the v-component of the capital invested, but never realise the surplus –we
believe that the significanceof the ltrpf lies elsewhere: namely in the scathing
critique of the crisis-theoretical framework of the classics, which is simultan-
eously the critique of their value-theoretical framework. To briefly contextualise
the setting of the problem, we believe, it is therefore more useful to carefully
consider Marx’s own intent – at least in a rough sketch – with the presenta-
tion of the law as a direct refutation of the classics. This is because the rising
occ, despite Heinrich’s and Bellofiore’s dismissal of its relevance, here plays
a significant role as a direct critique of the understanding of the law of value,
notably in Smith and Ricardo, who had no notion of the organic composition,
and hence, the value composition of capital.
As has been pointed out byHeinrich, a falling rate of profit had already been
acknowledged by Smith and Ricardo as an empirical phenomenon, while the
explanation differed: Smith (faultily) saw the falling rate of profit as the result
of competition,418 while for Ricardo, only the rise of wages could lead to a fall
in the rate of profit, conditioned by a growing population which would have
415 Bellofiore 2011, p. 89.
416 Bellofiore 2011, p. 90.
417 Bellofiore, p. 90.
418 This view is contested by L.Tsoulfidis andD. Paitaridiswho argue,with ample documenta-
tion, that Smith’s theory of falling profits is linkedmore closely to the evolution of interest
rates and rising wages, seeing competition much rather as a result than a cause for falling
profit rates. Tsoulfidis and Paitaridis (2012). Competition, after all, is also one of the factors
(though not the cause) of falling profit rates for Marx.
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to reproduce itself from continuously less fertile land, implying a higher price
of grain.419 Marx in turn criticised Ricardo for failing to see that productivity
increases in grain are possible either with a falling or rising price of grain. But
while Marx was, strictly speaking, not the first to point out the secular tend-
encies of a falling rate of profit, he was the first to claim to have ‘discovered a
coherent explanation for this law’.420 Indeed, ‘Marx does not assume any par-
ticular form of market or conditions of competition, but rather solely the form
of development of the forces of production typical of capitalism, the increas-
ing deployment of machinery’.421 Themethod is hence based not on ‘empirical
evidence’, even if that may have been the case, giving the re-occurring crises
since the late 1850s.422 The method rather rests on proving the law from the
inner tendencies of capital itself. And here is where we can pick up the golden
thread that runs through the analysis of the fetishismof political economy: pre-
cisely by conflating value and price, and surplus value and profit, Smith and
Ricardo were not only unable to explain the origin of capital on the basis of
equal exchange, they were also blind to the different properties in the compos-
ition of capital, which led both Smith and Ricardo to draw the line of demarc-
ation between fixed and circulating capital, instead of variable and constant
capital. Ultimately, both labour and means of production were sources of value
for Smith andRicardo, a theoretical predicament that blocked theway to a clear
understanding of the cause for the crisis of accumulation. The organic com-
position of capital and its internal changes accompanying the development of
productive forces thus remained anathematic to them, leading to an intern-
ally inconsistent theory of crisis. In Ricardo’s case, the search for an ‘invariable’
measure of value further obscured the origin of surplus value, the ‘pure form’ of
profit: for the working day, the measure of value, is not invariable – necessary
and surplus labour assume different proportions in it. But that does not mean
it is not absolute, to the contrary: as an absolute measure of value, it is variable,
but nevertheless an ‘absolute’, i.e. not relative (dependent on a different factor)
explanation of the source of value. Hence it was crucial for Marx to stress the
importance of a growing occ as a heuristic framework for crisis, since it was
419 See Heinrich 2013, p. 21.
420 Heinrich 2013, p. 21.
421 Heinrich 2013, p. 22.
422 Since especially these crises did not occur so much in 10 year-period cyclic outbreaks, as
Marx had believed earlier, but, with the relatively short time span between the 1857–8
and the 1861 crisis, happened more frequently, however less eruptively. See Clarke 1994,
pp. 263–4.
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systematically obscured from the elaborations of the classics who ultimately
did not hold a labour theory of value in anymeaningful sense of the term at all.
The ltrpf is therefore significant as a further development of Marx’s labour
theory of value as a critique of the classics, in that it clarifies, forMarx (to return
to the previous quote) ‘how previous political economy has fumbled around
with the distinction between constant and variable capital, but has neverman-
aged to formulate this in any definite way … how it has essentially never ana-
lysed the differences in the organic composition of capital, and hence has not
analysed the formation of the general rate of profit either’. Keeping in mind
capital’s only objective however – the drive towards infinite accumulation and
profitability, and themeans toobtain it – ‘then it ceases tobe apuzzle that polit-
ical economy has never found this puzzle’s solution’.423 In other words, the law
of value as the law of crisis lies in the form of capital itself :
Capitalist production constantly strives to overcome these immanent
barriers, but it overcomes them only by means that set up the barriers
afresh and on a more powerful scale. The true barrier to capitalist pro-
duction is capital itself. It is that capital and its self-valorization appear
as the starting and finishing point, as the motive and purpose of pro-
duction; production is production only for capital, and not the reverse,
i.e. the means of production are not simply means for a steadily expand-
ing pattern of life for the society of producers. The barriers within which
the maintenance and valorization of the capital-value has necessarily to
move – and this in turn depends on the dispossession and impoverish-
ment of the great mass of the producers – therefore come constantly into
contradiction with the methods of production that capital must apply to
is purpose and which set its course towards an unlimited expansion of
production, to production as an end in itself, to an unrestricted develop-
ment of the social productive powers of labour. The means – the unres-
tricted development of the forces of social production – comes into per-
sistent conflict with the restricted end, the valorization of the existing cap-
ital. If the capitalistmode of production is therefore a historicalmeans for
developing the material powers of production and for creating a corres-
ponding world market, it is at the same time the constant contradiction
between this historical task and the social relations of production corres-
ponding to it.424
423 Marx 1981, p. 320.
424 Marx 1981, pp. 358–9. Emphasis added.
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Not so much a ‘crisis of realisation’, then, in terms of successful exchange of
the aggregate product with workers (and capitalists) forming the other pole of
the contradiction to themode of production in underconsumptionist terms,425
but a crisis of the realisation of maximumprofitability, in that the value product
increasingly represents less surplus value (the s component in c+v+s), and
hence lessmoney, unable to reapprofits thatwould compensate over and above
the invested capital, and thus increase over time, which the term ‘extended
reproduction’ – capital’s modus operandi – designates. In other words, even if
workers continue to ‘buy back’ the v-share of the full aggregate product, and
the capitalists provide a monetary equivalent to realise its entire c-share and
the surplus value, profits ‘melt’,426 returns decrease. As we have seen in our
discussion of overproduction, money can only realise what the process of pro-
duction provides in terms of value. If the commodities contain less value, then
less money is needed to realise this value. Money cannot create value ‘out of
thin air’. Hence, the crisis of capitalist production is not caused by unsuccess-
ful monetary circulation, because even successful monetary circulation does
not circumvent decreasing returns. This is the precise meaning of the contra-
diction between the conditions of the production and the conditions of the
realisation of value and surplus value:427 the character of production itself –
the production of profit – undermines its own realisation: ‘Circulation, or the
exchange of commodities, creates no value’428 – and no surplus value either.
If we place this result of Marx’s analysis of crisis against Uno’s view of the
‘law of value’ in which production and consumption fall into magical har-
425 This would be the level of the argument conducted in Volume ii of Capital. Marx shows
that successful circulation, even ‘without an equivalent’, is possible – but only if one
abstracts from capital’s sine qua non of developing the forces of production without limit.
On the basis of the production of relative surplus value, which accompanies and sustains
this development, however, the realisationof ever greater shares inprofit is hampered.The
theoretical framework of the ltrpf is the production of relative surplus-value inVolume i
of Capital, not the reproduction schemes.
426 We here lean on the general crisis-theoretical framework of the Wertkritik school (pre-
dominantly Robert Kurz andClaus Peter Ortlieb), without necessarily sharing their dysto-
pian conclusions. In general, Wertkritik proposes a ‘value dissolution’ theory of crisis
(Wertabschmelzung) in terms of the diminishing mass of surplus value produced by all
productiveworkers, or conversely, themass of surplus value contained the aggregate value
product (Ortlieb 2014, p. 78). To our knowledge, this is the only theory coherently devel-
oping the notion of crisis from the conceptual framework of the production of relative
surplus value. For English translations of central texts, see Larsen et al. (eds.) 2014.
427 We consider this clarification necessary in light of Heinrich’s and Bellofiore’s imprecise
notion of ‘realisation’.
428 Marx 1976, p. 266.
the principles of political economy 409
mony – not only of the initial separation of production and circulation, but
also into a harmony of interests of workers and capitalists – we can see that
Marx’s view is not only the opposite, but that its theoretical interest also rad-
ically differs: while Marx’s interest is critical, Uno’s intervention – in line with
his endeavour to present the ‘principles’ of a ‘pure capitalist society’ – must
refrain from critical assumptions. The question then however arises whether
the bracketing of the inherent crisis character of capital, tantamount to the ‘law
of value’ as the appropriation of unpaid surplus labour and its internal contra-
dictions, renders it appropriate as a theory of capitalism. Before we come to an
overall conclusion concerningUno’s project,we shouldbriefly return to aspects
of crisis in the Principles, insofar as the discussion in the present chapter has
not considered them yet.
4.4.5 Aspects in Uno’s Theory of the Business Cycle (1): The Supply of
Labour Power and Accumulation
In his main work, the Principles, Uno argues for a close relation between the
supply of labour power, the law of population ‘peculiar to capitalism’, the fall
in the rate of profit, and the innovation of productive methods (the renewal
of fixed capital) in terms of business cycles (keiki junkan). As mentioned earlier
(Chapter 4.1.), Uno therefore provides a theory of business cycles, but lacks a
theory of crisis.429 Partly, this theory is accounted for by themethod of present-
ing a ‘pure’ capitalist society ( junsui no shihonshugi shakai), a society fully cap-
able of ‘self-sustaining by itself (sore jishin ni sonritsu suru) one historical soci-
ety in completion’.430 Accordingly, it is not the inner contradictions of the capit-
alist mode of production that formUno’s object of interest, but to the contrary,
capital’s ability to function. From this view alone, the approaches of Marx and
Uno present irreconcilable opposites. More generally, as discussed throughout
the present volume, for Uno, capitalist production essentially hinges on the
commodification of labour power and its unobstructed supply to the produc-
tion process.While the labour power commodity is the only commodity ‘which
capital by itself cannot directly produce’, because the reproductionof that com-
modity falls to the ‘private lives of workers’, there is
429 Even though he has written a work of the same name, Theory of Crisis (Kyōkōron, 1953). In
this work, however, the business cycles rather than the secular crisis of capitalism stand
in focus. This is based on his work in the Principles 1950–2 and reproduced in the 1964
version.
430 Uno 1964, p. 12.
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no inherent limit to the accumulation of capital so long as capital is well
supplied with labour-power … in the form of surplus population. Hence,
so long as labour-power is available, there is no theoretical reason why
capital may not continue to expand its production with the given tech-
nical method.431
In the phase of prosperity, when a relative surplus population forms the pool
for the new supply of labour power, the technical composition of capital usu-
ally remains the same. A relatively large quantity of workers alone, however,
does not correspond to growing productivity. As seen in the discussion of the
ltrpf, rising productivity entails the reduction of the total number of workers,
accompanied by a rising occ and rate of surplus value. If Uno characterises the
expansion of capitalist production as being secured by the supply of labour
alone, then he cannot have the development of the forces of production in
mind that precisely seeks to save the cost of labour. Indeed, for Uno, rising pro-
ductivity, the formationof a relative surplus population, and a risingoccareno
constant conditions for capitalism’s ‘self-sustenance’. Capital, for Uno, ‘does not
constantly improve the method of production’, because fixed capital must be
used over a span of several – in average, ten – years, and new technicalmethods
are not quickly applied. Hence, so long as labour power is available, production
can continue on the same scale. We need to keep Uno’s axiom in mind for our
critique of this ‘basic condition’ for the expansion of capitalist production.
For Uno, the given technical production method, however, may change as
the result of pressures of other capitals, so that a rise in the occ cannot be
excluded. Nonetheless, the occ, according to Uno, only rises in a particular
phase of cyclical fluctuations that ‘characterise the development of capitalism’.
It is in the phase of depression that these new productivemethods are applied:
‘The general adoption of newproductivemethodsmust, therefore, in principle,
be forced upon capital in the phase of industrial depression’.432 Here is how
Uno argues for the cycle of expanded reproduction:
During the phase of prosperity, capital accumulation proceeds ‘extens-
ively’ under a given organic composition, absorbing surplus population
already created in the preceding phase of depression. During the depres-
431 Uno 1980, p. 88; Uno 1964, p. 169.
432 Uno 1964, p. 107. Sekine’s translation is different, adding ‘competition’: ‘The general adop-
tion of new productive methods must, therefore, in principle, be forced upon capital by
the severity of competition that it faces in the phase of industrial depression’. Uno 1980,
p. 53.
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sion phase that follows a crisis, as the disturbances caused by a crisis are
gradually brought under control, newmethods of production are adopted
providing the basis for an increase in the organic composition of capital
and for the formation of a relative surplus population to be absorbed in
the succeeding phase of prosperity.433
For Uno, this presents the ‘law of population peculiar to capitalism’, one of the
‘three great laws’ of the science of political economy. This relatively smooth
cycle of the expulsion and the absorption of labour power therefore also bears
no necessary relation to the deterioration of the living standard of the working
class as such. Throughout the Principles, and also in the corresponding texts
in which Uno critically discusses Marx’s theory of accumulation as a theory of
immiseration or pauperisation,434 Uno rejects Marx’s pessimistic view of the
coexistence between accumulation on higher scales and the generation of a
growing surplus population. In fact, for Uno, in stark contrast to Marx, as we
shall see in a short while, not only does the law of population determine the
living standard of the workers, but the living standard in turn also determines
the valueof labourpower. To facilitate anunderstandingof Marx’s opposed view
hereafter, it is useful to first reproduce Uno’s argument in detail:
The standard of living is in fact not a rigidly fixed datum, being ‘historic-
ally determined’ in a broad sense. In the development of capitalism, the
accumulation of capital historically generates a standard of living suit-
able to that level of accumulation, as wages rise in the prosperity phase
more than they fall in the depression phase of capital accumulation,
even though the net gain may fall short of the full advance in product-
ive powers. The economic crisis, which turns prosperity into a depression,
sets, in each industrial cycle, the upper limit beyond which wages cannot
rise. But in the course of capitalist development through business cycles,
a rise in real wages cannot be excluded.Moreover, capital in its accumula-
tion requires, andmust be able to command, labour-powerwhose owners
demand as a basic condition of trade some improvement in the standard
of living along with the general development of capitalist society. There-
fore it is not true, though often asserted, that the development of capit-
alism necessarily implies a deterioration of the workers’ living standard.
433 Uno 1980, p. 53. Uno 1964, p. 107.
434 These are inTheTheory of Crisis (Kyōkōron) (Uno 1974 (1953), pp. 147–63), and in theMeth-
odology. Uno 1974 (1962), pp. 213–48.
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Labour-power, which cannot be directly produced by labour and hence
neither by capital, is a special commodity; the demand for and the supply
of it must be regulated in the course of capital accumulation according
to the law of population peculiar to capitalism. The working of this law
determines the living standard of wage-earners, and their living standard
in turn determines the value of labour-power itself.435
Capitalist accumulation therefore, in line with a use value-oriented mechan-
ism of reproduction whose centre forms the reproduction of labour-power ‘in
the private lives of workers’ alone, does not infringe the possibility of a produc-
tion towards the demands of the population, namely an ‘improvement in the
standard of living’. This unrealistic and apologetic view – and onemay not even
need take recent surveys on distribution, national income, and wealth into
account436 – is however sharply contradicted by an understanding that takes
the specificities of the capitalist mode of production into consideration. The
aim of the acquisition of labour power by capital is not private consumption,
but the valorisation of capital, ‘the production of commodities which contain
more labour than [the capitalist] paid for, and therefore contain a portion of
value which costs him nothing and is nevertheless realized through the sale
of those commodities’.437 Labour-power can be sold only to the extent ‘that
it preserves and maintains the means of production as capital, reproduces its
own value as capital, and provides a source of additional capital in the shape of
unpaid labour’.438 Hence, we have to grasp the very function of the wage form of
value in altogether different terms than Uno would have it. The function of the
wage in the context of the valorisation postulate of capital does not primarily
435 Uno 1980, p. 54. Uno 1964, pp. 113–14. In similar vein, see Uno 1980, p. 67, footnote 8.
436 According to the World Bank’s Changing Wealth of Nations 2018-study, ‘global wealth
increased 66 percent from 1995 to 2014 (from $690 trillion to $1,143 trillion in constant
2014 US dollars at market prices)’, but inequality grows because per capita wealth in high-
incomeoecd countries is 52 times higher than in low-income countries (data 1995–2014).
See Lange et al. (ed.) 2018, p. 5. See also the World Inequality Report 2018 (Facundo et al.
(eds.) 2018), which diagnoses a constant growth of global income inequality since 1980, if
at different speeds: India’s income inequality rose gradually from 32% in 1980 to 56% in
2016 (in 2016, 56% of the national incomewas received by the top 10%, compared to 32%
in 1980), while inequality rose abruptly in Russia (21% to 45%). In Europe, US-Canada,
China, Sub-Saharan Africa, Brazil, and the Middle East, inequality grew steadily, while in
the latter three, inequality is the greatest.
437 Marx 1976, p. 769.
438 Marx 1976, p. 769.
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consist in the ‘guaranteed reproduction’ of labour power, and the significance
of wage rises does not lie in the possibility of a more comfortable life for work-
ers. Instead, a rise in the wage level indicates a decrease in the ratio of unpaid
labour. And this decrease, in turn, is limited by the drive to valorisation:
If the quantity of unpaid labour supplied by the working class and accu-
mulated by the capitalist class increases so rapidly that its transformation
into capital requires an extraordinary addition of paid labour, thenwages
rise, and all other circumstances remaining equal, the unpaid labour
diminishes in proportion. But as soon as this diminution touches the
point at which the surplus labour that nourishes capital is no longer sup-
plied in normal quantity, a reaction sets in: a smaller part of revenue is
capitalized, accumulation slows down, and the risingmovement of wages
comes up against an obstacle. The rise of wages is therefore confined
within limits that not only leave intact the foundations of the capitalist
system, but also secure its production on an increasing scale.439
In mathematical terms: the rate of accumulation is the independent, not the
dependent variable. The ‘living standard’ in turn is the dependent variable,
which cannever exist inanyother formthan theactualwagepaid to theworkers.
Uno’s insistence that the ‘living standard’ can be comprehended independently
of the living wage of the labourer – moreover as ‘determining the value of
labour power’ – is a phantasm in the context of the capitalist mode of produc-
tion. The same goes for accumulation: since not the supply of labour power,
but accumulation is the independent variable, the law of population does at no
point regulate, determine or provide the law of valorisation. To the contrary.
What Uno ultimately fails to understand is that in the capitalist mode of pro-
duction, capital at no point ‘hinges’ on ‘inner barriers’ in terms of use value or
the consumption/reproduction of the workers. The inner barrier to capital is
capital itself : its law, themaximum realisation of profit, contradicts the rules of
the realisation of that law, conditioned by the cost-saving, labour minimising,
and capital intensive conditions of production, ‘favourable’ only to the costs
of investment, but detrimental to returns. This is the exact sense in which the
realisation of the law of value collides with the law of value itself: as capital’s
self-imposed drive towards valorisationwhose only source is the appropriation
of alien and unpaid labour, the source which it seeks to abolish.
439 Marx 1976, p. 771.
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ButUno’s views donot halt at a viewof capitalist accumulation that could be
reconciled with a tendency to an improvement of the living standards of wage
workers. He criticises Marx’s theory of surplus population and the industrial
reserve army for not belonging to the theory of ‘pure’ capitalism. From such a
theory, ‘the law of pauperisation’ must be excluded, because ‘it is in reality no
more than a circumstantial phenomenon, according to which relative surplus
population is alternately formed and absorbed through the cyclical process of
growth’.440 We have discussed this problematic rejection in Chapter 2 of this
volume.Uno, againstMarxwho stresses accumulation as the independent vari-
able and the law of relative surplus population as the dependent one, however
insists that ‘Marx’s concept of “industrial reserve army” connotes more than
canbe strictly treated inpure theory’ andmaintains: ‘… the limits [of the lawsof
demand and supply of labour] are certainly not inconsistent with an improve-
ment in the living standards of the working class …’441 For Marx, as previously
discussed, a growing redundancy of labour in the course of capitalist accumu-
lation is the other side of the coin of a growing occ. However, this tendency
for the growing redundancy of labour, in turn, becomes a lever to the greater
centralisation and concentration of accumulation. Concentration and cent-
ralisation of accumulated capital hence become a ‘development within the
development’ for which the tendency to the redundancy of labour gives the
necessary incentive. In the analysis of the effect of a shift towards a higher occ
for the working population, Marx therefore states:
With the growth of the total capital, its variable constituent, the labour
incorporated in it, does admittedly increase, but in a constantly diminish-
ing proportion. The intermediate pauses in which accumulationworks as
simple extension of production on a given technical basis are shortened.
It is not merely that an accelerated accumulation of the total capital,
accelerated in a constantly growing progression, is needed to absorb
an additional number of workers, or even, on account of the constant
metamorphosis of old capital, to keep employed those already perform-
ing their functions. This increasing accumulation and centralization also
becomes in its turn a source of new changes in the composition of cap-
ital, or in other words of an accelerated diminution of capital’s variable
component, as compared with its constant one … it is capitalist accu-
440 Uno 1980, p. 66. Uno 1964, p. 112. Uno here calls pauperisation a ‘contingent phenomenon’.
Ibid.
441 Uno 1980, p. 67. Uno 1964, p. 115.
the principles of political economy 415
mulation itself that constantly produces, and produces indeed in direct
relation with its own energy and extent, a relatively redundant work-
ing population. i.e. a population which is superfluous to capital’s average
requirements for its own valorization, and is therefore a surplus popula-
tion.442
Uno laments that Marx had allegedly ‘de-emphasised’ the ‘important contrast
between the absorption of surplus population in prosperity and the formation
of it in a stagnation. Marx rather one-sidedly stresses the formation of surplus-
population, endeavouring to establish the lawof population on the basis of this
aspect alone’.443 Indeed, the contrast between Marx and Uno cannot be more
apparent than in the treatment of the effects of capitalist accumulation on the
working population. In other words, the general law of capitalist accumula-
tion in relation to a growing redundancy of labour is precisely the opposite of
what Uno terms the conditio sine qua non of the expansion of capitalist pro-
duction, namely the necessary supply of labour power. In the French edition
of the first volume of Capital, Marx himself has directly objected to determin-
ing the supply of labour power as the necessary condition of capital’s expan-
sion:
… at the same time as the number of workers attracted to capital reaches
its maximum, the products become so superabundant that the smallest
obstacle to their sale can make the social mechanism appear to halt; the
repulsion of labour by capital happens suddenly, on the largest scale and
in the most violent manner; the disorder itself imposes on capitalists
supreme efforts to economise on labour.444
442 Marx 1976, pp. 781–2. From this relative surplus population that becomes a disposable
‘lever’ to the production process, the industrial reserve army is formed ‘which belongs to
capital just as absolutely as if the latter had bred it at its own cost. Independently of the
limits of the actual increase in population, it creates a mass of human material always
ready for exploitation by capital in the interests of capital’s own changing valorization
requirements’. Marx 1976, p. 784.
443 Uno 1980, p. 64. Uno 1964, p. 108.
444 Marx 1989 [1872–5], p. 553. Translation from the French by S. Clarke, in Clarke 1994, p. 256.
Marx here also mentions the role of credit in deceiving political economists as to the
causes and the ‘periodicity’ of cycles. Marx 1976, p. 786. On this point, Clarke observes:
‘The cause of crisis appears to lie in the particular factor which triggered the crisis, which
may be a shortage of labour power, or rawmaterials, or the limitations of the market, or a
tightening of credit, butwhich of these emerges as the immediate barrier to accumulation
is a subsidiary issue to the fundamental determinant of the tendency to crisis, which is the
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With the growing scale of accumulation, a greater attraction of labour is
accompanied by a greater repulsion, and this repulsion and contraction of pro-
duction happens in ‘fits and starts’ in proportion to the preceding expansion.
Even if a sudden fit of expulsion – a rapid growth in the occ, the ‘setting free’
of labourers – should have a ‘rejuvenating’ effect on the ongoing production
cycle, the effect of the next contraction will be more disastrous, in both mass
and scale.
As Clarke observes, the political significance of Marx’s general law of accu-
mulation lies not in the automatism of generating a ‘revolutionary class’ that
will overthrow what has put it in fetters. The law of accumulation – in that
it induces a necessary polarisation between accumulated, concentrated and
centralised capital on the one hand, and a growing mass of redundant work-
ers on the other – lies in its generality, the fact that ‘every worker is subject to
the same law, since every worker is, from the point of view of capital, merely a
part of the commonmass of disposable labour power, facing competition from
other workers, and the constant threat of expulsion into the reserve army. The
general law is thus the basis of a common experience of the working class, and
so the foundation on which workers can unite as a class’.445 Needless to say,
within Uno’s self-imposed methodological confinements to a theory of ‘pure
capitalism’, this aspect is anathematic. To be sure, Marx did not write Cap-
ital as a theory of revolution. But he did not write it because, precisely by the
fetishism-critical analysis of the capitalist mode of production and its ‘syco-
phants’, the political economists, the insight into the necessity of revolution
would be generated, as we can see especially in the chapters on the ‘General
Law of Accumulation’ in Capital Volume i. Uno’s theory abstains from this
impetus. The question remains at what point and whether at all revolution
plays a significant role for Uno: after all, capitalismmanages to check its inher-
ent crisis tendencies in everynewperiodic cycle.Oddly enough,Uno recognises
the importance of Marx’s ltrpf – but it remains ‘sublated’ within the frame-
work of economic cycles. Let us see in the next and final section of this chapter
how Uno perceives of the crisis tendencies of the falling rate of profit within
his theory of business cycles.
tendency to the overaccumulation of capital in relation to the opportunities available to
it’. Clarke 1994, p. 259.
445 Clarke 1994, p. 251.
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4.4.6 Aspects in Uno’s Theory of the Business Cycle (2): The Renewal of
Fixed Capital and the Falling Rate of Profit
Uno assumes a tight relationship between the adoption of new productive
methods, the renewal of fixed capital, and the falling rate of profit within the
investment cycle. To disentangle the different instances of the cycle, we shall
consider the individual causes and effects that determine the cycle.
In the pursuit of relative surplus value, capital seeks to introduce ‘new and
technically improved’ machines in order to gain a surplus profit so long as this
new productive method has not yet become generalised: ‘Generally speaking,
capital produces relative surplus value by pursuing such a surplus profit and
in the course of that pursuit improves upon the current method of produc-
tion’.446 The surplus profit earned by the innovating capital is formed by the
difference between the commodity’s individual and its market value, so that
the new production techniques allow the capital in this segment of production
to sell its commodities below their market value. This development can go on
for a particular span of time, depending how quickly other capitals in the same
segment of production adapt the new (or even newer) methods. A newmarket
value is determined when themarket price has fallen to such an extent that no
capital in this segment can any longer gain a surplus profit, i.e. when the new
productive method has become generalised. A falling rate of profit is thus the
direct consequence of the generalisation of a risen occ, for Uno, as for Marx.
However, as notedbefore, forUno, ‘the development of the capitalistmethodof
production does not constitute a continual and uninterrupted process of tech-
nical improvement because the presence of fixed capital is incompatible with
such a process’.447 Since fixed capital is only introduced at a phase of depres-
sion, forced upon an individual capital through competition, it cannot be the
cause for depression, expressing itself in a fallenmarket value, butmuch rather
its effect. It is an effect, however, that must, towards the end of the cycle, cause
a new crisis, or else Uno’s implicit distinction between the adoption of new
productivemethods and the renewal of fixed capital becomes implausible. For
Uno, the implicit distinctionbetween the two seemsof amore technical nature:
because of its inertia and fixity, the presence of fixed capital does not permit
capital to adopt a technical improvement at any time. For Uno therefore, think-
ing himself to be in line with Marx’s own views of a cyclical explanation of
crisis, the investment cycle begins and ends with the renewal of fixed capital.
Once fixed capital is renewed, ‘the opportunity for capital to start afresh in a
446 Uno 1980, p. 86. Uno 1964, p. 164.
447 Uno 1980, p. 87, Uno 1964, p. 169.
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renovated environment is given’.448 The falling of wages, the overabundance of
commodities, and the devaluation of capital are unable to restore prosperity:
‘The general decline of prices and wages … cannot immediately introduce the
recovery phase because it does not remove the real cause of crisis and depres-
sion’.449 For Uno, the role of the renewal of fixed capital becomes decisive:
because fixed capitalmay hamper the adoption of newmethods of production,
once fixed capital is renewed, production can start afresh:
Only with the advent of new methods of production in the course of the
so-called industrial rationalisation can a new workers-versus-capitalists
relation be redefined, upon which a fresh development of productive
powers ismadepossible.Thedepression is now transformed intoprosper-
ity. Thus the improvement by capital of the methods of production can
only proceed intermittently in the process of business cycles, the recur-
rence of which is based upon the periodic renewal of fixed capital and the
formation of [a] relative surplus population.450
Here, the application of new methods of production is simultaneous with the
renewal of fixed capital, so that both constitute the beginning of the cycle. If
we however assume, with Uno, that the renewal of fixed capital introduces the
beginning of the cycle, then we are confronted with the problem of causa-
tion, because we might as well contend that the replacement of fixed capital
is itself determined by the periodicity of that cycle. One characteristic fea-
ture of crisis is the massive devaluation of capital, including its fixed form in
plant and machinery. Then although, physically, these machines still function,
they are ‘morally depreciated’: ‘… in addition to the material wear and tear,
a machine also undergoes what we might call a moral depreciation. It loses
exchange-value, either because machines of the same sort are being produced
more cheaply than it was, or because better machines are entering into com-
petition with it’.451 The scrapping of plant and machinery, and its substitution
for new machines, therefore follows from the moral depreciation of capital in
value terms, as a result of competition, etc. The renewal of fixed capital is there-
fore in itself not the lever of the new cycle, but the cycle itself – defined as it is
by the valorisation postulate – determines underwhich conditions the renewal
of fixed capital will yield an additional profit. It is important to note that Uno
448 Uno 1980, p. 89, Uno 1964, p. 171.
449 Uno 1980, p. 89.
450 Uno 1980, p. 89, Uno 1964, p. 171.
451 Marx 1976, p. 528.
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thought himself to be in linewithMarx’s understanding of periodic investment
cycles.While, as we have shown, Marx’s view of crisis is radically different – for
Marx, economic cycles and the crisis tendency of capital are not the same – it
must be noted however that throughout Capital, Marx does refer to periodic
cycles of the expansion and the contraction of production, particularly in rela-
tion to accumulation, and the growing obstacles these cycles confront in the
development of concentration. He also discusses cycles in the relation to the
renewal of fixed capital. It is first discussed in theGrundrisse, especially in relat-
ing production crisis to a cycle of the average time span it takes for fixed capital
to wear out:
A longer total period is therefore posited as the unit in terms of which
its turnovers are measured, and their repetition is now linked to this unit
notmerely externally but by necessity. According to Babbage, the average
reproduction of machinery in England takes 5 years; hence, the real, prob-
ably 10 years. There can be no doubt at all that the cycle through which
industry has been passing in plus ou moins ten-year periods since the
large-scale development of fixed capital, is linkedwith the total reproduc-
tion phase of capital determined in this way. We shall find other determ-
ining factors too, but this is one of them. There were good and bad times
for industry and for the harvests (in agriculture) in the past, too. But
the several-year-long industrial cycle divided into characteristic periods,
epochs, is unique to large-scale industry.452
The ten-year-cycle therefore characterises the turnover or the ‘total reproduc-
tion phase’ of capital.
In general, however, the substitution of fixed capital is discussed in Capital
Volume ii, especially in the reproduction schemes. And yet, the problem of the
renewal of fixed capital is linked to the problem of the source of the money to
realise the surplus value, not in association with crisis.
Moreover, there is a problem of both historical and systematic dimensions
involved in asserting the cause of crisis to lie in the periodic renewal of fixed
capital. In their research, Marx and Engels had both realised that, roughly in
the time span between the 1850s–70s, the character of the cycle had changed.
The ten-year period no longer presented a reliable calculating magnitude for
452 Marx 1987 [1857–61], p. 105. Babbage was a British economist (1791–1871) whose work On
the Economy of Machinery and Manufactures (1832) Marx has read in French translation.
Marx references the French translation (Traité sur l’ économie des machines et des manu-
factures) on pp. 375–7.
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determining cycles tied to the wear and tear (or the ‘moral depreciation’) of
fixed capital, as we both learn from the letters exchanged between Marx and
Engels,453 and also the supplements Marx added to the French edition of Cap-
ital.454 So while ‘the industrial cycles of the middle of the nineteenth century
had been dominated by one or two leading industrial sectors, particularly cot-
ton and railways, and had been centred onBritain’, as Clarke points out, capital-
ist production had expanded tomany other, various branches of production so
that ‘[the] diffusion of capitalist production had undermined any tendency to
general crisis that might be based on the replacement cycle of fixed capital’.455
Especially since the renewal of fixed capital does not take place in unison, but
at individual intervals depending on the founding of new enterprises, a gen-
eral tendency cannot be easily constructed. A quasi-natural assumption of a
ten-year periodic cycle, marking the renewal of fixed capital as the end viz.
the starting point, is therefore not only highly dubious, but a ‘non-solution
to a non-problem’,456 since these intervals do not happen smoothly. Nor can
an average of ten years be determined within the capitalist development that
depends rather on ‘new productive methods’ introduced by an increasingly
fierce competition. In other words, Uno hypostatises Marx’s ‘10-year-period’ as
an explanation of cyclical crises, while he makes no mention of the general
tendencies of capitalist accumulation that express themselves in increasing
obstacles to the realisation of profit, which marks the contradictory charac-
ter of the capitalist accumulation process itself. Although for Uno the renewal
of fixed capital, because of its inertia and slow adjustment to new productive
methods, forms the crucial point of tension for the periodic cycles that usu-
ally restores the productive powers on a higher level, it is the fall in the rate of
profit that marks the real expression of crisis. To conclude, we shall therefore
briefly turn to Uno’s periodic understanding of the fall in the rate of profit. For
Uno, ‘the tendency of the rate of profit to fall can only be observed by com-
paring the so-called normal or average level of the profit-rate which appears
in the prosperity phase of the business cycle with that which appears in the
same phase of another cycle’.457 Expanded production (‘prosperity’) for Uno
however is accompanied by an ‘inevitable rise of wages’ which ‘sharply depress
453 ‘Crisis. By no means burnt out on the Continent yet (esp. France). Incidentally, what the
crises have lost in intensity, they have now gained in frequency’. Marx’s letter to Engels,
4 November 1864. Marx and Engels 1987, p. 19.
454 See Marx’s remark that periods of boom, in which workers received higher wages, were
becoming shorter. See Marx 1989 [1872–5], p. 553.
455 Clarke 1994, p. 267.
456 Clarke 1994, p. 261.
457 Uno 1980, p. 89 and Uno 1964, p. 175.
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profit’. Economic crises, Uno subsequently contends, arise ‘fundamentally from
the superabundance of capital due to this sudden fall in the rate of profit’, so
that the rise of wages is the primary reason for a fall in the rate of profit, similar
to what Ricardo states. To be sure, for Marx, too, a high value of labour power
will depress profit, and is therefore incompatible with the development of the
capitalistmodeof production. But then thewage level and thenumber of work-
ers cannot be the real cause for crisis. Marx therefore rejects a theory of ‘profit
squeeze’ as an explanation of the fall in the rate of profit, but locates it, as we
have seen, in the drive of capital to expand the forces of production without
limit. The rise and the fall of wages is the primary determinant of the pattern
of accumulation, so that the supply and demand of labour does not form a
coherent explanation of crisis, at least not one that is a ‘theory of the dynamics
of the capitalist mode of production which establishes the tendency to crisis
as something inherent in those dynamics’. For Uno, however, with the determ-
ination of the periodic fluctuation of the profit rate according to the supply
of labour power as the constant variable, the explanation of ‘business cycles’
is exhausted: ‘Capitalism … develops through business cycles of some definite
periodicity; the general rate of profit, too, tends to fall as it fluctuates in the
course of the cyclical process’.458 For Uno, therefore, ‘the social regulation of
capitalist-economic processes requires two laws of profit to supplement the
law of value’:
the law of the equalisation of profit-rates on the one hand, and the law
of the falling tendency of the profit-rate on the other. According to the
former, the centres of gravity of fluctuating prices are production-prices
instead of values; according to the latter, the tendency of the rate of profit
to fall asserts itself only in the long run across cyclical ups and downs.459
Uno rejects two basic results form Marx’s own analysis: labour values as form-
ing the centre of gravitation for prices of production, and not vice versa,460 and
the framework of the ltrpf, which is completely independent of the theor-
isation of business cycles. In this chapter on the law of value as the law of
crisis, we could see how capital, by creating the conditions for the production
458 Uno 1980, p. 89 and Uno 1964, p. 175.
459 Uno 1980, p. 90 and Uno 1964, p. 176.
460 Prices of production forming the ‘centres of gravity’ is thoroughly implausible: since they
are only (a very distorted) expression or appearance of values, i.e. a value form, they can-
not themselves form a ‘centre of gravity’. Prices for Marx are an explanandum, not an
explanans.
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of (surplus) value, simultaneously undermines the realisation of that value:
this is already clear from the ‘formal’ possibility of crisis in money interrupting
the process of ‘every purchase being a sale’, from the generalisation of over-
production and overaccumulation, and from the creation of a constant relat-
ive surplus population and increasing polarisation of capitalist society in the
course of accumulation.We have discussed the law of the tendency of the rate
of profit to fall as a consequence of increasing accumulation on a higher scale
(a ‘meta-theory’, according to Bellofiore) as the long-term and secular tendency
of capital to fail to provide the means necessary for social reproduction on the
same scale by increasing the redundancy of labour. The development of capit-
alism is therefore inherently the development of the poverty of themass of the
population. Uno’smore optimistic outlookmay in part be explained by the par-
ticular historical trajectory of economic boom in 1950–60s Japan. But we have
to take him by his word when he says that he wanted to present capitalism
in its ‘pure form’, which supposedly abstracts from specific historical circum-
stances. In our estimation, not only is his view of business cycles mistaken, as
is his insistence that the supply of labour power is the most fundamental vari-
able. His principal misrecognition of capital as a fundamentally contradictory
mode of production shows the limits to Uno’s approach towards a ‘pure the-
ory’ – a theory which would have to account for the contradictory character of
its object.
But what is the impact of Uno’s ‘pure theory’, the method of his three-level
approach to political economy, onmore recent discourses of value andmoney,
the historical and the logical, and the prospect of revolution, both in the Japan-
ese and the international context? BecauseUno’s theorywas not confined to its
own theoretical context and setting in late 1940s to 1970s Japan, and was adop-
ted, reconsidered, and – as we will show – even radicalised, we shall conclude
this study with a critical evaluation of its reception.
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chapter 5
Uno’s Legacy in Japan and Beyond
There are always two principles confronting each other: the abstract
and the concrete, the universal and the singular, the dead and the
living [das Tote und das Lebendige], the identical and the non-
identical, exchange value and use value, capital and labour. The bad
chiliasm associated with a ‘theory of revolution’ has shown itself in
the simple aggregation of one side of these conceptual couplets as
the untrue whole and the other side as the principle of hope, or
put evenmore simply, as evil and good. Thus the significant content
each of these concepts had in the Hegelian andMarxian dialectic at
their specific place of mediation was necessarily lost, and it is here
that the real crisis of the theory of revolution consists, that is, in its
fragmentation [Auseinanderfallen] into, on the one hand, an apoca-




What is the legacy of Uno’s thought in the present discourse on value, capital,
history and the social forms they present? This chapter will evaluate the prob-
lems elucidated with regard to Uno’s pure theory in the theoretical spectrum
developed in such diverse areas of research as the ‘post’-Uno School of value
theory in Japan (5.1.), the Anglophone Uno School (as in Thomas T. Sekine’s
and Robert Albritton’s work) (5.2.), and aspects of Uno-affiliated historiograph-
ies in the Anglophone world today probably best represented in recent works
by Harry Harootunian and GavinWalker (5.3.). Despite their different theoret-
ical interests and incentives to utilise Uno’s theory for their respective views
of value, money, form of production, history and the question of resistance
to capital, they share a common theoretical basis that informs their respect-
1 Hafner 1993, p. 84. Many thanks to Eric-John Russell for his help with the translation.
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ive interventions: the disavowal of value as the organising principle of modern
capitalist social relations and, by the same token, the hypostatisation of the
use value aspect of the commodity form as themotivator of capitalist exchange
relations (in the post-Uno School of value theory) or even as site of resistance to
capital (Walker).Whether the use value aspect is used affirmatively in the sense
that it serves as the expression of exchange relations, against the social form of
value, or affirmatively in the sense that it provides ‘apparatuses’ (Walker) that
resist alleged ‘teleologically determined agendas of capitalism’ (Harootunian),
both share an indebtedness to Uno’s theoretical frameworkwe have previously
problematised as use value fetishism. This chapter will scrutinise the ‘career’
of the use value fetishistic aspects in Uno’s theory inmore recent international
scholarship.
Even after the demise of the influential Uno School in the 1980s, Japanese
economists have been continuously engaged in the categorial reconstruction
of Marx’s Critique of Political Economy, especially the theory of value and
money. Writing in the 1980s–2000s, authors like Ebitsuka Akira, Mukai Kim-
itoshi, Masaki Hachirō, Kataoka Kōji, Umezawa Naoki, and others, broadened
the value theoretical views of Uno School orthodoxy to include theNeueMarx-
Lektüre (the German ‘new reading of Marx’), French structuralism (in the eco-
nomists C. Benetti and J. Cartelier), the regulation school (M. Aglietta), and
other approaches. However, the integration of more internationally diverse
scholarship notwithstanding, the recent value theoretical debates in Japan
remain heavily influenced by Uno’s idiosyncratic reinterpretation of Marx’s
Capital. In his reconstructive reading, stretching from his works on Value
(Kachiron, 1947) to his better known Principles of Political Economy (Keizai
Genron, 1950/1964), Uno, as we have seen, strongly criticises Marx’s ‘deriva-
tion’ of money from the analysis of the commodity and the labour theory of
value.
Chapter 5.1. will review not only the remaining influence of Uno on the
newer Japanese readings of Capital, but also confront a reading that poses
what we believe is a false opposition of money and value in Marx’s critique of
political economy. This view is perpetuated by Ebitsuka Akira andMukai Kim-
itoshi’s appropriation of the ‘monetary approach’ of Benetti/Cartelier on the
one hand, and Hans-Georg Backhaus’s and Michael Heinrich’s ‘monetary the-
ory of value’ on the other, leading them to discard the labour theory of value
in favour of a ‘money only’-approach.Whilewewill problematise the appropri-
ation of Backhaus andHeinrich for this strategy,wewill show that the dismissal
of value theory leads to a reinterpretation of Marx’s critique of the capitalist
relations of production as aBaileyan apologetics of the same– apositionwhich
we believe is both theoretically and practically precarious.
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Chapter 5.2. will question the equilibrium approach to capitalist (re-)pro-
duction already found in Uno and resuscitated in Sekine’s work. In it, Sek-
ine’s critique of non-equilibrium approaches to capitalist economy, especially
Duncan Foley et al.’s ‘New Interpretation’, will receive a fundamental counter-
criticism, reinstalling the centrality of Marx’s labour theory of value as the
core critical theorem and heuristic of capitalist relations and their bourgeois
interpretation. In the same vein, Sekine’s view of the ‘law of value’ as a law of
general equilibrium will be shown to stem from an apologetic view of capital-
ist relations of production. A similar apologetic view of capital is repeated in
Albritton’s approach to Uno’s stages theory. Not only does Albritton adapt the
view of the law of value as the sustenance of an ‘ideal’ balancing between sup-
ply and demand, thereby introducing the idea that essentially capital produces
use values to guarantee general social reproduction, eschewing the problem of
moneyed demand (and therefore that of capitalism’s specificity), but he focuses
on the problem between the logic and the history of capitalist development
that he finds solved in Uno’s theory of stages (sandankairon). In it, the level
of pure theory corresponds to the equilibrium force of the law of value and the
realmof ‘ideal use values’, while the level of the concretely historical is reflected
in key developmental stages of capitalism as there are the stages of mercant-
ilism (merchant capital), liberalism (industrial capital) and the stage or era of
imperialism (finance capital). However, as we will argue, Albritton’s insistence
on the methodological separation of stages theory on one side and the alleged
‘purity’ of the principles of capitalist logic on the other do not constitute an
organicwhole, but remain external to one another, leaving the claimof amean-
ingful reconciliation of the logic and history of capital wanting (and, as we
will see, tautological). More importantly however, Albritton, like Uno, fails to
acknowledge the epistemological status of value, in that, as a real abstraction,
it does not describe an ‘ideal’ or ‘hypothetic’ assumption about the organisation
of the capitalist mode of production, but its actual implementation and contra-
dictory effects, including the problemof economic crisis absent fromAlbritton’s
(as well as Uno’s) theorisation. The methodological objection and resentment
against demonstrating the intrinsically devastating effects of the law of value,
or rather surplus value, in a real historical situation, which was Marx’s incent-
ive for many of his illustrations in Capital, bears a significant symptom of the
inherently apologetic character of Albritton’s contribution.
In Chapter 5.3., we will take up the issue of real subsumption as a critical
category within Marx’s fetish-critical method and the serious misinterpreta-
tion it receives in Harry Harootunian’s 2015 book Marx After Marx. In it, Har-
ootunian argues that rather than real subsumption, it is the term of formal
subsumption which more accurately describes the current ‘different histor-
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ical temporalities’2 and ‘uneven development’ that areas beyond the ‘Western
world’ have undergone. The concept of formal subsumption, for Harootunian,
‘offers … a way out of both the vulgate Marxian and modernizing bourgeois
historical narratives constrained to fulfilling teleologically agendas of capit-
alism that have claimed the unfolding of a singular trajectory everywhere’.3
This could allegedly be seen in the ‘ “effectivity” of practices and institutions
and the role played by uneven temporalities produced by incorporating and
metabolising pasts in the present’, against ‘the illusory claim of capitalism’s
inevitable completion everywhere’.4 Instead, Harootunian attempts to bring
to the fore instances of ‘singular contexts’, which may ‘very well have blun-
ted the direct consequences of both expropriation and exploitation or masked
their harshness and contributed to delaying the realization of real subsump-
tion’.5 To counter what we think is the real subsumption of meaning rather
than the meaning of real subsumption in this approach, a look at the specific
uses and misuses of Marx’s terminology and theorisation of ‘real and formal
subsumption’ is called for. We will present a radically different reading of real
subsumption that focuses on real subsumption as a methodological heuristic
indicating the ‘completed’ fetishisation of the capital relation. We will show
that real subsumption 1) presents a critical category directed against the ‘fet-
ishism of the political economists’, 2) forms not only the incentive, but the
actual object of Marx’s analysis of the capitalist mode of production, and 3),
by directly corresponding to the production of relative surplus value, it allows
us to conceptually permeate the mechanism that effects the dominance and
perseverance of capital on a global scale, the ‘overcoming’ of any obstacle,
economic or political, that may impede the appropriation of unpaid surplus
labour in our present historical time. Harootunian’s taxonomical subordina-
tion of real under ‘formal’ and ‘hybrid forms’ of subsumption, expressed in
globally different cultural practices, not onlymisrecognises the specifically eco-
nomic character of the relation between capital and labour and the ways its
analysis contributes to a theory of class and wage dependency, but, with his
resentment against the concept of real subsumption as a critical theory of the
appropriation of unpaid and alien surplus labour, Harootunian unwittingly
makes a case for the neoliberal view of ‘different capitals’ whose workings can-
not be solely evaluated from the standpoint of (surplus) value extraction. Aswe
will show, he thus invites a cynical view of the hardships of billions of people
2 Harootunian 2015, p. 20.
3 Harootunian 2015, p. 19.
4 Harootunian 2015, p. 19.
5 Harootunian 2015, p. 62.
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with ‘culturally different’ backgrounds and ‘singular contexts’whosedaily grind
in a globalised world Harootunian surprisingly finds unworthy of mentioning.
Insofar asHarootunian’s perspective on the presentworld is informedby the
view of a not-yet-subsumed ‘temporality’ or ‘space’ withdrawing from the ‘grip’
of value or capital, i.e. the aspect of use value against value, we find a simil-
arity with Gavin Walker’s 2016 book The Sublime Perversion of Capital and its
highly original approach to Uno’s work. The leading question will not so much
concern the tenability of Uno’s (and with it, Walker’s) contention about the
muri of the commodification of labour power, i.e. the assumption that labour
power as a commodity cannot be directly produced by capital (for this, see our
Chapter 2.2.), but rather the implications this view has for an alleged ‘paradox’
between the ‘inner’ valorisation logic of capital and history’s ‘exteriority’ that
likewise serves as a buttress for capital’s self-image as the logic of a ‘smooth
circle’. In this area of conflict or Spannungsfeld, Walker posits his intervention
via its emphasis on the ‘resistance’ that the commodification of labour power,
or rather, its ‘(im)possibility’, presents to capital’s drive, located in the sphere
of consumption. We will argue that neither is there a theoretical ‘paradox’
between the logical ‘interior’ and the historical ‘exterior’, nor does the spectrum
of use value provide ameaningful category of resistance to the capitalist mode
of production. Drawing on Kornelia Hafner’s seminal critique of ‘use value fet-
ishism’, this chapter, and the present book, will conclude by highlighting the
ideologically precarious character of the lopsided view of the capitalist con-
tradiction, and counter it with the possibility of resistance the contradictory
character of the concept of value itself.
5.1 Money vs. Value? The ‘Monetary Approach’ in the Post-Uno School
of Value Theory6
The task of this chapter (5.1.) is to problematise aspects of the development of
value theory in Japan after Uno. More specifically, it aims to review and critic-
ally evaluate thepost-UnoSchool’s appropriationof the ‘monetary approach’ in
Benetti-Cartelier and the ‘monetary theory of value’ of the NeueMarx-Lektüre.
These appropriations culminate in the general contention of post-Uno School
theorists that Marx’s labour theory of value, or ‘value theory’ in their dictum,
and the ‘monetary approach’7 have to be set apart as two distinct and opposi-
6 An abridged version of this chapter can be found in Lange 2019c.
7 Cartelier 1991, p. 257.
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tional theoretical paradigms, which ultimately ‘amounts to postulating money
and discarding value theory’, as these authors conclude with Cartelier.8 They
therefore hypostasise an opposition of money and value, pitching their monet-
ary approach as an ‘alternative to the theory of value’.9 We will show that this
approach owes to a truncated reading, if not outright misunderstanding, of
Marx’s critical intervention against classical political economy, and therefore
against the ‘interpreters’ of the capitalist mode of production.10 The view of
money as ‘having nothing to do with value’ – i.e. with the substance of value in
abstract labour as a category of production and its measure in ‘socially neces-
sary labour time’ – is especially eminent in Ebitsuka Akira and Mukai Kim-
itoshi’s works which this chapter will reviewmore closely. Ebitsuka andMukai
are arguably most radically opposed to Marx’s central theorem, which is why
the focus on these authors is most promising in evaluating the development
of Japanese value theory after Uno. Ebitsuka’s and Mukai’s intervention lies in
approximating the Benetti-Carterlier paradigm, while Mukai’s more strongly
focuses on that of the Neue Marx-Lektüre, especially Hans-Georg Backhaus
and Michael Heinrich. Roughly, both Ebitsuka’s and Mukai’s argument, des-
pite their differences, relies on the assumption that Marx’s demonstration of
the ‘genesis of the money-form’ – ‘a task never even attempted by bourgeois
economists’ (Marx) – implies, on the one hand, a ‘substantialist’, i.e. transhis-
torical and physiological understanding of the substance of value as abstract
labour, and a ‘form-oriented’ analysis of money whose existence precedesmar-
ket exchange. Money, in these theories, is autonomous and self-explanatory
and need not be grounded in the ‘substantialist’ and ‘pre-monetary’ labour the-
ory of value. The latter must therefore be discarded. More strongly than Uno,
and in parts in direct opposition to him,11 they conclude that value is consti-
tuted in exchange, and abstract labour is not a category of production, but of
the market. Where these views agree with Uno, however, is in their conviction
that money logically precedes commodity exchange, and therefore the analyt-
8 Cartelier 1991, p. 260.
9 Cartelier 1991, p. 257.
10 In 1989, R. Bellofiore alreadymade the cause for a ‘Monetary Labour Theory of Value’. The
present essay rather diverges from Bellofiore’s results, while sharing its general impetus.
See Bellofiore 1989.
11 See Ebitsuka 1982, where he argues that Uno’s ‘proof’ of the labour theory of value in the
context of the production process of capital was still too tied up with a ‘substantialist’
view of value. Instead, the labour theory of value was to be conceptualised as a theory
of equilibrium, i.e. a theory of exchange, in which supply and social demand are directly
proportional.
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ical approach to the commodity: money is not to be derived from the com-
modity, but the commodity from money. Money therefore becomes the basis
for social relations, which cannot be further deduced.
Against this view, this chapter will argue that these criticisms remain on the
analytical level of what Marx called the ‘fetishism of the bourgeois relations
of production’, in that it no further asks what money actually is. Marx instead
demonstrates that it is the inverted and ‘dazzling’ expression of the social form
of labour that, as the predominant value-form– and therefore as fetish – obfus-
cates its constitutive content in the specific social form that labour takes under
the conditions of its confrontation with capital. We will argue that the opposi-
tion between value andmoney is a false one, ignoring the specificity of money
as the fetishised appearance of abstract wealth, which can only be meaning-
fully analysed on the basis of the social character of labour it is the ‘direct
incarnation’ of. Marx’s labour theory of value is not only not opposed to the the-
ory of money, but the latter can only bemeaningfully explained on the basis of
the former. According to our understanding,Marx’s theory of value is therefore
primarily a theory of the form-content (Formgehalt) and of the necessary con-
stitution of the fetishistic forms of value (the commodity, money, capital, wage,
profit, interest, rent, etc.), the latter of which form the categories of the bour-
geois horizon.This chapter’smain focus of critique and concern therefore is the
tendency towards a nominalist theory of money to be witnessed in the post-
Uno School, relying on a model of money and exchange close to classical or
‘vulgar’ economist Samuel Bailey and the school of marginalism, which indeed
parts withMarx’s crucial insights while claiming adherence to it in its attempts
to bring forward a Marx uninhabited by what the post-Uno School sees as the
‘relicts’ of the classical ‘labour theory of value’.
The focus will be on refuting the Baileyan propositions of this newer func-
tionalist and nominalist reading of money, arguing, first, that money as ‘means
of circulation’ or ‘symbol’ is not an explanans, but an explanandum. Second,
Marx’s analysis of money already contains the further analysis of capital, which
is Marx’s main concern. It will do so by evaluating Ebitsuka’s appropriation
of Benetti-Cartelier’s monetary paradigm, its misconception of the notion of
‘private labour’ and the absence of the problem of class to show that the mon-
etary approach adopted by Ebitsuka and Benetti/Cartelier alike falls short of
the Marx’s Problembewusstsein of the inner nexus and predicament of cap-
italist sociation. Third, this essay will critically review Mukai’s appropriation
of Hans-Georg Backhaus and Michael Heinrich’s readings of Marx for Mukai’s
own agenda of ‘abandoning’ the labour theory of value. It will show that this
attempt is not only misguided, but contains a wilful distortion of Backhaus’s
and Heinrich’s interventions.
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Finally, wewill contend that the strange ignorance of Marx’s larger Problem-
stellung, namely that the theory of value serves as the key heuristic analysis to
the ‘riddle’ of money, capital, andother value-forms, in these recent approaches
not only leads to a surrender to neoclassical views of value andmoney – views
which the authors claim to refute. It also leads to an abandonment of any idea
of modern society. Since, for them, capital and class do not exist, we must ulti-
mately conclude that modern society does not exist either.12
5.1.1 The Benetti-Cartelier Paradigm: The Logical Prevalence of Money
Inhis 1984 essay ‘Moneyand theCritiqueof Political Economy.TheProblematic
of the Critique of Political Economy according to Benetti-Cartelier’,13 Ebitsuka
presents Benetti-Cartelier’s ‘monetary’ approach as a helpful solution to the
problems posed not only by classical and neoclassical economy, but also Sraf-
fian ‘neo-Ricardianism’ and their disregard for money as constitutive for what
they call ‘market society’. This rethinking of Marx’s theory of money, ‘couched
within an explicitly stated Marxist disposition’,14 can be considered as a radic-
alisation of Uno’s claim concerning the dispensability of the labour theory of
value on the terrain of Marxist debate. Ebitsuka therefore sets the discussion
of the Benetti-Cartelier paradigm roughly in the (at the time of Ebitsuka’s con-
tribution) recent and well known ‘Value Controversy’ among Anglo Marxian
value andmoney theorists15 of the late 1970s that culminated in Ian Steedman’s
and Paul Sweezy’s publication of the same name in 1981. The neo-Ricardians
in the debate – predominantly Steedman16 – held the so-called ‘redundancy’-
thesis,17 namely that, with given physical quantities of inputs and their ratio,
i.e. givenwages andmeans of production, the labour theory of value – as Sraffa
had already suggested in his seminal Production of Commodities by Means of
Commodities in 1960 – becomes redundant. This becomes especially apparent
12 In his critique of Cartelier, William J. Urban does not beat around the bush: ‘… we sus-
pect that Cartelier disavows his true bourgeois agenda: believing to be acting on behalf of
Marx’s cause despite his exclusive utilization of the non-dialectical logic of ordinary eco-
nomic theory, he dismisses Marx’s arguments for deficient reasons in order to clear the
way for an alternative model that is not needed’. Urban 2010, p. 2.
13 Ebitsuka 1984.
14 Urban 2010, p. 2.
15 With the exception of Itoh, all the contributors were faculty members of British or US
higher education institutions.
16 Steedman’s view is elaborated in his Marx after Sraffa (1977), the discussion of which is
beyond the scope of this chapter.
17 See Steedman 1981, p. 15; Heinrich 1999, pp. 275–6.
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in Marx’s ‘faulty’18 proof of the transformation of labour values into prices of
production that regulate the general rate of profit: because the rate of profit
(s/c+v) cannot be expressed in terms of labour values, but only by ‘already trans-
formed’ prices of production,19 Marx was wrong to hypostasise s/c+v, in which
s, c and v ‘are “valued” in terms of labour contents’, as the rate of profit. In the
latter, the ratio of the surplus product to the capital advanced is ‘valued’ in
terms of prices. s/c+v is therefore ‘not the rate of profit’, Steedman argues: ‘…
the fact is that the profit rate and prices of production have to be treated sim-
ultaneously within the theory’. With given physical quantities of outputs and
inputs, including labour-time, in each industry, and a givenbundle of commod-
ities constituting real wages (Ricardo’s original assumption), this approach can
show three things: ‘First, those data suffice to determine, proximately, the rate
of profit and the prices of production … Second, the rate of profit does not,
in fact, depend on all those data, but only on real wages and the direct and
indirect conditions of production of those wage goods … Third, no quantities
of embodied labour play any necessary role in the determination of either the
rate of profit or prices of production’:
‘[E]mbodied-labour’ quantities are entirely redundant, evenwithin a sur-
plus-based theory … The quantities of labour embodied in … a commod-
ity are determined precisely by the physical quantities we took as data.
But those same data suffice to determine the rate of profit and prices of
production: hence embodied-labour quantities are necessarily redund-
ant.20
How does Ebitsuka – using the approach by Benetti/Cartelier – overcome the
shared rejection of the labour theory of value with Steedman and the Sraffi-
ans, while simultaneously rejecting the Sraffians’ non-monetary ‘solution’ to
the transformation problem?
In the context of the ‘Value Controversy’, Ebitsuka proposes that the ‘value
system’ (kachi taikei) and the ‘production price system’ (seisan kakaku taikei)
both stem from a system of ‘physical resources’ (butsuryō taikei) that assumed
18 Steedman 1981, p. 13.
19 Steedman correctly sees that Marx did not think labour values and ‘relative prices’ (pro-
duction prices) were ‘equal’, but that ‘the rate of profit and normal prices, under capitalist
conditions, can be explained in terms of labour quantities’. Steedman 1981, p. 14. Original
emphasis. The question of course remains how the expression ‘in terms of ’ can be more
precisely defined.
20 Steedman 1981, p. 15. For a critique of this ‘solution’ to the transformation problem, see
Moseley 2016, pp. 230–43; Heinrich 1999, pp. 272–84.
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a fixed production technology, andwages as ‘bundles of commodities’. The first
is an ‘evaluation systemworking under the assumption of homogenous labour
with the postulate of an equal rate of surplus value’, while the second is ‘an eval-
uation system which postulates an equilibrium in the rate of profit’.21 For him,
the differentia specifica is not between the two systems, but between these two
systems and another one, namely ‘the theory of abstract labour’:
The main contention in the ‘theory of abstract labour’ (chūshōteki rōdō
ron) of market society being a theory of the mode of social formation …
is [the question how] in an ‘economy having undergone a dispersion that
does not acknowledge any kind of social synthesis as a precondition’ can
the various private elements (shiteki sho yōsō) [the products of private
labour, ell] be mutually related, and, as social elements forming a soci-
ety, socially recognised for the organisation of society?22
Ebitsuka’s emphasis is on the aspect of social evaluation where both the value
and the production price system fail: ‘In both systems of evaluation, the social
evaluation system is completely ignored’.23 It must therefore be substituted
with a theory of abstract labour that accounts for the ‘mode of social forma-
tion’ in which its elements – commodities – are mutually related, so that they
become recognised as aliquot parts of total social production: and its ‘locus’, so
to speak, is in exchange. Ebitsuka hence declares ‘embodied labour’-theories
of value redundant, by claiming ‘abstract labour’ to be a category of the mar-
ket. He thinks he operates within Marx’s field of vision: ‘[Marx’s concept of
value] … is not [a theory of] the ‘embodiment of labour’, but related to abstract
labour that establishes and mediates exchange relations’.24 To return to the
21 Ebitsuka 1984, p. 684.
22 Ebitsuka 1984, p. 685. Ebitsuka here relies on Michel de Vroey’s assumption that abstract
labour is socially validated through exchange: ‘Labour is first performed as private labour,
initiated by an independent decision. It is transformed into social labour through, and
only through, the sale of its product. When social labour is formed in this context, it
is called abstract labour, the adjective referring to the operation of homogenization or
abstraction achieved by exchange on the market’. de Vroey 1981, p. 176. The problem of
the monocausal linearity of this approach aside – is privately performed labour and its
elements, the means of production and labour power, not already bought on the market?
If yes, the production process, which is initiated with these elements, must be equally
social – de Vroey, as well as the other proponents of the ‘exchange theory’ of abstract
labour, are begging the question: they forget that the condition of possibility of exchange
cannot be exchange itself. They don’t explain on the basis of which of its faculties different
use values can be exchanged – and therefore relate to each other as commodities – at all.
23 Ebitsuka 1984, p. 684.
24 Ebitsuka 1984, p. 684.
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initial question: what makes the labour theory of value, understood as a the-
ory of the substance of value in ‘labour’, redundant is not a return to physical
quantities of inputs and outputs, as the Sraffians believe, but the emphasis on
exchange relations: abstract labour is a ‘post factum’ that can only have any
sort of legitimacy in the social mediation of commodities on the market. Con-
sequently,
the problem that arises in the key concept of abstract labour is that,
because it is a concept established post factum ( jigoteki ni) by passing
through (tsūjite) commodity exchange, guaranteeing the homogeneity of
commodities before commodity exchange and rendering exchange rela-
tions possible, any kind of substance is unlikely.25
For Ebituska therefore, the reconstruction of the theory of the mode of social
formation must be embedded in the ‘theory of exchange’ (kōkan ron) to over-
come the framework of neo-Ricardianism.
That, however, is not all. Drawing on the work of Benetti/Cartelier, espe-
cially Marchands, Salariat, et Capitalistes (1980), Ebitsuka seeks to reveal the
ideological implications of the anthropological hypothesis of classical political
economy. Let us briefly contextualise Benetti/Cartelier’s basic propositions.
Carlo Benetti and Jean Cartelier’s work is situated in the context of the book
series Intervention en économie politique, published by François Maspero with
PressesUniversitaire deGrenoble since 1974. Since that time, in their numerous
articles and essays, Benetti and Cartelier were actively promoting a ‘hetero-
dox political economy’, against the ‘nomenclature’ of the classics and neoclas-
sics alike. Assuming an Althusserian ideology-critical framework, in which not
only schools, but also universities are viewed as ‘places of ideology-building’,26
they aim at the evaluation of levels of domination in capitalist economics.
The task of the critique of political economy for them is the critique of the
‘rationalisation’ of capitalist ideology, bywhich they intend to adaptAlthusser’s
ideology critique for what they call an ‘approfondissement’ of Marx’s critique
of the classics. Somehow assuming the character of a non-sequitur to this
theoretical objective, their main intervention is the declaration of money as
the central ‘economic object’, an object ‘overlooked’ by classical political eco-
nomy. They reject the logic of derivation of money from the commodity, as
can be found not only in the classics, but also in Marx. In a recent article,
25 Ebitsuka 1984, p. 685.
26 See Ebitsuka 1984, p. 681.
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recapitulating their original intervention from30 years earlier, Benetti andCar-
telier insist that
[Our] refusal of a presupposed commodity-space (the so-calledhypothèse
de nomenclature) and our suggestion to conceive of individuals as pure
accounts are two complementary ways of emphasizing social objectiv-
ity –money – against a ‘natural’ one – use values …We have presupposed
money (far from the illusions of micro-foundation) to make it clear that
economic theory is a component of our society …27
Money, according to Benetti/Cartelier, is the ‘a priori’ mode of existence for the
possibility of the particular social structure and organisation of the capitalist
mode of production. Its existence therefore precedes the existence of the ‘com-
modity form’ –much akin to Uno’s understanding.28 According to Benetti/Car-
telier, the ‘nomenclature’ of conventional political economy has ignored the
specific social nexus provided by money. Instead, they resort to an ‘ideological
anthropology’ (Althusser) of the ‘physical world’ in which ‘man’ as the ‘desir-
ing subject’ is the ‘secretion’ of market society, a ‘subject’ which finds itself
facing ‘objects’ (or ‘use values’) made for the satisfaction of his own needs and
desires.29 Cartelier:
The contention of thenomenclature results in the hypothesis that the nar-
rative of the totality of the various things that have been attributed to the
‘good’ or the ‘commodity’ is possible before it has anything todowith soci-
ety. In other words, the specific social form (exchange, production, etc.)
is constructed on the basis of a ‘neutral substrate’ (un substrat neutre),
which is the potential and natural ‘monde physique’.30
While Benetti/Cartelier distinguish a classical and a neoclassical form of this
‘naturalist’ reduction, they reject both, demanding a theory of the economic
27 Benetti/Cartelier 2013, pp. 19–20. Thanks to Michael Gaul for bringing this article to my
attention.
28 Benetti/Cartelier’s theory has been accused of various ‘reductionisms’ and misreadings,
including a ‘conceptual limitation to a form of “monetary purism” ’, where ‘this limitation
makes it incapable of attributing any theoretical status either to the labour force or to the
wage-labour nexus’. See, e.g. Sobel and Postel 2014. See also StavrosMavroudeas’s critique,
who however claims Benetti/Cartelier belonged to the ‘Rubin school’. Mavrouedas 2017.
See alsoWilliam J. Urban’s discussion of Cartelier 1991, to which we pointed earlier.
29 See Ebitsuka 1984, p. 687.
30 Cartelier 1976, p. 94. Quoted in Ebitsuka 1984, p. 686.
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basis that overcomes the ‘conceptual chain’ or derivation from the ‘good’ to
‘money’ to the ‘commodity’. This theorymust account for a) the social character
of the economic nexus (against the naturalism in the classics and neoclassical
theories), and b) a ‘space of commensurability’31 (espace de commensurabilité)
where not ‘all objects acquire a monetary character’ and ‘each one is the equi-
valent against all others’ as in barter,32 but where money is excluded as the
specific agent causing homogeneity of all the commodities itmediates. For this
aim, in Marchands, Salariat, et Capitalistes, they proceed from two hypotheses:
(H1) La société est donnée et le lien entre ses éléments est la séparation,
dont l’expression est l’unité de compte commune.
(H2) Le mode d’existence de la séparation est la rupture entre le privé et
le social.33
The economic ‘common unit of calculation’ here is money. For Ebitsuka, these
claims have far-reaching consequences for the theoretical status of money: ‘…
H1 addresses the “separation” (bunri) =34 the social relations of amarket society
as the dispersed social relations (bunsanka shita shakai kankei), which presup-
pose the existence of money, i.e. the common unit of calculation. H2 addresses
the specificity of a dispersed society in which private evaluation and social
evaluation do not coincide’.35 Only by being ‘private’, as Ebitsuka summarises
Benetti/Cartelier’s argument, can the various amounts of the common unit
of calculation be socially recognised (reconnaissable). Only by the ‘social self
expression’ (shakaiteki jiko hyōji /autodéclaration sociale) of the common unit
of calculation, money, does the ‘private’ acquire a social meaning.36 Gener-
ally, in a market society, the quantity of ‘self-expression’ and the quantity of
social evaluation do not coincide. This is the ‘rupture’ between the private
and the social. This rupture is reflected in the ‘two factors of the commodity’,
31 Ebitsuka 1984, p. 688, quoting de Vroey 1981, p. 178. Somewhat counterfactually to his pre-
vious proposition that exchange is the locus of social coherence, de Vroey now assumes
value to be defined as ‘a space of commensurability without which no relation of equival-
ence could be established. Prior to anymeasurement, an abstractionmust be constructed’.
Emphasis added. De Vroey 1981, p. 178.
32 Benetti/Cartelier 1980, p. 90. Quoted in Ebitsuka 1984, p. 688.
33 Benetti/Cartelier 1980, p. 12. Quoted in Ebitsuka 1984, p. 690.
34 Ebitsuka uses an equals sign between social relations of market society and ‘separation’,
the latter of which he attributes to Aglietta 1976, pp. iv–v.
35 Ebitsuka 1984, p. 690.
36 As for the problem of private labour, see next page, and the referenced footnote.
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where use value acts as the individual factor, and value as the factor of homo-
genisation. Instead of the ‘human as desiring subject’, it is ‘money as a symbol’37
of market society from which, in this world, meaning is given.
… in sum, they [Benetii and Cartelier] come to show that money → ‘the
commodity’ → ‘the good’ (zai) is a conceptual chain that is the opposite of
political economy. This conceptual chain rejects the system of meaning
(imi taikei) of ‘political economy’, provided by ‘man as desiring subject’
that is an ‘ideological anthropology’, and can be viewed as a structure
theory of a system of meaning which is established when the theory of
money as symbol is adopted.38
Ebitsuka sees the advantage of such an inverted analysis of money –measured
against Marx’s – in the following:
InBenetti/Cartelier, the social relations precede the various ‘subjects’, and
can be grasped asmaking themutual relations of the variousmembers of
this society as social ‘subjects’ possible in the first place. Here, money is
just another name for social relation. Money assumes the position of the
centre of market society. Against political economy, which, with its mar-
ket ideology, cannot sufficiently grasp market society as money economy,
Benetti/Cartelier have shown a way out.39
For Benetti/Cartelier, the ‘logical prerequisite’ of the universal equivalent ‘for
the [market] relation to exist’, i.e. the logical prevalence of money results
from the alleged impossibility to ‘deduce’ the money from the commodity
form.Their argument oscillates between denying the possibility of an economy
withoutmoney40 and attempting to refuteMarx’s analysis of the value form, in
whichMarx showed the ‘origin of this money from the simplest, almost imper-
ceptible outline to the dazzling money-form’,41 which would make the mystery
of moneydisappear.These arguments belong todifferent levels of abstraction–
while certainly Marx did not deny that a capitalist economy was impossible
without money, he further asked what money actually is and by which of its fac-
37 Ebitsuka 1984, p. 692.
38 Ebitsuka 1984, p. 692.
39 Ebitsuka 1984, p. 692.
40 ‘If an economy without money is assumed as a starting point, it is logically impossible to
get a monetary economy as an outcome’. Benetti/Cartelier 1998, p. 158.
41 Marx 1976, p. 139.
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ulties it was endowed with being the universal equivalent at all. This question
is unfortunately beyond the scope of Benetii/Cartelier’s, Ebitsuka’s, and Uno’s,
interest. Rather, they insist that ‘the solution Marx proposed [of deriving the
money from the commodity form] is incorrect’.42 In our view, FredMoseley has
already successfully demonstrated where Benetti/Cartelier’s reading of value
form analysis is misguided, and the critique therefore need not be repeated
here.43 Instead, as seen above, for Benetti/Cartelier,moneymust beunderstood
as ‘symbol.’ The problem of a ‘symbol’ theory of money, however, does not dis-
perse with the problem at hand: namely, by which of its faculty, money can
become the universal equivalent at all – and what it is that money actually
measures.44
5.1.2 The StrangeMeaning of Private Labour and the Absence of Class
The approach of the ‘logical prevalance of money’ over value remains strangely
obscure as to its own cognitive gain over and above Marx’s analysis of the value
form.More pertinently however, a certain question begging is involved in Ebit-
suka’s and Benetti/Cartelier’s position – if not dominantly informing it. Pre-
cisely by conjuring away the problematic of the social form of labour by releg-
ating abstract labour to the sphere of circulation and exchange, and not to
42 ‘Themonetary formof value cannot be obtainedby inversion of form ii of value. In an eco-
nomy composed of n commodities, form ii does not contain (n-1) expressions of relative
values (or particular equivalents) as Marx states. It contains n(n-1) expressions. It follows
that the result of inversion of form ii is nothing but form ii itself ’. Benetti/Cartelier 1998,
p. 162. See also Benetti 1985, pp. 96–7 and Benetti 1990.
43 For a critique of Benetti’s interpretation of Marx’s development of the value form and the
‘Necessity of Money’, see Moseley 1998b (http://www.mtholyoke.edu/~fmoseley/working​
%20papers/BENETTI.pdf). Moseley has shown how Benetti’s interpretation of the expan-
ded form of value as the complete set of n expressions of the value of all n commodities,
each in terms of all other (n-1) commodities as particular equivalents, is a misrepresent-
ation of Marx’s intent. In the expanded form of value (form ii), one particular amount
of the commodity in the relative form of value (here: 20 yards of linen) can be represen-
ted by a myriad of commodities in the equivalent form. It does not designate the value of
the relative form and the equivalent form ‘in terms of each other’, but only in terms of 20
yards of linen. It is therefore incomplete. Interestingly, Uno’s point is arguably different
form Benetti’s: Uno acknowledges that it is ‘linen’, and no other commodity, whose value
expression is sought; he only doubts that its value expressionmust always be represented
in a certain amount (e.g. 20 yards). See Uno 1980, p. 8.
44 As Engster has pointed out, ‘[a]ll symbol and sign theories of money misrecognise the
productive meaning that [the act of] measuring has for the valorisation (Verwertung) of
labour and capital, because no sign and no symbol theory of money can adequately grasp
capitalism as a valorisation processmeasuring and realising itself inmoney’. Engster 2014,
p. 488.
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production, they have cut the path to recapturing the social dimension of money
they explicitly seek to establish, against the neoclassicals and the Sraffians.
Hence, their emphasis on the ‘social dimension’ of money is never redeemed.
This is because, other than Benetti/Cartelier, and with them, Ebitsuka, believe,
money is not an explanans, but an explanandum as a category of political eco-
nomy. It becomes the social synthesis of private labours in a social context
only by virtue of being the ‘direct incarnation of all human labour’,45 of directly
representing all individual and concrete labours, while representing none of
them specifically – hence being the direct expression of abstract labour. Not
only is the problematic of how the products of individual labours can relate
to one another as commodities at all beyond the scope of Benetti/Cartelier’s
and Ebitsuka’s interest. Their ‘monetary approach’ indeed also remains on the
level of formalism, owing to their rejection of a meaningful basis on which
the exchange relation can be grounded, namely abstract labour as the social
‘substance’ of value. In a word, they are begging the question: if money is the
condition of possibility of exchange, what is the condition of possibility of
money? It cannot be exchange. It is indeed striking how the social dimen-
sion of money – namely what relations of production money is an expres-
sion of – is eclipsed fromEbitsuka’s and Benetti/Cartelier’s ‘deflationary’ views,
despite their insistence on emphasising it, against the Sraffians. But Ebitsuka,
Benetti/Cartelier – and Uno – forget that money does not make commodities
commensurable: ‘Quite the contrary’.46 It only appears to be able to do that
precisely by being the palpable, material expression of a violent ‘homogenisa-
tion’ that has already been performed in the homogenisation of social labour
and its ‘quantification’ as labour time, a process involving the totality of pro-
ductive relations, predominantly that of class. Yet, money, being the fetishistic
expression of value, ‘does not reveal what has been transformed into it’:47 but a
disparity between appearance and essence does not even occur to the ‘monet-
ary approach’. It can therefore be characterised as a nominalist theory of money,
akin to the paradigms of neoclassical – in Marx’s dictum, ‘vulgar’ – theory and
45 Marx 1976, p. 187.
46 Marx 1976, p. 188: ‘It is notmoney that renders the commodities commensurable.Quite the
contrary. Because all commodities, as values, are objectified human labour, and therefore
in themselves commensurable, their values can be communally measured in one and the
same specific commodity, and this commodity can be converted into the commonmeas-
ure of their values, that is into money. Money as a measure of value is the necessary form
of appearance of themeasure of valuewhich is immanent in commodites, namely labour-
time’.
47 Marx 1976, p. 229.
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its ‘founding father’, Samuel Bailey.48 This problematic is also not solved by
the ‘private’/‘social’-distinction or ‘rupture’ alone, especially when it shifts the
emphasis away from the specific form of labour. Marx, in his analysis of the
third particularity of the equivalent form of value,49 emphasises in what way
the money fetish ‘exists’ as the mediation of private labours in a social context:
‘… private labour takes the form of its opposite, namely labour in its directly
social form’.50 Benetti/Cartelier, in their strong reference to the term ‘private’
do not address this crucial social aspect of money. However, as pointed out
by Marx in the third particularity of the equivalent form of value, the relation
between social and private labour is constitutive for money. In order to under-
stand this, however, one must possess an adequate grasp of the concept of
‘private labour’ – which Benetti/Cartelier lack. Especially Cartelier distorts the
meaning of ‘private labour’ as a labour ‘according to the labourer’s own views’
to unrecognisability.51 That ‘private labour’ – understood as a kind of labour in
which ‘individuals have the choice’52 – should then be irreconcilable with the
fact that labour-power becomes a commodity under generalised surplus value
production (i.e. unfree labour), i.e. where the worker ‘does not have a choice’,53
demonstrates not only a fundamental misunderstanding of Marx’s theory, and
gives Cartelier’s intention to reveal a ‘contradiction’ inMarx’s theory of surplus
value an almost embarrassing twist. But, as W.J. Urban correctly sees, it also
betrays Cartelier’s ‘neoclassical economic bias’, bymaking ‘choice’ themeasure
of freedom.54 At the same time, however, this misrecognition is symptomatic
for the absence of class in the Benetti/Cartelier approach. This fatal absence
48 We will come back to the Baileyist implications of the post-Uno School’s and Ebitsuka’s
money theory further down.
49 The first and second particularities of the equivalent form, i.e. money, consist in taking
the form of appearance of their opposite, i.e. value (not use value), and abstract labour
(not concrete labour). See Marx 1976, pp. 148, 150–1. These three particularities are logic-
ally simultaneous. In the first edition of Capital, the fetish-character of the commodity
formed a fourth particularity.
50 Marx 1976, p. 151.
51 ‘The labour processes are private ones, that is, oriented according to the labourer’s own
views. Essentially, individuals have the choice, and this generates the market as the
adequate form for the confrontation of the products of labour. Labour processes have to
be private and independent in order to be considered part of the commodity division of
labour. To assume that some people are deprived of any means of production amounts to
saying they are excluded from commodity production. Labour performed by wage work-
ers is neither private nor independent. The choice of commodities produced and the way
of producing them are determined by capitalists’. Cartelier 1991, p. 263.
52 Cartelier 1991, p. 263.
53 Cartelier 1991, p. 263.
54 Urban 2010, p. 12.
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accounts for Cartelier’s reading of ‘private labour’ as labour ‘according to the
labourer’s own views’, and not a mode of social production in which the sum
total of the conditions of production belongs to the capitalist: private labour is
capitalist labour. Private labour,more specifically, is based on the independence
and the unawareness of the individual producers (i.e. capitalists), in that e.g.
the specific quantity of a commodity to be produced is not subject to previous
negotiation between all capitalists. The concept of private labour has there-
fore absolutely nothing to do with labour being ‘free’ and ‘independent’. Car-
telier’s conclusion therefore, that the commodification of labour power (unfree
labour) is incompatible with the commodity division of labour (private, free
labour, labour as ‘choice’) is bizarre, to say the least. Saying that ‘some people’
(sic) are deprived of any means of production does not mean to say that they
are ‘excluded from commodity production’, as Cartelier insinuates.55 In fact,
only when social relations between commodity owners, including class, are
understood as a symmetrical, and not asymmetrical relation – in other words,
when the ‘free’ market is declared as the ‘adequate form’ of social exchange
and the conditions of production equally belong to all ‘individuals’, as Cartelier
believes – does his crude hypothesis make any sense. However, a concept of
class in which the contradiction between capital and labour is suspended, i.e.
a notion of class in which the conditions of production do not belong to one
class (i.e. the capitalist) against the other (i.e. the workers), is not a concept of
class at all. And where there is no concept of class, i.e. a concept of unequal
exchange, it is difficult to understand that moneymeasures the expenditure of
human labour in the abstract as the result of a valorisation process (the notion
of valorisation implies that of necessary and surplus labour, and therefore that
of class) in which it ‘becomes the form of appearance of its own opposite’,
the token of equality, freedom and wealth per se: a fetish. As early as in the
Grundrisse, Marx clarified money’s fetishistic appeal to conventional political
economy. It is political economy’s taking categories in isolation, i.e. abstraction,
that accounts for their ‘overlooking’ of the fundamental social mediation, that
of class:
What is overlooked, finally, is that already the simple forms of exchange
value and of money latently contain the opposition between labour and
capital etc. Thus, what all this wisdom comes down to is the attempt to
stick fast to the simplest economic relations, which, conceived by them-
selves, are pure abstractions; but these relations are, in reality, mediated
55 Cartelier 1991, p. 263.
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by the deepest antithesis, and represent only one side, in which the full
expression of the anti-thesis [between labour and capital] is obscured.56
In order to constitute the semblance of equal exchange between capital and
labour, money is therefore not an accidental, but a very necessary form of
appearance of value and surplus value.
To summarise: in their attempt to reject both the ahistoricity of the (neo-)
classical school and the non-monetary approach of Sraffian neo-Ricadianism,
Benetti/Cartelier succumb to a functionalist reading of money as both analyt-
ically-conceptually and temporally prior to value and its forms, undermining
Marx’s theory of money as the paradigmatic form of value which can only be
grasped from the social form of value producing, i.e., abstract labour in the pro-
duction process. The (false) reduction of Marx’s explicit problematisation of
‘form’ to the eminence of money – mistaking the object of critique (the forms
that value takes, i.e. money) for affirmative categories – misrecognises that the
forms that value takes are precisely the fetishised forms of value Marx sought
a) to designate as the specific economic object (against the ‘economic unaware-
ness’ of political economy) and b) to reveal ‘what has been transformed into’
them, their content in the specific form of capitalist labour. Benetti/Cartelier’s
impetus to fortify the theoretical status of money in economic theory (l’unitéde
compte commune, economic object) therefore ironically digresses intomoney’s
theoretical subalternatisation, because in their theory, Marx’s main interest in
the analysis of the value form – not that money is a commodity, but ‘how, why,
andbywhatmeans a commodity becomesmoney’57 and therefore, howmoney
is precisely excluded as a specific form of value from the ‘world of commodit-
ies’ – remains obscure. It is equally obscure how Benetti/Cartelier’s ‘solution’
of ‘postulating money and discarding value theory’ can overcome the Sraf-
fian paradigm. Ironically, Benetti/Cartelier’s and the Sraffians’s approach are
but the reverse side of the same pre-critical coin: while the Sraffians precisely
lack an understanding of value as necessarily tied to money, the ‘monetary
approach’ lacks insight into the necessity of money to reflect a social relation
of production. More devastatingly however, Benetti/Cartelier’s ‘symbol theory’
of money confirms the judgement that their theory does not move beyond the
claims they intend to reject in neoclassical economics. As with Uno, therefore,
56 Marx 1973, p. 248. The context inwhich the quote appears is the critique of Proudhon,who
is attacked as a deeply ‘bourgeois’ thinker in believing that exchange represents a ‘system
of universal freedom’, which has only been ‘perverted by money, capital, etc’. Marx 1973,
p. 248.
57 Marx 1976, p. 186.
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Benetti/Cartelier’s nominalist reading of money and their strange disavowal
of its social dimension can be traced back to the ignorance of the problem of
fetishism. For Marx, the particularities of the equivalent value form, i.e. paradig-
matically that of money – and not just the analysis of the value form in the
confrontation of two commodities per se – are at the heart of the ‘secret’ to the
fetishisms of the bourgeois mode of production. Yet, this omission of the cru-
cial outcome of Marx’s analytical approach to value form analysis seems to run
like a golden thread through the proponents of the interpretation of value from
Uno to the post-Uno School and its appropriation of other, more recentmoney
theoretical approaches, as in Benetti/Cartelier. Recent critics of theUno School
in Japan have therefore pointed to the omission of the fetishism paradigm as
the differentia specifica betweenUno-oriented theory and that of other schools
and theorists of Marxian value theory, e.g. Kuruma Samezō. A case in point is
Sasaki Ryūji, who in his 2011 book Marx’s Theory of Reification. The Thinking of
the Material as the Critique of Capitalism, contends:
With regard to Uno Kōzō, because he does not intend an interpretation
of Marx, but a ‘correction’ of Capital towards a static theory of principles,
it is self-understood that it is different from Marx in this sense. Without
a doubt, he misconceives the core of the theory of reification (busshō,
also: fetishism). As is well known, Uno argues that in the chapter on the
commodity the labour theory of value cannot be proven, and one must
wait until the emergence of capital to prove it for the first time. Hence,
in the commodity chapter, not the relation between value, substance and
value form, but only the form should be discussed. This is why the prob-
lem of reification where the social relations of persons appear as social
relations of things (busshō) is cut off from the problem around produc-
tion relations, which are the social expression of private labours. [Uno]
merely shows the value form as an abstract unfolding of the contradic-
tion between value and use value in the commodity … Accordingly, with
Uno’s framework, one cannot explain the reification of production rela-
tions founded on private labour.58
58 Sasaki 2011, pp. 125–6. The Kuruma ‘school’ emphasises the third particularity – private
labours appearing as directly socially mediated labour – as the defining specificity of
the capitalist mode of production, as against theories that emphasise the historical spe-
cificity of abstract labour. See also Sasaki 2012, pp. 48–50. In this reading, however, it is
also important not to forget the other two particularities. All of them however have their
origin in the specific kind of labour that is productive of value as a social totality. Abstract
labour is the shorthand for it. Also see Sasaki and Saitō 2013.
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Can the integration of interpretations of the Neue Marx-Lektüre, especially
Hans-Georg Backhaus and Michael Heinrich, in the Japanese post-Uno school
provide us with a better grasp of the relation between value and money? For
this, we shall turn briefly to Mukai Kimitoshi and his intellectual context.
5.1.3 Money as the Logical Limit to Value – The NeueMarx-Lektüre in the
Post-Uno School
The characterisation of the works of Mukai Kimitoshi as the ‘post-Uno School’
is strictly speaking incorrect, since Mukai was a student of the well-known
Marxist economist Satō Kinzaburō (1927–89) who was one of Uno’s foremost
critics. And yet, with regard to his embeddedness in the debates on value
continuing after Uno’s death in 1977 and his enthusiastic accordance with
Uno’s interpretation of the money form as prior to the commodity,59 the sub-
sumption of Mukai to the post-Uno school can be justified. In Mukai’s case,
however, although he strongly references Benetti/Cartelier, the emphasis on
the works of the NeueMarx-Lektüre, and especially Hans-Georg Backhaus and
Michael Heinrich, is more evident. The signature intervention of the Neue
Marx-Lektüre (nml) in the value theoretical debates of the late 1960s–70s in
Germany until today is twofold: the rejection of the premonetary theory of
value (prämonetäreWerttheorie) and the logico-historicalmethod. The latter is
first prosposed by Engels’s interpretation60 andperpetuated in theworks of e.g.
Wolfgang Fritz Haug in the German context.61 This twofold landmark interven-
tion has especially been advocated by Backhaus andHeinrich in their writings.
Backhaus first propagated this view in his seminal ‘Materialien zur Rekonstruk-
tion der Marxschen Werttheorie’ (Materials for the Reconstruction of Marx’s
Theory of Value, 1974–8), while Heinrich strongly argued for it in his Die Wis-
59 See Mukai 1995, p. 98.
60 Engels’s review of the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859), his postface
to the third edition of Capital Volume i, and his preface to the third volume of Capital are
pertinent in this regard. In his review of the Contribution, Engels claims that ‘the logical
method of approach’, understood as ‘simplified’method (see Elbe 2008, p. 19), was ‘indeed
nothing but the historical method, only stripped of the historical form and of interfering
contingencies. The point where this history begins must also be the starting point of the
train of thought, and its further progress will be simply the reflection, in abstract and the-
oretically consistent form, of the course of history, a corrected reflection, but corrected in
accordance with laws provided by the actual course of history, since eachmoment can be
examined at the stage of development where it reaches its full maturity, its classical form’.
Engels 1980, p. 475.
61 See the ‘Methodenstreit’ between Haug, Heinrich, and Backhaus taking place in the Ger-
man Marxist journal (edited by Wolfgang Fritz Haug) Das Argument in 2003. The best
overview and commentary on the Methodenstreit is to be found inWolf 2008b.
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senschaft vom Wert (The Science of Value, 1991).62 With different emphasis on
its derivation, what can be said for both Backhaus and Heinrich is that Marx’s
theory of value in Capitalmust be interpreted as amonetary theory of value, its
method being strictly logical. But, as both Backhaus and Heinrich stress, Marx
himself wasn’t sufficiently conscious of his own ‘paradigm change’ against the
classics, which is why value form analysis in Section 3 of Chapter 1 of Capital
Volume i can still be read as an ‘embodied’ labour theory of value. Especially
Heinrich claims that the substance of value, abstract labour, only has exist-
ence in exchange, in the ‘social relation between commodity to commodity’.63
Because Marx was allegedly caught up between the framework of the classics
(the ‘embodied labour theory of value’) on the one hand and breaking up their
discourse, Heinrich hypostatises two distinct theories of value in Marx, a ‘pre-
monetary’ and a ‘monetary’ one.64 Because, forHeinrich, the ‘embodied’ labour
theory of value – the ‘old discourse’ – must be rejected in favour of Marx’s
breakthrough to a ‘monetary theory of value’, it is in exchange that ‘value’ is
constituted, and this therefore by necessity hinges on the existence of money.
We will come back to a critical evaluation of these contentions in the last sec-
tion. In the following,wewill presentMukai’s argument of why themoney form
must precede the commodity, and why the labour theory of value is to be dis-
carded from the outset. As we will see, his argument is more consistent than
that of Ebitsuka, and drawing onMarx’s originalwork, at first alsomore convin-
cing. Like Ebitsuka, however,Mukai ironically leaves the problematic of money,
and especially its capitalist dimension,unproblematised. Just because exchange
necessitates the existence of a thing called ‘money’, we still have not under-
stood whatmoney actually is, by which of its characteristics it is actually able to
hold the place of universal equivalent. To examine Mukai’s argument, we shall
first look at its contextualisation within the different value theoretical streams
in 1960s–70s Japan – which is oriented towards Backhaus’s characterisation
of the same streams in Germany – and then turn to Mukai’s own ‘monetary
approach’ and the rejection of the historicist turn (‘historizistiche Wendung’)
which can allegedly be detected in the different presentations of the value form
from the first to the subsequent editions of Capital. Both of these positions
are strongly informed by Backhaus’s argument in Part iii of the ‘Materialien’,
in Chapter 6 of Heinrich’s Science of Value (‘Die monetäre Werttheorie’), and
also reflected in the Benetti/Cartelier paradigm, which Mukai appropriates to
62 For an extensive discussion of both positions, see Dieter Wolf ’s work. Especially Wolf
2008b.
63 Marx 1976, pp. 138–9.
64 Heinrich 1988, p. 30 and Heinrich 1991 [1999], p. 13. Quoted in Mukai 2014, p. 5.
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harden the evidence for his case. We shall see that Mukai, despite his claim
to have convincingly argued the superfluousness of the labour theory of value
from Marx’s own ‘defects’ in the analysis of the value form, like the authors
he adopts as buttresses for his view, fails to take notice of the centrality of the
fetish paradigm in Marx’s theory of money, which leads to a truncated, mis-
conceived and therefore non-critical view of the money form. Our contention
is that the opposition of a ‘monetary’ theory of value to the labour theory of
value is a false one, leading to precarious shortenings in the theoretical scope
of the labour theory that is simultaneously the monetary theory of value.
5.1.4 Against the Labour Theory of Value
Mukai’s unpublished article65 ‘The New Readings of Capital in Japan since the
1960s’ (2014) is the latest in a series of articles since 1990 inwhichMukai argues
for the ‘dispensability’ of the labour theory of value for the analysis of capital-
ist relations.66 Here, Mukai Kimitoshi develops a short intellectual biography
of ‘heterodox’ (i.e. non-party line) Japanese value theoretical approaches, espe-
cially his own, contextualising it within his teacher Satō Kinzaburō’s work on
the Grundrisse and Capital in the late 1960s. Mukais’ claim that no reference
to the concept of labour is needed for the development of the value form – an
assignment he says, that is left to himafter the death of hismentor Satō – is con-
ducted in the fashion of a critical commentary on Marx’s value form analysis,
focussing on its ‘defects’.67 Before we follow Mukai’s argument critically, the
general overview of the ‘three streams of Japanese Marxian economics in the
1960–70s’ is useful to situate Mukai’s work. Mukai follows Hans-Georg Back-
haus’s characterisation of different readings of Capital in Germany from the
end of the Second World War to, roughly, the late 1960s.68 We find here the
streams of 1. the logico-historical approach of the ‘old orthodoxy (traditional
65 We have explicit personal permission fromMukai Kimitoshi to discuss his work in a pub-
lication.
66 SeeMukai 1990, Mukai 1992, and the two-series article on the ‘Phenomenology of Money’
(Mukai 1995 and Mukai 1996). See also Mukai 2010.
67 Mukai 2014, p. 3.
68 According to Backhaus, within the ‘secondary literature’ on Capital, three different ‘relat-
ively homogenous’ streams can be detected: 1. the ‘logico-historical’ stream, as represen-
ted by the ‘old orthodoxy’ (Engels, Marxism-Leninism) (see Footnote 58), 2. the ‘logical’
interpretation, as represented by the ‘new orthodoxy’ arisen around the Frankfurt School
of Critical Theory. In it, the rejection of ‘reflection theory’ (Widerspiegelungstheorie),
Engels’s dialectic of nature, and the basis-superstructure paradigm are commonplace. 3.
the ‘model-platonic’ interpretation, held by modern (Marxian) economists solely inter-
ested in quantitative problems and terms (the transformation problem, etc.). Backhaus
2011, p. 136.
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Marxists)’ and the ‘Civil society’ school (K. Hirata), 2. the ‘logical approach’
of Uno Kōzō and the ‘new orthodoxy’ of Satō Kinzaburō, and 3. the model-
platonic approach of ‘Algebraic Marxism’ (N. Okishio).69 Mukai, like Back-
haus, sees himself in the tradition of the ‘logical’ approach. Though the latter
expresses doubts as to the ‘strictly’ logical approach, and especially the ‘new
dogmatism’ in the theoretical circumference of the Frankfurt School,70 Mukai
is more inclined to count himself among the representatives of the ‘new ortho-
doxy’, though not without a peculiar radicalisation of Satō’s and even Uno’s
argument that the labour theory of value were ‘premature’ in the development
of the value form: for Mukai, it is not only ‘prematurely’ introduced in Capital,
but entirely superfluous, as a theory of capitalist relations can be sufficiently
expressed in money. As for the question of a historical or ‘logical’ methodo-
logical approach to the value forms of the commodity and money in the first
chapter of Capital Volume i, Mukai adopted the ‘logical’-systematic interpreta-
tion from his mentor Satō. While this non-evolutionary-historical theorisation
is clear in theGrundrisse and the first edition of Capital, Mukai, following Back-
haus, asks whether the ‘strictly logical’ approach had really been thoroughly
pursued in the subsequent editions of Capital, or whether we must not con-
cede a ‘historicist turn’ (Backhaus)71 in the editions following the first of 1867
and the conventional fourth edition. In other words: ‘What happened between
the Grundrisse and Capital?’72 According to Mukai, and leaning on the nml’s
central thesis, the historicist turn was owed to certain defects in the ‘attempts
of popularisation’ of the presentation of the analysis of the value form and the
‘genesis of money’, conducted in the subsequent editions of Capital. The two
interpretations of value form analysis in Chapter 1, Section 3 of Capital, inter-
preted by both Mukai and the Neue Marx-Lektüre as precarious – on the one
hand, a historicist reading of the analysis of value, and a ‘premonetary’ theory
of value on the other hand – are however thoroughly ‘woven’ into the material
of Capital, so that it must be conceded that Marx himself wasn’t entirely aware
of the ‘qualitative difference’ of his ownvalue theory against that of his classical
predecessors. Mukai here strongly relies on Heinrich’s evaluation:
69 Though not a Marxist, Morishima Michio may be counted among the latter type as well.
70 Backhaus 2010 (1978), p. 138.
71 Backhaus 2011, p. 154: ‘Thehistoricist turn in [Marx’s] laterworkswould remain thoroughly
mysterious (rätselhaft) if it couldn’t also be shown thatMarx attempted to relate the “logic-
ally” developed categorial analysis to a “logical-historical” development of the same’.
72 Mukai 2014, p. 3.
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As Heinrich says, we can find a paradigm change, but Marx was not con-
scious of it, and continued to believe that he remained in the paradigm
of the labour theory of value. ‘On the other hand, the discourse of the
classics can still be found in central passages of his work … [his] own cat-
egorial development remains ambivalent in some of the crucial passages’.
(Heinrich 1991, p. 13).73
For Mukai, Marx did not always succeed in opening a new terrain against the
classical ‘embodied labour’, i.e. quantitative, theories of value that can be found
in Ricardo etc.74 To prove his point, Mukai quotes the passage on the ‘physiolo-
gical’ aspects of abstract labour from the fourth edition, namely, that
all labour is an expenditure of human labour-power, in the physiological
sense, and it is in this quality of being equal, or abstract, human labour
that it forms the value of commodities.75
Mukai concludes, with Heinrich and Backhaus:
Herewe can see no difference betweenMarx andRicardo, because ‘values
are then reduced to mere labour quantities independent of money, as in
Ricardo’. (Heinrich 1988, p. 32) So it can be called a ‘premonetary theory
of value’ (Backhaus 1978, p. 17) which belongs to the same paradigm as
classical economists and neo-Ricardians of today.76
While for Mukai the ‘new paradigm’ was invented by Marx as a ‘qualitative
one’ – ‘… the qualitative side of value relation expresses a new theoretical
domain opened up byMarx’s analysis of the value-form’77 –Marx at times slips
back into a ‘substantialist’ quantitative view stuck in the Ricardian framework,
and locates the constitution of value in production, not exchange, according
to Mukai. In other words, Marx did not always clearly distinguish his own
‘premonetary’ from his ‘monetary’ theory of value. Yet, according to Mukai, at
times, the ‘monetary approach’, and especially its rejection of the ‘premonetary’
one, is clearly detectable – while the reader is left in the dark as to which cri-
73 Mukai 2014, p. 5. TheHeinrich quote is provided in German, translationmy own. Heinrich
1999, p. 13.
74 See Mukai 2014, pp. 3–4.
75 Marx 1976, p. 137.
76 Mukai 2014, p. 4. The quotes by Heinrich and Backhaus are given in German.
77 Mukai 2014, p. 4.
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teria this evaluation adheres to, as Mukai does not argue why certain texts, e.g.
the 1861–3 Economic Manuscripts, should have a more consistent ‘monetary’
approach. For reasons of space, let us limit the presentation towhat, forMukai,
is the most conclusive passages that show Marx’s standpoint of the overcom-
ing of the ‘old discourse’. Mukai quotes from the 1861–3 Economic Manuscripts
on Ricardo: ‘… this qualitative aspect of the matter which is contained in the
representation of exchange value as money, is not elaborated by Ricardo. This
circumstance – the necessity of presenting labour contained in commodities
as uniform social labour, i.e. as money – is overlooked by Ricardo’.78 To prove
his point, Mukai further quotes this decisive passage:
However, let us remember that commodities possess an objective charac-
ter as values (Wertgegenständlichkeit) only insofar as they are all expres-
sions of an identical social substance, human labour, that their objective
character as values is therefore purely social. From this it follows self-
evidently that it can only appear in the social relation between commod-
ity and commodity.79
WhatMarxpresents to the reader in these passages is the inherent linkbetween
the ‘human labour’ objectified in the commodities, and money, in which the
latter must represent all of these different labours as one ‘uniform social’ sub-
stance, as abstract labour. This is especially clear from the first quote Mukai
provides. Contrary to Mukai’s belief, however, Marx’s critique of Ricardo is not
motivated by the confrontation of a ‘premonetary theory of value’ with a ‘mon-
etary’ one, but by the desire to remind Ricardo of the quality of value, in that
it must be represented in uniform (or abstract) social labour – expressed as
money. Let us enhance thequoteMukai provideswith somecontext to seewhat
Marx really had in mind with his critique of Ricardo:
Ricardo’s mistake is that he is concerned only with the magnitude of
value. Consequently his attention is concentrated on the relative quant-
ities of labour which the different commodities represent, or which the
commodities as values embody. But the labour embodied in themmust be
represented as social labour, as alienated individual labour … This trans-
formation of the labour of private individuals contained in the commod-
ities into uniform social labour, consequently into labour which can be
78 Marx 1989, p. 318; orig. mega2ii/3.4., 1318 (Marx 1979). Original emphasis. Quoted inMukai
2014, p. 4, without the emphasis.
79 Marx 1976, pp. 138–9; orig. mew 23, p. 62 (Marx 2008), quoted in Mukai 2014, p. 4.
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expressed in all use values and canbe exchanged for them, this qualitative
aspect of thematterwhich is contained in the representation of exchange
value as money, is not elaborated by Ricardo. This circumstance – the
necessity of presenting labour contained in commodities asuniformsocial
labour, i.e. as money – is overlooked by Ricardo.80
Marx explicitly refers to money as ‘uniform social labour’ (‘uniform social
labour, i.e. money’), as the presentation of the labour contained in the com-
modities, which is necessary in order to obtain a uniform objective existence.
However, Ricardo’s mind is fully absorbed by, first, the analysis of the mag-
nitude of value, and second, the search for an ‘invariable measure’ of value. But
Marx had shown that the sole emphasis on the magnitudes of relative labour
quantities in the firstmisses the specific condition of possibility bywhichmag-
nitudes of value can even be compared to one another – uniform social labour,
expressed in money.81 The labour theory of value, for Marx, is nothing but the
theoryof money, and the analysis of money essentially comesdownto the labour
theory of value. The latter grounds both the quantitative and the qualitative
aspect of value, as the indicator of capitalist exchange relations, and the basis
on which different labours can be meaningfully exchanged with one another.
This is also the context in which Marx emphasises the necessity of money – as
demonstrated in the third particularity of the equivalent form – to invertedly
represent the product of individual private labour (and not self-determined
labour, as Carterlierwrongfully suggests) as directly social labour. In his critique
of Bailey’s nominalist theory of money –money as the ‘direct expression’ of the
ratio in which different use values exchange for one another – Marx notes:
… the labourwhich constitutes the substance of value is not only uniform,
simple, average labour; it is the labour of a private individual represented
in a definite product. However, the product as value must be the embod-
iment of social labour and, as such, be directly convertible from one use
80 Marx 1989, p. 318. Original emphasis.
81 The second misses that there is no need for an ‘invariable measure’ of value: the abstract
labour that is the substance of value is variable, because the working day is variable. His
unsuccessful search for an ‘invariablemeasure’ of value is precisely the contextwhich pre-
vented Ricardo from detecting the unequal exchange between capital and labour in the
variable proportions of necessary and surplus labour in an equally variable working day.
In other words: abstract or uniform social labour as the substance of value is an absolute,
not a relative determination, but it is equally variable, not invariable.While Ricardo’s critic
Bailey correctly refutes the necessity of an ‘invariable’ measure of value, he is of course
completely unaware of the reason for the necessity of a variable measure.
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value into any other … Thus the labour of individuals has to be directly
represented as its opposite, social labour; this transformed labour is, as its
immediate opposite,abstract, general labour, which is therefore represen-
ted in a general equivalent. … This necessity to express individual labour
as general labour is equivalent to the necessity of expressing a commodity
as money.82
Mukai however counterfactually insists on the irrelevance of the recourse to
abstract human labour for the phenomenology of money – even after quot-
ing these indeed relevant passages! To sustain his argument, he contrasts the
concept of ‘abstract human labour’ in the ‘physiological’ determination of
value with the concept of ‘abstract, general labour’ in the above quote to
claim that the former was a category of production, i.e. still attached to the old
‘embodied labour’-discourse of the classics, while the latter was a category of
the ‘new domain’, a category of exchange:
‘Abstract general labour’ herementioned as an opposite of private labour
is quite different from the above-mentioned ‘abstract human labour’. It
was newly created by Marx in order to clarify the secret of money, which
makes the different products of private labors in the market commen-
surable and reduce them to the same unit. ‘The equality of labor’ means
this commensurability, which does not exist before exchange, but emerges
only in exchange, correctly speaking, in the relation of the commodity to
money. As such an ‘abstract labor’ is ‘purely social’, it cannot be acquired
by imagining real human labor in production, e.g. the factory, and there-
fore its quantity cannot be measured by the duration of labor, but only by
money.83
However at no point does Marx say that value is constituted in exchange. To
the contrary: it is precisely the position Marx polemicised against. To main-
tain the opposite means to wittingly ignore Marx’s critique of the classics. It is
therefore difficult not to viewMukai’s reading as a consciousmisjudgement (or
ignorance) of Marx extensive discussion of 1.) Ricardo’s negligence of the sub-
stantial dimension of value in the social form of abstract-general human labour
represented bymoney, as shown above (‘abstract-general’ and ‘abstract human
labour’ are not two different concepts inMarx) and 2.) Bailey’s ignorance of the
82 Marx 1989 pp. 322–3; Marx 1979, p. 1322. Quoted in Mukai 2014, p. 4.
83 Mukai 2014, p. 4.
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simple fact that, if money ‘measures’ different heterogenous use values, a com-
mon denominator of these different use values becomes a logical prerequisite
for the comparison (tertium-problem), and this common denominator cannot
be money itself.
… for commodities to express their exchange value independently in
money, in a third commodity, the exclusive commodity, the values of com-
moditiesmust already be presupposed.84 Now the point is merely to com-
pare them quantitatively. A homogeneity which makes them the same –
makes them values – which as values makes them qualitatively equal,
is already presupposed in order that their value and their differences in
value can be represented in this way. For example, if all commodities
express their value in gold, then this expression in gold, their gold price,
their equation with gold, is an equation on the basis of which it is pos-
sible to elucidate and compute their value relation to one another, for
they are now expressed as different quantities of gold and in this way the
commodities are represented in their prices, as comparable magnitudes
of the same common denominator.
But in order to be represented in this way, the commodities must
already be identical as values.85
According to Bailey, it is not the determination of the product as value
which leads to the establishment of money and which expresses itself in
money, but it is the existence of money which leads to the fiction of the
concept of value.86
To claim that the common denominator is money itself, as Bailey, Uno, Ebit-
suka, Benetti/Cartelier, and Mukai do, is to identify substance and form,
essence and appearance – in sum, it means to identify what generates a phe-
nomenon, no matter how its appearance inverts the underlying constitution,
with thephenomenon itself. This becomesprevalent in thediscussionof Bailey’s
identification of valuewith its externalmeasure,money.Marx here neatly sum-
marises what it means to determine the value of a commodity by, first, the
quantity of labour inherent in it, and second, by the ‘value of labour’ that
produces it (a conflation originally produced by Smith, but prevalent also in
Bailey):
84 Emphasis added.
85 Emphasis added. Marx 1989, p. 321.
86 Marx 1989, p. 332. Original emphasis.
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In the first case one investigates the genesis and immanentnatureof value
itself. In the second, the development of the commodity into money or
the form which exchange value acquires in the process of the exchange
of commodities. In the first, we are concernedwith value, independent of
this representation, or rather antecedent to this representation. Baileyhas
this in commonwith the other fools: to determine the value of commodit-
iesmeans to find theirmonetary expression,AN EXTERNAL MEASURE
OF THEIR VALUES.87
It is precisely this conflation for which Marx called Bailey not only a ‘fool’, but
also a ‘Fetischdiener’ (‘fetish-worshipper’).88 It must however be asked whether
this characterisation does not also apply to Marx’s modern Marxist critics. As
though to further substantiate this, Mukai concludes:
It is true that the qualitative and the quantitative sides of Marx’s value
theory are incompatiblewith each other under developed capitalism. But
we need not make them compatible in a particular model, as Rubin did.
In order to understand the qualitative side completely, we should only
abandon the quantitative one, the labor theory of value.89
Accordingly, Mukai, like his peers, ignores the task of value form analysis, in
that it is the analysis of the necessity of the emergence of the money form as
universal equivalent from the defects of the expanded value form, measured in
different use values. Mukai does not understand this:
Where does value as ‘something purely social’ (etwas rein Gesellschaft-
liches) appear? Marx would say, ‘it can appear only in the relation of
commodity to commodity’.90 So he begins his analysis of the value-form
with the ‘simple form of value’: x commodity A = y commodity B. But why
not x commodity A = y money? In reality, we can find a direct relation of
commodity to commodity without money nowhere in today’s developed
87 Marx 1989, p. 341. Original emphasis. Note howMarx stresses that value were ‘antecedent’
to its representation in money.
88 Marx 1989, p. 317.
89 Mukai 2014, p. 4.
90 The question is indeed whether Marx would say this. In fact however, he has nowhere said
it. Mukai succumbs to the identification of value and value objectivity (Wertgegenständ-
lichkeit).
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commodity circulation … In this sense, Marx’s analysis of the value-form
beginning with x commodity A = y commodity B should be called a ‘pre-
monetary’ one.91
Like Uno,Mukaimistakes the analysis of the value form for an analysis of com-
modity exchange (or ‘circulation’).92 However, exchange is not the object of the
analysis (in fact it onlybecomes thematic inChapter 2, ‘TheExchangeProcess’).
The object of the analysis is the precondition of exchange, i.e. the money form:
how a commodity obtains general exchangeability against all the other com-
modities of the ‘whole world’ of commodities. The question is not whether 20
yards of linen actually do exchange for 1 coat, but what conditions a commodity
must fulfil in order to serve as the universal equivalent. In other words, it is the
analysis of the preconditions of exchange. However, Mukai’s rejection of the
alleged ‘premonetary’ character of value form analysis has a deeper, two-fold
motivation: if Marx’s ‘derivation’ of money from the commodity in the analysis
of the value form were illegitimate, following the Benetti/Cartelier paradigm,
then money cannot be a commodity:
Marx took over not only the labor theory of value, but also a theory
of money from classical economists – the commodity theory of money.
In his analysis of the value-form, therefore, it is presupposed without a
doubt that money is a commodity which has its own value and use-value,
and that a commodity becomes money as the result of exchanges. But as
Backhaus says, ‘The concept of a premonetary commodity (sic) should be
recognised as something impossible to think’.93
In his critique of readings that hypostatise amoney commodity inMarx, Hein-
rich has shown that Marx at no point assumes that money must necessarily be
a commodity.94 Mukai’s reading falls short by believing that the derivation of
91 Mukai 2014, p. 6.
92 For the problemof Uno’s reading of value form analysis as a theory of exchange, see Lange
2014.
93 Mukai 2014, p. 6. See Backhaus 2010, p. 150.
94 See e.g. Heinrich 1999, p. 233: ‘What [Marx] demonstrates is not the necessity of another
commodity to serve as the value expression, but that this value expression is incomplete
and defected, if it clings to a single, accidental commodity. By the value expression of one
commodity in another commodity, Marx demonstrates which requirements a value form
must fulfil in order to adequately express value.That the bearer of this value form itself be a
commodity, is not shown, but presumed from the beginning. Therefore, value form analysis
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money from the commodity form is the same as assuming that money must
necessarily ‘be’ a commodity. These however are two separate things, and their
conflation provides a truncated, if not outright wrong, reading of Marx’s ana-
lysis.
5.1.5 With Backhaus andHeinrich againstMarx? The ‘Historicist Turn’
and the Labour Theory of Value as Remnants of the ‘Old Discourse’
The argument of Marx’s alleged inability to breakwith the ‘old discourse’ is fur-
ther supported by Mukai’s claim that Marx ‘introduced’ historical elements in
the derivation of the value form, in that the emergence of moneywas ‘deduced’
from barter. Backhaus’s problematisation of the ‘popularisation of the present-
ation of the value form’ gives Mukai a buttress for his view. To prove that the
historicist turn was already introduced in the first edition of Capital, Mukai
quotes from the appendix:
Let us consider exchange between linen-producer A and coat-producer B.
Before they come to terms, A says: 20 yards of linen are worth 2 coats (20
yards of linen = 2 coats), but B responds: 1 coat is worth 22 yards of linen
(1 coat = 22 yards of linen). Finally, after they have haggled for a long time
they agree: A says: 20 yards of linen are worth 1 coat, and B says: 1 coat is
worth 20 yards of linen.95
Mukai follows:
This is the first step to the ‘historization of the logical’ (Historisierung des
Logischen, Backhaus)96 in the second edition.With the popularization of
the description as a turning point, his analysis of the value-form has been
reduced to a ‘story telling’ about ‘historical occurrences’ (‘Fabeleien über
Historisches’, Backhaus)97 – the genesis of money from barter. Although
he had quite a new answer from his analysis of the value-form, [Marx]
reverted to the old answer – the labor theory of value and the commodity
theory of money.98
provides the form determinations of the universal equivalent, but it does not provide an
argument whether the universal equivalent must be a commodity or not’.
95 See https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867‑c1/appendix.htm; Marx 1983,
p. 628.
96 See Backhaus 2011, p. 155.
97 See Backhaus 2011, p. 155.
98 Mukai 2014, p. 9. All quotes from Backhaus are in German.
uno’s legacy in japan and beyond 455
However, thequestion remainswhat thediagnosis of the ‘historisationof the
logical’ in the ‘popularised’ version of value form analysis is actually supposed
to prove. Commentators like Mukai and Backhaus – though his intervention is
more complex and metatheoretical, as we will see – seem not to be aware that
by admitting that Marx’s ‘historically grounded’ reformulation of value-form
analysis is owed not to a content-related reconsideration, but a reconsideration
of form (in order to make his analysis, e.g., more ‘reader-friendly’, i.e. to ‘pop-
ularise’ it), they have implicitly admitted that Marx’s original methodological
vantage pointwas indeed a systematic and logical one. It addresses the analysis
of the nexus between value andmoney in specifically capitalist societies.99 The
logical-historical interpretation, as Backhaus correctly sees, is therefore actu-
ally owed to amisunderstanding, even if it presents amisunderstandingwhose
scope Marx himself obviously was not aware of.
Morepertinent however isMukai’s appropriationof Backhaus’s intervention
for his ownends, the delegitimisationof the labour theory of value.While Back-
haus is often inconsistent (or rather indecisive, as we will see) towards Marx’s
own ‘monetary theory of value’, he stresses that the specific cognitive gain of
Marx’s intervention – and the new problem-horizon it provides, as opposed
to that of the classics – consists in having precisely demonstrated the neces-
sity of the money-value nexus. The labour theory of value therefore does not
present an opposition, but the necessary explanatory framework for the the-
ory of money. The appropriation of Backhaus’s intervention for Mukai’s ends –
notwithstanding Backhaus’s own ambiguities – is therefore utterly problem-
atic. In the following, we will briefly characterise Backhaus’s intervention and
stress what, for Backhaus, the specific cognitive interest in Marx’s theory is.
Already in his relatively early text ‘On the Dialectics of the Value Form’ (‘Zur
Dialektik der Wertform’, 1970), Backhaus, according to his overall methodolo-
99 Backhaus’s doubts towards a ‘purely logical’ reading are 1. the failure of the reception to
produce an ‘intersubjectively binding detailed definiton of the basic concepts’, which all
interpreters could agree on, and 2. the failure of the ‘logical reading’ to explain such a gross
misconception as that of Engels’s theory of ‘simple commodity production’. See Backhaus
2011, pp. 157–8. The question is whether these different interpretations can be ascribed
to the ‘logical’ reading, or not rather the opposite, its misreading. Backhaus’s claim to a
good theory is that it must deliver an ‘intersubjectively binding’ interpretation (Backhaus
2011, p. 191), an interpretation on which ‘consensus is to be obtained’ (ibid.), contain-
ing a ‘non-falsifiable’ theoretical core (Backhaus 2011, p. 192). The question is whether, in
the intellectual history of men and women, such a theory has ever existed – or indeed,
whether it will. That Marx’s, andMarx’s theory alone, should comply with such a claim, is
probably slightly unfair.
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gical standard of presenting a meta-theoretical evaluation of the reception of
Marx’s theory of value, holds that
[n]umerous authors ignore the claim of the labour theory of value to
derivemoney asmoney and thus to inaugurate a specific theory of money.
It is then no longer astonishing that these interpreters only present the
theory of value, but exclude or correct the theory of money and there-
fore become unable to make the difference between the classical and
the marxist (sic) labour theory of value plausible. They misconceive that
the basic concepts of value theory are only understood when they on
their part make the understanding of the money-theoretical basic con-
cepts possible. Value theory is adequately interpreted when the com-
modity is grasped in such a way that it posits itself in the process of
an ‘immanentmoving-beyond-itself ’ (imProzess eines ‘immanentenÜber-
sich-Hinausgehens’) as money. This inner nexus between value and money
forbids acceptance of the Marxian theory of value that simultaneously
disavows the theory of money posited with it.100
The ‘inner nexus between value and money’ is where, for Backhaus, Marx’s
advancement, indeed his breakwith the classical ‘labour theory of value’, must
be situated – and not, as some representatives of the post-Uno school (or
Benetti/Cartelier, for that matter) would have it, in the disavowal of the the-
ory of value in favour of a ‘monetary approach’. The opposition of the two
is a false one. The money-value nexus can only be disrupted at the risk of
jeopardising Marx’s specific intervention, and the misrecognition of the new
problem-horizon that his predecessors were not even aware existed: namely,
the specific social form of labour whose characteristic is to take on specific forms
of value, predominantly money. This question, tantamount to the question of
how fetishism is possible under the specifically capitalist mode of production,
is what guides Marx’s exegesis – and his critique.101 In Backhaus’s 1978 text,
Part iii of the ‘Materials’ (‘Materialien zur Rekonstruktion der MarxschenWert-
theorie’), the crucial theoretical distinction between Marx and the ‘classical’,
i.e. premonetary labour theory of value, but also to neoclassical, ‘subjectivist’
theories of value, is further delineated. Interestingly, Backhaus sees striking
parallels between the objectivist labour theory of value, and both its ‘logico-
100 Backhaus 2011, p. 45. Emphasis added.
101 It is all themore regrettable that an author like Backhaus, who identifies his work as being
ultimately guided by ‘the problem of fetishism’ (Backhaus 2011, p. 34), never applies this
claim to the actual theory he puts forward.
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historical’ and its ‘model-platonic’ variants, on the one hand, and subjectivist
theories of utility (subjektive Nutzenlehre) on the other. He presents them as
two sides of the same coin: ‘They tacitly and unreflectedly posit the logical per-
missibility of a procedure which abstracts from the “money veil” in order to be
able to interpret the result of this abstraction as amodel of a fictitious, or as the
structure of a historical, natural economy (Naturalwirtschaft), and ultimately
as the “essence” of modern monetary economy hidden beneath the “money
veil” ’.102 In other words, both the objectivist and the subjectivist premonet-
ary theories of value disregard (and therefore misconceive of) the constitutive
function of money for the functioning of capitalist social relations: they are
therefore paradigmatically theories of value without fetish. Instead, according
to Backhaus,
Marx was… concerned primarily with the evolution of the thesis that the
nexus between value and money must be comprehended as the nexus
between the ‘immanent’ and ‘appearing’ (erscheinend) measure of value,
[as the nexus] between the substance and form ‘of ’ value. Value therefore
cannot be thought as a premonetary substance existing for itself, which
is externally related to a third thing called money. Value does not exist
beyond and independently of its ‘adequate’ form of appearance … the
organic nexus of value and price has its theoretical expression in the fact
that value theory must be ‘sublated’ in a specific theory of money.103
Interestingly, Backhaus (unwittingly) rejects the claim made by Benetti/Car-
telier and also Mukai that Marx was unable to show the necessity of money
from the ‘development’ of the commodity form. According to Backhaus, in the
analysis of the value form, Marx precisely sets it as his task to demonstrate
that ‘the construction of an exchange process of premonetary commodities
must fail by necessity’.104 These are the ‘Defects of the total or expanded form
of value’ (Form ii), in which the ‘series of representations never comes to
an end’, and which is therefore ‘a motley mosaic of disparate and unconnec-
ted expressions of value’.105 Benetti/Cartelier, apart frommisrecognising value
form analysis as the explanandum of money, and not as an analysis of ‘barter’,
also underestimate its critical function: namely, to show that the failure of the
102 Backhaus 2011, p. 147.
103 Backhaus 2011, p. 150.
104 Backhaus 2011, p. 150.
105 Marx 1976, p. 156.
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hypothesis that commodities can relate to one another without an equivalent,
is fully intended. Also fully intended, therefore, is the presentation of money’s
genesis in which the ‘dazzling’ money form ‘leav[es] no trace [of the process
by whichmoney emerges] behind’.106 Taking no notice of Marx’s explicit refer-
ences to the ‘defect’ of Form ii, Benetti/Cartelier, Ebitsuka and Mukai take the
‘derivation’ of money from the commodity for a positivisticmodel in which the
latter is a direct ‘result’ of the former. The ‘monetarists’ declare Marx’s theory
of value bankrupt, fully unaware of Marx’s intent and method of showing the
necessity of money from the incompleteness of Forms i and ii.107
In sum, for Backhaus, Marx’s theory of value is constituted of four different
tasks:
1. the rationale (Begründung) and unfolding of value as the basis of the
determination of exchange relations (quantitative theory of value),
2. a critique of premonetary theories of value,
3. the rationale of a specific theory of money,
4. a critique of money theories corresponding to premonetary theories of
value, which proceed from the aporia of the separation between the or-
ganically interrelated categories of value and money.108
Especially the last of these must be regarded as Marx’s specific cognitive in-
terest, in refuting any ‘nominalist’, as well as ‘realist’ theory of money, taking
their vantage point from either symbol theories or functionalism (‘money as
facilitator of exchange’). However, as announced before, Backhaus is indeed
ambivalent in his own theorisation, so that it must be asked if his endeavour to
establish a ‘binding consensus’ in the history of the reception of Marx’s theory
of value is not rendered rathermore difficult by his own indecision. Here is also
the place to recapitulate the appropriation of Backhaus’s and Heinrich’s inter-
pretation for the purposes of rejecting labour theories of value. First, though,
wewill staywith Backhaus, beforemoving on to a striking problematic inHein-
rich.
106 Marx 1976, p. 187.
107 That this deeply Hegelianmotive inMarx’s analysis of the value form has gonemissing in
the interpretations of the post-Uno School and Benetti/Cartelier, should not be too sur-
prising now. Cartelier however sees the deliberate ignorance of ‘an alleged deeper level’
(Cartelier 1991, p. 260) as the specific advantage, not disadvantage, of his approach.
108 See Backhaus 2011, p. 151.
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5.1.6 The Conflation of Value and the Value Form, or: The ‘Original Sin’ of
Conventional Political Economy
The claim that Marx’s labour theory of value was a ‘residue’ of the discourse
of the classics, is an argument to be found in almost all newer discussions
of Marx’s value theory.109 We, however, think that this contention cannot be
upheld. It builds on the assumption that the classics had a ‘labour theory of
value’ at all, which we have refuted in Chapter 1. Only Marx, we argue, in fact
had a consistent, social, and consistently social labour theory of value at all. To
therefore claim that Marx’s labour theory of value as a theory of the quality
and the quantity of value is a ‘Classical residue in Marx’s value theory’ (Itoh),
‘derived from Classical political economy’ (Reuten), even a theorem that Marx
‘refused’ (Harvey), has no theoretical basis. Yet, even if the claim of the ‘old dis-
course’ prevailing in Marx can be successfully refuted – are the claims of the
nml thoroughly consistent with regard to the ‘organically interrelated categor-
ies of value and money’? To give an example: in the same text (the Materials
iii), Backhaus meanders between different conceptualisations of the ‘preval-
ence’ of money. Having just shown that the nexus between value and money,
and therefore the derivation of money from the commodity, must be thought
of as a critique of premonetary theories of value, he verges on digressing into
the nominalism he has just admonished – even though these considerations
are formulated very hypothetically:
If it can be proven that Marx’s path of the ‘development’ of the money
form of the commodity cannot be followed, then the category of money
will have to be accepted as the logical prius of economic theory, as the
basic concept irreducible by the means of economic analysis. It may
be hypostasised that value theoretical consequences follow from it. The
objectivist theory of value would lose its object if the objectivity of inter-
subjectively valid units of money can be provided.110
But Backhaus has already formulated the insight that money is not an ex-
planans: that, in his own words, the category of money is precisely not an ‘irre-
ducible basic concept’, but itself in need of an explanation – hence Marx’s task
to answer the ‘riddle’ of money. What is more, Backhaus in this passage seems
to confuse what an ‘objectivist’ theory of value could provide with whatmoney
109 Apart from the authorsmentionedhere, see Itō 1976, p. 312; Reuten 1993, p. 89;Arthur 2006,
p. 10; Harvey 2018, p. 1. Interestingly (or rather tellingly), these authors do not provide any
original source for their claims.
110 Backhaus 2011, p. 181.
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itself (‘intersubjectively valid units of money’) could provide.However, a theory
of B and B are not the same thing: even if these ‘intersubjectively valid units
of money’ exist objectively, they still require an explanation. This being given,
the theory of value would not lose its object, because money would still be
an explanandum. Backhaus seems to admit the epistemological dimension of
this problematic when he says: ‘Ultimately, the point is whether an “empirical
principle” is demanded to give an argument for the intersubjective validity of
economic unities’.111 One can therefore evade the impression of ambiguities in
Backhaus’s theory of money, verging on the neoclassical identification of value
with its external measure (money), only with difficulty.
Marx has time and again stressed that value, and with it, abstract labour,
is never constituted in exchange. To the contrary, the idea of a mere Form-
wechsel (change of form) from the commodity to money, or an interchange of
their specific locus in the exchange process being generative of value, is pre-
cisely the target of Marx’s critique.112 Yet, even prominent Marxist theorists
deeply engaged in reconstructing Marx’s theory of value, do not always suffi-
ciently delineate their distance to ‘exchange’ or ‘circulation’ theories of value.
We contend that the assumption that value is constituted in exchange relies
on a conflation of value and the value form, a conflation of Wert andWertgegen-
ständlichkeit. This conflation is unfortunately also to be found in Heinrich. In
The Science of Value, Heinrich quotes from the fetish chapter: ‘It is only by being
exchanged that the products of labour acquire a socially uniform objectivity as
values (Wertgegenständlichkeit), which is distinct from their sensuously varied
objectivity as articles of utility’.113 He comments: ‘In this sense, abstract labour
[i.e. the substance of value] is a specific social determination of labour that is
111 Backhaus 2011, p. 183.
112 The locus classicus of course being the chapter of the ‘Contradiction in the General For-
mula [M-C-M’]’: ‘Circulation, or the exchange of commodities, creates no value’. Marx
1976, p. 266. Marxist theorists often forget that M-C-M’ is the object of Marx’s critique, and
not a ‘neutral’ formula. The standpoint of the ‘neutral’ or ‘formal’ form is the standpoint
of conventional political economy. For this argument, see also Brentel 1989, pp. 244–5:
‘The ideological semblance of simple circulation precisely results from the fact that their
economic determinations appear to the immediately acting subjects, as well as their the-
oretical interpretors, as exlusively formal determinations … in themediating forms C-M-C
and M-C-M, simple circulation merely presents the “formal process” (Grundrisse, 919) of
mediating or realising both determinations of the commodity as use value and exchange
value in so far as these – polarly distributed to the extremes of the exchange process –
interchange with one another as money and the commodity … money as economic form
therefore seems to have no further content-related (inhaltlich) determination or rationale
than the mediating movement of simple circulation itself ’.
113 Marx 1976, p. 166, quoted in Heinrich 1999, p. 208.
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only brought about in exchange (erst durchdenTausch zustande kommt)’.114 But
Marx does not speak of value (Wert) in the quote Heinrich provides – instead,
he speaks of value objectivity (Wertgegenständlichkeit): the form inwhich value
becomes objective (gegenständlich), that is, as the value form of money. And
it is a matter of fact that ‘only by being exchanged’ the different labours can
appear as uniform labour in money.115Wertgegenständlichkeit therefore has to
be understood as the form of value, not value itself (Wert). This distinction is
crucial. Its neglect informs what wemight call the ‘original sin’ of conventional
political economy. If the systematic fetish-character of money and the further,
even more ‘mysterious’ forms of value (capital, profit, rent, interest, etc.) are
to be correctly understood and targeted in the nexus in which they constitute
the categories of political economy, it is essential to distinguish value and its
forms. And it is only the latter (the value form), as a necessary form of appear-
ance of the former (value) that has its locus in exchange. But it is precisely
because the ‘sphere of exchange is the only sphere known to the bourgeois
economist’, that their relation to value, i.e. the social form of labour in its con-
frontation with capital, is obfuscated. In consequence, to the naked, i.e. con-
ventional economist’s, eye, it is unclearwhat value has ‘got to do’ withmoney. If
accordingly, the constitutive conceptual difference of value and the value form
is collapsed, it is easy to conclude that value, andnot the value formofmoney, is
constituted in exchange. Marx, in his economy-critical work, especially in the
1861–3 Economic Manuscripts through Capital, has shown precisely this iden-
tification of the two to account for the fetishistic horizon, the ‘original sin’
114 Heinrich 1999, p. 209.
115 Throughout the following section ‘Value Objectivity’ (‘Wertgegenständlichkeit’) (Heinrich
1999, pp. 214–15), Heinrich identifies value and value objectivity.While Heinrich’s endeav-
our is in proving that value – a specific social relation – is constituted in exchange, he
exclusively refers to value objectivity: ‘Value objectivity … is assumed by the commod-
ity only under specific social relations (commodity production) and is therefore a social
property that however appears as an objective property, which constitutes the fetish char-
acter of the commodity. It is however essential that this social property only exists in the
social relation between commodities, i.e. in exchange’. Heinrich 1999, pp. 215–16. This is
true as far as value objectivity, i.e. the value form, is concerned. But, in line with Marx’s
overall argument reconstructed above, it is wrong as far as value is concerned. It seems
odd that Heinrich conflates the question of value’s necessary appearance (as Vergegen-
ständlichung) with the cause of the same, i.e. the specificity of the social form of labour
under capitalist productive relations – despite his attempt to emphasise the latter. His
argument about the specificity of abstract labour in the capitalist mode of production
therefore only goes halfway. (That value objectivity is constituted in exchange is uncon-
tentious to our interpretation.)
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of bourgeois political economy. As we have shown, his critique of Bailey, but
also of Ricardo, is pertinent here.
That said, however, neither Backhaus’s nor Heinrich’s interventions are
attempts to discard (or ‘abandon’, as Mukai suggests) the theory of value. It is
quite the opposite: an understanding of how deeply the theory of money pen-
etrates the theory of value – and vice versa. Consequently, their appropriation
byMukai, as well as other Japanese theorists working in value theory since the
1990s towards a position that rejects Marx’s core critical theorem, is indeed
rather difficult to defend. While it is true that the labour theory of value is the
vantage point for any meaningful analysis of the fetishistic forms of value in
the capitalist mode of production, this does notmean itmust be separated from
the theory of money. To the contrary, it is precisely because the labour theory
of value is the methodological and analytic heuristic – the ‘tool’ – to unravel
the forms that value takes, paradigmatically money, that it presents the theory
of money. This is how the ‘monetary theory of value’ must be understood – and
this has nothing to do with ‘embodied’ theories of labour.
It is, however, difficult to diffuse the suspicion that, by the appropriation
of the nml to delegitimise the labour theory of value – attempts which we
can also find in the Benetti/Cartelier paradigm andwhich they ironically share
with their neo-Ricardian ‘adversaries’ – a new framework can be found in an
attempt to delegitimise Marx’s critique of the capitalist mode of production.
That withoutMarx’s critique, themost holistic and concise analysis of the cap-
italist mode of production that we have even today, we would be thrown into a
kind of ‘stone age of cognition’ as to themode of socialisation in whichwe now
live, is hopefully shown to be obvious. Yet, authors working in the post-Uno
school seem to concentrate their energies on precisely this kind of deconstruc-
tion, whatever their motives. It may, however, just be that with their emphasis
on the category of the ‘market’ as economic object, the ‘monetary approach’
with its nominalist, Baileyan identification of value/price and money, and the
declaration of the predominance of ‘circulation’ over ‘production’, these the-
ories have long succumbed to the fetishisms of the bourgeois relations of pro-
duction they, or so we at least like to believe, must have questioned at some
point.
5.2 The ‘Dialectic of Capital’ as the Apologetic of Capital in the
Anglophone Uno School
As we have seen in Chapters 3 and 4, the analysis of Uno’s reconstruction of
Marx’s Critique of Political Economy as the critique of capitalist relations of
production provided the following results:
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– the reference to the framework of methodological individualism implied in
the reinterpretation of value form analysis as structurally depending on the
personal ‘wants’ of commodity owners,
– thebasic concept of capital derived frommerchant capital, i.e. ‘buying cheap
and selling dear’ (arbitrage),
– an understanding of ‘social reproduction’ unhinged from the exploitation of
alien and unpaid labour,
– the reinterpretation of the ‘law of value’ as the law of general equilibrium of
supply and demand,
– the dismissal of a concept of crisis in favour of a concept of business cycles
consolidating that equilibrium,
– the dismissal of labour values in favour of market-regulated price as a) the
‘solution’ to the problem of the transformation of labour values into prices
of production and b) the ‘real enactment’ of the law of value in which values
and prices of production coincide.
In sum, these results can be diagnosed as the hypostatisation of use value
as the primary locus of capitalist economic mediation, which implies Uno’s
theoretical proximity to the paradigms of classical, and consequently (albeit
more problematically) neoclassical economy, in its acceptance of a ‘harmoni-
ous’ interplay of factors of production and consumption, in which the aim of
capitalist production is the satisfaction of ‘needs’. Aswehavepreviously shown,
Uno’s theory of value and money is basically informed by the methodological
framework of marginalism and shares its core features – methodological indi-
vidualism; functionalism (‘money is what money does’); the understanding of
capital as not primarily defined in its contradictory relation to labour, but in
being a ‘commodity economy’; and the vantage point of surplus value produc-
tion not primarily in the exploitation of living labour, but other factors, such
as arbitrage. Marx’s predominant Problemstellung, namely the capitalist pro-
duction process itself, whose objects, the categories of conventional political
economy, assume their fetish-character by disavowing the problem of abstract
living labour and its unequal exchange with capital, remains a theoretical side-
line in Uno. Most of all, however, the prevalence of the idea of general equi-
librium as the ‘enactment’ of the law of value, balanced social reproduction,
and the structural impossibility of crisis within the framework of ‘pure theory’,
are detrimental to Marx’s critique of the prevailing social mode of produc-
tion.
The general aim of this chapter (5.2.) is to present and problematise the
relatively recent receptionof Uno’sworkby theAnglophoneUnoSchoolwhich,
for reasons of their sheer prolificness, we identify rather reductively with the
works of Thomas T. Sekine and his best-known follower, Robert Albrit-
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ton.116 By evaluating which of Uno’s theorems have been emphasised in this
line of reception, we in turn investigate its specific interest in Marxian theory
and how it served to produce an independent theorisation of Marx’s legacy.
We can here identify a central problemwhich has already confronted us in the
analysis of Uno’s intervention: the capital relation, i.e. the confrontation of cap-
ital and labour, is not understood as the object and target of critique, but as a
‘logical’ and transparent entity, devoid of any problematic as to the inversion
of capital’s own self-presentation in the rationalisations in bourgeois economy
and its real basis in the social form of labour, i.e. the problem of fetishism. In
this perspective, indeed, ‘[c]apital… cannot lie to us or deceive us’.117 Therefore,
despite its claims of presenting, in the case of Sekine, a ‘Critique of Bourgeois
Economics’,118 this interventionmust much rather be characterised as capital’s
apologetic, as will be shown in this chapter. For a large part, this is owed to the
invocation of the term ‘law of value’ as a central analytical category in this line
of reception. Following Uno, the ‘law of value’ in Sekine’s perspective indic-
ates balanced and evenly distributed production and the general equilibrium
of supply and demand as the core feature of capitalist reproduction,119 not the
sustenance of capital through increasingly crisis-ridden forms of exploitation
and appropriation of living labour as its basic condition. It therefore betrays a
euphemistic and apologetic outlook on the concept of capital as the ‘god of our
own “economic motives” ’ in the style of Feuerbachian anthropomorphism, in
combination with an asocial, idealist, and arguably ‘rational choice’-inspired
‘utility maximising’ conception of the individual:
According to Feuerbach, God did not create us in his image, rather it is we
who create him in our image… If … these wonderful attributes of ours, or
human essences, as Feuerbach calls them, aremade infinite and absolute,
and extrapolated as attributes of an entity beyond us, we have created
God … Similarly, I would say that we, finite human beings, are all to some
extent greedy and acquisitive, avoid waste and pursue efficiency (sic),
wish to accumulate material wealth, etc.; in short, we maximise gains
and minimise losses. But we never do so infinitely. Let these ‘economic
116 Othermembers include John R. Bell, John Simoulidis, RichardWestra.We have referred to
their works in Chapters 3 and 4. See References for the major publications by Sekine and
Albritton.
117 Sekine 2013 (1999), p. 188.
118 This is the title of Sekine’s collection of essays from 1980–2013 (Sekine 2013).
119 ‘The lawof value…cannever be adequately accounted for except in light of a general equi-
librium of the capitalist economy, in which resources are presumed optimally allocated
(sic) to all branches of production.’ Sekine 2013 (1999), p. 191.
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motives’ be made infinite and absolute, and be extrapolated in an entity
beyondourselves (sic). Thenwehave created ‘capital’. In otherwords, cap-
ital is the god of our own ‘economic motives’.120
Consequently, the de-problematisation of capital as a social relation in the
Anglophone Uno-School leads to an unconscious conflation of what is called
the ‘dialectic of capital’ with the idea of pre-established harmony, reflected
in the (mis-)use of ‘law of value’ as ‘balanced’ conditions of reproduction –
and hence the rejection of the inherent crisis-ridden character of capital, the
rejection of Marx’s analysis of surplus value as the direct exploitation of liv-
ing labour as the point of reference, and, ultimately, the problem of ‘labour’
remaining external to its analysis. Capital’s fundamental dependence on forms
of appropriation of living labour without an equivalent remains unaddressed
in Sekine’s approach.
We do not only ascribe this insufficient awareness of the Problemstellung
with regard to the law of valorisation (rather than the euphemistically named
‘law of value’) to a lack of awareness of the contradiction between dead labour
(capital) and living labour as the source of (surplus) value. We also detect a
radical divergence of the pragmatic and the semantic aspects of Sekine’s and
Albritton’s contentions, or, in common parlance, a divergence between the
assertion and the reality of their claims. First, we will evaluate Sekine’s posi-
tion, followed by an evaluation of Albritton’s central works and claims.
5.2.1 Sekine’s Idealisation of Capital
Like that of Itoh Makoto around the same period, the work of Sekine, who
studied with Uno and came to accept a position at York University in the
late 1970s, helped to introduce Uno’s theory to a non-Japanese audience for
the first time. His English publications, such as ‘Uno-Riron: A Japanese Con-
tribution to Marxian Political Economy’ (1975) and ‘An Uno School Seminar
on “The Theory of Value” ’ (1984–5)’ arguably contributed to the reshaping of
questions of basic Marxian methodology and value theory to include a wider,
non-European or US scholarly reception. His translation of Uno’s Principles
in 1980 arguably gave Uno’s theory and attempt to reconstruct Marx’s Capital
the greatest impact. Unlike Uno, however, Sekine sees his specific contribution
in having established a correlation between the methodological architecture
of the tri-partite structure of Hegel’s Logic and Marx’s Capital that ‘[o]nly the
120 Sekine 2013 (1994), p. 7.
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Unoist approach’121 has adequately articulated. In Sekine’s view, therefore, in
the Principles, ‘Uno treats the theory of a purely capitalist society in the three
doctrines of circulation, production and distribution in just the same way as
Hegel expounds his Logic in the three doctrines of being, essence, and the
notion’,122 which can be considered a more rigorous systematisation of Marx’s
structure. Central to this understanding is that Uno’s doctrine of distribution
(bunpairon) ‘shows how the capitalist mode of production develops and regu-
lates its ownmarket so as to produce all use-values that are socially needed in a
manner that ismost satisfactory to the self-adopted claim of capital’,123 thereby
short-circuiting the alleged pre-establishedharmony of capitalist reproduction
with a certain understanding of the Hegelian ‘Absolute’.124
Before we come to understand the idealistic hypostasis of Sekine’s concept
of capital, we must note that Sekine’s work, unlike that of Itoh and despite its
alleged Hegelian habitus, addresses a non-academic audience. This is evident
in terms of both style and content: the introductory and schematic charac-
ter of explanations,125 the use of simple (if not overly simplifying) examples
and language,126 the lack of reference to original sources, the often anecdotal
121 Sekine 2013 (1994), p. 2.
122 In the appendix to Uno 1980, pp. 147–8.
123 Ibid., p. 148.
124 In this context, see also: ‘Here the dialectic of “capital” replaces the dialectic of the Abso-
lute; with Marx “capital” plays the same role as Hegel’s Absolute …’ Sekine 1986, p. 39,
quoted in Versieren 2018, p. 220.
125 A schoolbook-style explanation of the difference between ‘natural’ and ‘social sciences’
forms the introduction to at least three of Sekine’s essays (see Sekine 2013, pp. 4–6; Sekine
2013, pp. 13–16; Sekine 2013, pp. 35–41). In these, we hear that ‘[f]or instance, we may be
able to predict, with a fair degree of accuracy, that an earthquake of a certain magnitude
is about to occur in a given region …We cannot, however, stop the earthquake itself from
occurring … In summary, we can never know nature from inside out.We can only observe
it from the outside to learn the regularity of its motion in various specific contexts, and
conjecture what it might do next. Since we cannot get to the Ding-an-sich … of nature,
we had better conform to its motion wisely and subtly, without becoming too arrogant …
This wisdom, however, does not apply, as soon as we put “society” in place of “nature” in
the above argument. Society is that which we ourselves make up. We are its creator, and
we are (or ought to be) fully privy to its inner logic’. Sekine 2013 (1994), pp. 4–5. Original
orthography. Note also that with this transhistorical view of society, the specificity of cap-
italist societies, in which ‘the process of production has mastery over man’ (Marx 1976,
p. 175) akin to a force of nature, as well the ‘socio-natural properties’ (Marx 1976, p. 165) of
commodities which account for their fetishism, remains unaddressed.
126 ‘Dialectic, however, never claims that A and Ā’ are simultaneously true. It merely says that
if Mr. Jones is a husband, that does not prevent him from being a son, a father, an uncle, a
brother, a cousin, etc. of someone other than his wife’. Sekine 2013 (1980), p. 47.
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style in which certain claims are upheld,127 and, last but not least, the missing
engagement with other schools of thought, especially in the Hegelian Marx-
ist vein, whose arguments might or might not reflect or situate Sekine’s own
work. It is striking that Sekine at no point seems to find it necessary to engage
with the efforts of the Neue Marx-Lektüre, Postone, or even the Althusserian
problematisation of Hegelian Marxism in discussing his own idiosyncratic
parallelisation of Hegel’s and Marx’s system, despite the common rejection
of the logical-historical method and the delineation from traditional Marx-
ism.128 His engagementwith related positions is limited to a critical response to
Chris Arthur’s original critical engagement with the Uno School’s conception
of money and exchange.129 Pointing out the non-academic character of Sek-
ine’s writings should however not make the reader prone to take less seriously
his high claims to interpreting the ‘dialectic of capital’ as a self-sustaining and
enhancing system in the vein of Hegel’s ‘absolute spirit’. If anything, it should
make the reader more sensitive to it. For we detect a considerable gap in Sek-
ine’s (and, aswewill see, Albritton’s) fairly high claims of the ‘Dialectic, or Logic
that Coincides with Economics’ and the very validity of this claim in aMarxian
framework. In fact, we contend that Sekine’s idiosyncratic interpretation of the
concept of capital raises no suspicions of having been developed in a Marxian
framework at all – including, pertinently, capital as a form of value emerging
from the conditions of unequal exchangebetween itself and labour on thebasis
of the appearance of equivalent exchange, i.e. as a specifically conditioned and
contradictory social relation, presupposing class society as the specific relation
of production.The rejection of the very core of Marx’s analysis, i.e. the rejection
of what is arguably the defining feature of Marx’s intervention against classical
political economy, further consolidates this lack of engagement with Marx’s
problem-setting. The height of this misconception can be found in Sekine’s
almost alienating assertion that ‘themorewe study economics, themore “capital-
127 ‘In the course of my training as an economist I have learned that true economic theory
should take the formof thedialectic of capital,whose structure is amirror imageof Hegel’s
logic. My reason for writing this essay is to explain to you what all that means. With this
preamble-caveat, I wish to beginwith a personal episode relatingmewithHegel…’ Sekine
2013 (2003), p. 12.
128 Versieren’s claim that Sekine, in his latest contributions, ‘also underlines his differences in
conceptualizing totalitywithAdorno,NeueMarx-Lektüre and NewDialectic– threeHegel-
ianized interpretations of Marx’s Capital’ can – with the exception of Sekine’s response to
Chris Arthur – not be confirmed.
129 See Arthur 2006 and Sekine’s response in the same journal (Capital and Class) in 2009.
See Sekine 2013 (2009), pp. 163–84.
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ist”we tend tobecome. OnlyKarlMarxknew this danger fromthebeginning, and
thus undertook to criticise that “opium-like” science of political economy’.130
For Sekine, as briefly summarised above, capital is nothing ‘outside of us’,
but, analogous to Feuerbach’s anthropomorphism of God, the extension and
extrapolation of our own economic interests and motives: ‘To understand the
logic of capital, we only have to ask ourselveswhatwe, as economicman,would
do in this or that situation’.131 The ‘fundamental core of economic theory’, for
Sekine, is therefore ‘the definition of capitalism by capital itself ’,132 or method
copying, as he calls it elsewhere. This includes the detection of capital’s own
laws, i.e. that of general equilibrium, not by the ‘experimental, trial-and-error
method’ of the natural sciences, but ‘by introspection’. As though this reference
to the realm of religion were not sufficiently unsettling, Sekine further mobil-
ises hyper-idealisticmotives as the ‘method’ bywhich to gain access to capital’s
functioning. Let us see how.
An important aspect in Sekine’s, as inUno’s, concept of capital as a totality, is
its relation to ‘use-value space’, in such away that use value can never be totally
subsumed to the totalising demands of capital.We have already problematised
Uno’s idea of the ‘constraint of use value’ in Chapters 2 to 4 in relation to Uno’s
principal failure to sufficiently conceptualise the threefold inversion taking
place in the equivalent form of value, i.e. money, as well as in Uno’s Ricardian
understanding of premonetary social reproduction in which capitalist society
basically hinges on the fulfilment of demand in terms of use value, not in terms
of value, that is, moneyed demand. For Sekine, capital must however ‘presup-
pose an ideal use-value space’.133 This has little to do with understanding the
necessity of monetary mediation, but rather with capital’s self-idealisation, the
insight into which allegedly allows us to understand the ‘method’ of capital’s
dialectic, or logic.
A use-value space is ideal when no part of it resists or exceeds subsump-
tion under the logic of capital. Only by presupposing such an ideal use-
value space, can we let capital synthesize pure capitalism, the theoretical
definition of capitalism. Theway inwhich this kind of economic theory is
synthesized is, in fact, quite simple. In this ideal use-value space, we need
130 Sekine 2013 (1994), p. 6. Italics in the original. This use of decontextualised and arbitrary
quotes, without providing the original source, is another feature of Sekine’s populist sci-
entific approach.
131 Sekine 2013 (1994), p. 7.
132 Sekine 2013 (1994), p. 7.
133 Sekine 2013 (2003), p. 19.
uno’s legacy in japan and beyond 469
only specify a particular situation or context, before asking capital, ‘Now
what do youwant to do?’We always get the right answer from capital, and
economic theory is no more than an ordered totality of such answers.134
As though this assertion were not already deeply set in the framework of a
Fichtean identitarian idealism (which Hegel has fiercely objected to), Sekine
expands the idealistic hyperbole to the individual, culminating in Novalis-style
romantic metaphysics:
But how do we know that capital’s answer is always true? Because the
truth is already in ourselves. Recall that capital originated in us before
it transcended us. Since capital is our ‘economic motives’ made infinite,
we are in fact asking the question of ourselves and answering it. There is
nothing inside ourselves that we do not know.135
We shudder to thinkwhatMarx, whosewit and scathing criticism far surpasses
our own, would have made of these claims. Certainly we must halt to ask what
bearing this combination of naive romanticism and dogmatism has on the
critique of political economy. Yet, for Sekine ‘[o]nly when we see the whole
body of economic theory as the definition of capitalism by capital itself, i.e.,
as the logic of capital the unfolding of which constitutes capitalism, do we
understand how the structural (or equilibrium) aspect of it and the dynamic
(or cyclical) aspect of it can be brought together into a unified system. This
we call the dialectic of capital’.136 Equilibrium instead of the necessary rupture
between (over-)production and moneyed demand, and cyclical operations of
the market instead of the inherent tendency to the increasingly exacerbating
crisis, as problematised in Uno’s approach in Chapter 4, accordingly become
the hallmark of this line of interpretation, for which Sekine explicitly claims
Uno’s legacy: ‘It is the signal accomplishment of Kōzō Uno (1897–1977) to have
understood Marx’s Capital as essentially a book of the dialectic of capital’.137
The difficulty here arises in reconciling such a reading with what Marx actu-
ally proposed, due to the lack of e.g. references to the source that Sekine claims
as authoritative to his interpretation – i.e., Capital and Marx’s other critical-
economic writings. Similarly underdeveloped are critical engagements with
texts that might further substantiate Sekine’s idiosyncratic perspective.
134 Sekine 2013 (2003), p. 20.
135 Sekine 2013 (2003), p. 20.
136 Sekine 2013 (1994), p. 8. Emphasis in the original.
137 Sekine 2013 (1994) p. 8.
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The non-fulfilment of even the most minimal scientific standards notwith-
standing, Sekine’s view of the law of value as the ‘law’ of general equilibrium
becomes the defining feature of his economic theory, i.e. the ‘dialectic of cap-
ital’. In it, the production of surplus value is not denied, but it is understood
to complement the law of equilibrium, and not to contradict or considerably
unsettle it. The price-value divergence must hence be ‘corrected’ in such a
way that, ultimately, prices regulate balanced production and demand through
their fluctuations on the market, in which labour values no longer exert any
influence on real price formation. By discarding the problematic of surplus
value and profit as the unpaid labour time of total social production, unpaid
labour appears as paid labour in Sekine’s approach, without any means to dis-
cern how this very transformation could have taken place. However, as shown
in Chapter 4.3., in the context of the theory of profit, Marx’s intention is no
longer to explain the origin of surplus value, but the appearance of capital as
self-valorising, or, in Heinrich’s words, ‘how the origin of profit becomes invis-
ible’,138 i.e. how the appropriation of unpaid labour can appear as paid labour
in total social production. This cognitive interest is beyond Sekine, for whom
the labour theory of value is no longer the determining framework by which
the discrepancy of value and price, but also that of paid and unpaid labour,
can be accounted for as soon as labour values assume the form of produc-
tion price. Sekine’s intention much rather is to explain the ‘law of value’ as the
law of equilibrium price formation on the market, where value ‘is that which
expresses itself as a price in the sphere of circulation and that which consists
of abstract (in the sense of “socially-necessary”) labour in the sphere of pro-
duction.’ However, this explanation is tautological: according to Sekine, labour
values automatically become prices of production by the workings of the ‘law
of value’, which is however at no point derived from a set of assumptions not
already presupposing what is supposed to be explained. The tautological char-
acter of Sekine’s approach is further exacerbated by his decision to explain the
substance of value by ‘the real cost that society bears in producing it in terms of
the expenditure of productive labour’.139 In this view, the substance of value is
the ‘real cost’ of its own production, value is explained by its ‘cost’, and cost by
‘value’. The vague notion of ‘society bearing costs’ completely evades the class
character constitutive for this kind of production. The extraction and appro-
priation of alien unpaid labour is anathematic to Sekine’s theory.
138 Heinrich 1999, p. 283.
139 Sekine 2013 (1999), p. 195.
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In this context, Sekine criticises the ‘non-equilibrium’ approach of Marx-
ist economists who insist that value and prices (prices of production) do not
converge, but that the sum total of unpaid labour time is directly proportional
to the total sum of profits. They therefore do not abandon Marx’s axioms for-
mulated in Chapter 9 of Capital Volume iii and can simultaneously account
for capital’s false appearance as ‘self-valorising’. In the following, we will set
Sekine’s equilibrium approach in contrast to one of the ‘non-equilibrium’ ap-
proaches he criticises, developed by Duncan Foley, Gérard Duménil, and Alain
Lipietz in the early 1980s.140 Here, the concept of the ‘value of money’, or in
later terminology melt, upholds the labour theory of value as the sine qua
non frame of reference for showing that, in the problematic surrounding the
‘transformation problem’, ‘the proportionality of profit and unpaid labor time
in the face of any deviations of prices from labour values’, are ‘retained’.141
This theory in our view has at least three advantages over Sekine’s, in that it
is a) monetary (defining capitalist production as specifically capitalist, i.e., not
mediated by use values), b) defining, explaining and solving the value-price
deviation without abandoning the necessity of this deviation, and c) retain-
ing class struggle as historically specific to the capitalist mode of production.
The explicit reference to the labour theory of value as the defining framework
undertaken in Foley’s approach is not only missing from Sekine, but emphat-
ically rejected, in that he dissolves the ‘non-equilibrium’ inherent to the value-
price deviation and the deviation between supply and moneyed demand into
the pre-established harmony of ‘balanced production’ and an understanding of
the law of value as reflected in optimal or equilibriumprice. Here, themeaning
of ‘socially necessary labour time’ is no longer tied to the ‘optimal allocation
of unpaid labour’ through intersectoral competition of firms (and, to a lesser
extent, demand) and its effect on price formation, but euphemistically referred
to as the optimal allocation of resources for balanced production in which sup-
ply and demand are regulated by the market, and in which crises can and do
not occur. This problematic shall be addressed in the following.
5.2.2 General Equilibrium and the Linearity of Capital
According to Sekine,
[o]ne of the commonest claims that Marxists make is that economics
should stress the instability and not the equilibrium of the capitalist eco-
140 For reasons of space, we must limit our commentary to Foley’s work.
141 Foley 1982, p. 37.
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nomy because the latter is a ‘contradictory’ system doomed to automatic
breakdown. According to such a claim, ‘equilibrium’ is nothingmore than
a false vision of capitalism, complacently entertained by the bourgeoisie,
and should have no place in Marxist economic analysis.142
The reason why Marxist theorists reject the equilibrium approach is not, as
Sekine thinks, the belief in capitalism’s ‘automatic breakdown’, or, as he states
further down the page, the belief in ‘Nostradamus-style’ prophecies about the
‘future of human civilisation’, but equilibrium’s blindness to capital’s incess-
ant accumulation of abstract wealth in the form of profit on the one pole
and, by this very process, the simultaneous creation of conditions for labour’s
increasing redundancy, in the form of superfluous industrial reserve army and
its subforms (the precariat, the surplus population), on the other. This fun-
damental contradiction, which is much more likely to characterise the law of
value as the law of crisis than of ‘general equilibrium’, is a dynamic inherent to
the verymodeof productionwhoseultimate raisond’être is neveruse value, but
value, embodied in money or abstract wealth. Money here marks the very cleft
between capital’s necessity of self-valorisation and the laws of its realisation.
As long as the specificity of a particular mode of production does not consist
in producing commodities thatmeet demand, but only commodities thatmeet
moneyed demand, this contradiction will be constitutive for its mode of oper-
ation.
Conceptually, capital therefore operates on the logic of its own contradic-
tion, a contradiction that is exacerbated by historical progress.We have shown
the operations of this dynamic in Chapter 4 and contrasted it with Uno’s thesis
of the law of value as the law of general equilibrium. Sekine’s strange disavowal
of this logic of capital and the invocation of capital’s logic as ‘being for the
best’ of capital does not even acknowledge that this ‘dialectic’ (which is in
fact closer to the Fichtean concept of identity) does not even apply to cap-
ital’s own terms of operation. The development of the forces of production and
its increasing contradiction with the relations of production is factual, both
logically and empirically. For instance, the increasing hyper-inflation of busi-
nesses developing computerised applications for saving labour costs for major
companies since the 2010s (abb, Rockwell Automation, Allen-Bradley, Cognex
Corporation, etc.) has spawned an economy-onto-itself, which is no less safe
from crisis tendencies than the ‘real economy’ it helps to ‘optimise’. Capital
does activate its powers to ‘tear down all barriers’ to accumulation, but pre-
142 Sekine 2013 (1999), p. 191.
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cisely by doing this and inventing ever so intricate business models to enhance
this process, it reaches its inner limits: all of these ever so innovative models,
being of the logic of capital, stand or fall with the valorisation of labour. This is
a tendency that is both very real as well as grounded in the deeper, very contra-
dictory logic of capital’s secular tendency to crisis.
For Sekine however, the ideal model of the ‘dialectic of capital’ which by
no means is ‘only a theoretical fiction’143 fundamentally rests on the precon-
dition of 1) an ideal use value space (in which use values are ‘controlled or
“neutralised”; that is to say, rendered in thought more amenable to the logic of
capital’144 than they ‘actually’ are), and 2) the limitless availability of labour-
power. These being given, capital can operate according to its own logic of
inherent equilibrium, allocate productive ‘resources’ and ultimately produce
all commodities in accordance with their ‘socially necessary labour time’, or
value, which then simply coincides with their production price:
The law of value, after all, can never be adequately accounted for except
in the light of a general equilibrium of the capitalist economy, in which
resources are presumed optimally allocated (sic) to all branches of pro-
duction. In the dialectic of capital, a state of general equilibrium exists
when no commodity is either overproduced or underproduced relative to
the existing pattern of social demand, i.e., when all commodities are cap-
italistically produced in their socially necessary (i.e. equilibrium) quant-
ities. In such a state, capital allocates the productive resources available
to society ‘optimally’ to all branches of production, in which a uniform
rate of profit prevails. In such a state all commodities will be exchanged
one for another at their respective production-prices, while embodying
nomore or less than the socially necessary labour for their production as
value.145
If one were to think that the discrepancy to Marx’s critical cognitive interest
in capital’s logical convulsions could not be stronger at this point, capitalism,
for Sekine, is sufficiently defined by equilibrium production. In fact, for Sekine,
if empirically a state of equilibrium cannot be accounted for, then ‘the eco-
nomy, which fails to embody the definition of capitalism (sic), cannot be a
capitalist one’.146 At the same time, it is true that capital accumulation must
143 Sekine 2013 (1999), p. 192.
144 Sekine 2013 (1999), p. 191.
145 Sekine 2013 (1999), p. 192.
146 Sekine 2013 (1999), p. 192.
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undergo ‘cycles’, i.e. a ‘special macro-mechanism’ that ensures ‘the continued
existence of capitalism’.147 This, for him, is the ‘law of relative surplus popu-
lation’ that, by the expulsion of workers superfluous relative to the demands
of capital, ensures the sustenance of capital’s functioning (i.e. further accumu-
lation) through the depressive phase of the business cycle, as we have seen in
Uno in 4.4. It is crucial to Sekine that the interchange of cycles in the ‘widening’
or ‘prosperity’ phase (absorption of labourers) and ‘deepening’ or ‘depression’
phase (expulsion of labourers) relative to the demands of capital makes cap-
ital steadfast against real crises of valorisation. The relation between social
change and crisis for Sekine is therefore entirely arbitrary: ‘A crisis can lead
to a revolution for contingent reasons but not as a necessary consequence of
the operation of the logic of capital’.148 It is as though the whole conceptual
problematic of the production of relative surplus value is beyond the scope of
Sekine’s interest. Sekine’s is precisely not a dialectical, but a linear conceptual-
isation of capital.
This becomes even clearer in Sekine’s concept of surplus value, which ulti-
mately discards Marx’s theoretical framework and resorts to the conception
of ‘profit as arbitrage’ (or ‘profit upon alienation’) of the classics that Marx so
fiercely objected to. In the context of the critique of the neoclassical economic
notion of ‘utility maximisation’ or ‘substitution’, which Sekine contrasts with
his concept of general equilibrium as the ‘enactment’ of the law of value, he
claims:
The general equilibrium in the capitalist market (sic) results from the
mercantile behaviour of ‘buying cheap and selling dear’ any commodity,
i.e. from the indifferent act of ‘arbitrage’ on the part of the capitalist, and
not from the consumer’s act of substituting one use-value for another.
A merchant, which the capitalist most certainly is, shifts any commod-
ity from where the demand for it is low to where the demand for it is
high by the capitalist act of arbitrage, so that the available commodities
in the market are reshuffled and shifted to where they are most needed
by society. If production is also involved, capital sees to it that the most
needed and wanted commodities are produced first, allocating society’s
productive resources optimally to all industries. In other words, a general
equilibrium of the capitalist market is achieved by the mercantile act of
arbitrage.149
147 Sekine 2013 (1999), p. 192.
148 Sekine 2013 (1999). p. 194.
149 Sekine 2013 (1999), p. 197.
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Counterfactual to Marx’s analysis of the origin of profit which, as explained
earlier, lies in the difference of k (cost price) and C (commodity value), not in
the difference between C and sales price, Sekine reiterates Proudhon’s (as well
as Torrens’s and partly Steuart’s) argument that the cost price of the commod-
ity constitutes its value, and that by virtue of its sale alone, surplus value (and
finally profit) emerges. In short, for Sekine (as well as Marx’s predecessors),
profit appears as the excess of the sales price of the commodity above its value.
With arbitrage as the explanatory framework for surplus value (and profit),
something is generated out of nothing. Because cost price is identifiedwith the
value of a commodity, surplus value must stem from exchange. However, the
value of a commodity, as soon as it is produced as a product of capital, already
contains profit in the form of C = k + p. Production price thenmarks the aliquot
part of that share in the total sum of produced values that is in proportion to
the capital invested: k + kp’. Here is what Marx says about conceptualisations
like that of Sekine which falls victim to the fetishism of profit as being consti-
tuted in exchange – which was already dealt with extensively in Chapter 5 of
Capital Volume i, the locus classicus of the refutation of theories of ‘value by
exchange’:
Thus if commodity value is formed without any other element besides
the capitalist’s advance of value, there is no way of seeing how any more
value is to come out of production than went into it, unless something is
to come out of nothing.150
Robert Torrens, one of first proponents of ‘productive factors’ theory,
manages to evade this creation from nothing only by shifting it from the
sphere of commodity production to the sphere of commodity circula-
tion. Profit cannot derive from production, says Torrens, for if it did it
would already be included in the costs of production and would not be
an excess over and above these costs …The sum of values of the products
exchanged is evidently not affected by the exchange of the products
whose value sum this is.151
Therefore, neither Torrens, nor the ‘socialist’ Proudhon, can explain the origin
of profit:
150 Marx 1981, p. 128.
151 Marx 1981, p. 129.
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The unthinking notion that the cost price of a commodity is its real
price and that surplus-value springs from selling the commodity above
its value, i.e. that commodities are sold at their values when their sale
price is equal to their cost price – i.e. equal to the price of the means of
production consumed in them, plus wages – has been trumpeted forth
by Proudhon with his customary pseudo-scientific quackery as a newly
discovered secret of socialism.152
Sekine’s inability to understand, not to mention explain the ‘real contradic-
tions’153 of developed categories of political economy, such as profit, within his
framework of the reconciliation of a theory of arbitrage with the law of value
as general equilibrium, is therefore only mildly surprising.
What Sekine really takes issues with, however, is the ‘non-equilibirum’ ap-
proachof the single system interpretation (A.Kliman,A. Freeman,G.Carchedi)
and the New Interpretation, especially the proponents of the ‘value of money’
ormelt approach,D. Foley et al., asmentioned earlier. As Sekine correctly sees,
these authors reject Bortkiewicz’s ‘dual systems’ approach (of two different
equilibriums, one measured in value, one in price), continue to regard Marx’s
labour theoryof value as absolutely indispensable, and ‘vigorously defendMarx
by claiming that his reasoning, based onwhat they call the “single (value-price)
system” approach was flawless without the transformation of input values into
prices’. The signature claimof these authors (also including F.Moseley and oth-
ers, who differ much in the details – which Sekine ignores) is, according to
Sekine, to take the constant and variable capital advanced by industries and
152 Marx 1981, p. 130.
153 Himmelweit and Mohun state that the significance and status of Marx’s value theory
‘are such that its apparent inconsistencies can be recreated as the expression of the real
contradictions of capitalist society’. Himmelweit and Mohun 1981, p. 231. ‘Hence Marx’s
transformationprocedure is not, as it would be for Ricardo, an attempt to correct an unfor-
tunate disjuncture between an embodied-labour theory of value and the requirements
that the equalization of the rate of profitmakes of prices. Rather, that disjuncture is recog-
nized as the necessarily contradictory link between value, as the explanation of capitalist
production relations, and its expression as exchange-value in prices. Hence it is not sur-
prising that, when competition is accounted for, the one-to-one relationship of values to
exchange-value disappears’. Himmelweit and Mohun 1981, p. 264. This interpretation is
close to our view of the transformation problem as a problem of fetishism developed in
Chapter 4.3. It must however bemore clearly stressed that Marx’s theory of value, while it
explains the contradictions of capitalist production relations, is not itself contradictory.
This is akin to Hegel’s dialectic which at no point violates the laws of logic, but makes
violations of the laws of logic its object. The confusion of the two has led some authors to
believe that Hegel was ‘illogical’.
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firms as given and as already expressed in price, not value. It determines the
output values and prices on the basis of whether each sector or firm receives
the surplus value it has actually produced or only on the basis of the share of
the aggregate social surplus value proportional to the total capital which it has
advanced. Hence, they do not abandon Marx’s two axioms of the equality of
the sum of values to the sum of prices and that of the equality of the total sum
of surplus values to the total sum of profits. Generally, Sekine agrees with this
‘definitional stage-setting’. Viewing the ‘micro-dynamic’ of competition, Sek-
ine argues, equilibrium is rather the exception than the rule: in intrasectoral
competition, the equalisation of profit rates does not take place, so that equi-
librium in this case must be ‘limited to the sub-phase of “average activity” of
business cycles’.154 Intersectoral competition does only take place when the
labour market (the availability of labour power) is in equilibrium and must be
regulated by intrasectoral competitionwhich by itself does not (except in ‘aver-
age activity’) equalise the profit rates. Interestingly, Sekine’s departure from
the ‘non-equilibrium approach’155 is motivated by a methodological differen-
tiation:
Since capitalism is most of the time out of equilibrium and does not
always necessarily point towards it, why should one attach such a dispro-
portionate emphasis to the idealist state of equilibrium? There seems to
be a consensus in the negative on this point among the authors of the
book. The dialectic of capital, however, is not am empiricist theory. Con-
sequently, it takes a different view on this issue …156
However, the ‘New Approach’ or New Interpretation (ni), which we will look
at more closely presently, is not an empiricist theory either, but precisely cri-
ticises the approach of establishing the correlation between embodied labour
coefficients and production and market prices empirically, i.e. ‘Ricardo’s posi-
154 Sekine 2013 (1999), p. 209. Sekine argues that in the phase of depression (the ‘deepening’
phase), it is intrasectoral rather than intersectoral competition that ‘induces the adoption
of new techniques. Thus, when the labour market is out of equilibrium in the depression
phase of the business cycle, themarket for commodities has not yet acquired firmly given
technical parameters to operate by’. Ibid.
155 We use this umbrella term out of convenience for the different approaches associated
with the rejection of the dual system approach (the New Interpretation, the (t)ssi, Mose-
ley’s macro-monetary approach), despite their internal differences, in opposition to the
‘general equilibrium’ approach.
156 Sekine 2013 (1999), p. 209.
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tion’, Foley associateswith thework of A. Shaikh, P. Cockshott andA. Cottrell.157
Rather, regarding method, the ni ‘proposes a definitional ordering of the key
abstractions of the labor theory of value’.158 The ni therefore abstracts entirely
from the question of quantity-correlation and focuses on the theoretical signi-
ficance of the labour theory of value for explaining the value-price divergence.
For Sekine however, what is at stake is the ‘status of the theory of value in
non-equilibrium’.159 For if, e.g., the value of a commodity ‘or its production-
price’ is 5 hours of labour per unit, the market however only acknowledges 4.2
hours of labour, ‘this contradicts the law of value; for 8 hours of surplus labour,
actually performed, in the production of every unit of this commodity system-
atically fails to become surplus value’.160 The only solution, as Sekine proposes,
is to introduce a technical change, so that the commodity unit can be produced
in 4.2 hours or less. But what else than precisely the ‘law of value’ has Sekine just
described here? The fact that under conditions of (intrasectoral) competition,
e.g. 0.8 hours of labour could be redundantly expended, so that capital needs
to readjust the productive conditions for its most profitable valorisation, is not
a ‘contradiction’ of the ‘law of value’, but its exact expression. If we view the law
of value from Marx’s standpoint, namely capital’s incessant drive to optimise
the exploitation andappropriationof unpaid labour for capital’smaximumval-
orisation, the constant readjustment of productive conditions is but one of its
defining features. Naturally, no individual capital can afford to let labour time
go to waste through unfulfilled valorisation on the market. Two things must be
noted in this regard: Sekine’smisconception of the notion of ‘socially necessary
labour time’ and the static interpretation of the ‘law of value’.
First, it is the law of capital’s maximum proportion of the aliquot share
in the total aggregate surplus value produced, conditioned to the largest part
by competition, that defines the ‘socially necessary labour time’ that in turn
defines the magnitude of value of a commodity. The meaning of the term
‘socially necessary’, contrary to what Sekine believes, is completely unhinged
from the ‘optimal allocation of productive labour for the provision of the use-
values that society needs and wants’,161 as the appropriate amount of labour
time necessary to satisfy social demand. The meaning of ‘socially necessary’ is
quite different: it is solely defined within the logic of capital’s most profitable
157 See Foley 1997, p. 17.
158 Foley 1997, p. 19.
159 Sekine 2013 (1999), p. 209.
160 Sekine 2013 (1999), p. 212.
161 Sekine 2013 (1999), p. 196.
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and optimal share in surplus value.162 Needless to say, this must evade an
approach that sees the aim of capitalist production in use value, not in value.
Second, Sekine only seems to acknowledge a static condition, with given
inputs and no technical change. Any assumption acknowledging the dynamic
of capital, i.e. capital’s readjustment of productive techniques, etc., seems to fall
out of the scope of this idiosyncratic and rigid definition of the law of value, for
Sekine.
Yet, Sekine has amore fundamental concern, namely to disqualify the inter-
pretation delivered by the New Approach or ni, and to disavow the usefulness
of the labour theory of value for the explanation of the emergence of a gen-
eral rate of profit and prices of production: ‘It has not been clear what they
(D. Foley and G. Duménil) and their followers wish to accomplish by means
of the newly interpreted labour theory of value, since none of them have so
far shown a significant result of its application (i.e. a significant thesis which
cannot be advanced without depending on it), going beyond a trivial proof of
Marx’s infallibility’.163 Sekine, in other words, has two objections to the ni: the
alleged tautology of their line of argument, and the question of its use. In the
following, we will, for reasons of space, give only a brief overview of Duncan
Foley’s conceptualisation of the term ‘value of money’ or themonetary expres-
sion of labour time, to show that Sekine’s allegations are unfounded. Specific
attention is given to the retention of Marx’s axioms of the aggregate sumof sur-
plus value being equal to the sum of profit, i.e. the correspondence of unpaid
labour to profits.
5.2.3 Duncan Foley’s Concept of ‘Value of Money’ andmelt as themodus
operandi of the Labour Theory of Value
As said previously, Foley refers to the labour theory of value when he shows
that, with the concept of the value of money (or the melt which is the more
practical mathematical inversion serving the same function), ‘the proportion-
ality of profit and unpaid labor time in the face of any deviations of prices from
labour values’, are ‘retained’.164 This is indeed themain desideratumof showing
the coherence of Marx’s value theory, if not economic analysis in toto. Foley’s
approach is therefore at least a valid contribution to the problem surround-
ing the ‘transformation problem’.Wewill show that it is also aminimalistic and
desirable approach, inwhich the emphasis on a specific set of axioms (or rather,
162 We would think that an approach that relies on the ‘definition of capitalism by capital
itself ’ would at least acknowledge a basic feature of its operation such as this.
163 Sekine 2013 (1999), p. 212.
164 Foley 1982, p. 37.
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definitions) is methodologically put to use to solve the problem addressing the
total operation of the real economy.Theminimalistic redefinitions concern the
value-price distinction, for which the labour theory of value can still be held
accountable. It is therefore in its general outline close to the view of the labour
theory of value held here, in that it can be regarded as the ‘Turing bombe’ or
decoding machine to the fetishisms of the conventional categories of political
economy (for Foley, the labour theory of value ‘plays a role in political economy
analogous to the role played by Newton’s Laws in mechanics’).165 The question
in this quantitative approach is of the operability of the labour theory of value
as a theoretical approach, not whether certain determinations of magnitudes
can be confirmed.
The novelty (hence ‘new’ approach or interpretation) of Foley et al. is the
redefinition of the value of labour power. The value of labour power, Foley con-
tends, is not in general equal to the labour value of workers’ consumption. This
is almost intuitively confirmed, because workers do not receive the ‘value’ of
their labour power (a bundle of commodities measured in labour values pro-
duced during a certain part of the working day), but a money wage (i.e. the
price of the labour power commodity), which are not necessarily the same.
This holds also for any other commodity aside from labour power: ‘Any par-
ticular commodity can be seen as embodying a certain fraction of the total
abstract labor expended in producing commodities; it also exchanges for a cer-
tain amount of money (its price), which represents a possibly different fraction
of the aggregate abstract social labour expended’.166 The value of labour power
is the mathematical product of the money wage multiplied by what he calls
the ‘value of money’, a mathematical term of conversion which is defined as,
in the special case of equivalence of labour values to prices, the ratio of the
labour value of the commodity to its price. This definition, which is in linewith
Marx’s own conceptual determinations, allows us to ‘consistently … translate
back and forth between labor time andmoney value’.167 The presuppositions of
this definition are rooted inMarx’s determination of the convertibility of value
and labour time. In Foley’s words:
… the labour theory of value [is] the claim that the money value of the
whole mass of net production of commodities expresses the expenditure
of the total social labor in a commodity-producing economy …168
165 Foley 1997, p. 23.
166 Foley 1982, p. 37. Emphasis added.
167 Foley 1982, p. 39.
168 Foley 1982, p. 37.
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This way of thinking of the labor theory of value requires us to think of
a strict relation in a commodity-producing economy between themonet-
ary unit (whether that unit is linked to a general equivalent money com-
modity or not) and abstract labor time. A unit of money, in this approach,
can be thought of as a claim to a certain amount of the abstract social
labor expended in the economy.169
The expenditure of labor creates value, which is expressed in the price
of the commodity. A quantity of money under these assumptions is the
expression of a certain amount of labor time (for example, 1 hour of labor
equals 10 dollars).170
These presuppositions within Marx’s own conceptual framework allow Foley
to give a set of definitions that conceptualises the ‘value of money’ as the coef-
ficient of the labor value of the commodity to its price.171 ‘Its dimensions are
hours of labor per dollar’. This also holds for the case in which prices are not
uniformly proportional to labour values, and can thus be generalised: viewed
in the total economy with aggregate products, the value of money expresses
the ratio between the aggregate direct labour and the aggregate money value
added to production (the price of the commodity minus the non-wage costs,
i.e. means of production etc.), or the ratio of the aggregate direct labour to
the net product (= added value). The monetary expression of labour (time),
mel or melt, is the reverse: the ratio of the net domestic product at current
prices to living productive labour (e.g. per annum).172 Both the value of money
and melt are integrated to determine the value of labour power which is the
modusoperandiof the labour theory of value even in caseswhere prices diverge
from labour values. The following presents an overview of the definition of the
value of money in the case of (i) coincidence of labour values and prices, (ii)
169 Foley 1982, p. 37.
170 Foley 1982, p. 39.
171 ‘If we want to hold to the idea that labor produces value, and that money is a form of
value, the question of how much abstract simple labor a unit of money represents still
makes sense’. Foley 1982, p. 41.
172 ‘We argued that the core content of Marx’s labor theory of value was that the expenditure
of living labor in production addsmoney value to the inputs of production…Thuswe con-
cluded that the appropriate definition of the monetary expression of labor was the ratio
of the net domestic product at current prices to the living productive labor expended in
an economy over a period of time’. Foley 1997, p. 18. Needless to say, the equality of value
and price is redefined by limiting it to the newly produced or added value component of
value and price of production. There is however no reason to assume this is not within
Marx’s framework.
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divergence of labour values and prices, and the new formula for the value of
labour powerusing (iii) the definitionof the value of money (= aggregate direct
labour / aggregate value added) and (iv) the definition of melt (= net domestic
product at current prices / living productive labour).
(i) value of money = labour value of the commodity (hours of labour time
expressed in a unit of money) / price
(ii) value of money = aggregate direct labour / aggregate value added
(iii) value of labour power = money wage × agg. direct labour / agg. value
added
(iv) value of labour power = money wage / mel(t)
The significance of this approach is the deviation from the ‘classic’ interpret-
ation of the value of labour power in that the money wage multiplied by the
value of money implies ‘that the value of labour power is equal inmagnitude to
the wage share in aggregate value added’.173 In other words, the value of labour
power is already transformed in terms of price expressing its exact value, i.e. the
‘fraction of the working day that is paid labour’.174With the introduction of the
new determination of the ‘value of labour power’ by the conversion unit of the
‘value of money’ or melt, aminimalistic approach to understanding the value-
price divergence, Foley retains ‘at a global level the relation between money
and embodied labour which is central to the idea thatmoney is a form of value
and that the substance of value is abstract social labour’.175 This approach is
therefore strictly monetary, in line with Marx’s analysis.
Second, it builds a logical correspondence between surplus value or profit
and unpaid labour time.
Since the value of money is the ratio of aggregate direct labor time to aggreg-
ate value added,
if wemultiply it by the average level of money wages, we get the wage bill
divided by value added, or the share of wages in aggregate value added,
on the assumption that one hour of labor power sold yields one hour of
actual labor time. An immediate corollary of these stipulations is that the
aggregate profit in the system of capitalist production as a whole multi-
plied by the value of money is exactly equal to the unpaid labor time, in
the sense of the time worked for which workers receive no equivalent in
the wage. With these interpretations, the most central of Marx’s claims
173 Foley 1982, p. 42.
174 Moseley 2016, p. 256.
175 Foley 1982, p. 41.
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about the ‘transformation’ of values into prices of production, that profit
arises from unpaid labor time, is sustained …176
Third, andprobablymost importantly, Foley emphasises a specific senseof cap-
italist exploitation and class struggle which the struggle over the distribution
of profit otherwise obscures. While class struggle, under capitalist relations of
production, seems to be ‘a struggle over what part of the net product will go to
workers and will constitute the social surplus’, this should not at all be viewed
as the impetus, for its logical end would only be the disappearance of the sur-
plus product altogether, and a standstill to social development. He therefore
pleads for a different approach to the significance of class struggle, namely that
‘we keep clearly in mind the specific form the surplus takes in capitalist soci-
ety, a surplus value appropriated by a particular class’ whose consequence is
not the elimination (or different distribution) of the surplus product, but ‘to
transform the social relations that make the social surplus take the form of
surplus value’.177 This is indeed a ‘more historical conception of class struggle
than the notion of a purely distributional conflict’,178 fulfilling the condition
of Marx’s discernment of the central problem of capitalist relations of pro-
duction, namely that the form that social labour necessarily assumes are the
fetish-characteristic forms of value.
None of the three features of the ni and other approaches in the ‘non-
equilibrium’ or ‘single system’ spectrum, namely that it is monetary, that it
retains the equivalence of unpaid labour and profit, and that it specifies the
meaning of historical class struggle on the basis of the meaning of value – posi-
tions thatwehave shown are crucial toMarx’s economic analysis – is addressed
in Sekine’s ‘dialectical’ approach. Contrary to what Sekine believes, they are
also neither tautological, nor useless. To the contrary:with a precise graspof the
significance and explanatory power of the labour theory of value, the ‘riddles’
of the ‘transformation problem’ can be solved.179 At no point is there a question
176 Foley 1982, p. 42.
177 Foley 1982, p. 43.
178 Foley 1982, p. 43.
179 Needless to say, the ni is also criticised by eminent Marxist economists. Of these, prob-
ably the criticisms by F. Moseley (Moseley 2016, pp. 253–64), M. Heinrich (Heinrich 1999,
pp. 276–7), and A. Rodriguez-Herrera (Rodriguez-Herrera 1996) are the most to the point.
See also Makoto Itoh’s critique (Itoh 2005). While Moseley agrees with the general con-
tentions of the macro-monetary approach of the ni, he thinks the ni ‘only goes halfway’
(Moseley 2016, p. 253) in transforming the inputs of the value of labour-power, but forget-
ting constant capital, thereby 1) remaining in the framework of the neo-Ricardian input-
output matrix of physical quantities, and 2) failing to establish ‘the logical connection’ to
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begging involved, unlike Sekine’s own view of social cost explaining value and
value explaining social costs. But thiswouldprecisely require anunderstanding
grounded in the problematic direct relation between living and value-adding
labour in the production process and value (and its monetary forms) that is
denied in the Sekine approach, as well as in that of his mentor, Uno Kōzō.
Instead, Uno views the forms of value, such as the commodity, money and
capital, as if they were detached from production, and instead locates them
in exchange, treated as the primary form of the social metabolism which then
(when?) ‘absorbs’ the production process. This is tantamount tomisconceiving
the direct interrelation of labour and value that gives rise to this particular his-
torical social nexus without which capitalist relations of production cannot be
adequately addressed. Indeed,
[o]ne of the virtues of the New Interpretation is that it firmly links the
value of the net product at market prices to the expenditure of living
labour and profit to unpaid labour time. It is true that the New Interpret-
ation identifies the phenomenal forms of price to the categories of the
labour theory of value, but it is hard to see why this turns the relation on
its head. The New Interpretation locates the course of new value in the
expenditure of living labour in production, not in market exchange, the
relation Marx insists on.180
Sekine’s objections to the tautological character of the ni and its ‘uselessness’
for explaining a very specific set of assumptions involving equilibrium produc-
tion cannot be maintained.
But on what grounds does Sekine think the identitarian, i.e. non-contra-
dictory ‘dialectic of capital’, helps to grasp the nature of capital better than
the framework Marx develops throughout Capital? It seems that the ‘self-
a theory of individual price and the level of the rate of profit (the macro-micro connec-
tion). In his view, ni is therefore limited to stating the equivalence between total surplus
value and unpaid labourwhichMoseley, however, agrees is the ‘main conclusion of Marx’s
theory’ (Moseley 2016, p. 255). Heinrich however doubts that the ni ismonetary at all. The
‘value of money’, he states, is merely a ‘factor of conversion’ for the redistribution of the
surplus (Heinrich 1999, p. 277). The notion of the ‘redistribution’ of surplus value in the
‘transformation’ process is also criticised inHimmelweit andMohun: ‘Surplus-value is not
redistributed between capitals so as to equalize the rate of profit, because there is no state
fromwhich this redistribution occurs’. Himmelweit andMohun 1981, p. 240. None of these
however argue from a ‘general equilibrium’ theory of value standpoint.
180 Foley 1997, p. 22.
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sustenance’ of capital is given a greater emphasis than the contradictionwithin
capital’s logic of self-valorisation. Yet, this self-sustenance is neither logically,
nor empirically verified. For this reason, it seems, Sekine draws on the sterility
of equilibriummodels close to theWalras’ law (which he explicitly refers to).181
Methodologically, the incantation of an ominous ‘dialectic’ or ‘logic’ of capital
which is never explicitly spelled out forms a crude opposition to the actual
presentation of the proof of equilibrium which is suddenly and without medi-
ation (hence poorly Hegelian) deferred to formulas of output levels, means of
production and labour times in linear schemas.182 Sekine’s approach therefore
lacks a coherent method that redeems its own claims. Instead, the separation
between assertion and reality, or the semantic and the pragmatic, is indeed
unbridgeable and makes for a logically poor and conceptually dissatisfactory
interpretation that shares with the Marxian template it claims to engage with
nothing but the invocation of Marx’s name. There may however exist a more
general problem thanmerely the reconciliation of Sekine’s general equilibrium
view of the pre-established harmony of social production and demand for use
values with theMarxian framework.We hold that themore general problem of
the unfolding of Sekine’s proposition seems to be the unawareness with which
he uses concepts such as ‘value’ and ‘capital’, ‘fetishism’, ‘price’ and ‘money’. Not
once does Sekine provide a systematic definition of these concepts, not once
does he mobilise their semantic dimension in their nexus, i.e., relation to one
another, and not once do we hear in what way they are significant for Marx’s
critique (or not). They remain utterly external to the analysis. Their sematic
dimension and pragmatic use are unrelated. For a self-proclaimed ‘Hegelian’
approach to the concept of capital, this is quite a striking deficit.
Now let us see how another allegedly Hegelian legacy is further put to use
in understanding Uno’s interpretation of Marx’s analysis in the work of Robert
Albritton.
181 Sekine 2013 (1999), pp. 191, 197, 200. Interestingly, Foley indirectly criticises Sekine’s ap-
proach by targeting John Roemer’s criticism of the identification of social labour time
with money. Foley: ‘Roemer’s failure to find much resonance in the New Interpretation
may also be connected with his commitment to the Walrasian model of market equilib-
rium as a vehicle for the analysis of commodity relations. The Walrasian approach is in
striking contrast to Marx’s in its inability to integrate money, which is precisely the point
on which the New Interpretation definitions rest’. Foley 1997, p. 24.
182 Sekine 2013 (1999), pp. 200–2.
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5.2.4 Use Value as Central Category in Stage Theory: Robert Albritton’s
Contribution
A strange externality of the analytical framework invoked and the object of
investigation – the capitalist mode of production – also informs Robert Albrit-
ton’s work. This is all the more baffling, since Albritton insists on the coherence
and inner structural logic of themethod he applies and its object. Like Uno and
Sekine, in understanding the capitalist relations of production as primarily use
value-mediated, ‘self-sufficient’, and ‘self-regulating’, Albritton’s analysis is also
inflicted with the apologetic character of the interpretation of capital that we
have found in both Uno and Sekine.
In the following, we will show how 1) Albritton’s theory, in accordance with
whatwe have seen in Sekine and also inUno, assumes the formof an apologetic
towards capital which is thoroughly disinterested in the fundamentally contra-
dictory character of the law of value and its implementation, and 2) Albritton’s
conceptualisation of method and object assumes a truistic, if not outright tau-
tological character, that fails to deliver precisely the inner nexus it claims to
provide. Both aspects, as we will show, are related.
More profoundly than Sekine and Uno himself, Albritton’s research focuses
on the concrete implementation of the ‘levels-of-analysis’ approach (sandan-
kairon) which, as we have seen in Chapter 2, Uno has sketched in the Meth-
odology and, in broader terms, in the Principles, the latter of which Albritton
orients himself toward. To recapitulate, in sandankairon, which Uno concep-
tualises as the ‘correct method’ of political economy, a first level of analysis,
pure theory or the theory of principles (genriron) ‘establishes the foundation of
political economy’183 bymaking a ‘pure capitalist society’ its object of analysis.
More specifically, for Albritton, it addresses a hypothetical society in which
all use values are ideally subsumed by value and the capital-labour relation.
It is therefore an ‘ideal’ capitalist society from which all empirical and histor-
ical ‘impurities’ are eliminated, both on the level of presentation and analysis.
From this follows, for Albritton, that this level of abstraction has no real histor-
ical equivalent (we have seen that Uno’s view is more ambiguous). The second
level, dankairon, addresses the stages of capitalist development in their rough
succession of economic models and forms of capital as they appear in history:
mercantilism based on merchant capital, liberalism based on industrial cap-
ital, and imperialism based on finance capital. The third and final level, genjō
bunseki, addresses the ‘analysis of actual phenomena’ in Uno’s dictum, or ‘the
183 Albritton 1986, p. 73.
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historical analysis’ of capitalism in concrete terms (no longer tied to rough eco-
nomic schemas) in Albritton’s view.
Itmust be noted that Albritton is only familiar withUno’s Principles in trans-
lation, so that his interpretation and understanding of sandankairon is mainly
informed by this work and Sekine, who was Albritton’s close associate at the
University of York since the 1970s. In the following, we shall concentrate on
Albritton’s voluminous monograph A Japanese Reconstruction of Marxist The-
ory (1986) that gives the most inclusive outline of his Sekine-informed inter-
pretation of what he calls ‘Stage Theory’.
The main contention is that pure theory, while it is the most holistic and
general analysis of the law of value and the workings of capital in a ‘pure’ cap-
italist society, cannot account for the ‘historical impurities’ that capitalism in
its real historical development has shown to possess: ‘The distance between
the inner logic of capitalism and its historical development is great. To apply
the law of value directly to history would therefore produce an economistic
and reductionist history’.184 Yet, we never hear why this is the case. After all,
Marx’s project in Capital was to show how the law of value prevails precisely
in a historically real economy – see his elaborations in ‘The Working Day’. The
methodological objection and resentment against demonstrating the intrins-
ically devastating effects of the law of value, or rather surplus value, in a real
historical situation, which was Marx’s incentive for many of his illustrations in
Capital, bears a significant symptom of the inherently apologetic character of
Albritton’s contribution, as we will see.
For Albritton, the ‘gap’ between theory and history ‘must be addressed by
developingmediations’.185 Stage theory, according to him, is successful in doing
so. The object of the second level of analysis, dankairon, is no longer the most
abstract capital vs. worker-relation in which ‘ideal use values’ are produced –
i.e. use values which ideally constitute the wage basket needed for the repro-
duction of theworking class: ‘A use-value such as a shirt fits these requirements
perfectly and hence may be considered an “ideal” use value’.186 In the concrete
analysis of historical stages of capitalism, which is the topic of stage theory,
on the other hand, not all use values produced are ‘so capitalistically man-
ageable’.187 His example here is grapes and other agricultural produce whose
successful production depends on a number of varying factors, such as the fer-
tility of the soil, theweather, etc., andwhich require a shorter (thoughAlbritton
184 Albritton 1986, p. 73.
185 Albritton 1986, p. 73.
186 Albritton 1986, p. 74.
187 Albritton 1986, p. 74.
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does not use that term) turnover time.Why grapes should not present an ‘ideal
use value’, however, is never explained. In times when mass fertilisation and
turnover times are integral factors of the standardisation and automatisation
of agricultural production, grapes are as easily produced as T-shirts.188 It is also
difficult to comprehend why ‘grapes’ should not belong in the workers’ ‘wage
basket’.
Theproblematic of decidingwhichuse values areproducedas ‘ideal’ (corres-
ponding to pure theory) and which are ‘less capitalistically manageable’ (cor-
responding to stage theory and the historical analysis of capitalism), however,
permeates the discussion of the legitimisation of levels-of-analysis-approach
in Albritton. For him, ‘if the motion of value has difficulty subsuming agricul-
ture at a historical level, it also has difficulty subsuming other types of use-value
production’.189 His examples are fine art, spaceships, battleships and thermo-
nuclear weapons. Indeed, these use values (with the exception, under very
exceptional conditions, of fine art) usually do not constitute the worker’s wage
basket. But what does that prove? Are thermonuclear weapons ‘less capital-
istically manageable’ in the sense that grapes are ‘less capitalistically manage-
able’?Hardly. Butwe are left in thedark as towhat exactly the criterionof differ-
ence between grapes, battleships, and a Van Gogh painting is in their common
denominator of being ‘capitalistically less manageable’. How exactly in these
instances use value production is not subsumed by value is never addressed. It
would require the demonstration that battleships are not sold for money, and
therefore not part of the valorisation nexus of capital (which should however
prove to be difficult), a requirement not met by Albritton.
Nevertheless, Albritton insists that stage theory comes in where pure the-
ory fails in conceptualising the real character of use value production, which
is not exhausted in ‘ideal’ or ‘capitalistically manageable use values’ alone. The
argument of the ‘passive use value-restraint’ has also been substantial for Uno,
as shown in Chapter 4. As much as it is decisive for recapitulating capital’s
188 On the standardisation and automatisation of agricultural production, see Becker 2017,
pp. 195–201.This is a process that has beenactively implemented in theWest (but not only)
since the agricultural industrialisation or the ‘Green Revolution’ in the 1960s, and could
have been known to Albritton. Becker also points out that as early as the nineteenth cen-
tury, especially in slavery-based cotton farming in the US South, standardisationmethods
were employed: ‘Slavery formed the vantage point for the global valorisation chains of the
textile industry. Between 1800 and 1860, the harvest per slave quadrupled after some new
species [of cotton] were cultivated which were easier to pick’. Becker 2017, p. 197. This also
shows that the implementation of capitalist relations is unlikely without a simultaneous
implementation of technological means to increase productivity.
189 Albritton 1986, p. 75.
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alleged ‘partial grasp on historical reality’190 (capital can never subsume all and
every use value), it is lacking persuasive power. The examples of thermonuclear
weapons, grapes and spaceships not adhering to the ‘law of value’ are absurd.
Why art must be exempted from the value-nexus, however, is very persuasively
argued in Dave Beech’s work.191 But Albritton fails to make this case explicit,
because he nowhere defines an exhaustive criterion for his much-invoked ‘law of
value’: it is not ‘the use-values which constitute the wage basket’, but in that
value is measured in socially necessary abstract labour time that defines the
law of value and which allows us to meaningfully speak about the production
of value in the first place192 (from which follow the equalisation of profit rates
and the distribution of surplus value, etc.). It would indeed have to be shown
that grapes andweapons are not produced as the products of capital, involving
the employment of productive capital, c + v, the equalisation of profit rates (i.e.
their production measured in socially necessary labour time), and the realisa-
tion of surplus value in the circulation process with their transformation into
money, in order to prove that, here, use value ‘overwhelms value’.193 To say that
products of capital are not produced capitalistically, is not only logically con-
tradictory. It is absurd.
Yet, it is precisely capital’s alleged ‘failure’ to subsume the production of all
use values that motivates Albritton to come upwith a description of the role of
capital in the future world historical development:
Capitalism is a historically limitedmode of production because the law of
value can only subsume a limited range of use-value production … That
themotionof valuehas only limited success in taminguse-values explains
the limited grasp that capitalism has on history (i.e. historical capitalism
never becomes pure). That value can successfully manage only a limited
range of use-values explains the limited duration of capital’s passage on
this planet (i.e. capitalism only holds sway over a limited period of his-
tory).194
Indeed, of all the conventional reasons usually provided for why capitalism is
going to die a natural death (see the debate on the ltrpf we referred to in
190 Albritton 1986, p. 76.
191 Beech 2015.
192 ‘If the labour-time of the worker is to create value in production to its duration, it must be
socially necessary labour-time.’ Marx 1976, p. 987.
193 Albritton 1986, p. 76.
194 Albritton 1986, pp. 76–7.
490 chapter 5
Chapter 4.4.), saying that it fails ‘in taming use-value’, is probably the most
counterfactual one. As though to emphasise that point however, Albritton
insists that the time for class struggles is over:
Startingwith the stage of imperialism, there is no longer a historical tend-
ency towards two homogeneous and polarized classes (of course there
may be conjunctural tendencies towards polarization). Class struggle is
increasingly overlaid with national struggles and struggles of particular
strata and fractions within classes or even intermediate strata between
classes. In fact the strong state required by the imperialist stage with
its welfare state policies is the beginning of the modern service sector
with its intermediate strata that have fuelled somuch controversy within
Marxist discourse on class.195
Because class struggles have become obsolete in the face of national struggles
and the establishment of the ‘welfare state’ –we shall point out that this assess-
ment is not a critique, but Albritton’s neutral observation ‘proving’ the obsol-
escence of class struggle – we can basically only wait and see how capital,
unable to ‘manage all use-values’ it has itself produced, simply withers away.
Moreover, in this text from 1986, Albritton has good faith in the establishment
of the socialist project via the ‘transition away from capitalism’ introduced by
‘the first successful socialist revolution in 1917’:
Referring to the period from 1917 to the present as a transitional phase
does not mean that exploitation or the production for profit cease, but
only that the structural dynamics of economic life can less and less be
understood by the law of value … It is necessary to understand both that
the law of value has failed and why it has done so in order to understand
the stratified economies that have developed. It is necessary to see that
this is a transitional stage in which increasingly the world is becoming
socialist, albeit at first with often rather primitive forms of socialism.196
Albritton’s assessment of the ‘failure’ of the law of value has only been dis-
proven a few years after these lines were written. The world has never been
as capitalist to date as the world only a few years after Albritton’s statement,
and in its history it has never been as ‘capitalist’ as it is now.197 For Albrit-
195 Albritton 1986, p. 75.
196 Albritton 1986, p. 86.
197 It is of no small irony that one of the incentives of stage theory both for Uno andAlbritton
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ton in general, however, ‘the law of value increasingly does not apply and that
therefore the world must be understood primarily in terms of socioeconomic
forces and power relations and not in terms of value theory’.198 The implica-
tion of this kind of postmodern jargon is a pervasive reluctance to grapple with
the contradiction that the law of value presents insofar as it is fully realised: it
is precisely because the production of relative surplus value is fully operative
that capital reaches its contradictory and crisis-ridden limits. In other words,
it is not use value as ‘external’ or a ‘passive constraint’ to value that capital
fails – and Albritton never specifies the exact character of capital’s ‘historical
limit’ – but capital’s thorough absorption of the ‘use-value space’ that expresses
itself precisely in the contradiction between the conditions of the production
of surplus value and the conditions of its realisation, which is the significant,
encompassing contradiction of the capitalist mode of production grounded
in the ‘law of value’.199 Because the capitalist mode of production is not, and
neverwas, ‘aimed at (producing) use values’, asMarx says in theGrundrisse, but
subsumed the rationale of production under the auspices of value and surplus
value (the latterwhich is bizarrely out of the scope of Albritton’s theorisation of
capital’s ‘limits’), that it cannot contain itself. As we have seen in Chapter 4, the
result is an increasing exacerbation of crisis – and not just a business cycle of
‘alternating widening and deepening phases of accumulation’,200 as Albritton
states in accordance with Uno. It is the systemic devaluation and substitution of
the source of value and surplus value, the value-producing use value of labour
power, that leads to an equally systemic devaluationof themass of surplus value
wasMarx’s inability to correctly assess the future of capitalist development in its increas-
ing ‘impurity’. Even in the follow-up work A Japanese Approach to Stages of Capitalist
Development, published in the year of the end of the Soviet Union and a year after the fall
of the Soviet bloc (1991), Albritton was little inclined to modify his theory of the increas-
ing use value dominance over value. Counterfactually, hemerely supplements yet another
stage, that of ‘consumerism’, as though precisely ‘consumerism’ –were it not inflictedwith
the one-sidedness of the use value perspective alone – would show that the reign of value
had taken full control of society. See Albritton 1991. pp. 225ff.
198 Albritton 1986, p. 79. Had Albritton not attempted a critique of postmodernism in an art-
icle critically directed against Baudrillard – see Albritton 1995 – (‘Theorizing the Realm
of Consumption in Marxian Political Economy’, in: A Japanese Approach to Political Eco-
nomy, ed. Sekine and Albritton), one could have almost suspected him a promoter of the
very same ideology.
199 In Capital Volume ii, Marx points to two contradictions: first, the contradiction between
the importance of ‘workers as buyers of commodities’ and the restriction of workers
as sellers of their commodity, labour power – the source of value-creation – to their
‘minimum price’. Second, the contradiction between the conditions of the production of
surplus value and the conditions of its realisation. Marx 1978, p. 391.
200 Albritton 1986, p. 91.
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produced, which in turn makes it impossible for capital to realise increasingly
higher profits, and fulfil its only raison d’être, namely optimised profitability. It
is precisely the historical trajectory of the so-called ‘digital revolution’ which so
blatantly demonstrates not capital’s ‘versatility’ and ‘agility’ in dealing with the
obstacles of valorisation, but to the contrary, capital’s inability and ineptitude in
realising the foundation it is built on: the ‘limitless approximation to abstract
wealth’ in the realisation of increasingly higher amounts of moneyed surplus
value.201 Capital’s ‘other’, to remain in the postmodern jargon, is not use value:
it is themode of its own operation. It is inherently contradictory.
The fact that Albritton nowhere thematises the striking contradiction be-
tween the conditions of the production of surplus value (competition-induced
cost saving techniques, ‘investing in little value’) and the conditions of their
realisation (maximum share in profits, ‘expecting huge gains in value’), is amis-
recognition not only of the often-invoked topos of the ‘dialectic of capital’ –
which would at least indicate that the contradictory character of capital were
recognised–butbarely conceals thedisinterestedness of theUnoSchool in crit-
ically engagingwith their object, the capitalistmode of production. Instead, we
hear that capitalism cannot lack ‘internal integrity’. In his critical discussion of
classic theories of imperialism, Albritton objects to Rosa Luxemburg’s idea that
capital bears an intrinsically ‘parasitic’ character. Instead, for Albritton,
[if] capitalism is basically parasitic, as Luxemburg claims, then it cannot
be rigorously theorized as a mode of production that has internal integ-
rity.202
Because capital rests on a fundamentally contradictory mode of production
that completely evades the analysis of the Uno School, they fail to see that,
indeed, capital has no ‘internal integrity’. However, not only is there a baffling
201 Stock market shares of the digital economy are therefore the most volatile, in compar-
ison to the Dow Jones, Nasdaq and Dax. www.plattform‑index.com. As it were, plat-
form economies surge (gargantuan sums to lure venture capital are not usual in the
self-presentation of start-ups, see AirBnB) and equally fall sharply, as in August 2018,
including theworld’s highest capitalised firms (e.g. Alphabet (Google, Calico, Jigsaw, etc.)).




sting‑ubers‑valuation/. I’d like to thank Simon Joyce (Leeds) for these data. On the prob-
lem of ‘High Tech, Low Growth’, see also KimMoody (2019).
202 Albritton 1986, p. 103.
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denial of the principally contradictory and destructive character of capital’s
mode of operation, but by invoking an ethical category – ‘integrity’ – Albrit-
ton also suggests that capital were, indeed, a viable and ethically defensible
economic model – or at least, he at no point gives the impression that it is not.
This is further accentuated in his view, against Arghiri Emmanuel,203 that
[in] a purely capitalist society all exchange is equal exchange. To the
extent that a society is capitalist, systematic unequal exchange cannot
take place.204
Probably even more than Uno and Sekine, whose equilibrium approach to
reproduction is all-pervasive, Albritton makes the case for the neoclassical
assumption of ‘equal exchange’ which informs his apologetic interpretation
of the capitalist mode of production. This wilful blindness against the very
definition of what allows someone to speak of a mode of production as being
capitalist at all – namely through the unequal exchange of capital and labour
which is fetishised (but only fetishised!) as that of ‘equal exchange’ – is quite
astonishing.
This apologetic is also reflected in the conceptualisation of stage theory as
an ‘externalization of pure theory’ that disengages from the actual implement-
ation and operation of the law of value in real history and thereby absolutises
its workings and effects on humans existing in capitalist actuality.
5.2.5 Stage Theory as Tautology and the Apologetic of Capital
The transition from the logically contradictory diagnosis of capital as unable
to manage all capitalistically produced use values, to the concrete implement-
ation of stage theory, is evenmore incomprehensible and inflicted with logical
inconsistencies. One of them is the non sequitur-exposition of stage theory that
does not follow from the premises Albritton has previously unfolded. The other
is the tautological characterisation of the objectives of stage theory. We shall
turn to these now, in this order.
For Albritton, the stages of capitalist development correspond to particular
modes of the accumulation of capital: while ‘in pure capitalism, society is gov-
erned by a self-regulating market’ – the foremost apologetic topos of the Uno
School – in history, on the other hand,
203 See Arghiri Emmanuel 1972.
204 Albritton 1986, p. 108.
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capital always develops within and between territorial states, and the
development of capital and of the nation-state are up to a point mutually
supporting. Also capital develops very unevenly when viewed spatially
on a global scale. So in constructing stage theory we look for the form or
forms of use-value production that most characterize the stage …Thus at
the level of stage theory, we look for the dominant form of capitalist accu-
mulation, we look for its geographical location and we look for the types
of ideology and state policy that support it.205
These forms of accumulation in the historical development of capitalism cor-
respond to merchant capital with the state policy of mercantilism, to indus-
trial capital with the state policy of laissez faire, free market-liberalism, and
to finance-capital with the state policy of imperialism, ultimately adding the
‘transition away from capitalism’ with socialist planned production as the last
stage. To these economic models correspond different kinds of dominating use
value production: ‘Wool production is the type of use-value production that is
most characteristic of the activities of merchant-capital in so far as it directly
lays the foundations for the development of capitalism’.206 In the liberal stage,
‘which is closest to pure theory … the sort of light manufacturing represented
by cottonmanufacturing is closest to the ideal use-values assumed by pure the-
ory’.207 In imperialism, ‘themost characteristic type of use-value production …
became iron and steel’.208
The explanatory power of the determination of forms of capital accumula-
tion on the basis of the production of particular dominating forms of use value
is evident.209 As is well known, in his analysis of primitive or original accumu-
lation,Marx demonstrates the emergence of the capital relation on the basis of
fourteenth- and fifteenth-century wool production in the English countryside.
205 Albritton 1986, p. 79.
206 Albritton 1986, p. 81.
207 Albritton 1986, p. 83.
208 Albritton 1986, p. 84.
209 ‘The economies of scale associatedwith large fixed capital investments in steel production
required the long-term mobilisation of large amounts of capital and credit. The develop-
ment of the limited-liability joint-stock company accompanied by the development of
the banking system facilitated the rapid centralisation of capital in the late nineteenth
century. Large banks became very interested in the operations of heavy industry since
the banks committed large amounts of credit to the fixed capital investments of heavy
industry. The resulting merging of industrial-capital and banking-capital is referred to as
“finance-capital” ’. Albritton 1986, p. 84.
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In other words, this is not where Albritton’s argument lacks a rational explan-
atory basis. But the question is how it is related to the aforementioned thesis
that capital is increasingly unable to manage and ‘tame’ the realm of use values.
If anything, Albritton here precisely gives a coherent argument for the oppos-
ite view, namely that in each and every stage of capitalist accumulation, use
value is subsumed by capital as one of its forms of structuring production for
the maximum share in profits. This is why particular use values such as wool
have become dominant in the stage of mercantilism, cotton in the stage of lib-
eralism, steel and iron in the stage of imperialism: because they respectively
allowed capital to extract unpaid surplus labour from the production process
in themost developed, dynamic, and effectiveway. In each case, production was
organised in a way that best conformed to the development of the forces of
production. It is therefore a mystery how the thesis should hold that capital-
ism ‘loses its grip’ on use value production, and use values present an ‘obstacle’
to valorisation. To the contrary, Albritton precisely demonstrates the valorisa-
tion postulate of capital by highlighting the dominant forms of particular use
valueproduction facilitating capital’s firmergripon theproductionandvalorisa-
tion process. It is the process of the development of the forces of production in
which capital increasingly operates independently of the given structures anduse
values and itself dynamically transforms the process to adhere to its own con-
ditions of existence, the valorisation postulate – in other words, the process of
real subsumption in the production of relative surplus value. The specific use
values are therefore by nomeans gaining an increasing independence from the
reign of capital. To the contrary: they are capital’s means in securing its global
procession. The argument does not follow from the aforementioned thesis on
the status of pure theory: it is a non-sequitur.
At the same time, the usefulness of stage theory in explaining how history
becomes ‘detached’ from theory becomes even more unpersuasive.
To be sure, if the ‘three levels of analysis’-approach should hold any explan-
atory power at all and be distinguishable from a positivistic model or ‘schema’
whose criteria remain external and arbitrary (which Albritton clearly aims at),
their inner relation of the three must be self-reflexively elucidated. This is why
Albritton calls for ‘intermediary steps’. Unlike Uno, who wrongly believes the
model is self-explanatory in delivering the inner nexus, Albritton’s attempt
starts from the dubious premise that ‘pure theory’ is only an abstract model
that has no bearings on ‘real history’ at all:
Knowledge of the inner logic of capital achieved at the level of pure the-
oryhelps to interpret thehistoricalmaterial in constructing a stage theory,
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but stage theory is in no sense a deduction frompure theory. Rather, stage
theory represents an externalization of pure theory, such that the use-
value obstacles become more concrete and historical as do the motions
of value in overcoming these obstacles.210
Stage theory is a distinct level of analysis arrived at neither by a deduction from
pure theory nor by an abstraction fromhistory. The concepts of stage theory are
essentially abstract ‘material-types’ arrived at by using pure theory and history
to help determine the main structures and processes of the dominant mode of
capital accumulation in that historical stage. Stage theory is essentially static
since it aims to grasp the dominant type of capital accumulation andnot actual
historical change and development.211
That the two levels somehow must be ‘mediated’ (‘concepts of stage theory
are arrived at by using pure theory’), but remain ‘external’ to each other, cer-
tainly presents the biggest obstacle to their explanatory potential. Themeaning
of ‘externalisation’ of stage theory as a benchmark of the differentiation against
‘pure theory’ is nowhere explained; yet it would be precisely the definition of
criteria that allow for pure theory’s implementation on the level of stages, and
those cases in which this is impossible, and as well as a coherent argument for
the criteria of this difference, that would give significance to the pure theory-
stage theorynexus–and their difference.Atnopoint howeverdowehear about
meaningful criteria of either their nexus or their difference. That the realm of
use value should historically evade the grip of pure theory has been shown to
owe to a faulty and self-contradictory assumption. The usefulness of pure the-
ory, however, stands and falls with the demonstration of its actual applicability
to the capitalist mode of production. Because Albritton cannot establish the
necessary relation between pure theory and its explanatory power, pure theory
stands at a hypothetical model with no bearings or effect for the theorisation
of the capital relation.
That, however, is not all. In close relation to this problem, there is a fur-
ther obstacle that directly concerns the apologetic character of Albritton’s, as
well as the wider Uno School’s, approach. How do we arrive at history/the
real/the actual implementation of history if we cannot show that the law of
value is real? Like in Uno, we can witness a lack of insight into the epistem-
ological status of value in Albritton. Uno and his school defer the analysis of
‘pure capitalism’ to ‘pure theory’, where the law of value prevails and has a ‘full
210 Albritton 1986, pp. 79–80.
211 Albritton 1986, p. 78.
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grip’ on themode of production and reproduction.212 This ‘full grip’ however is
mitigatedby actual historical productionwhere ‘use values arenot so capitalist-
icallymanageable’. However, like Uno, Albritton does not fully grasp the idea of
real abstraction, the fact that value is both an objective as well as an immaterial
structuring phenomenon; it is both merely ‘social’, as well as a ‘real’ category. It
isnot amere ‘illusion’, a ‘construction in thought’, a ‘tacit premise’, or an ‘abstrac-
tion’without objective validity.213Onemust here rememberMarx’swell-known
statement fromVolume ii of Capital: ‘Those who consider the autonomization
[Verselbständigung] of value as a mere abstraction forget that the movement
of industrial capital is this abstraction in action’.214
Marx’s incentive, as written in the famous letter to Kugelmann, is to demon-
strate ‘how the law of value prevails’ in societies where themode of production
is organised capitalistically. This is why the illustration of the real living con-
ditions of the working class cannot be abstracted from in the presentation of
value’s domination: it is one and the same context that delivers critical inform-
ation as to the effects of the real implementation of the law of value. Setting
apart ‘pure theory’, where supply always corresponds to demand, workers can
seamlessly reproduce, and capital produces a great many use values ‘needed
by society’ – a theory that, in fact, has little to do with the capitalist mode of
production – from a theory of stages and the ‘historical analysis’, neither of
which thematise the devastating effects of capital accumulation on humans
and nature, is therefore probably the single most capital-apologetic assump-
tion we find in academic Marxism as a whole. It is detached from the object of
Marx’s critique.
Moreover, aswehave seen, because valueprevails as the structuring underly-
ingmode or essence inwhich social reproduction is organised, it appears in fet-
ishistic formsof e.g., use value-mediatedor ‘self-regulating’marketmechanisms
which canbe traced back all theway to the ‘three particularities’ of the ‘equival-
ent form of value’, which has been so fatally ignored by Uno. That the fetishistic
dimension of value’s appearance should be taken as a fact by the Uno School –
that the appearance should be taken as essence – is the key problem of this
particular line in the reception of Marx. It is however a problem that Marx has
212 The problems in Uno’s understanding of the law of value have been analysed in Chapters
2, 3 and 4.
213 As unfortunately some proponents of the Neue Marx-Lektüre, e.g. Helmut Reichelt, also
seem to believe. For a critique, see Elbe 2018, and my commentary in Lange 2021 (forth-
coming).
214 Marx 1978, p. 185. Emphasis added. The original reads: ‘diese Abstraktion in actu’. Marx
1963, p. 109.
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already detected in the elaborations of vulgar economy, predominantly Bailey
and Say, which we have referred to as the ‘original sin’ of political economy.
In sum, grasping the critical function of Marx’s method is tantamount to
understanding that the ‘theory of pure capitalism’ is unnecessary, because the
law of value always-already operates within the framework of impurity, namely
the fetishistic appearances it delivers. It is also unfeasible, because the inner
coherence of the whole structure, the sandankairon, cannot be maintained
unless we presuppose the standpoint of totality from which the ‘instances’ or
the ‘levels’ of analysis can bemeaningfully abstracted from.What is lacking is a
coherent superordinate conceptual heuristic which explains the formation of
stages which they are instances of. Sandankairon does not provide a coherent
anglewhichwould explain the formationof stages and inform thehistory of the
‘concrete phenomena’: in other words, it leaves method and object external to
each other. In Marx, we argue, the demonstration of ‘how the law of value pre-
vails’ precisely relates the ‘law’ to its actual operation, the labour theory of value
functioning as the precise nexus between method and object. In Albritton’s ver-
sion of stage theory, the three levels remain external to each other, as well as to
a common grounding nexus that would offer a coherent conceptual bond. As it
stands, stages theory can only remain on the terrain of logical inconsistencies
with regard to itself, as a truistic and tautological assurance that ‘the distance
between the inner logic of capitalism and its historical development is great’.
The truistic character of its assertions – that ‘pure capitalist society is global,
but in history capital always develops within and between territorial states’215
do not deliver any conceptual insight fromwhich ameaningful critique can be
arrived at, and which is the biggest obstacle to ameaningful conceptualisation
of capital, even in a concrete global, and historical context.
5.3 TheMeaning of Real Subsumption or the Real Subsumption of
Meaning: Aspects of Anglophone Uno School Historiographies
The relation between theory andhistory that forms the incentive for Albritton’s
interpretation of stage theory also forms the specific interest of historiographic
approaches in the Uno School, exemplified in the following in aspects of Harry
Harootunian’s and GavinWalker’s works.
Unlike Albritton, their impetus is motivated by both overcoming the tau-
tological argument of pure theory concerning a ‘purely capitalist society’, and
stage theory concerning the ‘historical formations’ of capitalism. At first at
215 Albritton (1986), p. 79.
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least it seems as though Harootunian and Walker in their respective works
are more interested in fundamentally relating these seemingly disparate the-
oretical objects. However, their success also depends on a thorough concep-
tualisation of that relation as one mediated by capital itself. Operating with
the truistic concept of ‘uneven development’ (or ‘different trajectories’ in Har-
ootunian’s dictum) in global capitalist societies, the capital relation and the
lawswhich govern them, however, as in the AnglophoneUno School approach,
remain external to their analysis. This is especially clear in Harootunian’s both
theoretically and empirically counterfactual and theoretically (and politically)
questionable preference for the concept of formal subsumption over real sub-
sumption as an explanandum for the global rise of capital.
What is to be gained for the understanding and, more importantly, for the
critique of the capital relation if we acknowledge so-called uneven develop-
ment and the ‘different trajectories’ that e.g. Western Europe and Japan have
taken in the generation of their respective histories? The main intervention of
HarryHarootunian’sMarxafterMarx consists in delegitimising ‘WesternMarx-
ism’s’216 alleged claim to the ‘completion of the commodity relation’ which
‘trumpet(s)’ the ‘triumphof capitalism’, expressed in the conceptual framework
of ‘real subsumption’. The book instead argues for a recognition of ‘the very
unevenness lived by all societies, both the putatively advanced and the back-
ward, as a condition of fulfilling capital’s law of accumulation’,217 expressed
in Marx’s concept of ‘formal subsumption’. The simple heuristic of disavow-
ing Marx’s concept of real subsumption and substituting it with that of formal
subsumption in order to avoid Western Marxism’s alleged one-sidedness and
its ‘abandonment of a meticulous historical materialism founded on a close
216 With the term ‘Western Marxism’ – introduced by Merleau-Ponty and subsequently used
by the Soviets to separate party line Marxism-Leninism from the ‘philosophical’ Hegelian
Marxist discourse initiated by Lukács – Harootunian refers to Marxist theory primarily
concerned with ideology and ‘cultural criticism’ contextualised within the problematic of
the value and the commodity form, hence ‘FrankfurtMarxism’with their special emphasis
on ‘circulation’. According to Harootunian, they ‘follow a homogeneous interpretative
strategy, founded on the presupposition of a unity based on geographical contiguity that
had long given up on the anticipated “withering of the state” or indeed the prospect of an
imminentworldwide social revolution for critical cultural analysis of capitalism’s domina-
tion of the social formation’. Harootunian 2015, p. 4.There are reasonable doubts regarding
this contention, which we hope to address in future publications. Harootunian’s conten-
tion, however, that ‘Western Marxism’ (i.e. the Frankfurt School and their intellectual
heirs) strived for a ‘progressive distancing from the economic for the cultural’ (p. 5) is
highly questionable, as studies in the Frankfurt School’s reception of Marx and the Cri-
tique of Political Economy have shown (see Behrens 2005, Braunstein 2011).
217 Harootunian 2015, pp. 4–5.
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investigation of specific and often singular contexts’218 forms Harootunian’s
overall argument. Formal subsumption, used as analytical category to under-
stand the (geographically) different trajectories that subsumptionof labourhas
taken, serves, among other things, to ‘widen(s) the angle of vision to include
the world beyondWestern Europe’.219 The appeal of the concept of formal sub-
sumption consists in ‘a way out of both the vulgate Marxian and modernising
bourgeois historical narratives constrained to fulfilling teleologically determ-
ined agendas of capitalism that have the unfolding of a singular trajectory
everywhere’.220 It is not clear which ‘vulgateMarxian’ historical narratives Har-
ootunian refers to, since he provides no references. As Harootunian claims,
Marxists like those in the Frankfurt School tradition and their intellectual heirs
(Hans-Georg Backhaus, among others) can be said to be guilty of a more ser-
ious offense, namely, in ‘their patient desire for the accomplishment of real
subsumption’ to not acknowledge the ‘great unevenness’ existing in different
geographical areas in the course of time and the expansion of capitalism, as
there are instances of the past ‘mingling with the present’, the ‘residual traces
that embodied untimely temporalities announcing their unevenness and dif-
ference’.221
The major irritation to the reader is to be found in Harootunian’s judgment
that the full capital relation, comprised in the analytical concept of real sub-
sumption, has not prevailed as the social form that dominates economic life
on a global scale. In other words, the capital relation described by the term
of real subsumption, in reality and globally, has not been completed. Hence,
the concept of ‘real subsumption’ only points to a theoreticalmodel that bears
no significance for the real historical diversity to be found in the ‘different his-
torical temporalities’ and the ‘synchronous nonsynchronisms’ (Ernst Bloch)
Harootunian finds represented in the concept of formal subsumption: ‘Marx
has posited the achievement of real subsumption as a model, perhaps as a
proto-ideal type that envisions the possible realization and completion of the
commodity relation in an as yet unreached future, in a last instance that never
comes’.222 As we have seen, quite the opposite is true –De te fabula narratur! –
if we look at the evidence in Marx. What is more bizarre, however, is Har-
ootunian’s underlying assumption that real subsumption may have some jus-
tification as a hypothetical model, but cannot be used as a template to analyse
218 Harootunian 2015, p. 5.
219 Harootunian 2015, p. 9.
220 Harootunian 2015, p. 19.
221 Harootunian 2015, pp. 17–18.
222 Harootunian 2015, p. 8.
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the present – not even the ‘past in the present’. As though the obvious empir-
ical evidence indicating the actual completion of the commodity form on a
global scale were a far-fetched, even absurd, illusion, Harootunian expatiates:
‘Whether Marx actually believed capital would ultimately realize the comple-
tion of the commodity relation … is hard to say. What seems certain is that he
needed sucha concept inorder topresent capitalismas a completed totality’.223
Indeed, forHarootunian, the ‘claimof capitalism’s inevitable completion every-
where’ is ‘illusory’. Allegedly, it is formal, not real subsumption thatmore accur-
ately theorises ‘the constant interaction of coexisting times and practices in a
ceaseless process that might lead to the final realization of capital but probably
not everywhere’.224 The remnants of the past in the present – outdatedmodes of
production existing alongside new technologies, but also religious and cultural
practices etc. – in Harootunian’s view hamper the ‘Western European’ export
of the capital relation to distant parts of the earth where the ‘old’ prevails and,
as Harootunian suggests in an astonishing argumentative move, the process
of expropriation and exploitation may not have exerted such a ‘harsh’ impact
on the particular social edifice found in regions of uneven development (pace
colonialism!):
In a sense, it is possible to argue that the undisturbed accompaniment of
older modes of work and tools, along with customs and religious beliefs
that were seen as vital to or indistinguishable from work, may very well
have blunted the direct consequences of both expropriation and exploit-
ation or masked their harshness and contributed to delaying the realiz-
ation of real subsumption. A good deal of agricultural practices in Japan
carried associations of work and Shintō beliefs well into the Meiji period
and probably beyond … And we know that even in post-War Japan, firms
and companies recruited Zen Buddhism to inculcate a sense of ‘spir-
itual’ discipline into employees designed to reinforce their work perform-
ance.225
To support his view that the violent process of primitive accumulation Marx
describes so vividly in the Grundrisse and in Capital did not exert its savage
powers so cruelly in late developers like Japan, or had been avoided completely,
Harootunian leans on Uno’s reflections in the work Outlines to the Agrarian
Question (Nōgyō mondai jōron, 1965), published shortly after the Methodology.
223 Ibid.
224 Harootunian 2015, p. 18. Emphasis added.
225 Harootunian 2015, p. 62.
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Here, Uno discusses the import of the capitalist production mode and its par-
ticular effects on agrarian production and the social edifice of rural Japan after
the Meiji restoration. Uno was interested in theorising ‘late development’ as
being especially significant in agrarianproduction that stillmadeup65percent
of the national net product in 1900.226 But the agrarian sector did not undergo
a process of ‘enclosures’ and the expropriation of the small scale farmers (that
made up more than half of the Japanese populace), so that the farming sec-
tor did not only come out of the capitalisation process relatively unscathed,
but constituted a means of promotion for capitalism’s self-implementation:
‘Agriculture that remainedwithin the sphere of production of direct consumer
items such as grains lingered in its prior form and was only gradually invaded
by capital as it assisted the process of reproduction of capitalism’.227 The vil-
lage therefore ‘remained committed to “small-scale agricultural production” in
contrast to the appearance of large-scale industrial enterprises in the cities and
provided the recruiting ground for male (?) and child labor when urban indus-
trialization required it’.228Hence, forHarootunian, primitive accumulationhad
been ‘bypassed’ in Japan, which initiated a development of unevenness and
verified that, although older relations of production were no longer directly
involved, the ‘ “influences” of the remnant still constituted a primary factor in
the development of productive power’.229 In other words, acknowledging the
Japanese development, exempted from ‘real subsumption’, could give clues as
to how capital ‘intentionally’ left the priormedieval village intact, ‘delaying the
alienation of large numbers of peasants from their means of subsistence’.230
Yet, against Harootunian’s verdict, one should not lose sight of the empirical
and historical: the development of rapidmodernisation and the release of land
from the feudal han-system that went hand in hand with the dissolution of
the bushi as a class, lifted the prohibition of the purchase and sale of agricul-
tural land, so that, to the contrary, ‘the erosion of themedieval agrarian village’
indeed took place and, like in England and greater parts of Europe before,
226 See Furihata 1987, p. 76. Furihata points out that the silk and the cotton manufacturing
industries made up the majority. More than half of Japan’s populace consisted of small-
scale farmers, most of these in turn produced rice and silk worms. The raw silk extracted
from this process had been nearly completely exported to the United States, so that the
export revenues could in turn be used to import raw cotton. ‘… the processing of raw cot-
ton and the export of manufactured cotton goods formed the most important activity of
capitalist enterprises’ in Japan’s Meiji period. Furihata 1987, p. 77.
227 Uno 1974 [1947], p. 41. Quoted in Harootunian 2015, p. 190.
228 Harootunian 2015.p. 190.
229 Harootunian 2015, p. 187.
230 Harootunian 2015, p. 186.
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generated a whole new class of ‘free’ wage workers. Harootunian’s verdict that
primitive accumulation has been ‘bypassed’ in Japan is counterfactual.231
In the case of Japan, the new proletariat was incorporated into the two
emerging new industries that would mark Japan’s economic success on the
globalised world market at the dawn of the imperialist age: silk and cotton
manufacturing industries (women and children) and the mining and heavy
metal industries (men). However, Uno was less interested in the details of the
‘formal subsumption’ process in the uneven development of Japanese capit-
alism as an object of economic analysis, as Harootunian believes, than in the
‘preservation and continuation of the form of older precapitalist practices and
ways of thinking that had taken command over time’ beyond the economic
sphere, including ‘areas of social and cultural life dominated by the involun-
tary interaction of conscious life and the force of other, unconscious habits and
modes of behaviour’.232Whilewe find the culturalist assumptions bordering on
(self-)orientalising schemes of explanation in this assessment problematic, it
is less Uno’s than Harootunian’s own specific disposition that is to be detected
here.
More rewarding than the probable culturalist consequences one may draw
from Harootunian’s interpretation is a look at the specific uses and misuses
of Marx’s terminology and theorisation of ‘real and formal subsumption’. As a
matter of fact, theorising late development does not preclude specific usages of
Marx’s terminology, quite to the contrary: a fruitful application of Marx’s theory
could imply a ‘creative’ way to deal with his categories when it is productive of
cognitive gain.The creative usage of Marx’s conceptualisations however should
be asked to meet the requirement of at least attempting to grasp Marx’s spe-
cific intervention. It could further be enhanced bymeetingMarx’s ownmethod
at eye level. This however implies the identification of the object of critique,
namely socialisation under the directive of the full operation of the capitalist
mode of production. However, as I will show, Harootunian neither meets this
requirement, nor seems to be particularly interested in recapitulating Marx’s
specific Problemstellung.Whatwe find inHarootunian’s theoretical approach is
that the meaning of real subsumption instead turns into the real subsumption
of meaning, irrespective of whether we have Marx’s conceptual framework or
231 For reasons of space, we consider it sufficient to point to the vast literature on the capit-
alisation of Japanese agriculture and the introduction of the factory system in the Meiji
period. See Saitō 1986; Toby 1991; Brandt 1993; Francks 2005; Marcon 2014; Smith 1986. I
thank Raji C. Steineck for his help with evaluating the literature.
232 Harootunian 2015, p. 192.
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the target of Marx’s critique in mind. We contend that Harootunian’s project
of ‘deprovincialising Marx’ against the postcolonial attempt to delegitimise
or ‘provincialise’ Marx becomes itself an unwitting attempt at Marx’s ‘provin-
cialisation’, in that it not only counterfactually mobilises formal against real
subsumption – in direct opposition to Marx – but makes the reference to
Marx’s central theoretical question about the operation of not only how capital
produces, but how it produces itself – the very definition of what the heur-
istic of real subsumption that Marx devotes the analysis of Capital to clarify-
ing – redundant. Because if the central question surrounding Marx’s project
is expurgated from the research programme, then another question suggests
itself immediately: why draw on Marx at all? The apparent non-applicability
and insignificance of Marx’s intervention for Harootunian’s ends (of which he
seems little aware) seems a far greater concession to Marx’s ‘provincialisation’
than the postcolonial project which at least recognises the theoretical fertility
of Marx’s intervention. As wewill see, the eschewal of Marx’s principal interest
in the conceptual interrelation of real subsumption, value and the develop-
ment of the forces of production on a systematic global scale, is due to a use
value-fetishistic hyperbole that Harootunian, like other authors discussed in
this chapter, mobilises against the value form. As I will show, this strategy also
betrays Harootunian’s neoliberal agenda, which downplays actual human suf-
fering effected by the global implementation of the law of value.
Again, as shown throughout this volume, the realm of use value, which Har-
ootunian mobilises as the space ‘mitigating’ the sphere of the valorisation, is
beside the point for capitalist production. And if it is true that an imagined
‘use-value space’ allegedly hampers the ‘completion of the commodity relation’
which ‘trumpet(s) the triumph of capitalism’, as Harootunian thinks, then it
does so only in order to present another barrier for the realisation of surplus
value, which must be overcome. This is what the analysis of the production of
relative surplus value, corresponding to the real subsumption of labour under
capital, signifies. With the breakdown of the barriers to the appropriation of
unpaid labour, also the legal and extra-economic barriers increasingly vanish.
As Marx neatly illustrates in this passage from the ‘Results of the Immediate
Process of Production’,
… on the one hand, [capital] creates means by which to overcome ob-
stacles that spring from the nature of production itself, and on the other
hand, with the development of the mode of production peculiar to itself,
it eliminates all the legal and extra-economic impediments to its free-
dom of movement in the different spheres of production. Above all, it
overturns all the legal and traditional barriers that would prevent it from
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buying this or that kind of labour-power as it sees fit, or from appropriat-
ing this or that kind of labour.233
What characterises capital is its indifference towards the particular ‘forms of the
labour process it acquires’,234 once real subsumption is enacted.The talk of ‘sin-
gular contexts’ (understood in terms of national/regional unevenness) barely
conceals the commentator’s desideratum of ‘preserving’ intact and innocent
spaces, ‘untouched’ by the capital relation, preserved in the notional sphere of
formal subsumption, concrete labour and use value.235 Against this unabashed
ideological, moralistically motivated rejection of real subsumption, we will
present a radically different reading of real subsumption that focuses on real
subsumption as a methodological heuristic indicating the ‘completed’ fetish-
isation of the capital relation. We will show that real subsumption 1) presents
a critical category directed against the ‘fetishism of the political economists’,
2) forms not only the incentive, but the actual object of Marx’s analysis of the
capitalist mode of production, and 3), by directly corresponding to the produc-
tion of relative surplus value, allows us to conceptually confront the mechan-
ism that effects the dominance and perseverance of capital on a global scale,
the ‘overcoming’ of any obstacle, economic or political, that may impede the
appropriation of unpaid surplus labour. As against formal subsumption, real
subsumption then indicates a methodological tool for deciphering the con-
text of fetishism and the increasingmystification of the capital relation, which
the present work highlights as the crucial aspect in Marx’s Critique of Polit-
ical Economy. Contrary to what Harootunian believes, it is formal, not real
subsumption that serves as no more than a preliminary ‘hypothetical model’,
lacking the form determination of capitalist reproduction that only real sub-
sumption– indicating the self-reproductive subsumptionof wage labourunder
capital implied by the production of relative suplus value – can offer.
233 Marx 1976, p. 1013.
234 Ibid.
235 Steineck correctly points to the theoretical consequences of such a view: ‘[Harootunian]
believes that there exists, in capitalism, spheres of purely concrete labour, in which pre-
capitalist formations of the metabolism of human beings with their environment remain
intact. In other words, he succumbs to an essentialism of the concrete that is also the hall-
mark of the fetishism of use value – meaning the identification of the production of use
values as the ultimate goal of capitalist production and the concomitant glorification of
concrete labour and its products over and against abstract labour and money. This is no
minormistake, because it is precisely the elevation of use value that consistently supports
reactionary anti-capitalism’. Steineck 2017, p. 1344.
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5.3.1 TheMeaning of Real Subsumption i: Against the ‘Capital Fetish’ of
Conventional Political Economy
Formal and real subsumption, as the two heuristic-interpretative diagnoses
corresponding to the production of absolute, and, respectively, the production
of relative surplus value and their inner relation,236 are clearly defined in their
loci classici in Capital (parts 3–5) and the ‘Results of the Immediate Process
of Production’, a chapter initially included as Chapter Six, but then discarded
from the third draft of Capital, the 1863–5Manuscript.237 However, the ‘Results’
offer a rich, if very dense, summary of what Marx thought was crucial about
both the immediate effect of the capitalistmode of production – that ‘capitalist
production’ is first and foremost ‘the production of surplus value’, as one sec-
tion title asserts – as well as what the bourgeois ‘interpreters’ in their ahistoric,
generalising, and hence, fetishistic approach to capital missed about capital’s
specific social form. The significance of the analysis of the general features of
capital is on a par with the critique of its fetishism in the political economists.
With the concepts of formal and real subsumption in the context of this debate,
the ‘Results’ are therefore a useful source for analysing the impetusMarx inten-
ded with these heuristic concepts. Here, we can immediately discern that the
conceptual distinction between formal and real subsumption is decisive for
grasping different levels of abstraction concerning the object in question (i.e.,
the capitalist mode of production). This impetus remained completely beyond
the scope of classical and vulgar political economy.The importance of different
levels of abstraction is evident from Marx’s explication that formal subsump-
tion ‘is the general form of every capitalist process of production’, while it can
be found as a ‘particular form alongside the specifically capitalist mode of pro-
duction’.238 While the specifically capitalist mode of production requires the
formal and general characteristics of the formal subsumption of labour under
capital, the reverse does not hold (i.e. formal subsumption exists, or rather, exis-
ted in the absence of the specifically capitalistmode of production). In the view
of historical succession which Marx points at throughout the chapter, formal
subsumption corresponds to ‘an earlier state of independence’239 of the direct
236 Marx more specifically distinguishes between four types of subsumption: formal, real,
hybrid, and ideal. For a detailed discussion of the latter two, see Murray 2004, pp. 263–
66. For reasons of space, they cannot and need not be presented for the purpose of the
present chapter.
237 For the locus of the ‘Results’ in the structure of Capital, see Antonowa 1982. For the wider
context of the ‘Results’ in Marx’s work, see Napoleoni 1974, pp. 108–18.
238 Marx 1976, p. 1019.
239 Marx 1976, p. 1028.
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producers (self-sustaining peasants, farmerswho only pay a rent on their direct
produce, rural or domestic secondary industry, independent handicraft), with
labour being subsumed under the directive that it produce surplus-value, but
without yet a direct transformation of the labour process by technological
innovation of the means of production, and hence, changes of scale, for the
production of surplus value. We can therefore state that formal subsumption
remains at the level of a general and formal, merely social relation, whereas
real subsumption also indicates the incessantly dynamic transformation of the
material conditions of production which in turnmore radically transforms the
social relationship between capital and labour.
To understand how formal and real subsumption point to different levels
of the fetishisation of capital and the capital relation, we should first look at
their common features. The connecting thematic nexus between formal and
real subsumption is the unity of the labour and valorisation process that is spe-
cific to the capitalist mode of production. The capital fetish, the perception
of capital of being directly ‘fruit-bearing’, is a direct result of the valorisation
process itself, which Marx so rigorously describes in the ‘Results’ as the effect
of viewing the form determinations of capital’s use value (the means of pro-
duction, i.e., raw materials, auxiliary materials, means of labour, tools, etc.) in
abstraction from the historically specific social form they serve: namely, to be
means for the production of surplus value. Capital thus appears as a ‘necessary
feature of the human labour process as such’.240 This applies to both formal as
well as real subsumption. Formal subsumptionhowever cannot account for the
same degree of mystification as real subsumption, because it is necessarily lim-
ited to the production of absolute surplus value, and with it, the lengthening
of the working day and the proportional rise in the value of labour power, as
well as the proportional rise in the value of the commodity. In other words, the
relation between labour and value is still cogent; less labour employed in the
final product implies less value, more labour employed will result in a higher
value of the commodity. The source of value is not yet thoroughly mystified.
In real subsumption, however, the relation between labour and value is fully
obscured. With the production of relative surplus value, the development of
the forces of production and the devalorisation of labour power, the proportion
of labour in the final product – and the commodity is the immediate product
240 Marx 1976, p. 981. Marx counters the claim of the existence of capital as the ‘eternal law of
nature of human production’ with an impressively polemical comparison: ‘I could prove
with equal facility that the Greeks and Romans celebrated communion because they
drank wine and ate bread, and that the Turks sprinkle themselves daily with holy water
like Catholics because they wash themselves daily’, Marx 1976, p. 999.
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of the process of capitalist production – becomes smaller: work is increasingly
substituted for ‘technology’241 andmachines (‘capital’ in thebourgeois dictum),
profits ascribed to the ‘fruit-bearing’ power of the means of production, the
‘productive power’ of capital. In the capital fetish, the obfuscation of the rela-
tion between labour and value is completed. A propos the ‘productive powers
of capital’, Marx notes:
It does not appear as the productive power of labour, or even of that part
of it that is identical with capital.242 And least of all does it appear as the
productive power either of the individual worker or of the workers joined
together in the process of production. The mystification implicit in the
relations of capital as a whole is greatly intensified here, far beyond the
point it had reachedor couldhave reached in themerely formal subsump-
tion of labour under capital.243
Accordingly, formal and real subsumption correspond to different levels of
mystification of the value forms. Marx identifies formal subsumption by ‘the
takeover by capital of amodeof labour developedbefore the emergence of cap-
italist relations’, an ‘available, established labour process’, a ‘traditional estab-
lished labour process’ in which only ‘gradual consequences’ of that form of
subsumption of labour under capital can appear:244 ‘The work may become
more intensive, its durationmay be extended, it may becomemore continuous
under the eye of the interested capitalist, but in themselves these changes do
not affect the character of the actual labour process’.245 This is quite contrary
to ‘the specifically capitalist mode of production’246 – the production of relat-
ive surplus value: ‘[The] latter not only transforms the situations of the various
agents of production, it also revolutionizes their actual mode of labour and the
real nature of the labour process as a whole’.247
241 In contradistinction to ‘Technik’, Bellofiore, drawing onGuidoFrison, notes that ‘Technolo-
gie defines the potential relationships between labour power and itsmeans, so it is strictly
related to innovation … it is one of the many examples of the fetish character of capital
(in this case, the immediate process of production) leading to fetishism: the social powers
created by capital, which are effective, are attributed to things as such (here, themeans of
production), and not to a specific social relation’. Bellofiore 2018, p. 373.
242 By the labour that is ‘identical with capital’, Marx presumably means dead labour.
243 Marx 1976, p. 1024.
244 Marx 1976, p. 1021. Original emphasis.
245 Marx 1976, p. 1021.
246 Marx 1976, p. 1021. Original emphasis.
247 Marx 1976, p. 1021. Original emphasis.
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What is interesting here is that Marx directly identifies the ‘specifically cap-
italist mode of production’ with the production of relative surplus value248
and explicitly distinguishes it from the production of absolute surplus value of
formal subsumption. In other words, wemay add, formal subsumptionmay be
a prerequisite for capitalist relations of production to arise249 (and the fertile
ground for themystification of capital); however, it is not itself specifically cap-
italist. Something else aside the mere subjugation of the labour process under
the directives of capital must happen in order for the real, for the specifically
capitalist mode of production to develop. What we can witness here is a clas-
sic case of the Hegelian ‘transformation of quantity into quality’, in that Marx
largely gives reasons attributable tomeasure, quantity and scale, i.e. the expan-
sion of the scale of production, i.e. large scale industry, the establishment of the
factory, etc. – in other words, a certain degree of the development of the forces of
production – so as to account for the emergence of real subsumption of labour
under capital, just as quantitative relations were a precondition for the emer-
gence of the formal subsumption against older modes of labour:
The distinction between labour formally subsumed under capital and
previous modes of labour becomes more apparent, the greater the in-
crease in the volume of capital employed by the individual capitalist, i.e.
the greater the increase in the number of workers employed by him at any
one time. Onlywith a certainminimumcapital does the capitalist cease to
be a worker himself and [begin] to concern himself entirely with direct-
ing work and organizing sales. And the real subsumption of labour under
capital, i.e. capitalist production proper, begins only when capital sums of
a certainmagnitude have directly taken over control of production, either
because themerchant turns into an industrial capitalist, or because larger
industrial capitalists have established themselves on the basis of formal
subsumption.250
248 In his critique of Derek Sayer, Murray emphasises this: ‘Sayer does not recognize that
Marx’s phrase “specifically capitalist production” is equivalent to production that has
undergone real subsumption’. Murray 2004 (ed. Bellofiore/Taylor), p. 251.
249 The ‘more completely’ the objective and subjective conditions of labour confront the
worker as capital – we will soon thematise this crucial aspect in greater detail – the ‘more
effectively the formal subsumption of labour under capital is accomplished, and this is
turn is the premiss and the precondition of its real subsumption’. Marx 1976, p. 1026. Ori-
ginal emphasis.
250 Marx 1976, p. 1027. Original emphasis.
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The choice of the plural – industrial capitalists – is not accidental. As we
have discussed at length in Chapter 4.3., it is only with competition that the
concept of themagnitude of value of socially necessary labour time receives its
full meaning, as well as its immediate appearance in the form of price (and the
notion of the existence of a single industrial capitalist makes little sense). We
have also seen that the ‘social value’ of the commodity no longer corresponds
to its ‘individual value’, because of the systematic and fetishistic distortion
induced by competitive suppliers in intrasectoral competition and technolo-
gical innovation. It is here that relative surplus value establishes itself as the
primary mode of the extraction of unpaid labour. Here, the price form allows
the individual capitalistwho first establishes cost-saving technological changes
(i.e., before other suppliers within the same branch of production do so) to sell
his commodities at a price above its social value. For Marx, ‘[with] the produc-
tion of relative surplus value the entire real form of production is altered and a
specifically capitalist form of production comes into being (at the technological
level, too)’.251
However, with the emergence of economies of scale, general wage depend-
ency comes into play. When the commodity form becomes the universal and
exclusive form of social reproduction, pushing back older forms of self-sub-
sistence, the wage form simultaneously arises as the universal and exclusive
possibility of workers’ reproduction. This is how the Umschlagen von Quant-
ität in Qualität is concretely enacted in the emergence of specifically capitalist
relations of production.
Consequently, it is the concept of real subsumption, not that of formal sub-
sumption, that formed the essential interest and motivation behind Marx’s
attempt to analyse not only the way that capital produces, but to describe how
the capital relation (re)produces itself by dynamically transforming the process
of technological and therefore also social production.
This is also more specifically the thematic of the ‘Process of Accumulation
of Capital’, Part 7 of Capital, and especially the chapter on ‘The Political Eco-
nomists’ Erroneous Conception of Reproduction on an Increasing Scale’, which
profoundly draws out the blind spots of classical political economy and its
failure to explain not only the origin of surplus, but how the surplus reinstan-
tiates the subsumption of labour under capital by the very process of capitalist
production itself. Real subsumption and the reproduction of the capital rela-
tion completely fall out of the framework of classical political economy.252 In that
sense, the analysis of the capital fetish and the concept of real subsumption
251 Marx 1976, p. 1024.
252 See e.g. ‘The Political Economists’ Erroneous conception of Reproduction on an Increas-
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serve the common goal of the critique of classical (and vulgar) political eco-
nomy, which Harootunian, like Uno, do not recognise as the first and foremost
function of Marx’s critical project.
The analogy of formal and real subsumption with simple and extended
reproduction, respectively, is striking. The production of absolute surplus value
can only ever be a limited form of production, due to the ‘natural limit’ of the
working day. In the presentation of reproduction in Part 7 of Capital Volume i,
as well as the Reproduction Schemes in Volume ii, Marx, for didactic reas-
ons, begins with simple reproduction. Simple reproduction however is only a
formal and general hypothetic model. It does not describe the actual capitalist
reproduction process, which cannot be anything other than reproduction on
an extended scale, reproduction yielding surplus value for the capitalist class.
Indeed, ‘[there] is no “simple” capitalist reproduction. Without self-expansion
capital is not capital, its circulatorymovement is, echoingHegel’s descriptionof
dialectical development, “a spiral, an expanding curve, not a simple circle” ’.253
Claudio Napoleoni confirms the analogy between the formal, general model of
simple reproductionwith formal subsumption, and the actual reproduction on
an extended scale with real subsumption:
Before the emergence of the capital relation, the goal of production was
not surplus value; production therefore took place within confined lim-
its. Now that the goal of production has clearly become surplus value and
it has no other determination than that of quantity, and the capitalist
has no other goal than augmenting this quantity, the labour process is,
so to speak, constrained by formal subsumption. While it remains the
same, it underlies the attempt to expand its scale, so that it can actu-
ally serve the specific goal of capitalist production, which consists in the
unlimited increase in surplus value. It is precisely this constraint of the
labour process which causes the transition from formal to real subsump-
tion, because at a certain point it becomes impossible to expand its scale
if it remains in the previous form.254
In other words, formal subsumption corresponds to a ‘general’ mode of the
subsumption of labour under capital. Here, however, the object, a process of
production, in which the value of labour power is constant, does not corres-
ing Scale’ (Marx 1976, p. 734), mainly targeting Ricardo and Smith’s schemes, which are
scrutinised again and more meticulously in Volume ii.
253 Sáenz de Sicilia 2016, p. 224. The author refers to the Grundrisse. See Marx 1973, p. 266.
254 Napoleoni 1974, p. 117.
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pond to its concept or ‘idea’, the maximal extraction of unpaid surplus labour.
This is a definite constraint to the aim and purpose of the capitalist mode of
production. Only with real subsumption and the production of relative sur-
plus value does the object correspond to its concept, in that only with the
devaluation of the value of labour power, and the potential extraction of infin-
ite quantities of surplus value, do we have the final ‘realisation of the ideal’
of capital’s self-valorisation. And this, as shown in Chapter 4.4., immediately
becomes the reason for capital’s crisis tendency, the inherent contradiction in
the law of value.
5.3.2 TheMeaning of Real Subsumption ii: The Capital Relation asMarx’s
Specific Object of Investigation
Hence it is formal, not real subsumption that serves as a ‘hypothetic model’
for analysing the actual conditions of capitalist reproduction, as a historical
precursor, but more significantly, as a rough approximation that still lacks
the specific form determinations of capitalist reproduction. The single most
important form determination of the real capitalist mode of production is,
however, the subsumption of labour under capital that is reproductive of itself,
i.e. not hinging on anything else but the process of production. This is provided
in the form determination of the wage. Wage dependency marks the differen-
tia specifica between the preliminary heuristic of formal against real (‘actually
implemented’) subsumption: ‘… the production of relative surplus-value com-
pletely revolutionizes the technical processes of labour and the groupings into
which society is divided’.255 In formal subsumption, with the ‘earlier state of
independence’ of the individual producers and reproduction on an even scale,
the dependence on the wage was peripheral. In real subsumption, the wage
relation becomes central. In fact, it becomes the single formdetermination that
fully expresses the transition of the objective conditions of production (means
of production) away from the direct producers towards the capitalist class –
and with it, also the subjective conditions of reproduction (means of subsist-
ence).Through the sole dominance of thewage form, the productionof relative
surplus value establishes itself as the confrontation between capital and labour
which is the object of Marx’s investigation (and not, e.g. the ‘hoarding of riches
in thehandsof the few’). Basedon theproductionof relative surplus-value, ‘and
simultaneously with it, the corresponding relations of production between the
various agents of production and above all, between the capitalist and thewage
255 Marx 1976, p. 645.
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labourer, come into being for the first time’.256 In his analysis of the production
of relative surplus value, Marx was finally able to determine the specific object
of critique, namely the systematic contradiction between the classes, between
capital and wage labour, or the capital relation:
Capitalist production therefore reproduces in the course of its own pro-
cess the separation between labour-power and the conditions of labour.
It thereby reproduces and perpetuates the conditions under which the
worker is exploited … It is no longer a mere accident that capitalist and
worker confront each other in the market as buyer and seller … The
capitalist process of production, therefore, seen as a total, connected
process, i.e. a process of reproduction, produces not only commodities,
not only surplus-value, but it also produces and reproduces the capital-
relation itself ; on the one hand the capitalist, on the other hand the wage
labourer.257
Hence the two different forms of the production of surplus value correspond to
two different forms of the subsumption of labour under capital, and not to, say,
two different forms of the ‘accumulation of wealth’. Because the production
of relative surplus value reproduces the capital relation itself, it indicates the
real, the total and absolute subordination of labour under capital, a relation, in
which the ‘object (Sache)’ corresponds to its ‘concept (Begriff )’, and the form
determination of the capital relation is complete. This is the object of Marx’s
investigation.
Let us briefly recapitulate, with Marx, how exactly the production of relat-
ive surplus value effects the reproduction of the capital relation. The ‘curtail-
ment’258 of necessary and,with it, the extension of surplus labour, onwhich the
production of relative surplus value rests, obviously entails a wage decrease for
the workers. Without a certain ‘standard of living’, however, the reproduction
of labour power proves to be difficult. Capital itself therefore must change the
conditions of production underwhich it can valorise itself. Production is trans-
formed under the auspices of velocity, efficiency, quantity of output – in short,
cost-saving administrative techniques and technologies.259 With the lowering
of production costs, especially in variable capital, and the intensified and/or
256 Marx 1976, p. 1024.
257 Marx 1976, p. 724. Emphasis added.
258 Marx 1976, p. 432.
259 These are the subject of every Business Administration Bachelor or Master degree pro-
gramme worldwide.
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extended use of constant capital, a bigger mass of commodities can be pro-
duced in a shorter period of time. At the same time, and by the same process,
the value of the commodities necessary for worker consumption260 decreases.
Insofar as the production of relative surplus value decreases the value of labour
power (the money wage), it also decreases the value of the commodities that
can be boughtwith it. The socially necessary labour time they contain becomes
smaller. By this dynamic, the subsistence of the working class has become dir-
ectly subordinate to the logic of capital. This is what is meant by the form
determination of wage: in its phenomenal form of abstract and general human
labour – money – it may be exchanged for any use value available on the mar-
ket, but it cannot present anything else than use values available on themarket,
again feeding into capital’s valorisation process. But if the value of the newly
produced commodities is lower, valorisation can only keep up with its own
imperative if a greater mass of commodities is being produced in a shorter
period of time – and, again, bought by the workers with their wage. With it,
working hours and days become longer, surplus labour and output increases.
The circle repeats itself. This process is inherent to the ‘constant revolutionising
of production’.
Bigger, not better, but faster, and more: it is this dynamic transformation of
the conditions of productionwhich spurs the development of the forces of pro-
duction.261 The means of choice for the capitalist class to lower the value of
labour power is the substitution of living for dead labour, i.e. the substitution
of labour for technical auxiliaries, advanced computerisation in the produc-
tion process, robotics, assistant systems, etc., today known as ‘digitalisation’.
Because the general division of private labour and the competition between
capitals, however, still dominate this mode of production – never mind the
stage of the development of the forces of production – every single capital
employed is viewed solely with regard to cost saving procedures – while every
single capitalist endeavours to achieve the most effective and potent valorisa-
tion of his capital. By no means the single capitalist consciously decides to
shorten necessary labour and lower the value of labour power, but ‘he con-
tributes towards increasing the general rate of surplus value only insofar as
he ultimately contributes to this result. The general and necessary tendencies
of capital must be distinguished from its forms of appearance’.262 As we have
260 Needless to say, not only consumer goods, but means of production as well ‘lose in value’.
261 Murray strangely puts the cart before the horse: ‘… the whole strategy of relative surplus-
value is to increase productivity in order to drive down the value of labour power’. Murray
2004, p. 262.
262 Marx 1976, p. 433.
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seen, it is precisely the capital fetish, i.e., the notion that the substitution of
living for dead labour enhances a more efficient valorisation, which is a form
of appearance, a fetish dominating capital’s self-perception and its prospective
survival strategies, regardless of its increasing inherent contradiction manifes-
ted in the crisis of valorisation. Yet, capital’s infinite ‘hunger for surplus labour’,
the shortening of necessary labour, the substitution of living for dead labour,
and the development of the forces of production is directly tied to the emer-
gence and consolidation of the capitalist mode of production as a class-based
social relation. Competition spurs ‘the individual capitalist … to seize the ini-
tiative’263 by shortening necessary and extending surplus labour through the
employmentof technological innovation; this in turn lowers the valueof labour
power, and finally the circle towards the consolidation of the class relation
is closed, because wage dependency is no longer an accidental social relation
between capital and labour, but its exclusive and solitary form.
However, just as obviously, this development is not a newone.Wagedepend-
ency is as old as the system of capitalist production itself. Looking at the history
of real subsumption, we can go back almost 300 years to find the same logic of
automatisation thatwe find today. Inmid-eighteenth-century France, engineer
and inventor Jacques de Vaucanson’s (1709–82) programme-controlled spin-
ningmachineshelped accelerate theproductionprocess and increased theout-
put level.264 Yet, for the capitalist class, the ‘flexibility’ of automated machines
was a desideratum in the early days of mass production, as it is one today:
[The development of automatons with higher flexibility] goes back as far
as the cylinders and wooden punch cards, which were used for machine
control systems in the 18th century. In the 1740s, the French clockmaker
and inventor Jacques Vaucanson developed the first programme-con-
trolled machine. He received an order by Louis xv to modernise the
French textile industry. Frustrated by the resistance of the weavers’ guild
of Lyon,265 he developed a weaving loom in which the textile pattern was
263 Marx 1976, p. 1023.
264 The prototype wasn’t used widely, but Joseph-Marie Jacquard’s optimised and elaborated
loom, based on Vaucanson’s original machine, was employed in textile production in the
aftermath of the French Revolution and the beginning of industrialisation, after a longer
period of unsuccessful resistance by France’s textile guilds. Allegedly, Jacquard cameupon
a destroyed specimen of Vaucanson’s machine which was kept at Napoléon Bonaparte’s
‘Conservatoire des arts et métiers’ in 1804. He used the parts for his own invention, which
first systematically applied the punch card system and became the cornerstone for auto-
mation in the production process.
265 In 1744, the weavers of Lyon did not expel Vaucanson because of his invention, but
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no longer crafted by humans, but by punch cards. Just like the pins on the
cylinder of a music box generate a melody, the punches in the wooden
plates guide the spinning needles and the thread’s different colours, to
craft a cloth whose pattern corresponded to that of the punch cards …
the weaving loom could now be operated without induction by the han-
dicraftsmen, which had hitherto determined the sequence of the multi-
coloured threads. Vaucanson … made their labour knowledge ‘machine-
readable’.266
In otherwords, even in its earliestmercantilist days, capitalist production could
not survive without a constant revolutionising of the mode of production, the
introduction of the newest techniques and technologies. Louis xv’s incent-
ive was the growing competition on the world market for sales, and in that
sense there is little to suggest a qualitative difference in motivation between
his enhanced production method of the early eighteenth century and China’s
mega-factories of today. In other words, capitalism without competition is
a contradictio in adiecto. Yet, in its general framework, formal subsumption
abstracts from market competition, and in doing so, it abstracts from general
wage dependency generated by the development of the productive forces. As
a general, abstract concept, it leaves the specific form determination of the sub-
sumption of labour under capital unconsidered.
It is clear from the greater bulk of passages in the ‘Results’ that Marx invites
a reading in which formal and real subsumption correspond to different his-
torical stages.267 Yet, when we consider the wider context of the discussion, it
is clearly embedded in a more theoretical and conceptual concern, the ‘mysti-
fication’ process of capital generated by its confrontation with labour. Hence,
Marx’s discussion of formal and real subsumption fundamentally concerns the
because, on the crown’s authority, he attempted to employ amore liberal trade and invest-
ment system. See Becker 2017, p. 213.
266 Becker 2017, pp. 43–4. Own translation.
267 See also Postone’s discussion on the emergence of abstract time inmedieval society, espe-
cially the cloth manufactures in Flanders: ‘Because workers were paid by the day, conflict
became focused on the length and definition of the work day. It seems that it was the
workerswho, at the beginning of the fourteenth century, demanded initially that thework
day be lengthened in order to increase their wages, which had declined in real value as a
result of the crisis [the economic crisis of textile industry in the late thirteenth century].
Very quickly however, the merchants seized upon the issue of the length of the work day
and tried to turn it to their advantage by regulating it more closely’. Postone 1993, p. 210.
Postone draws on Jacques Le Goff, ‘Labor Time in the ‘Crisis’ of the Fourteenth Century’,
in Time,Work and Culture in the Middle Ages, Chicago and London, 1980.
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increasingly persistent dominance of the capital fetish. Already with the emer-
gence of formal subsumption,
[the] mystification inherent in the capital-relation emerges … The value-
sustaining power of labour appears as the self-supporting power of cap-
ital; the value-creatingpowerof labour as the self-valorizingpowerof cap-
ital and, in general, in accordance with its concept, living labour appears
to be put to work by objectified labour.268
How the social creates the real mystification whose outcome is a technologic-
ally defined mode of production is the real concern of Marx’s discussion of
subsumption. When, in the heuristic of real subsumption, the technological
comes to dominate the social, things become persons, persons become things,
and the wage relation establishes itself as the sine qua non of reproduction, the
capital fetish is complete. With this framework, we must conclude that Har-
ootunian errs not only on the level of grasping the function of formal and real
subsumption as critical concepts, but he errs in believing that the framework of
formal subsumption meaningfully contributes to understanding the real and
actual workings of capitalist sociation on a global scale. We will shortly elu-
cidate this misunderstanding by pointing not only to the theoretical, but the
political perniciousness of Harootunian’s intervention following from his the-
oretical apotheosis of formal against real subsumption.
5.3.3 The Use Value-Fetishistic Hyperbole of Formal Subsumption
The critical function of Marx’s main work, Capital, as previously stated, is
already clear from the very first conceptual abstraction presented to us in the
value form of the commodity, this most complex, and by no means ‘simplest’
category that Marx utilises to deconstruct the fetishistic sphere of ‘simple
exchange’, as seen in Chapter 1. For already in the commodity, the contradic-
tion between value and use value implies a subsumption, as Sáenz de Sicilia
notices:
Capitalist social relations … involve the instauration of the commodity
as the elementary form of social wealth, a form whose value aspect stands
over and above the qualitative particularity of its use-value aspect and
subsumes it as a result of its subjection to commercial circulation.269
268 Marx 1976, p. 1021.
269 Sáenzde Sicilia 2016, p. 138.Unfortunately, in the latter part of the book, the author revokes
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The value aspect of the commodity, subsuming and subordinating use value,
has become the structuring force of capitalist production. The actual produc-
tion of relative surplus value, to which real subsumption and its techniques
of ‘constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the
relationsof production, andwith themthewhole relationsof society’270 corres-
pond, and of which the ‘digital revolution’, massive global technological recon-
struction, economies of scale, automatisation, the increasing substitution of
living labour for digitalised automatons and robots, etc. are direct expressions,
blatantly defies production of absolute surplus value and, with it, formal sub-
sumption. Formal subsumption, as we have seen, essentially assumes a con-
stant organic composition of capital, i.e. reproduction on an even scale.271
Formal subsumption is incompatible with specifically capitalist relations of
production. Today, it exists nowhere but in the mind of the theorist.
Indeed, a thorough critique of Marx’s category of real subsumption of labour
under capital would have to be formulated as a general critique of Marx’s ana-
lysis of the capital relation and the theory of social form on which it is based.
Such a critique would have to show that
the capitalist mode of production does not insist on a systematic sub-
sumption of living labour under the imperatives of the valorisation pro-
cess of capital, encroaching on the labour process, [itwouldhave to show]
that the class-form relation of the domination of capital is not constantly
being reproduced by the dynamic of capital growth, and that in its his-
his previous insights to claim that ‘Marx … brackets the independent existence of living
labour, reducing its reproduction to the functions it fulfils for the reproduction of capital
… But the “certain limits” … are crucial in opening the system to an independent qual-
itative dimension beyond capital’s unilateral control and direct interest, because whilst
the capitalist must cede a wage to the worker in order to ensure his or her reproduction,
they do not directly oversee that reproduction’. Ibid., p. 231. This is an illustrative example
for the confusion between the historically specific capitalist form determination of wage
(and its monetary expression) with a historically unspecific necessity for general human
reproduction. Sáenz de Sicilia overlooks that capitalist forms of consumption are confined
by the formdetermination of thewage, so that onemust ask towhat extentwemay speak of
an ‘independent existence of living labour’ under capitalist relations of production. Sáenz
de Sicilia’s argument seems to point in a direction similar to ‘feminist’ Social Reproduction
Theory and its problems that we have addressed previously.
270 As Marx and Engels famously declare in the Manifesto. Marx and Engels 1976 [1845–8],
p. 487.
271 ‘[Capital] finds in existence the actual production process – the particular mode of pro-
duction, and at the beginning it only subsumes it formally, without making any changes
in its specific technological character’. Marx and Engels 1988 [1861–3], p. 92.
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torical progress, capital did not transform the previous labourmodes and
labour forces according to forms necessitated by its need for expansion.
This would be tantamount to presenting evidence that the capital form
of value were not the organising and synthetisising principle of modern
bourgeois society.272
One may rightfully ask what motivates Harootunian’s intervention to taxo-
nomically subordinate the concept of real under that of formal subsumption.
We must return here to the problematic of the fetishism of use value that
informs most Uno-affiliated research. Here is precisely the second objection
to Harootunian’s project for the ‘recognition’ of uneven development, because,
strictly speaking and on the basis of the conceptual framework elaborated by
Marx, Harootunian contends that capitalism proper does not exist as a global
social system. For a writer working in the historical present, Harootunian’s
insistence on the ‘illusion’ that real subsumption should count as a social real-
ity is at best ignorant and, at worst, cynical – not only if we face the reality of
the hardship of billions of people who live under the conditions of capitalism
in its specifically globalised mode (which Harootunian strangely never refers
to). This denial of actually existing capitalism also coincideswith the neoliberal
agenda Harootunian unwittingly pursues. To be sure, if Harootunian’s claim is
that next to the ‘capitalist everyday’, there exist ‘other’, ‘hybrid’ forms,which sur-
vived as ‘remnants of the past’, this amounts to a truism. Harootunian’s claim,
however, is a stronger one: namely that the ‘hybrid forms’ – Zen Buddhism
in corporate activities, customs and religious beliefs – weaken the experience
of exploitation and the everyday grind in dependent wage labour. This claim
reads as if it had been taken from the catechism of corporate propaganda
(‘work-life-balance’), considering, for example, that Zen Buddhism in Japan-
ese corporations has not been able to mitigate the problem of karōshi (and
how, indeed, could it?).273 The karōshiphenomenonhowever is a direct and real
effect of real subsumption’s productionof relative surplus value in that capital’s
272 Schmiede 1988, p. 21. Own translation. Original emphasis.
273 One case of karōshi, proving the phenomenon no longer receives the media attention it
once had, has become public with the death of nhk reporter Miwa Sado in 2013, who
worked 159 hours overtime in a month. Companies have acknowledged that 93 cases of
suicide among their employees could be directly related to their workload in overtime
hours, which in all these cases were over 100 hours. In 2015, Abe has promised to cut over-
timeworkloads of more than 100 hours permonth and punish companieswhomade their
employers workmore. For a critical discussion of Abe’s work reforms, see https://apjjf.org/​
2017/23/Kojima.html (8March 2019). I’d like to thankProf.Dr.DavidChiavacci for pointing
this article out to me.
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appropriation of unpaid surplus labour has becomepotentially infinite, driving
employees to ‘work-onto-death’ and having to expect informal sanctions when
they do not. Harootunian’s confidence in the mitigating factors of ‘diverse cul-
tural practices’ and ‘religious beliefs’, categories of use value, cynically ignores
this actual and real implementation of the law of value in the fabric of eco-
nomic life. To claim that ‘singular contexts’, ‘uneven temporalities’ etc. weaken
‘the experience of exploitation’ does not change the fact that this amounts to
support for the euphemistic image neoliberalism likes to present of the real
capitalism which it ideologically and politically orchestrates. This is especially
clear where Harootunian attempts a critique of Marx’s analysis of real sub-
sumption, not only misrecognising the specific object of critique it establishes,
but confronting it with a conceptual catalogue allegedly indicating a ‘different’
agenda – the ‘archaic in the present’, ‘unevenness’, ‘untimeliness’ (yet the view
that capital had a specific ‘agenda’ remains Harootunian’s alone) – thus invit-
ing the view of use value as a possible field of political resistance to capital by
virtue of its alleged ‘externality’:
… Marx may have … understated the political consequences of recog-
nizing and mobilizing these spectral reminders of temporal unevenness,
untimeliness, and arrythmia in producing discordance, consequences
such as disturbing the homogenous linearity projected by the nation-
state busy promoting the claims of another kind of contemporaneity. For
these ‘ready-mades’, taken over and utilized in a different way, released
from the role they once played in modes of production that generated
them, were not completely emptied of their historicality but still indexed
the intimation of a time external to and dissimilar from capitalism, a
world where use-value and the non-differentiation of subject and object
still supposedly prevailed, bringingwith it possibilities for different forms
of political economy.274
However, categories of use value, mobilised as ‘arrythmia’ or ‘areas of life’ that
are not ‘fully subsumed’ by the capital relation (‘external’ to them) do not
hamper the hard interests of valorisation. ‘Cultural practices’ do not ‘weaken’
the ‘experience of exploitation’. Moreover, as a critical category, exploitation
is not an ‘experience’. This is precisely why it could become the secret to the
self-representations of alleged equivalent exchange. Harootunian’s empirical
hypostases miss Marx’s crucial analytical and critical intervention against cap-
274 Harootunian 2015, p. 55.
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ital’s self-definition. They cannot be empirically redeemed as they miss the
overall specificity of Marx’s method in relation to that of bourgeois political
economy’s empiricism.
Because of the fact that, by the process of really subsuming labour as a use
value-producing activity, capital renders value the ultimate and only goal of the
production process, the ongoing valorisation process is veritably indifferent275
to the ‘use-value space’ of cultural practices. It is indifferent to the fact that
Pakistani day labourers inDubai’s shipbuilding industry read theKoran, or that
Bangladeshi textile labourers perform Hindu rites, or that Chinese toy factory
slaveworkers,whenasked, name ‘Buddhism’ as their religionof choice – as long
as these practices do not hamper capital’s drive towards surplus value. Con-
sequently, Harootunian cynically ignores the conditions under which workers
in regions having undergone ‘uneven development’ live and suffer, with no
perspective for the future being one of the milder self-assessments. ‘Hybrid
forms of subsumption’ is the theorist’s euphemism for a reality in which work-
ers provide the ‘humanmaterial’ absorbed for capital’s valorisation process. At
the same time, and counter-intuitively, considering the strong emphasis Har-
ootunian puts on ‘uneven development’, his approach also ignores the effects of
globalisation. It is difficult to ignore real subsumption in the face of the reality
of child labourers in Africa’s Congo digging rare earths like cobalt and cassit-
erite as raw materials for the production of smart phones in China – not to
mention the anxiously anticipated effects of an even stronger globalised capit-
alism, manifested in political and economic tools such as Transatlantic trade
treaties like the ttip which mainly rely on real subsumption to perfect the
exploitation process. In view of his objective of ‘gaining access to the histor-
ically concrete’,276 Harootunian’s assessment that the commodity form has not
been completed everywhere becomes grotesque. His criticism of theorists who
‘fail to see what clearly is around and before them, everywhere: the persisting
traces of historical-temporal forms from the past, the shadowed silhouette of
“living labour”, and the ever present signals they emit of continuing uneven-
ness’,277 expresses not the slightest discernible theoretical or practical interest
in changing the conditions of the real capitalist predicament. To the contrary:
275 ‘Of course, the particularity of labour must correspond to the particular substance of
which a given capital consists; but since capital as such is indifferent to every particularity
of its substance, and exists not only as the totality of the same as the abstraction from all
its particularities, the labour which confronts it likewise subjectively has the same totality
and abstraction in itself ’. Marx 1973, p. 296. Original emphasis.
276 Harootunian 2015, p. 38.
277 Harootunian 2015, p. 68.
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this romanticising view of the ‘shadowed silhouette of “living labor” ’ betrays
his apologetic view to the capital’s subsumption mode.278 It delivers no con-
ceptual instrument to confront the actual conditions of our historical present.
Like the Anglophone Uno School’s approach to the analysis of the capitalist
relations of production,Harrootunian assumes an apologetic stance toward the
present. In this framework, capitalism is no longer a problem – in fact, a social
relation of production that must be overcome if humankind were to be free –
but an object of discourse to be viewedmore empathically, with more nuance,
more ‘diversely’. This is in line with the propaganda of neoliberalism, in which
the concept of ‘different capitalisms’ – another word for ‘singular contexts’ of
capital – serves to extenuate resistance andcritical actionagainst a clearly iden-
tified target of critique.
In sum, Harootunian’s theoretical hypostatisation of an alleged realm ‘out-
side’ of capital’s global dominance assumes a fetishistic attitude to the con-
ceptual circumference of use valuewhich it attempts to mobilise against value
as ‘the organising and synthetisising principle of modern bourgeois society’
(R. Schmiede), choosing to imitate the neoliberal impetus of highlighting the
‘mitigating effects’ of use value-mediated cultural practices and/or ‘remnants’
of ‘different temporalities’, thereby downplaying and ignoring human suffering
induced by the law of value.
Like the projects of Uno, of the value theorists of the post-Uno School, and
of Sekine andAlbritton, respectively, Harootunian presents a travesty of Marx’s
Critique of Political Economy. While the concessions to neoliberal tropes and
the apologetic stance they takemaybedue to academic necessities – and today,
the university is the neoliberal institution per se – their work presents a seri-
ous obstacle to an emancipatory struggle, which also always takes place in the
realm of theory.
5.3.4 The Fetishism of Use Value as the ‘Site of Resistance’
In his The Sublime Perversion of Capital. Marxist Theory and the Politics of His-
tory in Modern Japan, Gavin Walker posits a question directly relevant to our
own inquiry, namely whether Uno, decisively rejecting any consequences for a
278 As can also be detected in his pledge of allegiance to an underconsumptionist approach
to the phenomenon of crisis Harootunian identifies in the work of Rosa Luxemburg. Lux-
emburg’s insistence on an ‘outside’ to the capitalistically organised global work market,
as supply market for goods whose consumption becomes the condition of possibility for
capital’s valorisation and ‘extended reproduction’, indicating capital’s immanent break-
down, also fatally ignores that ‘the aim of capitalist production is never use-value’, i.e. is
never worker’s consumption. See Luxemburg. Also see Chapters 4.2., and especially 4.4.
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theory of revolution from the analysis of Capital ‘was not … also giving up on
Marx’s revolutionary project?’279 ForWalker, this questionmust be answered in
the negative, while we have seen in the previous that it is the inadequacy of the
categories by which Uno attempts to grasp the phenomenon of capital in con-
trast toMarx that already renders the object of critiqueUno addresses obscure.
In accordance with our analysis, it is little surprising then that Uno disrupts
pure theory from the question of revolution: capital, understood as a princip-
ally ‘self-regulating’ heaven, an equilibrium form of production which sees to
the satisfaction of social needs does not exactly urge one to call for an overcom-
ing of such a production form. InWalker’s interpretation, however, Uno offers
a ‘suspension that ruptures the apparently smooth cycle’ of capital, found in
the concept of the ‘(im)possibility of the commodification of labour power’ or
the ‘muri’ of capital which serves as capital’s site of resistance. The tenet of the
following critiquewill be to show,however, that a conceptual ‘apparatus’mobil-
ised against a particular predicament which is itself misconceived cannot help
but be itself a faultily constructed theoretical, and hence also political, claim.
In his work, Walker follows a unique, if not to say idiosyncratic approach:
rather than viewing Uno’s pure theory as a conceptualisation of the ‘general
normsof economic life’, asUno contends in the Introduction to the 1964 edition
of the Principles, Walker sees pure theory as capital’s ‘fantasy’: ‘Uno intervenes
in theory to show that capitalism can be systematized as a pure circuit: he calls
this internal dream or fantasy of capital “the world of principle”, or pure capit-
alism’ … Strictly speaking, this “world of principle” does not exist as such’.280
As we have seen, Uno’s ‘purification’, restructuring and condensation of the
analysis in Capital, completely evading the topos of the Critique of Political
Economy, is what is striking about Uno’s work, as it is responsible for the short-
comings we have analysed.Walker’s approach is not only different: he sees the
striking feature not so much in the ‘purification’ of the theory of capital, but
in the new positing of questions seemingly unrelated, but directly related to
the ‘general analysis’ of capital: the national and the agrarian question. Like in
Harootunian therefore, the agrarian question assumes a pivotal role inWalker’s
interpretationof pure theory. Let us see howWalker contextualises the agrarian
question in relation to the question of the inter-relation of history and logic
and the ‘paradoxical’ solution he offers in his interpretation of the ‘muri’ or the
‘(im)posssibility of the commodification of labour power’.
279 Walker 2016, p. 153.
280 Walker 2016, p. 164.
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In his essay ‘The World of Principle, or Pure Capitalism: Exteriority and
Suspension in Uno Kōzō’ (2012), Walker, like Harootunian, draws on Uno’s
Agrarian Question to indicate that the ‘transition’ from feudalism to capital-
ism in the nation-state of Japan did not occur ‘smoothly’. To the contrary, what
was perceived as ‘feudal remnants’ were not ‘remnants’ at all – they formed
auxiliary means and even vital presuppositions to the implementation of the
capitalist mode of production in Japan: ‘The debate on Japanese capitalism,
and therefore on the nature and location of the agrarian question in theory,
leads Uno to a seemingly paradoxical conclusion: that the so-called “feudal
remnants” were not in fact “remnants” of feudalism in the strong sense, that
is, obstacles or blocks on capital’s local deployment, but rather precisely the
opposite …’281
Unlike Harootunian, however, Walker has a specific philosophical interest
connected with Uno’s text that goes far beyond its being a mere interven-
tion in the debate on the evaluation of Japanese capitalism. In Walker’s view,
Uno’s historical understanding of capitalism is here interrelatedwith its logical
‘unfolding’ as presented in the theory of principles. The historical herein pro-
vides a key to situate the logic, and even exerts ‘a certain theoretical pressure on
the logical form of capital’s functioning: the role of the mechanisms or appar-
atuses that would allow for the development of this paradoxical relation [of
the historical and logical ‘impossibility’ of capital] in which what should be an
obstacle instead functions to buttress, to nurture, to support, to aid’.282
However, this ‘paradox’ becomes thematic inUno’s theorisation of the agrar-
ian question only in relation to the historically inexplicable ‘event’ (Badiou) of
the commodification of labour power – an event neither explicable by history,
nor by logic, but only as something forgotten within the apparatus of explica-
tion delivered by the means of capitalist logic itself, and hence a ‘nihil’ (muri)
of reason. Walker: ‘This is exactly how Uno will repeatedly disclose to us cap-
ital’s essential dementia, a dementia that should arrest or obstruct its function,
and yet through the formation and maintenance of these apparatuses, capital
will be able to overcome its own demented logic without resolving the “nihil of
reason” that characterizes its inner drive’.283 What could this possibly mean?
According to Walker, while the three-level method (or ‘schematic of three
levels of analysis’, as Walker prefers to call it) – designating the theory of pure
capitalism, the stage-theoretical analysis of capitalist development and the
‘conjunctural analysis of the immediate situation’ (genjō bunseki) – ‘seems at
281 Walker 2012, p. 20.
282 Walker 2012, p. 20.
283 Walker 2012, p. 20. Original Emphasis.
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first to exclude the historical from the “world of principle”, in fact Uno’s work
presupposes that this logical “world” is not a pure circle but a torus, a struc-
ture that constantly folds onto itself ’.284 Capital may present itself as a ‘per-
fect’, indeed, a ‘smooth’ circle, but Walker contends that the geometric fig-
ure of a torus would much better symbolise the ‘hidden’, indeed, the ‘forgot-
ten’ agenda of capitalist valorisation. In his explication, Walker puts special
emphasis on the conceptual oppositions of inside/outside (of capital’s logic,
respectively, history) andpresence/absence to concede thatUnohasworkedon
these oppositions so as to show the fundamentally ‘irrational’ or the ‘absence
of reason’ in attempts that explain the capitalist accumulation process as a
perfect circle. Capital’s self-instantiation, like the famous ‘course of love’ Marx
quotes fromShakespeare in the chapter on value-form analysis, ‘never does run
smooth’. Not only does capital for its self-functioning rely on a social relation
outside of its immediate grasp – the reproduction of labour power that takes
place in the sphere of consumption–, it also constantly suppresses its historical
condition of possibility, the absence of the original commodification of labour
power, in order to make its presence visible, according to Walker. Hence, with
his three levels of abstraction, Uno, according toWalker, has figured out a way,
or rather, a ‘weapon’, to show how the existence of capitalism can be grasped
as a social system that is in and out of itself, logically and historically, incom-
prehensible:
The analysis of ‘pure capitalism’ showsus thatwhilewe candetermine the
specifically logical drive of capital’s interior motion, the logical interior
itself is always paradoxically dependent on and coextensive with the his-
torical exterior for its conditions of interiority. This paradox is expressed
as the (im)possibility, the ‘nihil of reason’, ormuri of the commodification
of labor power, the Ur-Akt or arché of capital’s logic … when Uno argues,
for example, that logically the circuit of commodities andmoney is inter-
rupted by the consumption process and not by the production process,
he is pointing out the paradox that the historicity of social relations is
always-already suspending the pure and smooth circulation process.
But where is the ‘paradox’? To say that the consumption process constitutes
an ‘interruption’ to the logical process of circulation is not paradoxical. The
‘historical’ in this case may be external to the ‘logical’ process of valorisation,
but it is by no means ‘paradoxical’. To claim that a logical operation hinges on
factors it cannot provide itself may therefore question the status of its logicity,
284 Walker 2016, p. 153.
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but is itself neither self-referential,285 contradictory, a vicious circle, nor ‘para-
doxical.’ That logic and history may be constitutive for each other in order to
constitute a whole or to legitimise their own specific status only confirms the
status of their respective exteriority. Yet they are in no ‘paradoxical’ positon. A
paradox only appears in the logical procedure of a self-contradiction in a = ¬ a,
but the dependence of the logical on the historical does not indicate such a con-
tradiction. A paradox requires that one category contradicts itself, not another
one. These concepts simply designate two different categories. In other words,
the relation of the logical and the historical does not seem to be elucidated by
the conceptual apparatus Uno’s theory provides. Like in Albritton’s stage theor-
etical elaborations, both remain external to one another and require separate
theorisations. It is also implausible why the ‘interruption’ in the consumption
process of labour power should be categorised as a ‘historical’ event. Onemight
as well, and with greater plausibility, argue that the consumption process of
labour power belongs to the very logic of capitalist reproduction, asMarx does,
when he insists that ‘[it] is not the worker who buys the means of production
and subsistence, but themeans of subsistence that buy the worker to incorpor-
ate him into the means of production’.286We will return to this point soon.
Uno’s thesis that Japan’s feudal remnants served not as an obstacle, but as
a support for the newly emerging capitalist system here finds another ‘para-
doxical’ expression. According toWalker, for Uno the new economic order was
already at work ‘within’ capitalist social relations, as ‘a violence of the interior
of capitalist social relations’,287 namely in the role of the proletariat:
The rural village structure, which had formed the social basis of the
ancien régime, was thus seemingly dismantled through violence, yet at
the same time, this was also in fact an expression of the planned balancing
and harmonization [sic] of capitalist production. The pastures, expanded
to accommodate the goal of wool exports, offered raw materials to the
domestic wool industry, and the peasantry, expelled from the land in pre-
285 The paradigmof the paradox remains the classic ‘This sentence is false’, or the Epimenides
paradox according to which Epimenides, a Cretan, claims that ‘All Cretans are liars’.
286 Marx 1976, p. 1004. It is possibly the gravest mistranslation made throughout the Pen-
guin/nlr edition of Capital and its manuscripts: the original mega reads (in accord with
Marx’s argument at this point): ‘Es ist nicht der Arbeiter, der Lebensmittel und Produc-
tionsmittel kauft, sondern die Lebensmittel kaufen den Arbeiter, um ihn den Produc-
tionsmitteln einzuverleiben’. mega ii/4.2., p. 78. It should be the ‘means of subsistence
that buy the worker’, not, as in Livingstone’s translation, the ‘means of production that
buy the worker’.
287 Walker 2016, p. 156.
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cisely the same process, became the laboring proletariat, the force that
spurred on the capitalist industrialization of thewool and othermedieval
industries,whichwere at that point still beingmanaged and administered
on the level of simple handicrafts. Thus the emerging proletariat was itself
usedas apowerful force of pressure in order to forcibly subordinate the exist-
ing artisans to capital.288
Again, whatWalker here identifies as a ‘basic paradox’289 is not a paradox at all.
The proletariat emerged from the dissolution of the rural village structure
that constituted the ‘social basis of theancien régime’ whenproductionwas still
organised by peasants and artisans in domestic production in semi-dependent
relationships, i.e. individual producersmanufacturing goods in domestic, often
family labour, under the supervision of overseers. With industrialisation, this
kind of labour organisation was no longer possible: on its basis, peasants were
expelled from the land, the enclosure system established, and the proletariat
as the ‘free worker in the double sense’, i.e., the wage system emerged. This
process indeed did not happen ‘smoothly’, and it may well have been neces-
sary to use parts of the emerging proletariat to force (wage?) pressure on
the remaining artisans. However, this is not a ‘paradox’, but the specific form
of development that the emergence of the proletariat had assumed in early
sixteenth-century England. If anything, the new capitalist classes’ use of the
proletariat to ‘forcibly subordinate’ the artisans to capital, is a logical, not para-
doxical strategy. It helps them to subordinate production to production on
a greater scale, and therefore favours the conditions for the production of
greater amounts of surplus value. For the capitalists, this is quite a logical tac-
tic. In other words, just because a specific historical transition does not occur
‘smoothly’, does not imply its being ‘paradoxical’. In Walker’s – not so much
Uno’s – theorisation of original accumulation,we can detect a conceptual over-
reach of what it means for a certain historical development/logic to be ‘para-
doxical’.
The real point forWalker, however, is that capital utilises means and ‘appar-
atuses’ that make its historical conditions of production appear as part of cap-
ital’s logic, internal to it: ‘… capital not only encloses the outside while relying
on it but, more specifically, forces the outside to invert or reverse itself into
the inside; it “folds” the historical exterior “inside out” so that it can function as
288 Uno 1974 (ukc 8), pp. 24–5. Quoted in Walker 2016, p. 156. Italics Walker’s. ‘[Sic]’ the
author’s.
289 Walker 2016, p. 156.
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the putatively logical interior’.290 But hasn’tWalker just attempted to show that
capital in its historical unfolding relies on something always-already internal to
capital, namely, the ‘proletariat as pressure’, to mark this as the specific ‘basic
paradox’ of capital’s emergence? Is capital’s emergence the result of a force
from the ‘outside’ (‘history’), disguised as ‘its’ inside – or the result of something
‘always-already inside’ (the proletariat, used as pressure)? This is never clear in
Walker’s conceptualisation, and we are left in the dark as to what the ‘paradox
of inside and outside that obtains in the volatile amalgam of logic and history
in the form of capital in general’ is actually supposed to indicate, or what cog-
nitive gain it is supposed to provide.291
To be sure, to elucidate the ‘gaps of the supposedly perfect circle of capital’s
self-movement’292 is what motivates Walker’s intervention and his interpreta-
tion of Uno’smuri of the commodification of labour power.Walker viewsUno’s
three level-method as a ‘weapon’ or ‘device that is forcefully inserted or shoved
into the situation that bears the name “capital”. By ramming this weapon into
capital’s smooth self-definition, Uno attempts to see how capital behaveswhen
it is forced to disclose its essence, by being purified or determined in accord-
ance with a schema that disables capital’s own techniques of insinuation’.293
Herein, finally, consists the secret to Walker’s theoretical riddle, the ‘paradox’
of the apparatus that makes capital’s dependence on factors external to itself
seem as though it belonged to the internal logic of capital itself: it is the ‘ele-
mentary form of resistance’294 that results from the muri of the commodific-
ation of labour power. With the ‘historically contingent’ process of original or
primitive accumulation, the commodification of labour power presents itself
as this weapon of resistance, something defying incorporation into capital’s
logic, even if capital would have us think differently.
… the proletariat discovers that it has ‘nothing to lose but its chains’ only
through the experience of being divorced form the land in the process
of primitive accumulation and forcibly reconstituted as the owner of a
single thing: labor power that can be commodified. Through the inser-
tion of this labor-power commodity, the foundational input for capital’s
operation, the elementary form of resistance insinuates itself within the
interior (capital’s logic), and capital, in confronting the fact that it can-
290 Walker 2016, p. 158.
291 Walker 2016, p. 158.
292 Walker 2012, p. 164.
293 Walker 2012, p. 23.
294 Walker 2016, p. 168. Emphasis added.
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not itself produce this labor-power commodity, is forced to plug up its
own gaps with the material of this resistance. Thus the proletarian out-
side discovers for itself the openings for the project of communism only,
paradoxically, by being exposed to theweaknesses and limitations of cap-
ital from the inside: it is not a pure absence, but an ‘indiscernible’ element
that structures the exchange between interior and exterior.295
Again, there is no such thing as an ‘independent existence of living labour’
under capitalist relations of production. The muri of the commodification of
labour power cannot be upheld as the site of ‘rupture’ or ‘break’ (much less
‘resistance’) to the law of value, because it is itself constitutive of this very law.
Walker himself neatly illustrates this fact in his discussion of the term Um-
schlag, which Marx used to indicate the transition of the law of equivalent
exchange (between the labour power commodity and its exchange value) into
the law of appropriation (of the unpaid surplus value produced beyond the
exchange value of labour power):
This ‘inversion’ or ‘reversal’ [Umschlag] arises from the fact that the use
value of labour capacity, as value, is itself the value-creating element; the
substance of value, and the value-increasing substance … [The worker] is
absorbed and incarnated into the body of capital [wird er absorbiert vom
und inkarniert in das Kapital] as a cause [Ursache], as activity [Tätigkeit].
Thus the exchange turns into its opposite, and the laws of private prop-
erty… turn into theworker’s propertylessness and thedispossessionof his
labour [Eigentumslosigkeit des Arbeiters und Entäußerung seiner Arbeit],
[i.e.], the fact that he relates to it as alien property and vice versa.296
Because the use value of the commodity of labour power consists of living
labour, i.e. of the positing of exchange value, there is indeed an ‘inversion’
(Umschlag), asWalker notices, fromuse value to value, but also from value (the
monetary expression of the value of labour power) to use value. But it is pre-
cisely the quantitative difference between the value and the use value of the
labour power commodity, or the necessary and the surplus labour it performs,
that constitutes the conditio sine qua non of the capitalist production process.
In otherwords, this inversion orUmschlag from the law of equivalent exchange
295 Walker 2016, p. 168.
296 Marx 1987 (mecw 29), p. 64, quoted inWalker 2016, p. 177.
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to the law of appropriation in which the law of appropriation appears as the law
of equivalent exchange does not indicate any kind of ‘gap’ or ‘rupture’ within
the ‘smooth circle of capital’: it is the condition of possibility of capitalist social
relations, andwith it, the fetishistic gaze of its bourgeois interpreters.Marxwas
able to solve the riddle of the classical political economists by explaining the
source of surplus valueon thebasis of the lawof equivalent exchange.However,
he also explained that the use value of the labour power capacity quantitatively
(measured in socially necessary labour time) exceeds its value is the ‘luck’ of
the money owner,297 not a fraud. History does not impede the ‘smooth circle’,
if anything, it forces it. In fact, as soon as the commodity form has really sub-
sumed living labour under its own rationale, resistance cannot come from an
imagined, ‘as-of-yet-still-not-commodified’ space of use value. It is precisely the
process of production as the site of the valorisation process in which the sub-
sumption of use value under value is enacted. Hence the consumption process
of labour power is the production process of capital. There is no way that the
use value of labour power or in fact any other use value designates ‘freedom’
or ‘independence’ (as in the phrase ‘the independence of living labour’) from
the interests of the social relation in which it is embedded. What would such
an independence look like? Where should that place be? Capital has not ‘pre-
served spaces’ in terms of use value for the theorist to claim as his little patch
of land or ‘weapon’ to insert into its ‘supposedly perfect circle’. Any heuristic
of resistance or even revolution has to accept that such a view succumbs to
ideology. As we have seen in Chapter 2.2., living labour is a use value for cap-
ital only insofar as it is themediating activity of valorisation. Both the objective
(means of production) and subjective conditions of labour (means of subsist-
ence) confront the worker as capital.298 The means of subsistence he buys are
really subsumed into the logic of capital’s valorisation process, ‘to incorporate
him into themeans of production’. Resistance cannot come from the use value
dimensionof an alleged ‘free realm’ inwhich theworker can enact a supposedly
not-yet-commodified ‘will’ or ‘individuality’.
But if the aspect of use value is not the site of resistance to capital, thenwhat
is?
297 ‘In order to extract value out of the consumption of a commodity, our friend the money-
owner must be lucky enough to find within the sphere of circulation, on the market, a
commodity whose use-value possesses the peculiar property of being a source of value,
whose actual consumption is therefore itself an objectification [Vergegenständlichung] of
labour, hence a creation of value’. Marx 1976, p. 270.
298 Marx 1976, p. 1026.
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To answer, let us first summarise the problem of the hypostatisation of use
value as site of resistance we have found in bothWalker and in Harootunian, to
conclude our investigation with the contradiction (and not merely ‘paradox’)
of the capital relation itself.
The real stakes of the problem both in Harootunian’s and Walker’s ap-
proaches consist in their relianceon the assumption that capital hasnot perfec-
ted (‘really subsumed’) virtually all human social relations under its own logic
(a logic of Sachzwänge, ‘practical constraints’ or ‘necessities’), because we can
detect a failure, a rupture, a ‘gap’, to capital’s drive to self-valorisation in notions
of ‘formal subsumption’ (Harootunian) or ‘the nihil of reason/the muri or the
(im)possibility of labour power’ (Walker). As we have seen, both theorisations
are haunted by the spectre of resistance that the concept of use value seem-
ingly provides. Particularly Walker deduces this claim from the fact that the
labour power commodity has to reproduce itself in the sphere of consumption
in which capital’s circuit is allegedly interrupted. Here, the commodification of
labour power and its reproduction as a commodity becomes a ‘force’ against
capital, or amuri, an ‘impossibility’ in Uno’s view, for the perfect totality of the
production and reproduction process. Harootunian’s discourse is informed by
the same presumption. Despite his insistence on the importance of the site
of production, his discourse being informed by Luxemburg’s criticisms from
the viewpoint of (under)consumption, he also retreats to the positive effect he
concedes to use value against the completed value form of real subsumption.
This can also be seen in his romantic affiliation with the concept of ‘the free-
dom of living labour’ that he sees not as generating the exchange relation, but
as the ‘radical other’ of the ‘unfreedom’ generated by abstract labour. His cri-
tique of value form theory that allegedly ‘fail[s] to see what clearly is around
and before [it], everywhere: the persisting traces of historical-temporal forms
from the past, the shadowed silhouette of “living labour”, and the ever present
signals they emit of continuing unevenness’299 summons an empirical access
to the ‘immediacy’ of life that fails to meet the Marxian critique at eye level,
even at its most empirical. In this interpretation, living labour produces not
for value (and is appropriated without an equivalent through exchange), but
for use value that resists real subsumption into ‘even’ and singular trajectories,
confirmed by a nostalgic view of the present that defies the reality of the hard-
ship of billions of people in our historical time.
Moreover, both theorists more or less declare the sphere of circulation (or
‘consumption’) and the effects of use value as the site where capital collides
299 Harootunian 2015, p. 232 and p. 68.
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with its own limits and the sphere of production subaltern to their discourse:
‘… when Uno argues, for example, that logically the circuit of commodities
and money is interrupted by the consumption process and not by the produc-
tion process, he is pointing out the paradox that the historicity of social rela-
tions is always-already suspending the pure and smooth circulationprocess’.300
Second, this very understanding of the commodity andmoney forms – abstrac-
ted from their own conditions of possibility in the way in which production is
organised in capitalist societies – owes to a reading of Marx’s central concepts
that completely sidesteps the problemof the fetish in relation to value.Herewe
might even draw a wider circle to incorporate not only the direct heirs of the
Uno School, but also the post-Uno School of value theory in our critique. As we
have seen in Chapter 5.1., Ebitsuka and Mukai, by systematically rejecting the
importance of the substance of value in abstract labour, do not overcome the
theoretical circumference of the Baileyan nominalist view of value andmoney.
It is, however, precisely the rejection of the essential and grounding social rela-
tion – value as both a qualitative and quantitative determination – that renders
their explanation of exchange relations confined to the aspect of use value. This
is in line with their neoclassical argument of specific ‘wants’ of commodity
owners as the motivator for exchange relations whose Baileyan implications
we have already analysed in Uno.
Again, the ‘paradox’, ‘gap’, or ‘outside’ is not determined by the use value
aspect of capitalist sociation. If anything, it is determined by the logic of pro-
duction itself. This, we hold, is the real Verrücktheit – ‘derangedness’ or ‘dis-
placement’, in Walker’s idiom – that constitutes the irrationality of capital-
ism: the production of (surplus) value for the sake of surplus value under
conditions in which people suffer ‘from the dead’. It is this logic according
to which the production process of capital undermines and negates the ‘ori-
ginal sources (Springquellen) of its ownwealth’,301 the exploitation of Man and
nature, regardless of needs, that qualifies as ‘mad’ (verrückt). By no means can
use value, signifying the aspect of consumption or ‘specific wants’ or ‘needs’
of commodity owners, sidestep, evade, interrupt, or deliver any means of res-
istance against the principles of capital’s self-valorisation which is itself inher-
ently contradictory (and not just merely ‘paradoxical’). In the following, let us
elucidate the concept of use value fetishism and its lopsided view of the capital
relation to articulate a radically different locus of resistance to capital which
lies in the concept of capital, the law of value, itself.
300 Walker (2012), p. 16. Original emphasis.
301 Marx 1976, p. 638.
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In her epochal essay ‘Use Value Fetishism’ (‘Gebrauchswertfetischismus’)
(1993), Kornelia Hafner contends that use value as a category of ‘resistance and
revolt’, as can also be found in the works of Helmut Reinicke302 or Wolfgang
Pohrt,303 is often owed to a conflation of use value with the category of the
non-identical, as theorised by Adorno.304 The incommensurability of the non-
identical to the ‘concept’ (Begriff ) then functions as the theoretical model for
the same alleged incommensurability to be found in the relation between use
value and value, ‘use value’ being identifiedwith the non-identical or the ‘thing’
(Sache), ‘value’ with the concept (Begriff ). This equivocation however is lop-
sided and has its basis in the misrecognition of the Hegelian dialectic as a
‘philosophy of identity’. Moreover, in this strategy, the interpretation of the
non-identical as ‘moment of resistance’ becomes the directmodel for the hypo-
statisation of the sphere of use value as ‘resisting’ real subsumption. However,
the fact that the thing [Sache] is not absorbed in the concept [daß die
Sache im Begriff nicht aufgeht], even if it is made into the object of
thought, may for some be an ever new stimulus for a more pronounced
formation of thought while for others, who mistrust [thought] as a
stealthy agent of capital, this fact is a soothing reassurance that its reach
does not extend everywhere.
Yet, by no means is it an indication for the resistance [Widerständig-
keit] of use value in the sense of potential opposition [Gegenwehr], or
even revolutionary activity … Even if scientific knowledge [Erkenntnis]
has in themeantime actually beenmore or less subordinated to the valor-
isation interests of capital, the non-identical of an object does not consti-
tute its use value dimension. On the contrary: only as known is the object
available for use [erschliesst er sich dem Gebrauch].305
Similarly to Reinicke, who attempts to ‘reveal the history of the subversion of
the use value-side of the commodity’,306 the authors discussed here attempt to
mobilise a sphere ‘beyond’ value, ‘unsettling’ the ‘supposedly perfect circle of
capital’s self-movement’ to identify it in the ‘other’ of valorisation, in the ‘shad-
owed silhouette of living labour’ (Harootunian), or the consumption sphere




305 Hafner 1993, p. 69. My thanks to Eric-John Russell for helping with the translation.
306 Reinicke 1975, p. 22. Quoted in Hafner, p. 68.
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fetishising it as the site of ‘resistance’. Indeed, as we have seen in the discus-
sion of crisis in Chapter 4.4., use value does mark a boundary to capital, but
only insofar as it presents a ‘barrier’ [Schranke] in the Hegelian sense, i.e. only
as it makes its appearance as something always-already vanquished by capital
itself, inducing it to re-instantiate the production process on an extended scale
(incorporating new technologies, new labour processes and techniques, creat-
ing newareas of demand), until it again confronts newbarriers provided by the
sphere of use value, repeating the process of an evermore effective, intensified
and extended procedure for the extraction and appropriation of alien unpaid
surplus labour on a larger scale. In other words, use value is indeed an active
ingredient of the valorisation process in production, as we have seen, not only
on the side of the worker and the ‘productive consumption’ of labour power,
but also on the side of capital: ‘Capital has consumed its material with labour,
and its labour with material; it has consumed itself as use value’.307 But that
does not mean that use value can in any way function as an independent vari-
able within the production and valorisation process – and even less so in the
process of circulation or consumption:
Its [capital’s] consumption as use value therefore in this case falls within
circulation itself, or rather it itself posits the beginning of circulation or
its end, as one prefers. The consumption of the use value itself here falls
within the economic process, because the use value here is itself determ-
ined by exchange value. In no moment of the production process does
capital cease to be capital or value to be value, and, as such, exchange
value.308
Is resistance, then, impossible?We argue that it is impossible if we rely on the
‘revolutionary potential’ of the aspect of use value, torn from its interrelation
with the totality of the capital relation, fetishised as the ‘incommensurable’ and
hypostasised as capital’s alleged ‘other’, thereby regressing to the illusions of
bourgeois classical and vulgar political economy, which share the use value-
mediating impetus of social reproduction withmanymodernMarxist intellec-
tuals.
‘Since Marx’, Hafner argues in this context, ‘it is actually well known that if
one surrenders to this temptation [of de-contextualisation], one always only
evokes those fetishised forms whose penetration is the actual prerequisite for
307 Marx 1973, p. 311.
308 Marx 1973, p. 311.
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any political agency [politische Handlungsfähigkeit], which wants to be more
than just blind [blindwütige] reaction’.309 ‘Actual reality’ cannot be grasped in
themode of immediacy. The dilemmaof the attempts to conceive of capitalism
at eye level consists, as Hafner says, ‘in evoking mediation and simultaneously
severing it’.310
What directly follows is that mediation must remain the object as well as the
method of critique. Marx’s (labour) theory of value, the tool of that very medi-
ation, presents not only a deciphering method or the ‘Turing Bombe’ to con-
ventional political economy and its modern repercussions at the level of ‘pure’
theory. It is the critical force behind which revolutionary action can and must,
indeed, be generated. Precisely because capital is indifferent to the private cir-
cumstances by which labourers take care of reproducing their labour power311
and indifferent towards the specific relics of the past or ‘formal subsumption’
that still find theirway into the contemporaneous organisation of cultural life –
in sum, precisely because capital is indifferent to use value – the hypostatisa-
tion of this very realm of use value as site of resistance remains at the level of
capital’s own ‘self-image’, as a historical law of nature, whose aim is the satisfac-
tion of social needs. It remains ideological. However, capital is not indifferent
to the modes in which it can or cannot extract surplus labour, modes which it
shapes in its own image. It is here that resistance must occur. This is the main
309 Hafner 1993, p. 82. Emphasis added.
310 Hafner 1993, p. 82. Emphasis added.
311 In this sense, M. Lebowitz errs doubly when he identifies a ‘one-sided Marxism’ result-
ing from ‘the absence of the examination of the part of workers’ struggles in shaping
the course of the development of capitalism …’ Lebowitz 2003 [1992], p. 121. For one, he
misrecognises the methodological centrality (despite his insistence on the importance of
method) of value’s real abstraction, inimitably expressed in Alfred Schmidt’s commentary
that ‘The one-sidedness idealistically lamented as “economism” … is an abstraction not
performed by the theorist, but by social reality’ (Schmidt 1968, p. 33). As argued before,
the demand for acknowledging ‘the goals of workers’, private (i.e. non-economic) repro-
duction, etc. loses sight of the specificity of the capital relation, for its is precisely the
‘dominance of abstraction’ (money) which is capital’s distinguishing feature as it consti-
tutes the target of critique. Second, Marx was more than aware that resistance to capital
has no other source than workers’ struggle, and that, where the length of the working day
became a question of equal rights, ‘force’, i.e. class struggle, ‘decides’ (Marx 1976, p. 344).
But the proof of the ‘righteousness’ of capital’s claim to the full product of the labour
process – precisely what should instantiate workers’ struggle – does not result from work-
ers’ struggle itself. To the contrary: Marx’s non-empirical analysis of capital’s ‘self-image’,
to remain in the present idiom, is the precondition for a meaningful organisation of class
struggle.
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lesson to be drawn from reading Capital. Capital and Marx’s other economy-
critical writings therefore do not ‘suggest’ revolutionary action. They comprise
the theory of revolution:
It becomes clear that, when Marx hoped for the revolutionising of soci-
ety, he did not think of natural-sensual qualities and needs, but of the
explosive force of social relations themselves, the collapse of a mode of
production based on exchange value due to its own contradictions.312
Indeed:
Capital is destructive towards, and constantly revolutionises, all this, tear-
ing down all barriers which impede the development of the productive
forces. The extension of the range of needs, the differentiation of pro-
duction, and the exploitation and exchange of all natural and spiritual
powers.
But from the fact that capital posits every such limit as a barrier which
it has ideally already overcome, it does not at all follow that capital has
really overcome it; and since every such limit contradicts the determ-
ination of capital, its production is subject to contradictions which are
constantly overcome but just as constantly posited. Moreover, the uni-
versality for which capital ceaselessly strives, comes up against barriers
in capital’s own nature, barriers which at a certain stage of its develop-
ment will allow it to be recognised as being itself the greatest barrier in
the way of this tendency, and will therefore drive towards its transcend-
ence through itself.313
UnoKōzō’s rejectionof Capital as a revolutionary theory – or rather, as thework
that paradigmatically establishes the link between epistemology and social
theory – along with his reluctance to posit the problem of the fetishism as the
central problemof the capitalist ‘self-image’, instead relying on an alleged ‘muri’
of capital in the sphere of use value mediation, in short, his theory of value
without fetish, thereby makes itself accomplice to the very logic it attempts to
undermine.
But it is precisely this gap which is illusory: capital does not produce for the
satisfaction of needs, it produces for profit. As long as the circle consists in this
312 Hafner 1993, p. 73.
313 Marx 1986 [1857–61], p. 337.
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theoretically simple, yet, for some theorists, evasive fact, along with the global
and deadly success of real subsumption that exposes its horrible grimace to us,
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